Brief for Appellee-Respondent
Public Court Documents
1984
126 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, Garner Working Files. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, 1984. 50fbe7ef-35a8-f011-bbd3-000d3a53d084. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/fd5d81f6-f0c1-4fcb-8217-6ba2d9601fe3/brief-for-appellee-respondent. Accessed February 12, 2026.
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Nos. 83-1035
83-1070
IN TH E
Supreme Court of tlje ®niteJ) States
October Term, 1984
The State of Tennessee Appellant,
V.
Cleamtee Garner, as father and next of kin of
Edward Eugene Garner, a deceased minor, Appellee.
Memphis Police Department;
City of Memphis, Tennessee, Petitioners,
V.
Cleamtee Garner, eisl., Respondent.
On A ^ ^ al From The United States Court O f Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit In No. 83-1035
On Writ O f Certiorari To The United States Court
O f AiH^eals For The Sixth Circuit In No. 83-1070
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE-RESPONDENT
J. LeV onne Chambers
Steven L. W inter*
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
W alter L. Bailey, Jr.
Suite 901, Tenoke Building
161 Jefferson Avenue
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
(901)521-1660
Attorney for Appellee-Respondent
*Counsel of Record
OF RAM PRINTING. HYAnSVILLE, MO <301) 864-6602
- 1 -
QUESTIONS PRESENTED— .1 |i ■■ ̂ " 1 ■ '■
1. Does the k i l l i n g of a non-
d a n g e r o u s , f l e e i n g p r o p e r t y
c r i m e s u s p e c t whom the officer
r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s to be
u n a r m e d v i o l a t e the fourth and
fourteenth amendments?
2. Does a m u n i c i p a l p o l i c y and
custom of liberal use of d e a d l y
f orce that r e s u l t s in the
excessive and unnecessary use p f
such force to stop non-
d a n g e r o u s , f l e e i n g felony
s u s p e c t s violate the fourth and
fourteenth amendments?
3. Is the Me m p h i s policy authoriz
ing the d i s c r e t i o n a r y s h o o t i n g
of n o n d a n g e r o u s , fleeing
property crime suspects racially
discriminatory?
- 11 -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS P R E S E N T E D ..................... i
TABLE OF A U T H O R I T I E S .................... v
STATEMENT OF THE C A S E .................. 1
A. The Facts of the
S h o o t i n g ......... 1
B. The Proceedings B e l o w .... 10
C. The Memphis Policy:
Liberal Use of Deadly
F o r c e .......................... 13
D. The Memphis Custom:
Racial D i s c r i m i n a t i o n..... 21
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T ..................... 31
A R G U M E N T ................................... 34
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS C O R
RECTLY BALANCED THE NATURE
OF THE INTRUSION AGAINST THE
STATE'S INTERESTS IN LAW EN
FORCEMENT AND HELD THAT THE
KILLING OF AN UNARMED, N O N
VIOLENT, FLEEING PROPERTY
CRIME SUSPECT VIOLATES THE
C O N S T I T U T I O N .................... 34
A. The Fourth Amendment Re
quires a Balancing of the
I n t e r e s t s .................... 35
- Ill -
Page
(1) The common law basis
of the doctrine no
longer supports the
reasonableness of
shooting all fleeing
f e l o n s ..................
(2) The Tennessee St a
tute's disregard
of the gravity of
the undelying offense
is a proper c o n s i d e r a
tion under the fourth
a m e n d m e n t..............
44
49
B. The Deprivation of Life
Must be Justified by
Countervailing State
I n t e r e s t s..... ........... 52
The Prohibition Against
Punishment without Due
Process Also Requires
Consideration of State
Interests Asserted in
Just i f i c a t i o n......... . . 55
D, A Balancing of the
Interests Demonstrates
that the Fleeing Felon
Doctrine is Unconstitu
tional ....... 65
(1) Apprehension of the
s u s p e c t ................. 68
(2) The crime prevention
i n t e r e s t s .............. 72
(3) The safety interests. 75
- IV -
(4) Effective law e n f o r c e
ment .....................
Page
81
II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE THE MEMPHIS POLICY
AND CUSTOM IS ONE OF LIBERAL
USE OF DEADLY FORCE THAT R E
SULTS IN THE EXCESSIVE AND
UNNECESSARY USE OF SUCH FORCE
TO STOP NONDANGEROUS, FLEEING
FELONY S U S P E C T S ................. 90
III. MEMPHIS'S POLICY AUTHORIZING
THE DISCRETIONARY SHOOTING OF
NONDANGEROUS, FLEEING PROPERTY
CRIME SUSPECTS VIOLATES THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE BECAUSE IT
INVITES AND RESULTS IN RACIAL
D I S C R I M I N A T I O N ....................
CONCLUSION
96
104
- V -
TABLES OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979).................................. 88,90
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252
( 1 9 7 7 ) .................................. 97
Ayler v. Hopper, 532 F. Supp. 198
(M.D. Ala. 1 9 8 1 ) ..................... 54
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137
( 1 9 7 9 ) ....................... 89
Barefoot v. Estelle, ____ U.S. ____,
77 L.Ed.2d 1 090 '(1 9 8 3 ) ............. 85
Beck V. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)____ 103
Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425
(6th Cir. 1 9 7 2 ) ...................... 91
Bell V. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979)........................ 55,56,64
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971 ) ............... 51,67,83
Brandon v. Holt, No. 83-1622
(p e n d i n g ) .............................. 20,93
Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 360 ( 1 9 4 9 ) ...................... 88
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
( 1 9 7 9 ) ................................. 102,103
Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6
(7th Cir. 1 9 7 2 ) ...................... 42
- VI -
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358
(D.C. Cir. 1971), r e v 'd on
other grounds, 409 U.S. 418
r r ^ T T T T T T T T T T ......................... 42
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ............................ 100,101
Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 ( 1 9 7 4 )..... 53
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
( 1 9 7 7 ) ................................ 46,74,75
Cunningham v. Ellington, 323
F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn.
1 9 7 1 )............... 91
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 29
( 1 9 7 3 ) .................................. 37
Dalia v. United States, 441
U.S. 238 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ...................... 38
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ........................... 37,41-42
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (197 9 )............................. 71,103
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981).................................. 103
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ............................. 37
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ............................. 62
Emmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 762
( 1 9 8 2 ) .................................. 75,81
Cases Page
- VI 1 -
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
, 75 L.Ed.Zd 229
T T 9 8 3 ) ....................................................... 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 1 , 7 1
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
( 1 9 7 2 ) .................................. 57,97
Garner v. Memphis Police
Department, 600 F.2d 52
(6th Cir. 1 9 7 9 ) ....................... Passim
Garner v. Memphis Police
Department, 710 F.2d 240
(6th. Cir. 1 9 8 3 ) ......................Passim
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
1 03 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ............................. 89
Giant Foods, Inc. v. Scherry,
51 Md. App. 586 544 A . 2d
483 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ............................. 86
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 253
(1976).................................. 46,74
Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d
59 (9th Cir. 1 9 74).................. 42
Hayes v. Memphis Police Dept.,
571 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1978)..... 91
Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d
1220 (8th Cir. 1 9 8 1 ) ................ 42
Howell V. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272
(3rd Cir. 1 9 7 2 )...................... 42
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
( 1 9 7 7 ).................................. 55
Cases Page
- V 1 1 1 -
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970)............................. 88
Jacobs V. City of Wichita, 531
F. Supp. 129 (D. Kan. 1 9 8 2 ) .. 54
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1 9 7 0 )..........41,42-43
Johnson v. Click, 481 F,2d 1028
(2d Cir.), cert, denied, 414
U.S. 1033 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ................ 42,54
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
( 1 9 3 8 )............................. 53
Jones V. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1 9 7 5 ) .................. 62
Kennedy v. M e n d o z a - M a r t i n e z ,
372 U.S. 144 (1 9 6 3 ) . 55,56,64-65,75
Ker V. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1 9 6 3 ) ............................. 38
Landrigan v. City of Warwick,
628 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1 9 8 0 ) .....
Leite v. City of Providence,
463 F. Supp. 585 (D.R.I. 1978)... 95
Lewis V. State, 398 So.2d 432
(Fla. 1 9 8 1 ) ...................... 79
Mattis V. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007
(8th Cir. 1976), vacated on
case and controversy qrounJs
sub noirTI Asher of t v"! Mat t i s ,
431 U.S. 1 71 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ............ 62
Cases Page
_ IX
May V. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
( 1 9 5 3 ) . . . .............................. 53
McDonard v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (19 4 8 )....................... 50
McKenna v. City of Memphis, 544
F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Tenn. 1982)... 95
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981).................................. 40
Monell V. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . . . . 95
Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338
d o t h Cir. 1 9 6 6 ) ............................... 42
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
( 1 9 8 0 ) ................................................... 4 8 , 8 6
Pruitt V. City of Montgomery,
Civ. Act. No. 83-T-903-N
(M.D. Ala. June 12, 1 9 8 4 ) ................... 89
Qualls V. Parish, 534 F.2d 690
(6th Cir. 1 9 7 6 ) ...................... 62,91
Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ------ 53,21
Rowe V. General Motors Corp., 457
F.2d 348 ( 5th Cir. 1 9 7 2 ) ........... 100
Schall V. Martin, ____ U.S. ,
81 L.Ed.2d 201 T T 9 8 4 ) ............................. 85
Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S . 757 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ................................. 3 8 , 4 2
Cases Page
- X _
Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 ( 1 9 4 5 ) .............
Cases
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
( 1 9 6 8 ) ...........................
Smith V. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209
(1982)...........................
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972)..............................
Taylor v. Collins, 574 F. Supp.
1554 (E.D. Mich. 1 9 8 3 ).........
Tefft V. Seward, 689 F.2d 637
(6th Cir. 1 9 8 2 )..............
53,57
85
92
53
48
42
Page
Terry v . O h i o , 392
U.S. 1 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ..... 36,37,38,40,41,85,103
United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 ( 1 9 7 4 ) .............. 38
United States v. City of Memphis,
Civ. Action C-7 4-286 (W.D.
Tenn. 1 9 7 4 ) .......................
United States v. Clark, 31 Fed.
710 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1887)...
United States v. New York Tele
phone, 434 U.S. 159 (1977)..
31
59-60
92
United States v. Place,
____ U.S. ___ , 77 L.Ed.
2d. 1 10 (1 9 8 3 ) ......... 37,38,42-41
United States v. Stokes, 506
F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975). 42
- XT -
United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, __ U.S. , 77
L,Ed.2d 2 T T 1 9 8 3 ) . T T T.............. 41
United States v. Villarin Gerena,
553 F.2d 723 (1st. Cir. 1 9 7 7 ) ____ 42
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
( 1 9 6 7 ) .......................... 39
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
592 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ............................. 97,100
Welsh V. Wisconsin, U.S.
____, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1 9 8 4 ) .......... 52,53
Werner v. Hartfelder, 113
Mich. App. 747, 318 N.W.
2d 825 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ......................... 88
Wil*ey V. Memphis Police
Dept., Civ. Action No.
C-73-8 (W.D. Tenn. June
30, 1975) , a f f 'd 548
F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.
1 9 7 7 ) ......................... 22,62,63,83,91
Wilkes V. Wood, 10 Howell, St.
Tr. 1 153 ( 1 7 7 3 ) ...................... 102
Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d
695 (5th Cir. 1 9 8 0 ) ................. 52,54
Woodson V. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1 9 7 6 ) ................. 57
Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1 8 8 6 ) .............. 53,96,97,104
Cases Page
- XT 1 -
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes;
U.S. Const, amend. IV.................. Passim
U.S. Const, amend. X I V ............. . Passim
42 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3 ......................... 11
Memphis City Code § 3 0 - 1 5 ............. 60
Memphis City Code § 1 - 8 . , . . .......... 60
Pub. Stats, of Tenn. §§ (Supp
1 858-1 871 ) ............................. 44
Tennessee Code Ann. § 37-102
( 1 9 7 7 ) .................................. 83
Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-3-401
( 1 9 7 3 ) .................................. 60,79
Tennessee Code Ann. § 40-808
( 1 9 7 5 ) .................................. 45,68
Other Authorities;
A.L.I, Model Penal Code Vol. II,
Art. 222.21 ........................... 78
W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES
( 1 8 0 0 ) .................................. 44
M. Blumberg, The Use of Deadly
Firearms by Police Officers:
The Impact of Individuals,
Communities, arid f^ace ( Ph . D .
