State Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Motion for Intervention as Party Plaintiff Filed by Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors
Public Court Documents
June 9, 1972

8 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Roadway Express v Monk Brief Amicus Curiae, 1980. 2e100d99-c29a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/dd152881-3801-4f31-8103-1ffd96e094a3/roadway-express-v-monk-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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1st the (Enurt o! % United 0tateB October T erm, 1979 No. 79-701 R oadway E xpress, I nc., v. Petitioner, J. D. Monk, et al. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE, AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE, OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. Jack Greenberg James M. N abrit, I I I N apoleon B. W illiams, Jr. Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae March 1980 INDEX Motion for Leave to F i l e A B r ie f Amicus Curiae ................................................... v i Statement o f In te res t .................................... 1 Summary o f Argument .......................................... 3 Argument I . SECTION 1927 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS’ ATTORNEYS .................................................... 5 I I . ATTORNEYS'S FEES ARE NOT ALLOWABLE AS ELEMENTS OF COSTS UNDER § 1927 . . . 20 Conclusion ............................................................ 24 Page x - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases: Acevedo v. Immigration and Natura l i zat ion Service, 538 F .2d 918 (2d Cir . 1976) ............ ............... ............. 7, 17 Aetna L i f e Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) ............................ ............ 6 Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) ............ ................. .. 2 Alyeska P ipe l ine Serv. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) .............. 21 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) . . 6 Bradley v. School Board of C ity of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974) . . . . . . . 2 Brotherhood o f Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & A.R.R. , 389 U.S. 327 (1967) .......... .................... 19 Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F .2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972) . . 14 Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977) .......................... 8, 11,21 Burre l l v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976) .................... ......................... ........... 7 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis sion, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) _______ 2,14,15,21 - ii - Page 1507 Corporation v. Henderson, 447 F. 2d 540 (7th Cir. 1971) ...................... 20,21 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ............ 6 Gamble v. Pope & Talbot , In c . , 307 F .2d 729 (3rd Cir. 1962), ce r t , denied 371 U.S. 888 (1962) ..................... 12 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) .................................................. 2 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916) .................. 19 Hanley v. Condrey, 467 F .2d 697 (2d Cir. 1972) ................................................ .. 11, 17 Hughes v. Repko, 578 F .2d 483 (3rd Cir. 1978) ............ ................................... . 23 K ie f e l v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc . , 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968), c e r t . denied, 395 U.S. 908 rehearing denied, 395 U.S 987 ...................... .. 12,20,21 Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. o f Phi ladelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. , 487 F. 2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973) ...................... 23 Los Angeles County v. Associated General Contractors o f Ca l i fo rn ia , 438 U.S. 909 (1978) ........ 2 Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Steiner, 301 F. 63 (2d Cir. 1912) ...................... 7 Newman v. P igg ie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) ........................................ 23 - iii - Page Parham v. Southwestern B e l l Telephone Co., In c . , 433 F .2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) .................. ........................................ 14 Parker v. Cali fano, 561 F .2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ........................ ................ 21 Prandine v. National Tea Co., 585 F .2d 47 (3rd Cir 1978) .......................... ......... Reed v. Ar l ington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th C ir . 1973) .................... ........... 14 Surowitz v. Hi lton Hotels Corp , , 383 U.S. 363 (1966) ____. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Thompson v. L o u is v i l l e , 362 U.S 199 (1966) ............................. 16,19 Triangle Involvement Council v. R i tch ie , 402 U.S 497 (1971) ................................ 7 United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961) ....................................................... 