Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae

    IN THE 

Supreme Court of the United States 
OcroBer TERM, 1969 
  

No. 632 
  

BEATRICE ALEXANDER, et al., 
Petitioners, 

v 

HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., 
Respondents. 

4 
by, GREE 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
For THE FirraH CIRCUIT 

  

  
  

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MEMORANDUM 
AMICUS CURIAE AND FOR IMMEDIATE 

CONSIDERATION THEREOF 
AND 

MEMORANDUM AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE 
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL 

RIGHTS UNDER LAW 
  
  

Jorn W. DoucLas 
GEORGE N. LINDSAY 

Co-chairmen 
BerauerL M. WEBSTER 
Cyrus R. VANCE 
AsA SOKOLOW 
JOHN SCHAFER 
Louis F. OBERDORFER 
Jorn Doar 
RicuArD C. DINKELSPIEL 
ArTHUR H. DEAN 
Lroyp N. CUTLER 
Bruce BROMLEY 
BERL I. BERNHARD 

Of Counsel: 1660 1. Street, N.W. 
TimorrY B. DYK Washington, D. C. 20036 
MicuAEL R. KLEIN Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, 
DeaNNE C. SIEMER Lawyers’ Committee for 

October 7, 1969 Civil Rights Under Law 

  

   



    

 



  
  

IN Tue 

Supreme Court of the United States 
OctoBeErR TERM, 1969 
  

No. 632 
  

BEATRICE ALEXANDER etal, 

Petitioners, 

2, 

HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ef al, 

Respondents. 
  

4 
4 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
For THE Firra Circuit 

4 
> 4 
  

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MEMORANDUM 
AMICUS CURIAE AND FOR IMMEDIATE 

CONSIDERATION THEREOF 

The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 

hereby respectfully moves for leave to file the attached 

Memorandum Amicus Curiae in the above-entitled case. 

Petitioners have consented to the filing of this memoran- 

dum. Respondent United States of America (a plaintiff 

below) has also consented. Consents have been requested 

from the respondents who are defendants below in the 

fourteen cases, but as yet consents from these respondents 

have not been received. 

Since the responses in this case are due to be filed this 

Wednesday, October 8, 1969, and since this Court may 
consider this case at this week’s Conference, this motion 

and the attached Memorandum Amicus Curiae cannot be 

considered by the Court if the non-consenting respondents 

are afforded time to respond to this motion under Rule 

35(4). Moreover, we believe that their positions on the 
merits may be adequately presented in their responses to 

the petition for certiorari. Accordingly, applicant respect-  



  

2 

fully requests that this motion and the attached Memoran- 

dum Amicus Curiae be considered together with the pe- 

tition for certiorari and the responses to the petition, and 

that, pursuant to Rule 35(4), consideration of this motion 

and the attached Memorandum Amicus Curiae not be post- 

poned pending receipt of papers in opposition from the non- 

consenting respondents. 
Applicant respectfully submits that the attached Mem- 

orandum Amicus Curiae will be of assistance to this Court. 

The reasons that applicant believes its motion should be 

granted are as follows: 

The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 

was organized on June 21, 1963, following a conference of 

lawyers at the White House called by President John F. 

Kennedy. The formal organization of the Lawyers’ Com- 

mittee for Civil Rights Under Law is that of a non-profit 

private corporation whose principal purpose is to involve 

private lawyers throughout the country in the struggle to 

assure all citizens their civil rights. The membership of 

the Committee includes eleven past presidents of the 

American Bar Association and two former Attorneys 

General. 

Since 1964, the Committee has operated a law office in 

Jackson, Mississippi, which has handled more than 2,000 

civil rights cases. Over 150 attorneys from all parts of the 

United States have served as unpaid volunteers in the Jack- 

son office in aid of the permanent staff there. The Com- 

mittee’s national and local offices have actively engaged the 

services of the private bar in addressing a range of legal 

problems in such areas as education, housing, employment, 

economic development, and the administration of justice. 

In the field of education, both the national staff and the local 

committees have undertaken well over a score of projects to 

promote quality education and to assure its availability to 

all citizens, regardless of income level or race. The Com- 

mittee has recently renewed its offer to assist the Depart- 

ment of Justice in carrying out national objectives in the 

civil rights area. 