Dissertation, S.U.N.Y., Albany,
Sch. of Crim. Justice Dec. 14,
1 9 8 2 ) ................................... 92
Page
- XT 1 1 -
Page
Bohlen & Schulman, Arrest With
and Without a Warrant, 75
U.Pa.L.Rev. 485 (1927)..... 58
Comment, Deadly Force to
Arrest: Triggering Con
stitutional R e v i e w , 11
Harv . Ci v . R . Civ . Lib .
L.Rev. 361 (1974)..... 44-45,46,58
Conklin and Bittner, Burglary
in a Suburb, 11 Criminology
208 (1 973)"..................... 80
W. A. Geller & K. 0. Karales,
Split Second D e c i s i o n s :
Shootings of and by Chicago
F*olice (Chicago Law En force-
ment Study Group) (1981)... 91
Holmes, The Paths of The L a w ,
1 0 Harv . L . R e v . 457
(1897)......................... 48-49
C. Kenner and 3. Anderson,
THE GUN IN AMERICA (1975) 47
"Magnum Force, Massive L aw
suits (More and More Co m
munities Urge Police to
Show Restraint)," The New
York Times, April 8, 1984,
p. 2 E, col. 4 .............. 66
Matulia, A Balance of F o r c e s :
A Report of, the Interna
tional Association of
Chiefs of Police (NaVional
Institute oT Justice 1 9 8 2 ) ..... 85,86-87
X I V -
9 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 186-87
(1931) quoted in J. Michael
& H. Wechsler, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, 80-82
n. 3 ( 1 9 4 0 ) ............................ 61
M. Myer, Police Shootings at M i n o r i
ties: The Case of Los A n g e l e s ,
52 Annals of Amer. Acad, of Pol.
& Scl. 98 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ...... .............. 92
Note, The Use of Deacjly Force
in Arizona by Police O f f i c e r s ,
1 972 L. & Soc. Order 4 8 1 ........... 58
Note, Legalized Murder of a
Fleeing Felon, 15 Va. L.
Rev. 582 ( 1 9 2 9 ) ...................... 58
R. Perkins, CRIMINAL LAW (2d e d .
1 9 6 9 ) ................................... 58
T. Reppetto, RESIDENTIAL CRIME
(1 9 7 4 ) ................................ 79,80,81
Sherman, Execution Without
Trial: Police Homocide and
the Constitution, 33 Vand.
L. Rev . 71 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ..............46,47,59,61
N. Shovell, BURGLARY AS AN
OCCUPATION ( 1 9 7 1 ) .................... 79
Staff Report to the Michigan
Civil Rights Commission
( May 1 8, l'9’81 ) . . . . . . .\ “. ............ 87
Page
- XV -
Pa^e
T. Taylor, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE
TATION ( 1 9 6 9 )....................... 45
I. Walker & N. Okihiro,
BURGLARY THE VICTIM
AND THE PUBLIC ( 1 9 7 8 ) .............. 79,80
O.Q. Wilson, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME ( 1 975) ......................... 73
Z. L. Wroth & 3, Zobel (eds.)
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
( 1 9 6 5 ) .................................. 102
- 1 -
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A . The Facts of the Shooting
Edward Eugene Garner, a fifteen-year-
old b l a c k , was shot and k i l l e d by a
M e m p h i s p o l i c e o f f i c e r on the n i ght of
October 3, 1974. He was an o b v i o u s j u v e
nile; slender of build, he weighed between
85 and 100 pounds and stood only five feet
1
and four inches high. R. 78; O.A. 64-65.
The o f f i c e r who shot him t h o u g h t that
young G a r n e r was a j u v e n i l e about seven
teen or e i g h t e e n - y e a r s - o l d . O.A. 44, 54.
̂ Citations to the Joint Appendix in this Court are
designated as O.A. . Citations to the opinions
below are to the appendix to the petition for writ
of certiorari in No. 83-1070 and are designated as
A. ____. Citations to the record below are to the
record as collected and paginated in the Joint
Appendix in the Sixth Circuit and are designated as
R.
- 2 -
The c r i t i c a l facts of the s h o o t i n g
are s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t than t h o s e
p r e s e n t e d by the a p p e l l a n t and the
petitioner. Contrary to their assertions,
State's Brief at 3-4; City's Brief at 3-4:
the o f f i c e r had no b a s i s upon which to
a s s u m e the existence of an accomplice; he
fired despite his r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f that
G a r n e r was not armed; and he fired from a
p o s i t i o n o n l y s e c o n d s away from young
G a r n e r .
On the n i g h t of O c t o b e r 3 , 1 974 ,
Officers Hymon and W r i g h t r e s p o n d e d to a
b u r g 1 a r y - i n - p r o g r e s s call at 737
Vollentine in Memphis. When they a r r i v e d
on the sce n e , the c o m p l a i n a n t was vague
and inarticulate. Officer Wright d e s c r i b
ed what occurred:
[S]he was pointing to the house next
door w h i c h we found later was 739
V o l l e n t i n e , and she was m o v i n g her
mouth but both of us were i n s i d e the
car, and, of c o u r s e , the engine was
running and c o u l d n ' t hear a n y t h i n g .
So my partner opened the door and got
out and went over to her and she was
- 3 -
s t i l l p o i n t i n g and she wasn't saying
anything. Finally, 1 was leaning over
in the s t r e e t like this to hear what
she was saying through the open door.
She said, " S o m e b o d y is b r e a k i n g in
there right now."
3.A. 75-77.
O f f i c e r H y m o n d e s c r i b e d the i n t e r
c h a n g e with the c o m p l a i n a n t in s i m i l a r
terms, n o t i n g that he did not understand
her to be saying that there was more than
one burglar.
When we a r r i v e d , the -- lady was
s t a n d i n g in the door at 737 Vol-
lentine, and she was pointing towards
739 V o l l e n t i n e , and she was, you
know, j u s t making a gesture with her
finger, p o i n t i n g in that d i r e c t i o n .
And I a s k e d her what she was saying,
and she m a d e a n o t h e r g e s t u r e , made
some type of gesture with her mouth,
and I couldn't u n d e r s t a n d her, so I
went up to the p o rch and asked her
what she was s a y i n g . R o u g h l y I
recall her s a y i n g , "They are breaking
inside."
Q. You used the term "They are
breaking in." Did you u n d e r s t a n d her
to be s a y i n g that there were several
people inside the house?
A. I d on't r e a l l y t h i n k she
knew. I t h i n k that she -- I t h i n k
that she m i g h t have m e n t i o n e d that
she had heard some glass b r e a k i n g or
something, and she knew that somebody
- 4 -
wa s b r e a k i n g in. I don't think that
the plural form had any indication of
her k n o w i n g .
3 . A. 37-38 (emphasis added).
Hymon went a r o u n d the near side of
the house, his r e v o l v e r dra w n , w h i l e
Wright went a r o u n d the far side. Hymon
reached the backyard first, where he heard
a door slam and saw s o m e o n e run from the
b a c k of the hou s e . He l o c a t e d young
Garner with his f l a s h l i g h t : Garner was
c r o u c h e d next to a six-foot cyclone fence
at the b a c k of the yard a b o u t 30 to 40
feet away from Hymon. See 3.A. 30. From
this vantage, Hymon was able to see one or
b o t h of G a r n e r ' s hands. Compare 3.A. 41
with 3.A . 56.
The s t a t e and city both recite that
Hymon c o u l d not tell w h e t h e r Garner was
armed. S t a t e ' s B r i e f at 3; City's Brief
at 4.
- 5 -
This c a n a r d is r e f u t e d by the
re c o r d . Hymon t e s t i f i e d that he was
" r e a s o n a b l y sure that the individual was
not a r m e d . " J.A. 41. On d i r e c t e x a m i n a
tion, the c i t y ' s a t t o r n e y a s k e d Hymon:
"Did you know p o s i t i v e l y whether or not
he was a r m e d ? " J.A. 56 (emphasis added).
He a n s w e r e d : "I a s s u m e d he w a s n ' t . . . . "
3
Id.
The City is less than candid with the Court. In
its brief in the Sixth Circuit, it admitted that
Garner "did not appear to be armed." Brief for
Appellees at 7.
Hymon's conclusion that Garner was unarmed was
based on several objective facts. Hymon noted that
"had he been armed, I assume that he would have
attempted to show that by firing a weapon, or I
assume that he would have thrown it down, or I
assume that I would have seen it." J.A. 41-42. He
went on to explain: "I figured, well, if he is armed
I'm standing out in the light and all of the light
is on me the[n] I assume he would have made some
kind of attempt to defend himself...." J.A. 56.
This conclusion is also corroborated by Hymon's
actions. He did not warn his partner that the
suspect might be armed, something he "definitely"
would have done "if he had any question about
whether this person was armed." J.A. 42. He did not
fear for his personal safety either. Otherwise, as
he admitted, "I would have taken more cover than
what I had." Id. Rather, he knowingly remained in
a position wfiFre "all of the light is on me" and
where he was a superior target. J.A. 56.
W h i l e young G a r n e r c r o u c h e d in
Hymon's flashlight beam, Hymon i d e n t i f i e d
himself and ordered Garner to halt. Garner
paused a few m o m e n t s d u r i n g w h i c h Hymon
4
made no attempt to advance, but continued
to aim his revolver at Garner. The r e c o r d
l e a v e s l i t t l e d o u b t that, at this point,
Hymon n e g l e c t e d the o p p o r t u n i t y to
a p p r e h e n d Garner without resort to deadly
force.
The c i t y s t a t e s as fact that "there
were s e v e r a l o b s t a c l e s , i n c l u d i n g a
c l o t h e s l i n e and other objects outlined in
the dark, b e t w e e n the o f f i c e r and the
s u s p e c t , m a k i n g p u r s u i t almost certainly
f u t i l e . . . . " C i t y ' s B r i e f at 4. But the
r e c o r d s h o w s that the o b s t a c l e s were
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . There was a three foot
- 6 -
^ Hymon testified that he did no more than take "a
couple of steps," J.A. 51, "which wasn't, you know,
far enough to make a difference." R. 256. Officer
Wright testified that when he rounded the corner of
the house after the shot, Hymon "was standing
still___ " O.A. 79.
- 7 -
c h i c k e n wire fence. 3 . A. 31. C h i e f
Detective Dan Jones of the S h e l b y C o u n t y
S h e r i f f ' s D e p a r t m e n t , who i n s p e c t e d the
site, t e s t i f i e d that it was "no g r eat
distance in the first place, and the fence
would have been very easy to get over . . .
for that o f f i c e r or me e i t h e r , b e c a u s e
w e ' r e both t a l l . " R. 296. See also R .
2 7 6 - 7 9 , 2 5 4 - 5 5 , 292. H y m o n t e s t i f i e d
several times that, after he shot Garner,
he stepped over the fence without problem.
R. 245, 251 , 651 . As for the o t her
o b s t a c l e s , H y m o n ' s t e s t i m o n y was u n a m
biguous
Q.
A.
Once you started moving from the
west side of the h o u s e over to
the east and to the c y c l o n e
fence, how long do you think it
took you?
Well, it didn't take me long. I
almost got my neck hung on the
clothesline wire. It didn't take
me very long, just a m a t t e r of
ducking and moving around.
- 8 -
J.A. 58. In fact, his partner testified
that after Hymon shot Garner, it only took
Hymon "three or four seconds" to reach the
b o d y . J .A . 79 .
