Georgia Prince Hall Masons Open Legal Defense Special Fund Raising Drive with $6,500

    No. 92-825

I n  T h e

Supreme Court of tlje Umteb S tates
O c t o b e r  T e r m  1992

A n t h o n y  T . L e e , et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

T a l l a d e g a  C o u n t y  B o a r d  o f  E d u c a t io n , et al,

AND

U n it e d  St a t e s  o f  A m e r ic a

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO BRIEFS IN 
OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

C l e o p h u s  T h o m a s , J r . 
P.O. Box 2303 
Anniston, AL 36202 
(205) 236-1240

*Counsel o f Record

E l a in e  R . J o n e s  
N o r m a n  J. C h a c h k in  
99 Hudson Street,
16th Floor
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

J a n e l l  M . B y r d  
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-1300



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Board o f Education o f Oklahoma City Public
Schools v. Dowell, _  U.S. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991)___  2

Georgia State Conference o f Branches o f NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985) ....................... .. 3

United States v. Board o f Education o f
Jackson County, 794 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1986 )..............  3

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No. 92-825

I n  T h e

Supreme Court ot ttje Mmteb ikateg
O c t o b e r  T e r m  1992

A n t h o n y  T . L e e , et al.,

v.
Petitioners,

T a l l a d e g a  C o u n t y  B o a r d  o f  E d u c a t io n , et al. ,

AND

U n it e d  St a t e s  o f  A m e r ic a

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO BRIEFS IN 
OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

Respondents’ opposition briefs fail to address 
adequately the fact that the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled as a matter of law that existing 
injunctive decrees in this school desegregation case were 
implicitly vacated when the district court used the term 
"unitary status" in an order dismissing the case. The court 
below stated:

By operation o f law, the orders enjoining the 
[School Board] were dissolved when the district



court declared that the school system had 
attained unitary status.

(App. 5a)(emphasis added).

[T]he district court found in March 1985 that 
the Talladega County School System had 
achieved unitary status. This finding implicitly 
dissolved the injunctions in effect at that time.

(App. 8a)(emphasis added, footnote omitted). The ruling 
below is clear and undeniably conflicts with Board o f
Education o f Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, _U.S.
_, 111 S. Ct. 630, 636 (1991), announcing that a precise
statement is required when school desegregation decrees are 
being terminated.

Respondents attempt to distinguish this case from 
Dowell by arguing that Dowell was ambiguous with respect to 
final termination of the case, where in this case it is clear that 
the district court intended the case to be concluded finally. 
Talladega County Board of Education, Brief in Opposition at 
5; United States, Brief in Opposition at 9. But simply saying 
that the cases are distinct does not make them so. In Dowell, 
the court anticipated that the decree would remain in effect 
despite dismissal of the case. See App. at 37a-39a. Here the 
district court incorporated into its dismissal order a School 
Board Resolution making clear the continuing obligations on 
the part of the Board, including continued compliance with

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prior court orders.1 See App. at 26a-28a. Thus, this case is 
just like Dowell.

Moreover, as implicitly conceded by the United States 
in footnote 4 of its Brief in Opposition, the ruling below re­
opens the door for district court dismissals of desegregation 
cases without express dissolution of the injunctive decrees. 
The confusion spawned by this approach is as evident in this 
case as it was in Dowell. The courts in the Eleventh Circuit 
have already adopted inconsistent approaches to dismissal of 
desegregation cases. See Georgia State Conference o f Branches 
o f NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 & n. 12, 1414 
(11th Cir. 1985) and cases cited therein; United States v. 
Board o f Education o f Jackson County, 794 F.2d 1514, 1543 
(11th Cir. 1986) ("That school districts have become unitary, 
however, does not inevitably require the court to vacate the 
orders upon which the parties have relied in reaching that 
state.") Reversal is necessary to eliminate the continued 
confusion, and the conflict with Dowell. Furthermore, 
summary reversal is warranted on this record.

1Contrary to the suggestion of the Talladega County Board of Education, 
Brief in Opposition at 2, the district court in the separate litigation, Elston v. 
Talladega County Board o f Education, App. 34a-36a, found no violation of the 
court orders despite the large number of interdistrict transfers because the 
court concluded that Talladega County was not intentionally discriminating 
and had no legal duty to stop the transfers. Talladega County Board of 
Education, Brief in Opposition, A-19-20. This, of course, totally ignores the 
outstanding court orders, which was justified by application of the holding that 
Petitioners seek to have this Court review in this proceeding.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set out in 
the Petition, the writ should be granted and the judgment 
below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

C l e o p h u s  T h o m a s , J r . 
P.O. Box 2303 
Anniston, AL 36202 
(205) 236-1240

E l a in e  R . J o n e s  
N o r m a n  J . C h a c h k in  
99 Hudson Street 
16th Floor
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

J a n e l l  M . B y r d  
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-1300

* Counsel o f Record

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