6 United States v. Ross, 535 F .2d 346 (6th Cir. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Weiss v. United States, 227 F.2d 72 (2d Cir 1955), c e r t . denied, 359 U.S. 936 (1956), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 977 ........................ 12 Wheeler v. Anchor Continental, Inc . , 20 F.E.P.C. 591 (D.S.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1116 (4th C i r . , Feb. 14, 1979) .................... 17 - IV Page Statutes 28 U. S.C. § 1920 ................................................ 23 T i t l e V I I o f the C i v i l Rights Act o f 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ............................................ .. 20,22 C i v i l Rights A ttorney 's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 .................... 20,21 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ............................................ 3,4,5,10, 16,18, 20 , 21,22 Rule 23 o f the Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure ........................................ 13,14 Publ ications Comment, Sanctions Imposed By Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judic ia l Process, 44 Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977) ............................ 8 7 Am Jur, 2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 12-43, 167-200 .............................................. 8 v - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1979 No. 79-701 ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., P e t i t ion e r , v. J. D. MONK, et a l . On Writ o f C e r t io ra r i to the United States Court o f Appeals for the F i f th C ircuit MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. NAACP Lega l Defense and Educat iona l Fund, Inc. hereby moves for leave to f i l e the attached b r i e f as amicus curiae. - vi - The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc . i s a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n in co rp o ra ted under the laws o f the State o f New York. I t was formed to ass is t black persons in securing the i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , and o ther r i g h t s , by prosecuting and defending lawsuits. I t s charter declares that i t s purposes include rendering lega l serv ices gratu itously to Negroes su f fer ing in jus t i c e by reason o f r a c ia l discr iminat ion. For many years attorneys for the Legal Defense Fund have represented part ies in l i t i g a t i o n before this Court and other courts as wel l as f i l e d b r i e f s amicus cur iae . See, e . g . , Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Los Angeles County v . A s s o c i a t e d General Con t rac to rs o f C a l i f o r n i a , 438 U.S. 909 (1978). The L e g a l Defense Fund b e l i e v e s that i t s experience in l i t i g a t i o n concerning a ttorney 's fees and employment discr imination may be o f as sistance to the Court in the present case. See, e . g . , Bradley v. School Board o f City o f Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974 ) ; A lbemarle Paper Company - V l l v . Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975 ) ; C hr is t ian sbu rg Garment Co, v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Ac c o r d in g l y , i t r eq u es ts perm iss ion to f i l e the accompanying amicus curiae b r i e f . Consent to the f i l i n g o f the b r i e f has been granted by counsel for respondents but has been refused by counsel fo r p e t i t i o n e r . The b r i e f is submitted in support o f responden ts . I t supports the arguments o f respondents and the general analysis o f the Court o f Appeals below a lthough the bas is f o r i t s reasoning is d i f f e r e n t from that r e l i e d upon by respondents and the Court o f Appeals. Because o f this d i f fe r ence and the p o ten t ia l l y adverse impact o f improper appl icat ion of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and re la ted prov is ions, upon the enforcement o f c i v i l * /r i g h t s s t a t u t e s , — the movant submits that the b r i e f should be accepted for f i l i n g by the Court. See, e . g . , Wheeler v. Anchor Continental, I n c . , 20 FEP Cases 591 (D .S .C . 1978) , appeal docketed, No. 79-1116 (4th Cir. , Feb. 14, 1979); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers ' Loca l Union No. 130, U.A. , C i v i l No. 77 C 1726, Nov. 19, 1979 (N.D. 1 1 1 . ) ; F lo ra v. Moore, 22 EPD % 30,365 (N.D. M iss . ) , Dec. 8, 1979. - viii - WHEREFORE, the NAACP Lega l Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. r espec t fu l l y prays that th is motion be granted and that the attached b r i e f be f i l e d . JACK GREENBERG JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR. Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circ le New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae - ix - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1979 No. 79-701 ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., P e t i t ion e r , v. J. D. MONK, et a l . On Writ of C er t io ra r i to the United States Court o f Appeals for the F i f th C ircuit BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. STATEMENT OF INTEREST The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc . i s a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n in co rpo ra ted under the laws o f the State o f New York. I t was formed to ass is t black persons in securing the ir c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , and o ther r i g h t s , by- prosecuting and defending lawsuits. I t s charter declares that i t s purposes include rendering lega l serv ices gratu itously to Negroes su f fe r ing in jus t i c e by reason o f r a c ia l d iscr iminat ion. For many years attorneys for the Legal Defense Fund have represented part ies in l i t i g a t i o n before this Court and other courts as we l l as f i l e d b r i e f s amicus cur iae . See, e . g . , Griggs v. Duke Power Co• , 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Los Angeles County v . A s s o c i a t e d General C on t rac to rs o f C a l i f o r n i a , 438 U.S. 909 (1978). The L ega l Defense Fund b e l i e v e s tha t i t s experience in l i t i g a t i o n concerning a t torney 's fees and employment d iscr iminat ion may be o f as sistance to the Court in the present case. See, e . g . , Bradley v. School Board o f City o f Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974 ) ; A lbemarle Paper Company v . Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975 ) ; C h r is t iansburg Garment Co. v, EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 3 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The wr i t o f c e r t i o r a r i should be dismissed as im p ro v id en t l y gran ted . Although th i s Court granted the wr i t for the sole purpose o f de te r mining the a l l o w a b i l i t y o f a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s as excess costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, i t is not possible to decide th is issue in the present state o f the record since both the Court o f Appeals and the d i s t r i c t court be low e r ron eou s ly assumed that § 1927 was applicable to the facts presented here. The record shows that the acts found by the court below to be unreasonable and vexatious were acts which were no more than fa i lu re to prosecute respondents' claims for r e l i e f . They were not acts which e i ther m ult ip l ied the proceedings below or caused de fendant to incur excess co s ts . Accordingly § 1927 is inapplicable . The w r i t should a l s o be d ismissed as im- providently granted because of the nonfinal nature o f the judgment by the Court of Appeals remanding the a c t i o n t o the d i s t r i c t court to determine what, i f any, excess costs were caused by respon - 4 - dents' at torneys ' unreasonable and vexatious acts or by any m u l t ip l i ca t ion o f the proceedings by them. I f the d i s t r i c t court, upon remand, con cludes that no excess costs and no m ult ip l ica t ion o f proceedings were caused, then the granting o f the wr i t o f c e r t i o r a r i to determine the a l low a b i l i t y o f a t to rney 's fees as excess costs under § 1927 w i l l have been improvident. I f , in the a l t e r n a t i v e , the w r i t i s not dismissed, then we submit that th is Court should a f f i rm in part and reverse in part. Insofar as the judgment remands the case to the d i s t r i c t court f o r the purpose o f d e te rm in ing whether excess co s ts were incurred by p e t i t i o n e r and whether excess cost resulted from respondents' at torneys ' vexatious acts or a l leged m u l t ip l i ca t ion o f the proceedings, the judgment, we submit, should be aff i rmed. To the extent, however, that the judgment r e s t s on an assumption, in the absence o f evidence, that respondent McPherson's f a i lu re to appear at his scheduled deposit ion was a m ult ip l i ca t ion o f proceedings caused by respon dents' attorneys, the judgment should reversed. - 5 - I f the Court nonetheless decides to reso lve the hypothet ica l issue in th is case o f whether a t t o r n e y ' s f e es can be assessed under § 1927, then, we submit, the Court should ho ld that a t torney 's fees are not items o f costs within the meaning o f § 1927. I f the Court, however, holds that at torney 's fees are al lowable under § 1927, then we urge that i t should ho ld fu r th e r that the i r allowance as part o f excess costs is d is c re tionary and governed by standards normally app l i cable to an award o f a t torney 's fees. ARGUMENT I . SECTION 1927 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEYS This Court g ranted p e t i t i o n e r ' s w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i fo r the l im ited purpose o f determining whether a t torney 's fees are al lowable as elements o f excess costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Neces s a r i l y , the Court assumed that th i s issue was presented by the record below and that § 1927 was appl icable to the proceedings below. Because t h i s assumption is not c o n s i s t e n t w i th the record, the p e t i t i o n for wr i t o f c e r t i o r a r i should be dismissed as improvidently granted. I t is a guiding rule of th is Court that i t w i l l neither render advisory opinions on hypothe t i c a l qu es t ions nor determine c o n t r o v e r s i e s which are not s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f in i t e and concrete to assure an immediate and d e f in i t i v e determina t ion o f the v a l i d i t y o f c o n f l i c t in g claims pre sented by adverse p a r t i e s . — ̂ Aetna L i f e Ins . Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1937 ) ; United S ta tes v. F ruehau f , 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961). A lso see, Flast v, Cohen, 392 U.S 83, 92-101 (1968 ) . D ism issa l o f the w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i as improvidently granted is proper there fore i f necessary to e f fec tua te this po l ic y . The writ should also be dismissed as improvidently granted when "conditions o r i g in a l l y thought to ju s t i f y granting the writ o f c e r t i o r a r i are not - 6 - U The source o f th is po l icy is in A r t i c l e I I I o f the Constitut ion o f the United States as we l l as in jur isprudent ia l considerations. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S 249, 256-257 (1953); Flast v . Cohen, supra, 392 U.S at 92-101. 7 in f a c t p r e s e n t . " — B u r r e l l v . McCray, 426 U.S 471, 473-74 (9 1 76) (Brennan, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) . Both conditions ex is t here. By the e x p l i c i t terms o f the statute , § 1927 is applicable only i f the offending attorney has, in the course o f l i t i g a t i o n , (1 ) mult ip l ied the proceedings, (2 ) increased the costs, (3 ) engaged in unreasonable and v exa t io u s ac ts , and (4 ) caused excess costs to have been incurred as a consequence o f the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f the p ro ceed ings r e s u l t i n g from the unreasonable and 3/ vex a t io u s a c t s . — See e . g . , Mot ion P i c tu r e s 2 / 2/ In Tr iangle Involvement Council v. R i t c h ie , 402 U.S. 497, 502 (1971), Justice Harlan stated in his concurring opinion that a "changed posture of the case" could preclude i t s adjudication from being "a provident expenditure of the energies of the Court." 3/ The necessity for showing the existence of each o f the four requ irements has not always been c l e a r l y perce ived. See Acevedo v. Immigra tion and Natura l izat ion Service" 538 F . 2d 918 (2d Cir. 1976) (assessment o f double costs as excess cos ts ) . A more recent decis ion by the same court attempted to formulate standards applicable to § 1927. The court wrote that [ l ] n an a c t i o n not i t s e l f brought in bad f a i t h , an award o f a t t o r n e y s ' f e es should 8 Patents Co. v, S te ine r , 301 F. 63, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1912). A f inding o f l i a b i l i t y under § 1927 can therefore only be predicated upon an antecedent f inding that each o f these c r i t e r i a is s a t i s f i ed . In par t icu la r , i t must be shown that the proceed ings have been m ult ip l ied and that the m u l t ip l i cat ion resulted in excess costs being incurred by the oppos ing p a r t y . A mere showing that the attorney acted unreasonably and vexat ious ly is / / there fore in s u f f i c i en t to invoke § 1927.—' The a l leged vexatious and unreasonable acts committed by r espon den ts ' a t t o rn ey s were des- 3J cont 'd be l im i t e d t o those expenses rea sonab ly incurred to meet the other par ty 's ground less, bad fa i th procedural moves. Browning Debenture H o ld e r s ' Committee v . DASA Corp . , 560 F . 2d 1078, 1089 (2d C i r . 1 977). Whether even th i s fo rm u la t ion is c om p le te ly accurate is perhaps doubtful. it/ A wide range o f sanc t ions are a v a i l a b l e a ga ins t an a t t o r n e y who ac ts unreasonably and v e x a t i o u s l y . See 7 Am Jur, 2d, A t to rn eys at Law, §§ 12-43, 167-200; and Comments, Sanctions Imposed By C our ts On A t to rn eys Who Abuse the J u d i c i a l P ro cess , 44 Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977 ) . - 9 - c r ib ed at l en g th by the Court o f A p p e a ls .— 599 F . 2d at 1380-1381. These acts were termed vexatious by that court as we l l as by the d i s t r i c t c ou r t . L ike the d i s t r i c t c ou r t , the Court o f Appeals regarded these acts as being vexatious on ly i n s o fa r as they ev idenced the f a i l u r e o f respondents' attorneys " t o d i l i g e n t l y pursue the p l a i n t i f f s ' in t e r e s ts " and evidenced the cause f o r the " f o r c e d d i s m is s a l o f the p l a i n t i f f ' s 5 / 5J Respondents ' a t t o r n e y s were he ld by the d i s t r i c t court to have ac ted unreasonably and v e x a t i o u s l y b e ca u s e o f th e f o l l o w i n g : ( 1 ) f a i l u r e o f respondent McPherson to appear for tw ice scheduled d e p o s i t i o n s ; ( 2 ) f a i l u r e to answer p e t i t i o n e r ' s in ter roga tor ies as ordered; (3 ) fa i lu r e of respondents' attorneys to f i l e a b r i e f , as ordered by the d i s t r i c t court, within 10 days o f A p r i l 7, 1976; ( 4 ) f i l i n g a b r i e f on June 1, 1976, more than ten days fo l low ing the c o u r t ' s second order o f May 19, 1976 to f i l e a b r i e f within ten days (the b r i e f was a l leged by the d i s t r i c t judge to be inadequate because i t "casually mention[ed]" a case which the judge wanted b r i e f e d and because i t "p r esen ted no so l id factual basis for d is t inguishing between that case" and the one before the court. (Ruling upon Motion For Rehearing, dated Apr i l 13, 1977); and (5 ) fa i lu r e to advise respondents of the ir denomination as class representat ives and o f the possible f inanc ia l consequences o f the denomina- t ion. 10 c la ims."