W h i l e H y m o n p a u s e d w i t h o u t g i v i n g
5
c h a s e . G a r n e r bolted, attempting to jump
the fence. Hymon fired, s t r i k i n g young
G a r n e r in the head. G a r n e r fell, draped
over the fence. He did not die imme-
Several record facts bear on Garner's attempt to
escape. First, Garner had prior brushes with the
law that, although minor, had been the occasion for
discipline by his parents. At the age of 12, he and
two other boys illegally entered the house in whose
yard they were playing. J.A. 68. He was placed on
probation for one year, id., and counseled and
chastised by his father. J.A. 28. In June of 1974,
he took a jar of pennies from a neighbor's house.
Although the neighbor refused to call the police
because the incident was so minor, the Garner family
insisted and called the police themselves. R. 88-89;
J.A. 70.
On the night of his death, Edward Eugene Garner's
judgment was further impaired by the fact that he
was intoxicated. The medical examiner testified
that fifteen-year-old Garner had a blood alcohol
content of .09%, just .01% under that set by
Tennessee law as creating a presumption of intoxi
cation for adults. J.A. 66; R. 461. According to the
medical examiner, this is the equivalent of about
four beers. R. 461.
- 9 -
d i a t e l y ; w h e n the p a r a m e d i c s a r r i v e d on
the s c e n e "he was h o l d i n g his head and
just t h r a s h i n g about on the ground," R,
141, "hollering, you know, from the pain."
R. 137. Edward Eugene Garner died on the
operating table. R. 153.
There was no one at h o m e when the
house was broken into. After the s h o o t
ing, the p o l i c e found that young Garner
had ten d o l l a r s and a coin p u r s e t a k e n
from the h o u s e . R. 737. The o wner of
the h o use t e s t i f i e d that the only items
m i s s i n g were a coin purse containing ten
dollars and a ring belonging to his wife,
but that the ring was n e v e r found. The
ten dollars were returned. 3.A. 34-35.
Plaintiff called two expert witnesses
-- Chief Detective Dan Jones of the Shelby
C o u n t y S h e r i f f ' s Department and Inspector
Eugene Barksdale, former c o m m a n d e r of the
p e r s o n a l c r i m e s b u r e a u of the M e m p h i s
P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t -- to testify about the
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of H y m o n ' s use of d e a d l y
force. As the district court found:
The substance of such t e s t i m o n y was
to the effect that Hymon should first
have e x h a u s t e d r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a
t i v e s such as g i v i n g c h a s e and
determining whether he had a r e a s o n
able o p p o r t u n i t y to apprehend him in
some other fashion before firing his
w e a p o n .
A. 8. Both J o n e s and B a r k s d a l e testified
that Hymon "should have tried to apprehend
him," R. 278, 375; B a r k s d a l e added that
"In all p r o b a b i l i ty he c o u l d have a p p r e
hended the subject without having to shoot
6
him...." R. 373.
B . The Proceedings Below
On April 8, 1975, C l e a m t e e Gar n e r
filed this a c t i o n for d a m a g e s for his
s o n ’s deat h . J.A. 5. On August 18, 1975,
- 10 -
The only witness to testify that the officer was
justified in using his gun was Memphis police
Captain Coletta, who had both trained Hymon and sat
on the review board that condoned the shooting. R.
506, 507-09. Even so, his opinion was based on an
assumption not supported by the facts: that Hymon
was "physically barred from the area by a fence." R.
532.
- 11 -
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i s m i s s e d the City of
Memphis and the Memphis Police D e p a r t m e n t
as d e f e n d a n t s u n der § 1983. After trial,
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t e n t e r e d a m e m o r a n d u m
o p i n i o n r e n d e r i n g j u d g m e n t for the
d e f e n d a n t s .
Mr. G a r n e r a p p e a l e d . The c ourt of
appeals r e v e r s e d and r e m a n d e d the case
for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n in light of Monel 1 v .
D e p a r t m e n t of Social S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S.
658 (1978). One of the questions that it
l i s t e d for c o n s i d e r a t i o n on r e m a n d was
w h e t h e r "a m u n i c i p a l i t y ' s use of deadly
force u nder T e n n e s s e e law to c a p t u r e
allegedly nondangerous felons fleeing from
n o n v i o l e n t c r i m e s [is] c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
p e r m i s s i b l e u nder the f ourth, sixth,
eighth and fourteenth amendments?" Garner
V . M e m p h i s P o l i c e D e p t . , 600 F.2d 52, 55
(6th Cir. 1979); A. 18. It also remanded
for c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the q u e s t i o n of
- 12 -
M e m p h i s ' s "policy or custom" for purposes
of l i a b i l i t y u n d e r M o n e 11 . 600 F.2d at
55; A. 19.
On r e m a n d , the district court denied
p l a i n t i f f the o p p o r t u n i t y to i n t r o d u c e
additional evidence on the question of the
M e m p h i s " p o l i c y or c u s t o m , " to s u b m i t an
o f f e r of p r o o f , or to s u b m i t a b r i e f on
the m e r i t s ; it e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t for the
defendants. A. 20. On plaintiff's motion
to r e c o n s i d e r , the c o u r t a l l o w e d the
s u b m i s s i o n of a b r i e f and offer of proof
and then a g a i n e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t for the
d e f e n d a n t s . A. 31. The court of appeals
r e v e r s e d . It held that the T e n n e s s e e
s t a t u t e , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-808 (1975),
violated the fourth amendment and the due
p r o c e s s c l a u s e "because it authorizes the
u n n e c e s s a r i l y s e v e r e and e x c e s s i v e , and
t h e r e f o r e u n r e a s o n a b l e , " use of d e a d l y
force to effect the " a r r e s t " of u n a r m e d ,
n o n v i o l e n t , f l e e i n g felony suspects such
- 13 -
as p l a i n t i f f ' s son, 710 F.2d at 241; A.
40-41. R e h e a r i n g and r e h e a r i n g en banc
w e r e d e n i e d on S e p t e m b e r 26, 1983. 710
F.2d at 240; A. 58.
C . The Memphis Policy: Liberal Use
of Deadly Force
When E d w a r d E u g e n e G a r n e r was shot
and killed on October 3, 1974, he was the
one hundred and eighth (108th) non-violent
property crime suspect shot at by M e m p h i s
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s s ince J a n u a r y 1969. R.
1 4 5 8 - 6 9 . The r e c o r d b e f o r e the Court
p a i n t s a p i c t u r e of a p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t
that arms and trains its officers to shoot
to kill, e n c ourages them to rely on their
r e v o l v e r s r a t h e r than to e x h a u s t o ther
a l t e r n a t i v e s , and a s s u r e s them that they
may do so w i t h o u t g u i d e l i n e s and with
impunity.
B e c a u s e of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
decision not to allow further h e a r i n g s on
rem a n d , the record on the question of the
M e m p h i s p o l i c y or custom is a hybrid. It
c o n s i s t s of the e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d at the
1976 trial and the offer of proof tendered
7
on remand. But despite the nature of the
record and the lack of findings below, it
is c l e a r that M e m p h i s ’s use of d e a d l y
force to s t o p n o n d a n g e r o u s s u s p e c t s is
- 14 -
extreme •
At the 1976 trial. p l a i n t i f f ca lied
Captain Coletta, who was r e s p o n s i b l e for
the d e p a r t m e n t ' s recru:. t t r aini n g and
ammun i t ion p o l i c i e s . He t e s t i f i e d tl-1 a t ,
in the • y e a r s i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g the
^ Organized in fifteen parts, the offer of proof
includes affidavits of expert witnesses who would
have been called to testify, J.A. 81-105; excerpts
from prior federal cases against the Memphis Police
Department that illuminate Memphis's actual policies
and customs regarding the use of deadly force, R.
798-1019, 1409-57, 1460-69, 1477-1601, 1614-1891;
excerpts from the report of the Tennessee Advisory
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
which was based on hearings on civil rights abuses
by the Memphis Police Department, R. 1050-58; the
deadly force policies of 44 major municipalities,
R. 1108-1368; the training materials for the New
York Police Department, R. 1369-1408; and an excerpt
from an LEAA publication on deadly force that
details police training procedures used in other
cities but not in Memphis. R. 1602-13.
- 15 -
G a r n e r s h o o t i n g , M e m p h i s t w i c e u p g r a d e d
its a m m u n i t i o n to b u l l e t s with g r e a t e r
velocity, accuracy, and predicted wounding
power. R. 41 3-1 6 , 4 2 5 - 2 7 , 447. It
f i n a l l y s e l e c t e d the 125 g r a i n , s e m i -
j a c k e t e d , h o l l o w - p o i n t R e m i n g t o n . Both
C o l e t t a and the S h e l b y C o u n t y m e d i c a l
examiner testified that this b u l l e t is a
" d u m - d u m " b u l l e t b a n n e d in international
use by the Hague C o n v e n t i o n of 1899
b e c a u s e it is d e s i g n e d to p r o d u c e more
grievous wounds. R. 487-88, 572. This is
the bullet that killed young Garner.
Coletta also t e s t i f i e d that M e m p h i s
r e c r u i t s are t a u g h t to aim at the torso,
or "center mass," w h er e vital o r g a n s are
m o r e l i k e l y to be hit. R. 3 57-58. See
8
also R. 1597, 1807-08. Together with the
Captain Coletta testified that the reason for
teaching recruits to aim for the torso is not
related to police safety; it did not create a better
chance of neutralizing a dangerous suspect. R.
353-57. Rather, it is taught solely because the
torso presents a greater target and thus reduces the
chances of missing. R. 357-58.
use of " d u m - d u m " bullets, this creates a
far greater risk that the r e s u l t i n g w ound
will be fatal. Indeed, in a p r ior case,
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t found that M e m p h i s
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s " w ere t r a i n e d w h e n e v e r
they use t h e i r f i r e a r m s to 'shoot to
k i l l . ' " W i l e y v, M e m p h i s P o l i c e D e p t , ,
548 F.2d 1247, 1250 (6th Cir. 1977).
The policies, practices, and c u s t o m s
of the Memphis Police Department encourage
quick r e s o r t to the use of d e a d l y force
w i t h o u t a p r o p e r e f f o r t to exhaust other
a l t e r n a t i v e s . C a p t a i n C o l e t t a t e s t i f i e d
that the department used the film "Shoot -
Don't S h o o t , " w h ich p r e s e n t s only a rmed
f l e e i n g f e l o n s in its situational illus
t r a t i o n s of the fl e e i n g felon rule, R,
9
3 2 9 - 3 2 ; that t h e r e was no t r a i n i n g in
- 16 -
^ The heavy reliance on the "Shoot-Don't Shoot" film
encourages the use of firearms because, as plain
tiff's expert Chief Bracey would have testified, it
has a negative effect on an inexperienced recruit,
making him jumpy and more likely to employ deadly
force, 3.A. 88,
a l t e r n a t i v e s that s h o u l d be e x h a u s t e d
before resorting to d e a d l y force to stop
u n a r m e d f l e e i n g fel o n y suspects, R. 340;
that the d e p a r t m e n t ' s f i r e a r m s m a n u a l
d e t a i l s f i r e a r m s t e c h n i q u e s , but not
techniques to avoid the ne ed for the use
of weapons, R. 344-45; and that the use of
d e a d l y force to stop f l e e i n g f e l o n y
s u s p e c t s is left to the i n d i v i d u a l
officer's discretion: recruits are s i m p l y
told that t h e y must live with themselves
if they kill a p erson. R. 326, 345;
accord R. 195-96, 901, 956, 1797.
M o r e o v e r , the f i r e a r m t r a i n i n g and
a m m u n i t i o n p o l i c i e s of the d e p a r t m e n t
create the indelible impression on Memphis
o f f i c e r s that the d e p a r t m e n t e n c o u r a g e s
use of d e a d l y force. Plaintiff's expert,
10
Chief William R. Bracey, explained that a
- 17 -
At the time of his affidavit, William R. Bracey was
Chief of Patrol of the New York Police Department
with supervisory authority over all 17,500 uniformed
personnel of the New York Police Department. He
would also have testified: that guidelines and
" d e f i n i t e m e s s a g e was t r a n s m i t t e d when
[ M e m p h i s ] r e i t e r a t e d its p o l i c y of
s h o o t i n g ’to stop' and at the same time
introduced the use of dum-dum bullets. The
message transmitted to line officers would
seem to suggest the d e p a r t m e n t ' s s u p p o r t
of firearm use." 3.A. 87.