   



  

3 

In the two weeks which have passed since the filing of 

the petition for certiorari, federal officials charged with 

enforcement responsibilities in this field have placed in ques- 

tion the capacity of the federal government to enforce an 

order for immediate desegregation. The Lawyers’ Com- 

mittee for Civil Rights Under Law, in the attached memo- 

randum, deals directly with this most relevant issue which 

is not presented in the petition for certiorari. Moreover, 

applicant deals with an additional question—not fully 

treated in the petition—whether community opposition is an 

adequate ground for delay in enforcement. 
Accordingly, the Committee respectfully requests that 

this Court grant leave to file the attached Memorandum 

Amicus Curiae, and consider this motion and the Memoran- 

dum together with the petition and responses. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Joun W. DoucLAs 

GEORGE N. LINDSAY 
Co-Chairmen 

Berauer M. WEBSTER 
Cyrus R. VANCE 
ASA SOKOLOW 
JOHN SCHAFER 
Louis F. OBERDORFER 
JorN Doar 
RicuaArp C. DINKELSPIEL 
ARTHUR H. DEAN 
Lroyp N. CUTLER 
Bruce BROMLEY 
BERL I. BERNHARD 

1660 L Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20036 

Of Counsel: Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, 
TimorHY B. DYK Lawyers’ Committee for 
MicHAEL R. KLEIN Civil Rights Under Law 
DeEaNNE C. SIEMER 

October 7, 1969  



    

 



In THE 

Supreme Court of the United States 
OctoBErR TERM, 1969 
  

No. 632 
  

BEATRICE ALEXANDER cf al, 

Petitioners, 

. 

HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. 

Respondents. 

  
4 
hf 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

For tae FirrH CIRCUIT 

4 
bff 

MEMORANDUM AMICUS CURIAE 
FOR THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR 

CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

  

Whether, fifteen years after this Court’s decision in 

Brown v. Board of Education, enforcement of elementary 

school desegregation in the State of Mississippi should be 

further delayed. 

INTEREST OF THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 

The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 

was organized on June 21, 1963, following a conference of 

lawyers at the White House called by President John F. 

Kennedy. The formal organization of the Lawyers’ Com- 

mittee for Civil Rights Under Law is that of a non-profit 

private corporation whose principal purpose is to involve 

private lawyers throughout the country in the struggle to 

assure all citizens of their civil rights. The membership of 

the Committee includes eleven past presidents of the Amer- 

ican Bar Association and two former Attorneys General. 

Since 1964, the Committee has operated a law office in 

Jackson, Mississippi, which handled more than 2,000 civil  



  

2 

rights cases. Over 150 attorneys from all parts of the United 

States have served as unpaid volunteers in the Jackson 

office in aid of the permanent staff there. The Committee’s 

national and local offices have actively engaged the services 

of the private bar in addressing a range of legal problems in 

such areas as education, housing, employment, economic 

development, and the administration of justice. In the field 

of education, both the national staff and the local com- 

mittees have undertaken well over a score of projects to 

promote quality education and to assure its availability to 

all citizens, regardless of income level or race. The Com- 

mittee has recently renewed its offer to assist the Depart- 

ment of Justice in carrying out national objectives in the civil 

rights area. 

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 

The Time for Additional Delay in 
School Desegregation Is At An End. 

This 1s not the first time elements of the school system 

of the State of Mississippi have appeared before the federal 

courts in matters of school segregation. In the fifteen years 
since the first Brown decision, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), at 
least fourteen decisions involving Mississippi school segre- 