—̂ 599 F.2d at 81. The aff irmance by the Court o f Appeals o f the d i s t r i c t court 's f inding and con c lu s ion that r espon den ts ' a t t o rn eys acted v e x a t i o u s l y thus r e f l e c t s the Court o f Appeals ' view, as w e l l as that of the d i s t r i c t court, that respondents' attorneys acted v e x a t i ously only insofar as they f a i l e d to prosecute t h e i r c l i e n t s ' case and caused the c la ims o f th e i r c l i en ts to be dismissed for nonprosecution. Acts const i tu t ing a f a i lu re to prosecute are not, with respect to an action dismissed on that ground, cognizable under § 1927. Such acts by d e f in i t i o n , do not resu l t in a m u l t ip l ica t ion o f proceedings. Perhaps, the requ is i t e m u l t ip l i ca t ion would have exis ted had the action not been aborted by respondents' at torneys ' conduct. This i s sue , however , need not be dec ided s ince the 6/ The opinion of the Court o f Appeals makes i t e v id en t that i t , and the d i s t r i c t c ou r t , con sidered the fa i lu re to f i l e b r i e f s as ordered and the fa i lu re to communicate with the named p la in t i f f s concerning possible class representation as bearing only upon respondents' attorneys ' f a i lu re to prosecute properly the i r c l i e n t s ' case. 599 F .2d at 1381. 11 action was in fact dismissed for nonprosecution. P e t i t ion e r bene f i t ted from the dismissal rather than being harmed by i t and necessar i ly , incurred no excess cos ts from f a i l u r e to p rosecu te or d i s m is s a l . To reward p e t i t i o n e r w i th excess costs ( i r r e s p e c t i v e o f whether a t torney 's fees are included in the award) would not be in conformity with the statute but would reward pe t i t i on e r twice over, once by dismissal o f respondents' claims and once by an award o f a l leged excess costs . The absurdity o f such a result is e spec ia l l y egregious since ne ither the d i s t r i c t court nor the Court of Appeals found that respondents or the i r attorneys had vexatiously commenced the action. Each r es ponsive action taken by p e t i t i on e r in th is lawsuit was t r igge red by nonfr ivolous actions taken by respondents and the i r attorneys. Consequently, no 7 /m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f p roceed ing occurred— and no 1J M u lt ip l i ca t ion o f proceedings occurs when a f r i v o l o u s a c t i o n is commenced or a f r i v o l o u s appeal is brought, See e .g . Hanley v. Condrey, 467 F . 2d 697 (2d Cir. 1972); Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA, supra, 560 F .2d at 1088-1089, or when any f r ivo lous action is taken which requires a response by the opposing party or 12 excess costs were incurred. In holding that respondents' attorneys acted v e x a t i o u s l y in not p ro s e c u t in g the un de r ly in g T i t l e V I I action, both lower courts considered the f a i l u r e o f r espon den ts ' a t t o r n e y s to f i l e a b r i e f and the f a i l u r e t o adv ise t h e i r c l i e n t s concerning the s ign i f icance o f in s t i tu t in g the act ion as a class action. The fa i lu r e to f i l e the r eq u i r e d b r i e f c l e a r l y d id not m u l t ip l y the proceedings or lead to excess costs. In a s im i lar s i tuat ion , the Third C ircu it held that the fa i lu re to f i l e a p r e t r i a l memorandum w i th in the time l im its did not cause the opposing party to incur excess costs . Gamble v. Pope & Talbot , In c . , 307 F.2d 729, 731, n . l (3rd Cir. 1962) cert ■ denied, 371 U.S 888 (1962 ) . Moreover, r esponden ts ' attorneys eventual ly did f i l e a b r i e f . See note 5, supra. In any event, no m u l t ip l ica t ion of the proceedings resulted from the fa i lu re . 7/ contd. which puts that party to unnecessary expense. See Weiss v. United S t a t e s , 227 F.2d 72 (2d C i r . 1955), c e r t . dneied, 359 U.S 936 (1956), rehearing denied 350 U.S. 977; K i e f e l v. Las Vegas Hacienda, In c ., 404 F,2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968), c e r t . denied, 395 U.S. 908, r eh ea r in g denied 395 U.S. 987. 