Lest this p o l i c y not be c l e a r l y
u n d e r s t o o d , M e m p h i s t a k e s two fu r t h e r
steps to assure its officers that they may
r e a d i l y r e s o r t to d e a d l y force: It
p r o v i d e s o u t s p o k e n and u n q u e s t i o n i n g
p u b l i c s u p p o r t for the s h o o t e r and
- 18 -
committed enforcement of those guidelines by the
police hierarchy will lead to reductions in the use
of unnecessary deadly force; that New York has
reduced firearms discharges by 50% by these means;
that the result of this reduction has been the
increased safety of New York Police Department
officers with fewer assaults on officers and fewer
deaths; that law enforcement has been unhampered;
that training, including training in alternatives
to minimize the need for use of deadly force, and
discipline are the keys to reducing unnecessary
deadly force; that shooting unarmed fleeing felons
is related to the officer's subjective notions of
punishment; and that the Memphis policies of
shooting fleeing property crime suspects, use of
"dum-dum" bullets, and training and discipline were
all deficienl. XA. 81-89.
r e s o l u t e l y r e f u s e s to d i s c i p l i n e its
o f f i c e r s for the use of t h e i r r e v o l v e r s
under any circumstances.
In J a n u a r y 1972, for e x a m p l e ,
f o u r t e e n - y e a r “ o 1 d Eddie Lee M a d i s o n , a
black, was shotgunned in the back. He and
a friend had stolen a car to joyride. They
were stopped by the p o l i c e at 1 1 : 0 0 P,M,
in downtown Memphis, Eddie Madison bolted
from the d r i v e r ’s side and ran. N e i t h e r
o f f i c e r g a v e c h a s e down the v i r t u a l l y
empty s t r e e t . Both o p e n e d fire, d e s p i t e
the fact that the a c c o m p l i c e was already
in c u s t o d y and thus c o u l d ha ve p r o v i d e d
M a d i s o n ' s i d e n t i t y to the p o l i c e . Five
days later, the m a y o r i s s u e d a s t a t e m e n t
d e f e n d i n g the s h o o t i n g , s a y i n g that the
officers' conduct was "in line with bo th
p r e v i o u s p o l i c y and in li ne with any
future policy that may be d e v e l o p e d , " R,
1632, 1 8 2 5 - 2 8 , N e v e r t h e l e s s , the mayor
subsequently a d m i t t e d in d e p o s i t i o n that
- 19 -
he found the use of force in that s itua
tion e x c e s s i v e and that he a m e n d e d the
p o l i c y to p r o h i b i t such shootings. O.A.
1 0 8 - 1 1 4 . See O.A. 1 4 0 - 4 4 ( a m e n d e d
11
policy) .
P e r h a p s e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t is the
M e m p h i s p o l i c y never to d i s c i p l i n e
officers for the use of deadly force under
any c i r c u m s t a n c e s . No M e m p h i s p o l i c e
o f f i c e r has ever been disciplined for the
use of his gun. R. 547 , 1 858 . The ,
civilian complaint procedures are designed
12
to d e t e r c o m p l a i n t s . R. 1050-58. And,
as detailed in the record before the Court
in B r a n d o n v. H o l t , No. 83-1622, various
o t h e r p o l i c i e s of the d e partment and the
City Civil Service Commission r e s u l t in a
- 20 -
The Memphis policy was again amended in 1979 to
prohibit the shooting of juveniles, like Madison and
Garner, except in defense of life. O.A. 120-21,
150.
^2 There is a rule that all complainants must take a
polygraph while no officer is ever required to. The
procedures also require that the officer against
whom a charge is made must immediately be notified
of the complainant's name and address. R. 1050-58.
- 21 -
d i s c i p l i n a r y s i t u a t i o n that, as c h a r a c
t e r i z e d by f o r m e r D i r e c t o r of P o l i c e
C h a p m a n , is best described as "hopeless."
Brief for Petitioners, Elizabeth B r a n d o n ,
et al., at 12-18.
As a result, Memphis officers get the
c l e a r m e s s a g e that they can use d e a d l y
force with impunity. The proximate result
is the e x c e s s i v e use of d e a d l y force in
s i t u a t i o n s wh en it is not n e c e s s a r y in
or der to a p p r e h e n d the s u b j e c t . As the
court of appeals noted in this case, Hymon
shot young Garner pursuant to the M e m p h i s
p o l i c y " w h i c h allows an officer to kill a
fleeing felon rather than run the risk of
a l l o w i n g him to escape apprehension." 600
F.2d at 54; A. 16.
D . The Memphis Custom; Rapial
Discrimination
On r e m a n d , r e s p o n d e n t m a d e an
e x t e n s i v e p r o f f e r r e g a r d i n g the r a c i a l
b a s i s of the Memphis policy countenancing
the s h o o t i n g of f l e e i n g , n o n v i o l e n t ,
p r o p e r t y c r i m e s u s p e c t s . The offer of
proof contains the raw data concerning all
arrests in Memphis between 1963 and 1974,
R. 1409-57, 1767-68; data on all shootings
of fleeing property crime suspects between
1969 and 1974, R. 1 4 6 0 - 6 9 ; d a t a on all
those k i l l e d by M e m p h i s p o l i c e o f f i c e r s
13
between 1969 and 1976, R. 1764-67, 1071;
prior analysis of this data by a s t a t i s t i
cian, R. 1769-77, and his testimony at an
earlier trial regarding this a n a l y s i s , R.
1 5 5 9 - 6 2 , 1589-92; historical data re gard
ing race d i s c r i m i n a t i o n by the M e m p h i s
P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t from 1874 t h r o u g h the
m i d - n i n e t e e n - s e V e n t i e s , i n c l u d i n g the
d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y of the m a y o r and
police d i r e c t o r s u p p o r t i n g this c o n c l u
sion, R. 908-910; J.A. 116-19, 135-38; R.
- 22 -
All of the foregoing data was collected and provided
by the Memphis Police Department as defendant in
Wiley V. Memphis Police Dept., Civ. Action No.
C-73-8 (W.D. Tenn. June 30, 1975), aff'd , 548 F.2d
1247 (6th Cir. 1977).
1 5 3 9 - 4 0 , 1571-75, 1646-56, 1677-78, 1690,
1828-29; and the affidavit of p l a i n t i f f ’s
14
expert. Dr. James J, Fyfe, which analyzed
in d e t a i l the a r r e s t and s h o o t i n g da ta
c o n t a i n e d in the o f fer of p r o o f . J.A.
97-106.
The d a t a reve a l that t h e r e are
s i g n i f i c a n t d i s p a r i t i e s in the use of
d e a d l y f orce b a s e d on the ra ce of the
shooting victim/suspect and that virtually
all of this disparity occurs as the result
of the Memphis policy that allows officers
to e x e r c i s e t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n to shoot
fleeing property c rime s u s p e c t s . B e t w e e n
1969 and 1976, blacks constituted IU .6% of
- 23 -
^^ D r . Fyfe is a former New York Police Department
lieutenant and training officer. He designed a
firearms trainings program for the New York Police
Department in which over 20,000 officers have
participated. His doctoral thesis concerned the use
of deadly force by New York Police Department
officers. He is an associate professor at The
American University in Washington, D.C., and has
served as a consultant on the deadly force issue for
the United States Department of Justice and the
Civil Rights Commission. J.A. 97-99. He also
teaches courses at the F.B.I. National Academy at
Quantico, Va.
- 24 -
t h o s e a r r e s t e d for p r o p e r t y c r i m e s in
M em ph is but 88.4?^ of the p r o p e r t y c r i m e
s u s p e c t s shot at by the M e m p h i s police.
In c o n t r a s t , the p e r c e n t a g e of b l a c k
violent crime suspects shot at by Memphis
police was closely p roportiona te to t h eir
p e r c e n t a g e in the v i o l e n t c r i m e a r r e s t
population: 85.4?o and 83.1%, respectively.
R. 1773.
Dr. Fyfe r e v i e w e d this da ta and
concluded that, controlling for d i f f e r e n
tial r a c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the arrest
population, black property c rime s u s p e c t s
we re m o r e than twice as likely to be shot
at than w h i t e s (4.33 per 1 000 b l a c k
p r o p e r t y c r i m e a r r e s t s ; 1.81 per 1000
white property crime arrests), four t i m e s
m o r e l i k e l y to be w o u n d e d (.586 per 1000
b la ck s; . 1113 per 1000 w h i t e s ) , and 40%
m o r e l i k e l y to be k i l l e d (.63 per 1000
b l a c k s ; .45 per 1 000 w h i t e s ) . O.A.
101-02.
C o m p a r i s o n of s h o o t i n g s by M e m p h i s
police officers while controlling for race
of the s h o o t i n g v i c t i m and the nature of
the incident p r o v i d e d s i m i l a r l y s t r i k i n g
data. Dr. Fyfe's analysis of the shooting
incidents between 1969 and 1976 d e s c r i b e d
by the M e m p h i s P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t to the
Civil Rights Commission showed a d r a m a t i c
disparity between the situations in which
w h i t e s were k i l l e d and t h o s e in w h i c h
b l a c k s were kil l e d . Of the b l a c k s shot,
50?o were unarmed and nonassault ive , 2 3 . 1 ?o
- 25 -
assaultive but not armed with a gun, 26.9
assaultive and armed with a gun. Of the
w h i t e s shot, on ly one ( 12.5%) was non-
assaultive, two (25%) were a s s a u l t i v e but
not armed with a gun, and five (62.5%)
15
were armed with a gun.
Dr. Fyfe noted that: "These are certainly dramatic
differences, but no measure of their significance is
possible ... because the only statistically signi
ficant category of whites killed is those armed with
guns." J.A. 104.
B a s e d on this data, Dr. Fyfe c o n
clu ded that, d u r i n g the p e r i o d in q u e s
tion, M e m p h i s police were far more likely
to s h o o t b l a c k s than w h i t e s in
non-threatening circumstances and that the
great disparity in blacks shot by M e m p h i s
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s is l a r g e l y accounted for
by the policy a l l o w i n g the d i s c r e t i o n a r y
s h o o t i n g of n o n - d a n g e r o u s fleeing felony
suspects. Between 1969 and 1976, M e m p h i s
p o l i c e k i l l e d 2.6 unarmed, non-assaultive
blacks for each armed, a s s a u l t i v e wh ite.
3. A. 102-04.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , in its
p o s t - r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n or der, A. 31,
r e j e c t e d Dr. F y f e ' s c o n c l u s i o n s on the
basis of several u n s u p p o r t ab 1 e c o n s i d e r a
tions. It noted Dr. Fyfe's "bias," A. 34,
16
without ever having seen him testify. It
- 26 -
The district court's "bias" finding was based on
Dr. Fyfe's disagreement with the Memphis policy
allowing the use of deadly force against non-
dangerous suspects. This "bias," however, is the
official policy of the F.B.I. and numerous metro-
- 27
a t t a c k e d Dr. F y f e ' s c o n c l u s i o n s because,
it c l a i m e d , he failed to " s p e c i f y the
ac tu a l n u m b e r of b l a c k s a r r e s t e d and/or
convicted for alleged ’property crimes' as
compared to whites during this period." A.
32. But, as discussed above. Dr. F y f e ' s
a n a l y s i s s p e c i f i c a l l y " c o n t r o l s for
differential i n v o l v e m e n t among the r a c e s
in p r o p e r t y cri m e . " 1• • y O •A. 101; i n d e e d ,
the data on w h ich D r . Fyfe r e l i e d was
i n c l u d e d in the offer 0 f p r o o f and
provided the actual numb e r 0 f both w h i t e
and b l a c k property crime arrests together
with the raw da ta of all a r r e s t s . R.