gation have been rendered by federal courts. Nearly all 

United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 410 
F. 2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969); Anthony v. Marshall County Bd. of 
Educ., 409 F. 2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Henry v. Clarksdale Muni- 
cipal Separate School Dist., 409 F. 2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United 
States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 406 F. 2d 
1086 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Adams v. Mathews, 403 F. 2d 181 (5th Cir. 
1968) ; United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 402 F. 2d 926 
(5th Cir. 1968); Singleton v. Jackson Muncipal Separate School 
Dist, 348 F. 2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Madison 
County Bd. of Educ., 326 F. 2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 
U. 8S. 929 (1964) ; Meredith v.- Fair, 313 F. 2d 532 (5th Cir. 1952), 
cert. denied, 372 U., S, 916 (1963); Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.' 2d 
534 (5th Cir. 1962); Coffey v. State Educational Finance Comm'n, 
296 F. Supp. 1389 (S. D. Miss. 1969) ; Franklin v. Quitman County 
Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509 (N. D. Miss. 1968) ; United States 
v. Natchez Special Municipal Separate School Dist., 267 F. Supp. 
614 (S. D. Miss. 1966) ; United States v. Biloxi Municipal School 
Dist, 219 F, Supp. 691 (S. D.: Miss. 1863), aff d, 326. F. 24.237 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 929 (1964). 

   



  

3 

have issued the same unmistakable declarations: Segrega- 

tion must end, good faith compliance with this Court’s 

decision in Browwn—which as an interpretation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment is “the supreme law of the land”*— 

1s constitutionally required. 

As the record painfully reveals, however, good faith 
compliance has not been forthcoming. Five thousand six 

hundred and eight days have passed since this Court’s 

landmark decision in 1954. For those fifteen years the 

school systems in Mississippi have failed to effect good 

faith compliance. If one lesson has been learned during 

these past fifteen years, it is that the ingenuity of the 

officials of the Mississippi school system should not be 

underestimated. Now, on the eve of the first meaningful 

elementary school desegregation in the State’s history, the 

defendants have apparently succeeded in convincing the 

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who in turn, 

has convinced the District Court, that further delay should 

be afforded because: 

“The administrative and logistical difficulties which 

must be encountered and met in the terribly short 

space of time remaining must surely . . . produce 

chaos, confusion and catastrophic educational set- 

back, ...0 

The ring is familiar if the source is not. 

The Secretary’s reference is to the defendant’s assertion 

that the petitioners’ constitutional rights must await (1) 
the redrawing of bus routes, (2) the reassignment of 

teachers, (3) the conversion of classrooms and (4) a pro- 

2Cooper v. Aaron; 358 UU. S. 1, 18 (1958). 
8 etter of Secretary Finch to the Court of Appeals and the judges 

of the District Court. Transcript of Record in the Court of Appeals, 
Vol. IV, Document No. YY, Exhibit 2.  



    

4 

gram of preparation of the teachers and students involved.* 

This fourth ground appears to be a euphemism for over- 

coming community resistance. 

The supposed administrative and logistical difficulties 

asserted in support of the request for a further delay are 

wholly inadequate, particularly in the light of the long 

delay already encountered.” There is nothing in the record 

to demonstrate that the redrawing of bus routes could take 

more than a few days. Even assuming that the second and 

third reasons (reassignment of teachers and the conversion 

of classrooms) will involve difficulties of substance for the 

school boards involved, it is scarcely credible that they out- 
weigh the long overdue promise of equality or that these 

supposed difficulties cannot be adequately resolved after 

desegregation has been achieved. 

4Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the District Court 
(Aug. 26, 1969), as reproduced by Petitioners in Appendix D at p. 65a 
of their Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 

5As this Court noted in Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, 529-30 
(1963), in ordering immediate desegregation of the Memphis city 
parks: 

“In considering the appropriateness of the equitable decree 
entered below inviting a plan calling for an even longer delay in 
effecting desegregation, we cannot ignore the passage of a sub- 
stantial period of time since the original declaration of the 
manifest unconstitutionality of racial practices such as are here 
challenged, the repeated and numerous decisions giving notice of 
such illegality, and the many intervening opportunities hereto- 
fore available to attain the equality of treatment which the Four- 
teenth Amendment commands the States to achieve. These 
factors must inevitably and substantially temper the present 
import of such broad policy considerations as may have 
underlain, even in part, the form of decree ultimately framed 
in the Brown case. Given the extended time which has 
elapsed, it is far from clear that the mandate of the second 
Brown decision requiring that desegregation proceed with ‘all 
deliberate speed’ would today be fully satisfied by types of plans 
or programs for desegregation of public educational facilities 
which eight years ago might have been deemed sufficient. 
Brown never contemplated that the concept of ‘deliberate speed’ 
would countenance indefinite delay in elimination of racial bar- 
riers in schools...” 