13 S im i la r ly , no m u l t ip l i ca t ion o f the proceed ings resulted from the i n i t i a l e f f o r t to bring the a c t i o n as a c l a s s a c t i o n or from the a l l e g e d fa i lu re to advise the indiv idual p l a i n t i f f s in d e ta i l about the s ign i f icance o f the c lass act ion. No ev idence has been presen ted showing that a class action was improper or that respondents' attorneys were not i n i t i a l l y e n t i t l e d to r e ly upon the ir c l i e n t s ' assert ion and b e l i e f that other blacks suffered s im i lar rac ia l d iscr iminat ion at the hands o f defendant. See excerpts from respon d e n ts ' d e p o s i t i o n s 73 F.R.D. at 414-415, n.2. Moreover, neither the Court of Appeals nor the d i s t r i c t court found that the purported e f f o r t to bring the act ion as a c lass action was f r ivo lous 8/ . . . or v e x a t i o u s . — Apart from the i n i t i a l d es i g n a t i o n o f the law su i t as a c la s s a c t i o n , no attempt was made to seek a determination, pursuant to Rule 23(c ) o f the Federal Rules o f C i v i l Pro- 8/ Even i f there were a p o s s ib i l i t y o f constru ing the d i s t r i c t cour t 's decis ion as holding that respondents' attorneys acted vexat ious ly in a t tempting to bring the action as a class action, that portion o f the d i s t r i c t court 's decis ion was not a f f i rm ed upon appeal . See the Court o f Appeals' opinion at 599 F.2d at 1381. 14 - cedure, that the action could be maintained as a 9/ c la s s a c t i o n . — F i n a l l y , the f i n d in g that r e s pondents' attorneys had not apprised respondents that c o s t s , in c lu d in g a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , cou ld conceivably be assesed against them, see Chris- t ian sbu rg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Oppor tunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 421-422 (1978), did not demonstrate that respondents' attorneys had caused a m u l t ip l i ca t ion o f the proceedings or had caused p e t i t i o n e r to incur excess costs. 9/ The i n i t i a l d e s i g n a t i o n by responden ts ' attorneys o f the action as a class action did not necessar i ly determine the permissible scope of respondents' in te r roga to r ie s . See, e . g . , Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co. , 457 F .2d 1377 (4th C i r . 1972), where the Fourth Circuit stated that prosecution o f indiv idual claims o f r a c ia l discr imination may require examination o f " s t a t i s t i c s , patterns, pract ices and general p o l i c i e s to ascerta in whether d iscr iminat ion e x i s t s . " 457 F . 2d at 1382. Accord: Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. , 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970)'; Reed v. Ar l ington Hotel Co., In c . , 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1973). 10/ In Surowitz v. Hil ton Hotels Corp.,383 U.S. 363 (1966), th is Court tentat i v e l y explored, in the context o f a d e r iva t iv e suit under then Rule 23(b), the extent to which an attorney might be required to d isc lose to the c l i en t the nature o f the lawsuit and the extent to which the c l i e n t ' s 15 Moreover, the Christiansburg rule is applicable only when the action is f r ivo lous or brought in bad fa i th . Since respondents' at torneys ' other a l leged , , , . 11/ .unreasonable and vexatious acts— did not mult i ply the proceedings or cause excess costs, § 1927 i s in a p p l i c a b l e to the f a c t s o f t h i s case and the w r i t should be d ismissed as im prov id en t ly granted. 10/ cont'd ignorance o f the c ircumstances o f the lawsu it might, i f e v e r , j u s t i f y a d i sm issa l o f the c l i e n t ' s complaint. 383 U.S at 371-374. Apart from stat ing the necessity for the attorney and the c l i en t to act in good fa i th , th is Court only went so far , in the circumstances o f that case, as to conclude that a p l a i n t i f f seeking to invoke the aid o f the j u d i c i a l p rocess must on ly "have general knowledge of the acts o f which she com plains and the connection of the defendants to those acts which she a l l e g e s . " 383 U.S at f t . 5. 11/ The f a i l u r e o f r e sp on d en t ' s a t t o rn ey s to appear at a 10:00 a.m. court meeting on Apr i l 21, 1976, was described in the docket sheet o f the d i s t r i c t court as due to " inadvertence . " 73 F.R.D. at 412 (W.D. La. 1977). Since no evidence was presented below showing that respondents' attorneys were responsible for respondent McPherson 's nonattendance at h is 16 The reason for dismissing the wr i t as impro vident ly granted is simply put. The decis ion of the Court o f Appeals, while correct in concluding that a t t o r n e y ' s fees are not a l l o w a b le under § 1927, erred in assuming that § 1927 was app l ic ab le to responden ts ' conduct as found by the d i s t r i c t court. Dismissal o f the wr i t as impro vident ly granted would allow th is Court to avoid compounding the error . On the other hand, a f a i lu re to dismiss the wr i t as improvident ly granted that is fol lowed by an award o f a t torney 's fees to p e t i t i on e r , would imply that § 1927 is appl icable to conduct con s is t ing o f a fa i lu re to prosecute. Moreover, i t would r a i s e s e r ious qu es t ions concern ing the scope and the proper appl icat ion o f § 1927. For example, i t would ra ise questions concerning what type o f conduct const i tutes a m ult ip l ica t ion o f 11/ cont'd scheduled deposit ions, his f a i lu re to appear can not be used to show that respondents' attorneys m u l t i p l i e d the p ro ceed in gs . See Thompson v. L o u is v i l l e , 362 U.S 199 (1960). 