1 4 0 9- 57 , 1 7 6 7 - 6 8 . The d i s t r i c t court
questioned the d e l i n e a t i o n of " ' p r o p e r t y
crime' in the Fyfe definition." A. 32. But
the d e l i n e a t i o n b e t w e e n p r o p e r t y c r i m e s
and v i o l e n t crimes that Dr. Fyfe employed
was that m a d e by the M e m p h i s Poli c e
politan police departments as disparate as New York,
Atlanta, and Charlotte, North Carolina. See R. 1113,
1200, 1293, 1869.
D e p a r t m e n t and i n c l u d e d with the arrest
statistics. R. 1559, 1767-68. In numerous
s i m i l a r w ays, the d i s t r i c t c o u r t simply
m i s a p p r e h e n d e d Dr. F y f e ' s p r o f f e r e d
17
t e s t i m o n y .
- 28 -
For example, in questioning Dr. Fyfe's observation
that the incidence of use of deadly force in
property crime arrests in Memphis far exceeded that
in New York, the district court noted that;
"Professor Fyfe admitted his comparison was not
'precise' in respect to property crimes compa
rison." A. 32 n. 1. But Dr. Fyfe accounted for this
imprecision in a way that favored Memphis. His
"admission" was that;
More than half (50.7 percent) of the police
shootings in Memphis during 1969-1974 involved
shooting at property crime suspects. The
comparable percentage in 1971-1976 in New York
was no more than 11.8 percent. This compa
rison is not precise because the New York City
figure includes all shootings to "prevent or
terminate crimes." Thus, it includes shoot
ings precipitated by both property crimes and
crimes of violence. My estimate of the
percentage of New York City police shootings
which involved property crime suspects only is
four percent.
J.A. 100.
Similarly, in arguing that Dr, Fyfe failed to
control for disparate racial involvement in the
underlying felonies, the district court alleged that
Dr. Fyfe "concedes elsewhere that there is also
'differential racial involvement in police shoot
ings.'" A. 32. What Dr. Fyfe said, however, is
that; "In New York City, differential racial
M o r e o v e r , the d i s t r i c t court failed
to consider that the historical background
of the M e m p h i s Police Department c orrobo
rates the inference of discrimination that
a r i s e s from the s t a t i s t i c s . The d e p a r t
ment's history is one of entrenched racism
in employment, promotion, and law enforce-
18
ment. The department was repeatedly the
agent of e n f o r c e m e n t of the s e g r e g a t i o n
laws in the 60's, R. 1539-40, engaging in
r a c i a l a b u s e and b r u t a l i t y d u r i n g the
sanitation strike in 1968, R. 1571-75. A
1970 N A A C P Ad Hoc C o m m i t t e e Report
c o n c l u d e d that: "the most common form of
address by a Memphis policeman to a b l a c k
- 29 -
involvement in police shootings also exists, but
[unlike Memphis] it is almost totally accounted for
by differential racial involvement in the types of
activities likely to precipitate shootings." J.A.
101- 02 .
^^ As long ago as 1874, a "Resolution asking Police
Board to put 20 colored men on force, lost by vote
16-3" before the City Council. R, 1646.
p e r s o n a p p e a r s to be 'nigger.'" R. 1671.
As acknowledged by Director C h a p m a n , "the
'Hey, boy' s y n d r o m e ... l a s t e d [in the
M e m p h i s p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t ] l o n g e r , but
lasted there only because it was perceived
by the department as being accepted by the
m a j o r i t y of t h i s c o m m u n i t y . " J.A. 136.
This was still true in 1974, when Garn e r
19
was shot.
In 1974, b l a c k s m a d e up only 10% of
the force and o n l y 3.1% of the o f f i c e r s
ov er l i e u t e n a n t (t here were no b l a c k s
higher than c a p t a i n ) in a c i t y that was
a l m o s t 40% b l a c k . R. 169. See also R.
- 30 -
As the mayor testified;
The black community, speaking generally and in
a broad sense, perceives the police department
as having consistently brutalized them, almost
their enemy instead of their friend....
[T]alking about in 1972, what you say is abso
lutely true and I would say almost across the
board.
R. 1828-29; accord J.A. 118-119 (police director
testified thatl ‘'There is a basis in fact for the
^ist^yst o^ t̂ he ,{3̂ 1ack community.... Q. And 1974?
910; J.A, 136. This i s o l a t e d m i n o r i t y
conformed its behavior to the departmental
et h i c ; as d i r e c t o r C h a p m a n t e s t i f i e d in
1979, he "had equal p r o b l e m s with the
b l a c k o f f i c e r s in t erms of the b l a c k
officers trying to out red-neck the w h i t e
o f f i c e r s . , . . I m e a n t h a t ' s l i t e r a l l y
[sic] what we had." J.A. 137,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This ca se is not about the power "to
use whatever force is reasonably necessary
to e f f e c t the a r r e s t of a s u s p e c t , "
State's Brief at 14, nor "to l a w f u l l y use
d e a d l y force to apprehend." City's Brief
at 14. Rather, it is about the ability of
the p o l i c e to use force that is intended
and likely to re sult in d e a t h to p r e v e n t
the e s c a p e of u n a r m e d , n o n v i o l e n t , and
- 31 -
20
20 That same year, an employment discrimination lawsuit
brought by the Department of Justice was settled.
The consent decree was designed to increase the
hiring and promotion of black officers. United
States V. City of Memphis, Civ. Action No. C-74-286
(W.D. tenn. 1974).
n o n d an g e r o u s fleeing felony suspects when
the officer believes that he cannot effect
an arrest: in short, "if the killing of a
n o n - v i o l e n t f l e e i n g f e l o n y s u s p e c t
d e p r i v e s the s u s p e c t of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
g u a r a n t e e s . " S t a t e ' s B r i e f at 18. It
does. W h e t h e r a n a l y z e d in t erms of the
fou rt h a m e n d m e n t , the r i g h t not to be
d e p r i v e d of life w i t h o u t due process, or
the prohibition of punishment w i t h o u t due
p r o c e s s , the t a k i n g of life u nder these
circumstances is d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to and
e x c e s s i v e in light of the state interests
a s s e r t e d in j u s t i f i c a t i o n . While the
common law fleeing felon doctrine may have
made sense at the time of its d e v e l o p m e n t
and, even, as late as the n i n e t e e n t h
century, modern c o n d i t i o n s ha ve r e n d e r e d
the practice unreasonable and excessive. A
m a j o r i t y of the s t a t e s and the o v e r
w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y of m u n i c i p a l p o l i c e
d e p a r t m e n t s have r e c o g n i z e d this and
- 3 2 -
- 33
modified or abandoned the practice.
The Court s h o u l d also a f f i r m on the
basis of either of two alternative grounds
that s u p p o r t the j u d g m e n t belo w . The
d e a d l y f o rce p o l i c i e s and customs of the
M em ph is P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t e n c o u r a g e and
insulate the excessive and unnecessary use
of deadly force in situations, such as the
instant case, where the officer has failed
to e x h a u s t r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s .
I n d e p e n d e n t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of
the c o m m o n law fl e e i n g felon d o c t r i n e ,
this m u n i c i p a l policy violates the fourth
a m e n d m e n t and the due p r o c e s s c l a u s e .
M o r e o v e r , the M e m p h i s policy that leaves
the decision to shoot unarmed, nonviolent,
fl e e i n g p r o p e r t y c r i m e s u s p e c t s to the
d i s c r e t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l o f f i c e r is
racially discriminatory.
- 34 -
ARGUMENT
I. THE C O U R T OF A P P E A L S C O R R E C T L Y
B A L A N C E D THE N A T U R E OF THE INTRUSION
A G A I N S T THE S T A T E ' S I N T E R E S T S IN LAW
E N F O R C E M E N T AND HELD THAT THE KILLING
OF AN U N A R M E D , N O N V I O L E N T , F L E E I N G
P R O P E R T Y C R I M E S U S P E C T V I O L A T E S THE
CONSTITUTION ____________ ________________
The q u e s t i o n in this case is whether
a state or city may a u t h o r i z e its p o l i c e
to kill a f l e e i n g s u s p e c t whom the
officer reasonably believes to be u n a r m e d
wh en the o f f i c e r has p r o b a b l e c a u s e to
b e l i e v e that the s u s p e c t c o m m i t t e d a
n o n v i o l e n t f e l o n y such as b u r g l a r y but
feels that he cannot capture him. W h e t h e r
analyzed under the fourth amendment or the
due process clause, the answer u l t i m a t e l y
d e p e n d s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the
nature of the intrusion inflicted upon the
s u s p e c t and the s t ate interests asserted
in j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The c o u r t of a p p e a l s
a s s e s s e d this balance correctly. The use
of deadly force in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s is
- 35 -
excessive and disproportionate -- that is,
the a s s e r t e d s t ate i n t e r e s t s are not
s u b s t a n t i a l e n o u g h to ju s t i f y the taking
of the life of a n o n v i o l e n t , f l e e i n g
felony suspect.
In the s e c t i o n s that follow, we
d i s c u s s the a p p r o p r i a t e a n a l y s i s u nder
ea ch of t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e constitutional
theories. Section A d i s c u s s e s the fourth
a m e n d m e n t . S e c t i o n B c o n s i d e r s the due
p r o c e s s c l a u s e ' s p r o t e c t i o n of life.
S e c t i o n C e v a l u a t e s the f l e e i n g felon
d o c t r i n e in light of the f o u r t e e n t h
a m e n d m e n t ' s protection against punishment
without due process. F i n a l l y , s e c t i o n D
assesses the balance of interests required
by each of these analyses.
A . The Fourth Amendment Requires a
"Salancing of the Interests
The c i t y a r g u e s that the c ourt of
appeals erred because the fourth amendment
does no more than set the minimum standard
for initiating an arrest -- i.e,, probable
cause -- and does not c o n t r o l what the
police may do in effectuating that arrest.
City's Brief at 13. S i m i l a r l y , the s t a t e
a r g u e s that the c o m m o n law fleeing felon
rule s a t i s f i e s the f o u r t h a m e n d m e n t
b e c a u s e it p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t arbitrary or
unnecessary police a ction. S t a t e ' s B r i e f
at 10-11. It also r a i s e s a d d i t i o n a l
a r g u m e n t s why the rule s a t i s f i e s the
fo u r t h a m e n d m e n t . As we s h o w belo w , the
state and the c i t y are w rong on each of
t he se p o i n t s ; d e c i s i o n in this case will
tu rn on the b a l a n c i n g r e q u i r e d by the
21
fourth amendment.
- 36 -
Both the state and the city concede this point in
the end. The state admits that "'the reasona
bleness' under the Fourth Amendment of the seizure
of a person appears to have traditionally been
evaluated in terms of whether ... the magnitude of
the action was necessary in relation to the state
interest served by the police conduct...." State's
Brief at 10 (citing Terry v . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)). Similarly, the city admits that, if a
fourth amendment analysis is appropriate, "the court
must then look to the rule of reasonableness
established by Terry [and] identify both the
governmental interest involved which would justify
Fi rs t , the T e n n e s s e e p r a c t i c e at
issue is governed by the fourth amendment.
It s p e a k s di rectly to "[T]he right of the
people to be secure in t heir p e r s o n s ...
a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e ... s e i z u r e s . . . . "
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Terry v . O h i o , 392
U.S. 1, 16 (1968); United States v. P l a c e ,
_____ U.S. _____ , 77 L . E d . 2 d 110, 121-22
(1983); Dunaway v. New Y o r k , 442 U.S. 200,
207 (1979); Cupp v. M u r p h y , 412 U.S. 291,
294 (1973); Davis v. M i s s i s s i p p i , 394 U.S.
721 , 7 2 6 - 2 7 ( 1 969). As the c ourt of
appeals observed: "Killing the i n d i v i d u a l
... is p l a i n l y a ' se izure.'" 710 F.2d at
243; A. 44.