 



  

5 

Recent statements on behalf of the Department of Jus- 

tice, if accurately reported,’ would suggest that the request 

of the United States for additional delay, which was con- 

vincing to the District Court, is based, in significant part, 

upon the fourth ground—community resistance—and upon 

an asserted lack of adequate manpower in the Civil Rights 

Division to enforce immediate desegregation. The Depart- 

ment’s reliance on these factors is, in our view, unwarranted 

since neither of these arguments is sufficient or even cogniz- 

able by the courts. 

1. This Court Has Specifically Held That Desegregation Must 
Not Be Delayed Because of Community Resistance. 

From the beginning of the battle for equality of educa- 

tional opportunity this Court has made it clear that com- 

munity resistance is not an accepted basis for delay. As 

early as 1917 this Court in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 
60, 81, invalidating a zoning ordinance enforcing separa- 

tion of the races, held that the avoidance of “race conflicts” 

was not an adequate reason for continued segregation. In 

the second Brown decision itself, 349 U. S. 294, 300 

(1955), this Court declared: 

“[1]t should go without saying that the vitality of 

these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to 

yield simply because of disagreement with them.” 

Three years later, when faced with the spectre of co- 

ordinated state resistance to the enforcement of desegrega- 

6“Nixon Aide Warns Quick Integration Can’t Be Enforced,” 
The New York Times, p. 1, col. 3 (Sept. 30, 1969) ; “Leonard De- 
fends U. S. School Policy,” The New York Times, p. 25, col. 1 
(Oct. 3, 1969). (The full text of these articles is set forth as 
Appendix A to this Memorandum.) In a September 30, 1969, state- 
ment the Department conceded that, if the Supreme Court reversed 
the decision below, the Department would enforce the order entered 

pursuant to the Supreme Court’s mandate.  



  

6 

tion, the decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958), 

was no less emphatic. Specifically rejected there was the 

very concept upon which respondents’ contentions are, in 

large part, premised: the capacity of opposition to create 

practical difficulties in enforcement and then to successfully 

offer those difficulties as proof of the prematurity of a decree 

to desegregate now.’ 

2. The Alleged Inadequacy of the Enforcement Resources of 
the United States Department of Justice Is No Ground for 
Further Delay. 

As we have noted, the United States Department of 

Justice has publicly suggested that delay is in order because 

the Department lacks adequate resources to enforce immedi- 

ate desegregation. But “it is an ‘inadmissible suggestion’ 

that action might be taken in disregard of a judicial deter- 

mination.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 549 n. 

S6 (1969), 

“IT ]he Attorney General of the United States, has a 

constitutional obligation to eliminate racial discrim- 

ination. . . . Failure on the part of any of these 

Government officials to take legal action in the event 

that racial discrimination does exist . . . would con- 

stitute dereliction of official duty.” United States v. 

Frazer, 297 BF. Supp. 319,323 (M.D. Ala. 1968), 

Moreover, the Department’s contentions are without 

factual foundation. The Department has great flexibility 

in allocating resources. If, at any given time, there is an 

insufficient number of attorneys in the Civil Rights Divi- 

sion, the Attorney General may delegate civil rights 

functions to attorneys from other divisions within the 

"See also Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, 535-37 (1963) ; 
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284, 293 (1963) ; Taylor v. Louisiana, 
370 U. S. 154 (1962) ; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 (1961); 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955). 

   



7 

Department. 28 U. S..C...8 510. (Supp. 111 1965-67). 
Should there be insufficient manpower within the Depart- 

ment, the Attorney General is authorized to specially 

appoint any attorney to assist him in any proceedings, civil 

or criminal, whether or not the attorney is a resident of the 

district in which the proceeding is brought. 28 U. S. C. 

§ 515 (Supp. III 1965-67). The Lawyers’ Committee stands 
ready to assist in the recruitment of the services of as many 

volunteer attorneys as may be needed by the Department for 

the purpose of enforcement of desegregation orders in these 

and other cases.’ 

8The Lawyers’ Committee volunteers would offer their services 
without compensation, but token payment is required by statute. 31 
U.S. C. §665(b) (1964).  