17 proceedings and what type o f acts create excess costs. In addition i t would in v i te doubt as to whether there was a need to make an ev ident iary showing o f a causal connection between the multi p l i c a t ion o f the proceedings and the vexatious and unreasonable acts or to make a showing o f a causal connection between these acts and the incurrence o f excess costs. F in a l l y , i t would ra ise a basic question o f whether the existence o f excess costs can be i n f e r r e d s o l e l y from the occurrence o f vexatious acts. In view o f the confusion which already ex is ts concerning the appl icat ion o f § 1927, see e . g . , Hanley v. Condrey, 467 F . 2d 697 (2d Cir. 1972); (the need for a hear ing ) ; Acevedo v. Immigration and Natura l izat ion Se rv ice , supra (whether double costs can be imposed); Wheeler v. Anchor Continen ta l , In c . , 20 F.E.P.C. 591 (D.S.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1116 (4th Cir. Feb. 14, 1979) (whether excess costs , including a ttorney 's fees, can be assessed in the midst o f t r i a l , whether ora l argument s a t i s f i e s the requirements for an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r in g , and whether p a r t i c u l a r 18 - conduct is vexat ious ) , adding another l e v e l o f confusion might en t i r e l y overwhelm the e f f o r t to apply § 1927 in accordance with Congressional in t en t . Besides these reasons, there is one further reason which r eq u i r e s d is m is s a l o f the w r i t . There is more than a substantial p o s s ib i l i t y that the d i s t r i c t court, acting pursuant to the judg ment o f the Court o f Appeals, w i l l , upon remand, obviate any necessity for deciding the a l lowab i l i t y o f a ttorney 's fees under § 1927. The l i k e l i hood is great since the record shows neither the existence o f excess costs nor any mult ip l ica t ion o f the p roceed ings . Given th i s l i k e l i h o o d , the w r i t should be dismised as im prov id en t ly granted.— 12/ In i t s remand order, the Court of Appeals below said § 1927 provides only for excess costs caused by the p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t o r n e y s ' v exa t ious behavior and consequent m ult ip l ica t ion o f the proceedings, and not for the to ta l costs o f the l i t i g a t i o n . 599 F .2d at 1382. 19 Moreover, the dismissal would be, g iven the nature o f the remand by the Court o f Appeals, consistent with th is Court 's p o l i c y o f not reviewing nonfinal appel late decis ions. See Brotherhood o f Locomo t i v e F i rem en & Enginemen v , Bangor & A .R .R . , 389 U.S 327 (1967); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v . Wolf Bros. & Co. , 240 U.S 251, 258 (1916). I f the Court does not dismiss the w r i t , then i t should a f f i r m the judgment o f the Court o f Appeals remanding the case f o r an e v i d e n t i a r y hearing on the question whether excess costs were incurred and whether there was a m u l t ip l ica t ion o f p roceed ings caused by r espon den ts ' a t t o r n e y s ' vexatious acts. To the extent, however, that the judgment o f the Court o f Appeals permits the d i s t r i c t court to f in d tha t excess cos ts were c rea ted as a r e s u l t o f respondent McPherson 's f a i lu re to attend his noticed deposit ions, the judgment should be reversed since no evidence was ever o f fe red showing that any such excess costs , or concomitant m ul t ip l i ca t ion o f proceedings, were caused by acts o f respondents' attorneys. See Thompson v. L o u is v i l l e , supra. 20 - I I . ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT ALLOWABLE AS ELEMENTS OF COSTS UNDER § 1927 I f th is Court decides the issue for which i t granted c e r t i o r a r i , then the judgment o f the Court o f Appeals must, on that issue, be af f i rmed. For the reasons indicated by the F i f th C ircu i t , a t t o r - 13/ney 's fees are not recoverable under § 1927.——' As the F i f th C ircu it im p l i c i t l y recognized, the scope o f the meaning o f the term "cos ts " appearing in § 1927 is ne ither enlarged nor r es t r i c t ed by the types of costs allowable under T i t l e V I I o f the C i v i l Rights Act o f 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k) and under the C i v i l Rights Attorney 's 13/ No one ser ious ly doubts that, at the time the statute was enacted, i t was not contemplated that an award o f excess costs under i t would include a t torney 's fees . C lear ly the meaning o f the term "cos ts " was l im ited to what are commonly re fe rred to as taxable costs . 1507 Corporation v, Hender son, 447 F. 2d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1976). This has been interpreted co r re c t l y to require on ly in c lu s i o n o f items o f " r e g u l a r c o s t s " as e lements o f excess cos ts under § 1927. 1507 Corporation v. Henderson, supra, 447 F,2d at 542. Accord: K i e f e l v. Las Vegas Hacienda, In c . , supra, 404 F .2d at 1166, 1170. Since at torney 's fees are not items o f regular costs under federa l costs 21 Fees Award Act o f 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.