M o r e o v e r , the Court has long r e p u
d i a t e d the c o n t e n t i o n that the fou r t h
a m e n d m e n t g o v e r n s only the "w hen" of
p o l i c e a c t i o n and not the "how . " The
- 37 -
the use of deadly force and the effect such use
would have upon individual rights. Then the Court
must balance the two competing interests...." City's
Brief at 13.
C ou rt on ly r e c e n t l y r e a f f i r m e d what it
"observed in T e r r y , '[t]he manner in which
the s e i z u r e . . . [ w a s ] c o n d u c t e d is, of
course, as vital a part of the i n q u i r y as
w h e t h e r [it was] w a r r a n t e d at a l l . ’"
U n i t e d S t a t e s v, P l a c e , 77 L.Ed.2d at 121
2 2
( q u o t i n g T e r r y , 392 U.S. at 28). In
P l a c e , the C ourt went on to "examine the
agen ts' c o n d u c t . . . , " ., and found it
" s u f f i c i e n t to r e n d e r the s e i z u r e un-
23
reasonable." Id. at 122.
- 38 -
In Terry, the Court added that: "The Fourth Amend
ment proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope
of governmental action as by imposing preconditions
upon its initiation." 392 U.S. at 28-29.
See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768
(1966) ('‘whether the means and procedures employed
... respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonableness"); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
38 (1963) (whether the method of entering the home
may offend federal constitutional standards of
reasonableness"); United Stages v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (subpoena "'far Too sweeping in
its terms to be regarded as reasonable' under the
Fourth Amendment") (dicta); Dalia v. United States,
441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979) ("the manner in which a
warrant is executed is subject to later judicial
review as to its reasonableness").
But if the city is i n c o r r e c t in its
assertion that the fo urth a m e n d m e n t o n l y
g o v e r n s when police can arrest, the state
is equally wrong in its a s s e r t i o n that it
o n l y p r o v i d e s p r o t e c t i o n from a r b i t r a r y
and u n n e c e s s a r y , but not e x c e s s i v e ,
p o l i c e a c t i o n s . In every fourth amendment
c o n t e x t , the Court has c o n s i d e r e d the
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of p o l i c e a c t i o n s by
m e a s u r i n g the e x t e n t of the i n t r u s i o n
against the asserted justifications. Thus,
i n Terry the Court o b s e r v e d that; "The
scope of the search must be 'strictly tied
to and j u s t i f i e d by' the c i r c u m s t a n c e s
w h i c h r e n d e r e d its i n i t i a t i o n p e r m i s
s i b l e . " 392 U.5. at 19 (quoting Warden v .
H a y d e n , 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas,
0., c o n c u r r i n g ) ) . In F l o r i d a v. R o y e r ,
460 U.S. _____ , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), the
Court noted that a "search must be limited
in scope to that which is justified by the
p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s s e r v e d . . . . " Id. at
- 39 -
- 40 -
238. "The r e a s o n a b l e n e s s requirement of
the Fourth Amendment requires no less when
the p o l i c e a c t i o n is a s e i z u r e . , , . The
scope of the d e t e n t i o n mu st be c a r e f u l l y
tailored to its underlying justification."
I d . See also Michigan v . S u m m e r s , 452 U.S.
692, 7 0 1 - 0 2 (1981) (gauging nature of the
i n t r u s i o n ).
Thus, in d e t e r m i n i n g the r e a s o n
ableness of the use of deadly force under
the fourth amendment, the court of appeals
f o l l o w e d e x a c t l y the mo de of a n a l y s i s
applied by this Court in considering other
forms of police action.
T erry and its p r o g e n y r e s t s on a
b a l a n c i n g of the competing interests
to d e t e r m i n e the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of
the type of s e i z u r e i n v o l v e d within
the m e a n i n g of "the F o u r t h A m e n d
m e n t ' s g e n e r a l p r o s c r i p t i o n against
unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s . "
392 U.S, at 20. We mu st balance the
nature and q u a l i t y of the i n t r u s i o n
on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s Fourth Amendment
interests a g a i n s t the i m p o r t a n c e of
the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion.
- 41 -
United States v. P l a c e , 77 L.Ed.Zd at 118.
A c c o r d U n i t e d S t a t e s v. V i l l a m o n t e -
Marque z ,
(1983).
U.S. , 77 L.Ed.2d 22, 30
The " n a t u r e and q u a l i t y of the
intrusion" in this case were i n c o m p a r a b l y
s e v e r e . As the c ourt of a p p e a l s noted,
young Garner was "seized" p e r m a n e n t l y and
i r r e v o c a b l y . 710 F.2d at 245; A. 44.
M o r e o v e r , the p h y s i c a l a s s a u l t of the
I
shooting was itself an intrusion on fourth
a m e n d m e n t interests. As noted in Jenkins
V . A v e r e t t , 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir.
1970), on w h i c h the c o u r t of a p p e a l s
relied, 710 F.2d at 245; A. 50, the fourth
a m e n d m e n t "shield covers the individual's
p h y s i c a l i n t e g r i t y ; " it p r o t e c t s the
" i n e s t i m a b l e right of personal security."
Id., 424 F. 2d at 1232 ( q u o t i n g Terry v .
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 8-9); accord Florida v.
Ro yer , 75 L . E d . 2 d at 238 ; D avis v .
Mi s s i s s i p p i , 394 U.S. at 726-27 ("Nothing
is m o r e c l e a r than that the F o u r t h
Amendment was m eant to p r e v e n t w h o l e s a l e
i n t r u s i o n s up on the p e r s o n a l security of
our c i t i z e n r y . . , . " ) ; see S c h m e r b e r v.
C a l i f o r n i a , 384 U.S. at 767 ("we are
d e a l i n g wi th i n t r u s i o n s into the h uman
N 24
body") .
- 42 -
24 Every circuit has concurred in this conclusion,
although most now follow the Second Circuit's lead
as articulated by Judge Friendly in Johnson v.
Click, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973), that "quite apart from any
'specific' of the Bill of Rights, application of
undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a
suspect of liberty without due process of law." Id.
at 1032; accord Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628
F.2d 736, 741-42 (1st Cir^ i980) (citing United
States V. Viliarin Gerena, 553 F.2d 723, 728 (1st
Cir. 19V7) (fourth and fifth amendments)); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States
T , Stokes, 506 F.2d 771 , 775-76 (5th Cir.
1975) ;Tefft v. Seward 689 F.2d 637, 639 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1982); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th
Cir. 1972); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1229
(8th Cir. 1981); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59
(9th Cir. 1974); Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338
doth Cir. 1966); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358
(D.C, Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S.
418 (1973).
The argument that Jenkins is inapposite. City's
Brief at 8, 12-13, is thus incorrect. Jenkins was
not premised on the lack of probable cause to
arrest. Rather, the vice it found was that "our
Thus, the Court mu st b a l a n c e a
uniquely harsh intrusion on young Garner's
f o u r t h a m e n d m e n t i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t the
state's asserted justifications. The state
s e e k s to a void this a n a l y s i s by two
a d d i t i o n a l f o u r t h a m e n d m e n t a r g u m e n t s .
Fir st, it a r g u e s that the f l e e i n g felon
doctrine has h i s t o r i c a l s a n c t i o n b e c a u s e
it c o e x i s t e d with the a d o p t i o n of th.e
fo u r t h a m e n d m e n t . S t a t e ' s B r i e f at 9.
S ec on d, it a r g u e s that> the b a l a n c e
e n t e r t a i n e d by the court of a p p e a l s "is
b o t h u n p r e c e d e n t e d and u n w a r r a n t e d "
because it m e a s u r e s the p o l i c e a c t i o n by
the g r a v i t y of the underlying crime. I d .
at 10, We d i s p o s e of each of t hese in
turn.
- 43 -
plaintiff was subjected to the reckless use of
excessive force." 424 F.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
The city quotes but does not cite the Jenkins
panel's observation that "no force was needed to
restrain Jenkins." City Brief at 13. But it fails
to disclose that this quote comes from the discus
sion of the state law claim and was not part of the
court's constitutional analysis. Compare 424 F.2d
at 1232 with id. at 1231.
- 44 -
( 1 ) The c o m m o n law b a s i s of the
d o c t r i n e no longer supports the
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of s h o o t i n g all
fleeing f e l o n s ;
At c o m m o n law, f e l o n y u s u a l l y
r e f e r r e d o n l y to c r i m e s p u n i s h a b l e by
death. "[T]he idea of felony is indeed so
generally c o n n e c t e d with that of c a p t i a l
p u n i s h m e n t , that we find it hard to
s e p a r a t e t h e m . " 4 W. B l a c k s t o n e , C O M
M E N T A R I E S 98 (1800). In its e a r l y
d e v e l o p m e n t , the s t a t u t o r y law of
T e n n e s s e e largely assimilated this common
law norm. When T e n n e s s e e c o d i f i e d the
fleeing felon doctrine in 1858, and during
the p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g e n a c t m e n t of the
f o u r t e e n t h a m e n d m e n t , the Tennessee code
prescribed the d e a t h p e n a l t y for a l a r g e
n u m b e r of c r i m e s . Pub. Stats. of Tenn.
§5 (Supp. 1 8 5 8 - 1 8 7 1 ) . But as the n i n e
teenth century proceeded, the felony label
became attached to a b r o a d e n i n g a rray of
non-capital crimes. Comment, Deadly Force
to A r r e s t ; T r i g g e r i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
R e v i e w , 11 Harv. C i v . R . - C i v .L i b .L . R e v .
361, 366-67 (1974).
As long as m a n y f e l o n i e s were
capital, authorizing deadly force to st op
f l e e i n g f e l o n y s u s p e c t s was not without
its logic. For a suspect fleeing a d e ath
penalty could be assumed to be a desperate
person, motivated to resist a r r e s t by all
25
p o s s i b l e m e a n s . But the days have long
s i n c e p a s s e d when ” [t]o be a s u s p e c t e d
fe lon was o f t e n as good as b e i n g a dead
one." T. Taylor, TWO STUDIES IN C O N S T I
T U T I O N A L INTERPRETATION 28 (1969). Crimes
once c o n s i d e r e d c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s are no
l o n g e r so v i e w e d . The use of the death
p e n a l t y has been s e v e r e l y c u r t a i l e d so
that it is a v a i l a b l e o n l y for c r i m e s
c a u s i n g loss of life u nder s p e c i a l .
- 45 -
25 This is reflected in the Tennesse statute, which is
entitled "Resistance to Officer" and authorizes the
use of deadly force if the suspect "either flee or
forcibly resist...." Tenn. Code. Ann. §40-808.
- 46 -
a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . See Gregg v ,
G e o r g i a , 428 U . S . 1 53 ( 1 976 ); Co kej v .
G e o r g i a , 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
M o r e o v e r , the d o c t r i n e developed in
an age when t h e r e e x i s t e d v i r t u a l l y no
c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n law e n f o r c e m e n t
personnel in d i f f e r e n t t o w n s and c i t i e s .
Thus, the e s c a p i n g su s p e c t could easily
establish a new life in another c o m m u n i t y
with little fear of discovery and eventual
capture. But, by the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y ,
a u t h o r i t i e s were circulating descriptions
of w a n t e d c r i m i n a l s o u t s i d e of L ondon.
And, by the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ,
American police o f f i c e r s c o n s u l t e d t heir
c o l l e a g u e s in o t h e r c i t i e s about thieves
and their whereabouts. Sherman, Execution
W i t h o u t Tr ial; P o l i c e H o m i c i d e and the
C o n s t i t u t i o n , 33 V a n d . L . R e v . 71, 76
(1980 ); C o m m e n t , D e a d l y F o r c e , s u p r a , 11
H a r v .C i v .R . - C i v . Lib . L .Rev . at 361. The
d e v e l o p m e n t of m o d e r n p o l i c e a g e n c i e s
- 1̂ 1 -
armed with sophisticated means of co m m u n i
cation has further reduced the c o m m o n law
justification for the doctrine.