  

CONCLUSION 

Certiorari should be granted; the order of the Court of 

Appeals of August 28, 1969, should be summarily reversed; 

the order of the Court of Appeals of July 3, 1969, should 

be reinstated; and the case remanded for immediate appro- 

priate action in order that desegregation may be immedi- 

ately effected. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Of Counsel: 
TimoruY B. Dyk 
MicuAEL R. KLEIN 
DeANNE C. SIEMER 

October 7, 1969 

  

Jorn W. DoucGLAs 
GEORGE N. LINDSAY 

Co-chairmen 
BerHUEL M. WEBSTER 
Cyrus R. VANCE 
AsA SoKOLOW 
JOHN SCHAFER 
Louis F. OBERDORFER 
JorN Doar 
RicaArp C. DINKELSPIEL 
ARTHUR H. DEAN 
Liovyp N. Curigr 
Bruce BROMLEY 
BerL I. BERNHARD 

1660 L Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20036 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, 
Lawyers’ Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law 

 



Al 

APPENDIX A 

The New York Times, September 30, 1969 

NIXON AIDE WARNS QUICK INTEGRATION 
CAN'T BE ENFORCED 

Rights Chief Says “Nothing Would Change” 
If Court Told South to Act Now 

By Frep P. GrarAM, Special to The New York Times 

WASHINGTON, Sept. 29—The chief of the Justice 

Department’s Civil Rights Division said today that if the 

Supreme Court should rule in a pending case that schools 

must integrate immediately throughout the South the order 

could not be enforced. 

Referring to an appeal that the Court has already agreed 

to consider on an accelerated schedule, Jerris Leonard, an 

Assistant Attorney General, declared that “if the Court 

were to order instant integration nothing would change. 

Somebody would have to enforce that order.” 

“There just are not enough bodies and people” in the 

Civil Rights Division “to enforce that kind of a decision,” 

Mr. Leonard said at a news conference. 

Appeal in Mississippi 

The N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund 

Inc. has asked the Supreme Court to discard its “all delib- 

erate speed” formula for school desegregation and to de- 

mand immediate abolition of racially identifiable schools 

across the South. 

The request was made in an appeal of a desegregation 

delay that was granted to 30 Mississippi school districts at 

the behest of the Nixon Administration.  



  

A2 

Mr. Leonard’s remarks raised the possibility that the 

Supreme Court could find itself, for the first time since it 

declared public school segregation unconstitutional in 1954, 

in the position of issuing a school desegregation order with- 

out full expectation that it could or would be enforced by 

the executive branch. 

Mr. Leonard called the news conference to respond to a 

group of dissident lawyers on his staff who have protested 

that the Nixon Administration has softened civil rights 

enforcement. 

The dissident group released today the text of a state- 

ment of protest that they delivered last month to Mr. 

Leonard, Attorney General John N. Mitchell and President 

Nixon, 

The statement charged that the Government’s action in 

granting the Mississippi desegregation delay indicated “a 

disposition on the part of responsible officials of the Federal 

Government to subordinate clearly defined legal require- 

ments to nonlegal considerations when formulating the en- 

forcement policies of this division.” 

The lawyers charged that by basing civil rights deci- 

sions on “other considerations” than the law, the Admin- 

istration “will seriously impair the ability of the Civil Rights 

Division, and ultimately the judiciary, to attend to the 

faithful execution of the Federal civil rights statutes.” 

The statement reportedly bore the signatures of 65 of 

the 74 nonsupervisory “line” attorneys in the Civil Rights 
Division. 

Seeks Court Compliance 

Attorney General Mitchell was asked about the state- 

ment today at a news conference in Miami, where he is 

attending the meeting of the International Association of 

Chiefs of Police. 

   



A3 

He denied published reports that one of the “other con- 

siderations” that prompted the delay was a hint by Senator 

John C. Stennis of Mississippi that he would not give the 

Administration’s antiballistics missile project his full sup- 

port unless the delay were granted. 

“That is completely false,” Mr. Mitchell said. He added 

that “the objective of the Justice Department is to comply 

with the Court decision and statutory requirements.” 
Mr. Mitchell said he did not “presume that there would 

be any need to take action” against the dissident lawyers. 