— No j u s t i f i c a t i o n e x i s t s f o r b e l i e v i n g that the meaning and a p p l i c a t i o n of. § 1927 should vary 13/ cont 'd statutes, they have been proper ly excluded from c o n s id e r a t i o n as items o f c os ts under § 1927. 1507 Corporation v. Henderson, supra, 447 F.2d at 542-43; K i e f e l v. Las Vegas Hacienda, In c . , supra, 404 F .2d at 1170. ‘ This conc lu s ion i s the on ly one which i s consistent with th is Court's decisions in Alyeska P ipel ine Serv. v. Wilderness S o c ie t y , 421 U. S 240 (1975) and Christiansburg Garment Co. v . EEOC, supra. To the extent that contrary dec is ionshave been reached in o the r cases , they have been reached without analysis o f the underlying issues. See e . g . , Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v . DASA Corp. , supra. \kj The purposes behind the c i v i l r igh ts statutes and § 1927 are d i f f e r e n t . The l a t t e r is a penal statue, United States v. Ross, supra, 535 F.2d at 350, whereas the c i v i l r ights statutes are reme d ia l . See Newman v. P igg ie Park Enterpr ises , 390 U.S 400, 402 (1968); Prandine v. National Tea Co. , 585 F .2d 47, 53 (3rd Cir. 1978); Parker v. C a l i - fano, 561 F.2d 320, 330-331 (D.C. C i r . 1977). Morever, § 1927, unlike the c i v i l r igh ts statutes, is only concerned with m u l t ip l ica t ion o f proceed ings. By contrast , the c i v i l r ights statute are, unlike § 1927, only concerned with compensating p reva i l in g part ies and with deterr ing groundless actions. 22 according to whether the action is commenced under a c i v i l r igh ts statutes or is commenced pursuant to another federa l provis ion. Moreover, allowance o f such a variance in the meaning o f the statute would produce an anamoly. I t would mean, for example, that the United States would not be a b le , in a T i t l e V I I a c t i o n , to ob ta in a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , as part o f i t s excess c o s ts under § 1927, a ga ins t a d e fe n d a n t ' s a t torney who committed vexatious acts, no matter how much those ac ts may have m u l t i p l i e d the proceedings and caused the United States to incur excess c o s t s . This r e s u l t f o l l o w s from the fact that T i t l e V I I does not authorize the United States to recover a t torney 's fees . See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Yet , defendant would be permitted to recover, in the reverse s i tuat ion , at torney 's fees as excess costs against attorneys for the United S t a t e s . Th is , however , would be an absurdity that would make a mockery o f the pur poses o f § 1927. Thus, the term "cos ts " , as i t appears in § 1927, must be interpreted uniformly and made e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to a l l a c t i o n s . 23 Even i f t h i s Court were to ho ld that a t torney 's fees are recoverable under § 1927, i t would not f o l l o w there from, that such f e es are automatically to be awarded everytime excess costs are taxed under § 1927. The question o f whether a t torney 's fees should be imposed in a par t icu lar case is a separate question from whether regular items o f costs, including excess costs , should be imposed in the case . The a l l o w a b i l i t y o f a t torney 's fees is governed by standards that are a l together d i f f e r e n t from those governing assess ment o f cos ts under, f o r example, 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See e . g . , Newman v. P igg ie Park Enter p r i s e s , supra; Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3rd Cir. 1978); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc, o f Ph i la d e lph ia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. , 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973). Thus, any r e v e r s a l o f the F i f t h C i r c u i t ' s judgment must include a remand permitt ing that court an oppor t u n i t y to fash ion standards f o r the award o f at torney 's fees under § 1927 and permitt ing that court, as wel l as the d i s t r i c t court, to determine whether respondents' at torneys ' conduct has been, 24 - in l i g h t o f a l l o f the circumstances, such as to j u s t i f y the assessment o f a t torney 's fees against them. Moreover, such a remand may be necessary, in any event, to determine whether the judgment o f the F i f th C ircu it below const ituted a f inding that respondents' attorneys ' conduct was not so v e x a t i ous and unreasonable as to r e q u i r e , in t h i s instance, an assessment o f a t torney 's fees against them and in favor of p e t i t i on e r . CONCLUSION For the reasons s ta t e d above, th i s Court should dismiss the wr it as improvidently granted, o r , in the a l t e r n a t i v e , to e i t h e r a f f i r m the judgment below or remand the action for proceed ings consistent with pr inc ip les set forth herein. R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b mi t t e d , JACK GREENBERG JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR. Suite 2030 10 Columbus C irc le New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae MEILEN PRESS INC. —• H. Y. C. 219