So ha ve t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s in
w e a p o n r y . D u r i n g the early years of the
d o c t r i n e , w e a p o n r y was l i m i t e d to a r m a
m e n t s w i e l d e d by hand -- s w o r d s , farm
tools, and h a l b e r d s . And even after the
invention of the musket, its inconvenience
and i n a c c u r a c y p r e v e n t e d p o l i c e use of
b a l l i s t i c w e a p o n s . S h e r m a n , s u p r a , 33
V a n d . L . R e v . at 75. In this technological
c o n t e x t , the p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g of the
doctrine was that suspects could be killed
if they resisted arrest in a h a n d - t o - h a n d
s t r u g g l e ; it did not mean that they could
be killed from a distance while they were
in flight. These practical considerations
were decisively changed by the w i d e s p r e a d
use of revolvers, beginning in the 1850's.
C. Ke nn et and J. A n d e r s o n , THE GUN IN
A M E R I C A 22 (1975). For a c c u r a t e and
- 48 -
powerful handguns allowed, and continue to
allow, the police to kill fleeing suspects
who pose no immediate threat to anyone.
Thus, the original premises that made
the fl e e i n g felon d o c t r i n e reasonable at
the time the fourth amendment was a d o p t e d
are no l o n g e r a p p l i c a b l e . History, like
the fo urth amendment, is not static. S e e ,
e .g . , P a y t o n v. New Y o r k , 445 U.S. 573,
598 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ( " t h e issue is not one that can
be said to have been d e f i n i t i v e l y s e t t l e d
by the c o m m o n law at the time the Fourth
A m e n d m e n t was a d o p t e d " ) . As one c o urt
o b s e r v e d , "the h i s t o r i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of
American state fleeing-felon statutes is a
foundation built on loose sand." Taylor v .
C o l l i n s , 574 F.Supp. 1554, 1558 (E.D.Mich.
1983). A d a n g e r o u s a n a c h r o n i s m , the
d o c t r i n e s h o u l d be c o n s i g n e d to the
history that produced it.
It is r e v o l t i n g to ha ve no b e t t e r
reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV. It is still more revolting if the
- 49 -
g r o u n d s upon w h i c h it was laid down
have vanished long since and the rule
s i m p l y p e r s i s t s from blind imitation
of the p a s t .
H o l m e s , The P a ths of the L a w , 10 Harv,
L.Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
(2) The T e n n e s s e e s t a t u t e ' s dis-
r e g a r d of the g r a V ity of the
u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e is a proper
c o n s i d e r a t ion u n der the fourth
a m e n d m e n t :
The s t a t e c h a r g e s that the court of
appeals erred in j u d g i n g the r e a s o n a b l e
n e s s of the s e i z u r e on the b a s i s of the
gravity of the underlying crime, asserting
that this analysis "is both unprecedented
and u n w a r r a n t e d . " S t a t e ' s B r i e f at 10.
But what the court of appeals actually did
was look at the u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e to
a s s e s s the nature of the state's interest
in killing the fl e e i n g felon r a t h e r than
allowing his escape.
A state statute or rule that makes no
d i s t i n c t i o n s based on the type of
offense or the risk of danger to the
c o m m u n i t y is i n h e r e n t l y s u s p e c t
b e c a u s e it p e r m i t s an u n n e c e s a r i l y
- 50 -
s e v e r e and excessive police response
that is out of p r o p o r t i o n to the
danger to the community.
G a r n e r , 710 F.2d at 244 ; A. 48. The
statute's failing is its sweeping authori
zation of discretion to shoot the f l e e i n g
t h i e f a l o n g with the f l e e i n g m u r d e r e r ,
which cannot be justified by public safety
c o n c e r n s that would s u p p o r t a mo re
narrowly drawn statute.
This a n a l y s i s is h a r d l y u n p r e c e
dented. In c o n s i d e r i n g the w a r r a n t l e s s
e n t r y in M c D o n a l d v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 335
U.S. 451 (1948), J u s t i c e J a c k s o n ' s
concurring opinion noted that:
Whether there is reasonable necessity
for a s e a r c h w i t h o u t w a i t i n g to
o b t a i n a w a r r a n t c e r t a i n l y d e p e n d s
s o m e w h a t upon the g r a v i t y of the
offense thought to be in progress....
It is to me a s h o c k i n g p r o p o s i t i o n
that p r i v a t e homes, even quarters in
a tenement, may be i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y
i n v a d e d at the d i s c r e t i o n of any
suspicious police officer e n g a g e d in
following up offenses that involve no
violence or threats of it.
- 51 -
Id. at 459. The C h i e f J u s t i c e has s i m i
larly observed that:
F r e e i n g e i t h e r a t i g e r or a
mouse in a school room is an i l l e g a l
act, but no r a t i o n a l p e r s o n w ould
suggest that these two acts should be
p u n i s h e d in the same way. From time
to time judges have o c c a s i o n to pass
on r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g p o l i c e
procedures. I w o n d e r what would be
the j u d i c i a l r e s p o n s e to a p o l i c e
o rd er a u t h o r i z i n g " s h o o t to kill"
with r e s p e c t to e v e r y fugitive. It
is e a s y to p r e d i c t our c o l l e c t i v e
w r a t h and o u t r a g e . We, in c o m m o n
with all r a t i o n a l m i n d s , would say
that the police response must relate
to the g r a v i t y and need; that a
" s h o o t " o rder m i g h t c o n c e i v a b l y be
tolerable to prevent the e s c a p e of a
convicted killer but surely not for a
car thief, a p i c k p o c k e t or a s h o p
lifter.
B i v e n s v. Six U n k n o w n A g e n t s , 403 U . S .
388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., d i s s e n t
ing) .
The C o u r t ' s recent decision in Welsh
V . W i s c o n s i n , U. S. , 80 L.Ed.Zd
732 (1984), lays to rest any doubt on this
s c o r e . Welsh
c o n c l u d e [ d ] that the c o m m o n s e n s e
a p p r o a c h u t i l i z e d by most l ower
c o u r t s is r e q u i r e d by the Four t h
- 52 -
A m e n d m e n t p r o h i b i t i o n on "unreason
able s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s , " and
h[e]ld that an important factor to be
considered ... is the g r a v i t y of the
u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e for w h i c h the
arrest is being made.
_Id. at 745.
In sum, the c o u r t b e l o w p r o p e r l y
analyzed the T e n n e s s e e s t a t u t e under the
fo ur t h a m e n d m e n t . It assessed the nature
of the i n t r u s i o n , the g r a v i t y of the
underlying offense, and their relationship
to the nature of the state's justification
for its p o l i c y . As we s h o w in s e c t i o n D
below, it also struck the c o r r e c t c o n s t i
tutional balance.
B . The D e p r i v a t i o n of Life Must be
J u s t i f i e d by C o u n t e r v a i l i n g
State Interests
E d w a r d E u g e n e Gar n e r was shot and
killed by a Memphis p o l i c e o f f i c e r . "The
deceased's interest in life plainly was of
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n . U .S . Const.
amend. XIV, § 1." W i l l i a m s v. K e l l y , 624
F. 2d 695 , 697 (5th Cir. 1980). Since life
is a "fundamental" right, its deprivation
"may be j u s t i f i e d only by a ' c o m p e l l i n g
s t a t e i n t e r e s t ' ... and ... l e g i s l a t i v e
e n a c t m e n t s mu st be n a r r o w l y d r a w n to
e x p r e s s o n l y the l e g i t i m a t e state
i n t e r e s t s at s t a k e . " Roe v. W a d e , 410
U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See also Cleveland
B o a r d of E d u c a t i o n v. L a F l e u r , 414 U.S.
632 (1974); Stanley v. I l l i n o i s , 405 U.S.
645 (1972). Thus, the s t a t e mu st d e m o n
strate the existence of i n t e r e s t s e q u i v a -
- 53 -
26
26 The right not to be deprived of life without due
process is explicitly guaranteed by the Constitu
tion and is inherent in the constitutional frame
work. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886) ("the fundamental rights to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness"); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) ("fundamental
human rights of life and liberty"); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 131, 132 (1945)
(Rutledge, JT, concurring) (life is among the
"clear-cut fundamental rights"); i^. at 134-35
(Murphy, J., dissenting) ("He has been deprived of
the right to life itself.... That right was his
because he was an American citizen, because he was
a human being. As such, he was entitled to all the
respect and fair treatment that befits the dignity
of man, a dignity that is recognized and guaranteed
by the Constitution."); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533 (1953) (a right "far more precious than
... property rights").
le nt to or o t h e r w i s e s u f f i c i e n t to
counterbalance the right that is curtailed
-- i.e., the use of deadly force must not
be excessive. Williams v . K e l l y , 624 F. 2d
at 6 9 7 - 9 8 ; J o h n s o n v. C l i c k , 481 F,2d
1028, 1 0 3 1 - 3 3 (2d Cir. 1973); Ayler v.
H o p p e r , 532 F.Supp. 198 (M.D. Ala. 1981);
Jacobs V. City of W i c h i t a , 531 F.Supp. 129
27
(D.Kan. 1982).
The c o u r t of a p p e a l s a p p l i e d these
principles to assess the constitutionality
of the T e n n e s s e e f l e e i n g f elon statute.
710 F.2d at 2 4 6 - 4 7 ; A. 52-53. As u nder
the fo urth a m e n d m e n t , t h e y r e q u i r e a
c a r e f u l b a l a n c i n g of the d e p r i v a t i o n
i n f l i c t e d a g a i n s t the s t a t e i n t e r e s t s
asserted to support the drastic measure of
deadly force.
- 5 4 -
27 Ayler and Jacobs both held the common law fleeing
felon doctrine unconstitutional, belying the
assertion that Garner is the first and only case to
have done so. State's Brief at 14; City's Brief at
7, 11.
- 55 -
C . The P r o h i b i t i o n Against Punish
m e n t w i t h o u t Due P r o c e s s Also
R e q u i r e s Considerati on of State
I n t e r e s t s A s s e r t e d in 3us t i -
fic at ion
^ 1 1 ■ I
In bo th the d i s t r i c t c o u r t and the
c o u r t of a p p e a l s , p l a i n t i f f a d v a n c e d
a n o t h e r , e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e of due
p r o c e s s that i n v a l i d a t e s the T e n n e s s e e
statute. The fourteenth amendment provides
e v e r y p e r s o n with " p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t
p u n i s h m e n t without due process of law,...
For under the due p r o c e s s c l a u s e , a
[ p e r s o n ] may not be p u n i s h e d prior to an
adjudication of guilt in a c c o r d a n c e with
due p r o c e s s of law." Bell v . W o l f i s h , 441
U.S. 520, 535 (1979); accord Ingraham v.
W r i g h t , 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n. 40 (1977);
Kennedy v. M e n d o z a - M a r t i n e z , 372 U.S. 144,
1 6 5 - 6 7 (1963), The s h o o t i n g of Ed ward
Eug e n e G a r n e r v i o l a t e d the due p r o c e s s
c l a u s e b e c a u s e it " a m o u n t [ e d] to pu nish
ment." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535.
- 56 -
A " c o u r t mu st d e c i d e w h e t h e r the
disability is i m p o s e d for the p u r p o s e of
p u n i s h m e n t or w h e t h e r it is but an
incident of some other l e g i t i m a t e g o v e r n
mental purpose." W o l f i s h , 441 U.S. at 538.
In W o l f i s h , the Court c i t e d the s e ven
M e n d o z a - M a r t inez c r i t e r i a as " u s e f u l
guideposts" for making that determination:
W h e t h e r the s a n c t i o n i n v o l v e s an
a f f i r m a t i v e disability or restraint,
w h e t h e r it has h i s t o r i c a l l y been
r e g a r d e d as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a f i n d i n g of
s c i e n t e r , whether its operation will
p r o m o t e the t r a d i t i o n a l aims of
p u n i s h m e n t -- r e t r i b u t i o n and
deterrence, w h e t h e r the b e h a v i o r to
w h i c h it applies is already a crime,
w h e t h e r an a l t e r n a t i v e p u r p o s e to
w h i c h it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and w h e t h e r it
a p p e a r s e x c e s s i v e in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned....