Mr. Leonard said he had not been embarrassed by the 

ferment within his division and said he was confident that 

the line attorneys would cease their protests now that the 

Government’s policy has been clarified. 

Sources within the dissident group said that their state- 

ment was released today after having been kept secret for 

a month because the group believed that Mr. Leonard had 

not given assurances that the Justice Department would 

push school desegregation vigorously. But the lawyers said 

they did not know what further protest action, if any, their 

group would take. 

Request by Finch 

Mr. Leonard stressed repeatedly throughout his 45- 

minute news conference that the threat of school boycotts 

and school-closings by diehard whites in the South could 

retard the pace of school desegregation. The dissident at- 

torneys have charged that this official attitude could en- 
courage Southern whites to defy the law. 

Mr. Leonard disclosed that Robert H. Finch, Secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare, asked the Federal 

judges who had jurisdiction over the Mississippi case for 

the delay last month without first consulting Mr. Leonard, 

who had ultimate responsibility for the handling of the case.  



  

A4 

But Mr. Leonard agreed with Mr. Finch’s opinion that 
the time was too short to implement the desegregation plans 

in the few days that remained before the start of the school 

year. The judges granted the delay, which would put off 
major integration moves in the schools for at least a year. 

If the delay had not been obtained, Mr. Leonard said, 

“I think we would have been faced with massive litigation 

efforts, school closings, and massive boycotting. It would 

have taken years and years to bring these districts back into 
line.” 

He predicted that with a year in which to lay the ground- 

work for desegregation, it will be accomplished smoothly 

in 1970. 

In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the legal defense 

fund’s lawyers contend that the possibility of delay has 

encouraged Southern school officials to make no plans for 

desegregation and then to plead at the last moment that 

there is inadequate time to prepare for desegregation with- 

out disrupting the schools. 

The defense fund asked the Justices to give the appeal 

a speedy hearing and to order immediate desegregation of 

all Southern schools. The Court promptly announced that 

it ‘will decide soon after the new Court term begins on 

Oct. 6 .whether or not it will hear the appeal. : 

In the past, when the Court has agreed to accelerate its 

normal procedures, it has often developed that the justices 

were impressed with the contentions of the party seeking 

the speedy hearing. 

   



AS 

The New York Times, October 3, 1969 

LEONARD DEFENDS U. S. SCHOOL POLICY 
Says Critics of Rights Stand 

‘Run Off at the Mouth’ 

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 (AP)—Assistant Attorney 
General Jerris Leonard defended the Nixon Administra- 

tion’s school desegregation policy today, calling its critics 

“a lot of people who are frankly running off at the mouth.” 

Mr. Leonard, chief of the Justice Department’s Civil 

Rights Division, also said he had no intention of quitting 

because of dissension among his lawyers over Administra- 

tion policies. 

His comments came at an impromptu news conference 

after Garry J. Greenberg, who resigned yesterday at the re- 

quest of Mr. Leonard, said, he “would not and could not 

defend the Government’s position.” 

Insisting that there had been no slowdown in school 

desegregation, Mr. Leonard said, “take the Mississippi 

situation out and give me one example where we have not 

vigorously enforced the civil rights laws.” 

In order to accomplish what some critics propose, Mr. 

Leonard said, “no one could make a statement that didn’t 

advocate immediate, strict compliance with the law with- 

out regard to educational factors.” 

“1 reject that 1,000 per cent,” he said. “You cannot 
desegregate a school district that is presided over by re- 

calcitrant school board members by simply issuing an 

edict.” 

Cites Times Editorial 

Such a situation, he said, would put “school board mem- 

bers in the jail houses and kids in segregated schools.”  



  

Ab 

Asked about statements by Federal judges who charged 

that a July policy statement was “a red herring across the 

path of progress toward desegregation,” Mr. Leonard said, 

“I don’t care if its judges, lawyers, legislators or whoever 

disagrees.” 

He took particular issue with The New York Times, 

saying an editorial yesterday was ‘“picayunish and pusillani- 

mous’ and written by someone uninformed. 

Asked about critical statements by the Commission on 

Civil Rights and some Congressmen, Mr. Leonard re- 

marked, “I think you've got a lot of people who are frankly 

running off at the mouth who don’t know what the facts 
3» 

are.