M e n d o z a - M a r t i n e z , 372 U.S. at 1 6 8 - 6 9
( f o o t n o t e s o m i t t e d ) . The application of
these seven criteria overwhelmingly points
in on ly one direction: The use of deadly
- 57 -
f o r c e to a p p r e h e n d an u n a r m e d fl e e i n g
felony suspect is, in purpose and e f f e c t ,
punishment.
1) The i m p o s i t i o n of d e a t h is the
u l t i m a t e " a f f i r m a t i v e d i s a b i l i t y or r e
s t r a i n t , " d e p r i v i n g the v i c t i m of "the
right to have rights." Furman v. G e o r g i a ,
408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) ( B r e n n a n , 0.,
c o n c u r r i n g ) . See also S c r e w s v. United
S t a t e s , 325 U.S. 91, 188 (1945) (Rutledge,
0., c o n c u r r i n g ) ; ^ W o o d s o n v. North
C a r o l i n a , 428 U.S. 280, 323 (1976)
(Rehnquist, 0., dissenting).*
2) The historical u n d e r p i n n i n g s of
the doctrine demonstrate that the shooting
of fleeing felons was regarded as p u n i s h
ment. As late as the 15th c e n t u r y in
England and the 18th c e n t u r y in A m e r i c a ,
all f e l o n i e s -- m u r d e r , rape, m a n
s l a u g h t e r , r o b b e r y , s o d o m y , m a y h e m ,
burglary, arson, prison break, and larceny
-- were punishable by d e a t h ; the f leeing
- 58 -
f el on d o c t r i n e m e r e l y a c c e l e r a t e d the
28
p e na l p r o c e s s . E a r l y c o m m e n t a t o r s
d e s c r i b e d "the e x t i r p a t i o n [as] but a
p r e m a t u r e e x e c u t i o n of the i n e v i t a b l e
29
j u d g m e n t . . . . " "His killing was at best
an extrajudicial and p r e m a t u r e e x e c u t i o n
of a penalty which he. had already incurred
30
by his f e l o n y . " M o r e o v e r , the fleeing
felon d o c t r i n e g r e w out of an era when
s u m m a r y e x e c u t i o n was well e n s c o n c e d in
the law.
T h i e v e s we re o f t e n k i l l e d o u t r i g h t
d u r i n g the hue and cry, even a fter
th ey had b e e n captured. "Let all go
forth w h e r e God may d i r e c t them to
go," u r g e d the tenth-century laws of
Edgar; "let them do j u s t i c e on the
thief." Suspicion sufficed to convict
28 Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering
Constitutional Review, 11 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ.
LiB."L."ftev. 361, 36^ (1974); R. Perkins, CRIMINAL
LAW 10 (2d ed. 1969).
29 Note, Legalized Murder of a Fleeing Felon, 15 Va.
L. Rev. 582, 583 (l929). See also Note, The Use of
Deadly Force in Arizona by Police Officers, 1972 L.
& Soc. Order 481, 482 ("It made little difference if
the suspected felon were killed in the process of
capture, since, in the eyes of the law, he had
already forfeited his life by committing the
felony.")
^8 Bohlen & Schulman, Arrest With and Without a
Warrant, 75 U.Pa.L.Rev. 485, 495 (1927).
- 59 -
thieves without any trial at all, and
" e x e c u t i o n in such c a s e s o f t e n
f o l l o w e d i m m e d i a t e l y on a r r e s t . "
According to the p r e a m b l e to Act 24
of H e n r y VIII, it a p p e a r s that the
common law authorized the v i c t i m s of
c r i m e s and a t t e m p t e d crim e s to kill
the criminal, r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r
it was n e c e s s a r y to p r e v e n t the
felony....In the context of the times
in w h i c h the kill-to-arrest doctrine
evolved, it was c l e a r l y l i n k e d to a
p h i l o s o p h y of s u m m a r y j u s t i c e that
can only be viewed as punishment.
S h e r m a n , s u p r a , 33 V a n d . L . R e v . at 81
(footnotes omitted).
Even a f t e r the a d o p t i o n of the
f o u r t e e n t h a m e n d m e n t , the f l e e i n g felon
doctrine was regarded as punishment. Judge
(later Justice) Brown said:
I d o u b t , h o w e v e r , w h e t h e r this law
would be s t r i c t l y a p p l i c a b l e at the
p r e s e n t day. S u p p o s e , for example a
p e r s o n were a r r e s t e d for p etit
l a r c e n y , w h i c h was a f e l o n y at the
c o m m o n law, m i g h t an o f f i c e r under
any c i r c u m s t a n c e s be j u s t i f i e d in
killing him? I think not. The punish-
m e n t is a l t o g e t h e r too d i s p r o -
p o r t i o n e d to the m a g n i t u d e of the
offense.
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. C l a r k , 31 Fed. 710, 713
( C . C . E . D . Mich. 1887) ( e m p h a s i s added).
Thus, h i s t o r i c a l l y , the s h o o t i n g of a
f l e e i n g f e l o n y s u s p e c t has a l w a y s be en
regarded as punishment.
3) &. 5) A " f i n d i n g of scienter" is
made by the police officer in his determi-
n a t i o n that t h e r e is a " r e a s o n a b l e
s u s p i c i o n , " J.A. 141, that the f l e e i n g
s u s p e c t c o m m i t t e d a f e l o n y with its
s c i e n t e r r e q u i r e m e n t . That f e l o n y is
a l r e a d y a crime; although there is some
d o u b t about w h i c h c r i m e the v i c t i m is
u . 32
b e i n g shot for, "we are in fact killing
- 60 -
Burglary is prohibited by Tenn Code. Ann. §
39-3-401 (1975). Flight is not a statutory crime,
but it was a crime at common law. See n.32, infra.
Memphis City Code § 30-15 makes it "unlawful" for
any person "to escape from ... any officer or member
of the police force." Violation of this section
which prescribes no penalty, is subject to a maximum
fine of $50. ^See Memphis City Code § 1-8.
As cogently argued by Professor Mikell:
May I ask what we are killing him for when he
steals an automobile and runs off with it? Are
we killing him for stealing the automobile? ...
If we catch him and try him ..., what do we do
the ... thief for the volatile combination
of f e l o n y and flight, b o t h of w h i c h are
crimes." Sherman, s u p r a , 33 Vand.L.Rev. at
84.
4) The d o c t r i n e p r o m o t e s the
traditional aims of punishment -- re t r i b u
tion and deterrence. It was historically
viewed as merely a c c e l e r a t i n g p u n i s h m e n t
in an era when retribution (as-contrasted
with rehabilitation) was the p r i m a r y goal
of the penal law. The courts themselves
have indicated the r e t r i b u t i v e n a t u r e of
this sanction. In discussing the Tennessee
- 61 -
to him? Put him before a policeman and have a
policeman shoot him? Of course not. We give
him three years in a penitentiary. It cannot
be then that we allow the officer to kill him
because he stole the automobile, because the
statute provides only three years in a peni
tentiary for that. Is it then for fleeing? And
again I insist this is not a question of
resistance to the officer. Is it for fleeing
that we kill him? Fleeing from arrest is also
a common law offense and is punishable by a
light penalty, a penalty much less than that
for stealing the automobile.
9 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 186-87 (1931), quoted in 0.
Michael & H. Wechsler, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINI
STRATION 80-82 n. 3 (1940).
f l e e i n g f elon rule in W i l e y , the panel
c i t e d the o b s e r v a t i o n of the d i s s e n t in
M a t t i s V. S c h n a r r , 547 F. 2d 1007, 1023
(8th Cir. 1 976 ), v a c a t e d on case and
c o n t r o v e r s y g r o u n d s sub n o m . Ashe ro ft v .
M a t t i s , 431 U.S. 171 ( 1 977): "There is no
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right to commit felonious
o f f e n s e s and e s c a p e the c o n s e q u e n c e s of
t ho se o f f e n s e s , " W i l e y , 548 F , 2d at 1253.
The "consequences" of criminal conduct are
33
p u n i s h m e n t .
W h e t h e r the s h o o t i n g of fl e e i n g
felony suspects a c t u a l l y has a d e t e r r e n t
e f f e c t , the record indicates that Memphis
intends it for this purpose. Based on the
- 62 -
This line of reasoning assumes the guilt of the
fleeing felony suspect. But flight is not neces
sarily an index of guilt; it is equally likely to be
the result of immaturity. See Eddinqs v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115-116 n.11 rT982)“ ("adolescents . ..
are more ... impulsive [and] may have less capacity
to control their conduct and think in long range
terms than adults"). Thus, many of the prior cases
have involved minors as victims. See, e .g ., Wiley,
supra; Qualls v. Parish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir.
1976); Mattis, supra; Jones v, Marshall, 528 F.2d
132 (2d Cir. 1975).
t e s t i m o n y of M ayor C h a n d l e r and P o l i c e
D i r e c t o r H u b b a r d , d e f e n d a n t s in th is
a c t i o n w h o s e t e s t i m o n y is in the record,
R. 1 8 3 2 - 3 3 (M a y o r : "Q. Do you t h i n k the
policy acts as a deterrent? A. That is the
p u r p o s e . " ) , 1 8 4 8 - 5 0 ( P o l i c e D i r e c t o r
H u b b a r d : "I feel [it] has to be regarded
as some kind of d e t e r r e n t to s e r i o u s
c r i m e . " ) : see also 3 . A. 1 2 2 - 2 3 ( P o l i c e
D i r e c t o r C h a p m a n ) , the district court in
Wiley found ^
that one of the principal purposes of
M e m p h i s ' p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g use of
d e a d l y f o r c e insofar as they attempt
to j u s t i f y the p o s s i b l e d e a t h of
f l e e i n g b u r g l a r y s u s p e c t s , is to
deter criminal conduct.
W i l e y V . M e m p h i s P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t , Civ.
A c t i o n No. C -73-8, M e m . O p . at 13 (W.D.
34
Tenn. June 30, 1975). This s u b j e c t i v e
- 63 -
In this Court, the city echoes the Wiley panel and
the Mattis dissent in noting that the fleeing felony
suspect should pay for his crime: "There is no
constitutional right to commit felonious offenses
and to escape the consequences of those offenses."
City's Brief at 15. Both the city's and the state's
briefs suggest the deterrence rationale elsewhere as
well. City's Brief at 14, 15 (ability to kill
- 64 -
i n t e n t to p u n i s h s u f f i c e s to i n v a l i d a t e
the p o l i c y . W o l f i s h , 441 U.S. at 538;
35
M e n d o z a - M a r t i n e z , 372 U.S. at 169.
6) & 7): A b s e n t this p u n i t i v e
intent, a sanction may avoid the inference
that it is a punishment if "an alternative
p u r p o s e to w h i c h it may r a t i o n a l l y be
connected is assignable for it and ..." it
does not appear "excessive in r e l a t i o n to
the a l t e r n a t i v e p u r p o s e . . . . " M e n d o z a -
notifies the "criminal that flight is not an
option"); State’s Brief at 19 (power to shoot
"enhances the likelihood that suspects will submit
to arrest").
Chief Bracey's testimony offered below includes the
observation that:
From my experience it seems that shooting a
fleeing felony suspect is mostly related to an
officer's urge to punish a criminal. This
instinct for punishment is especially strong
when the suspect is thought to have just
committed a violent crime. Much of the resi
stance we faced when the Department tightened
its deadly-force regulations was grounded in
the feeling that criminals deserved no chance
of escaping punishment and that the punishment
of being shot when fleeing from a police
officer was not excessive.
O.A. 87.
M a r t i n e z 372 U.S. at 168-69. Analysis of
p o s s i b l e al t e r n a t i ve purposes, as well as
the professed deterrent aim, follows.
D . A B a l a n c i n g of the I n t e r e s t s
‘5‘em o n s t r a t e s that the Fleeitiig
F e l o n D o c t r i n e Is U n c o n s t i t u
tional
At the o u t s e t , the C o urt s h o u l d be
clear about the i n t e r e s t s at st ake. This
ca se is not about the right to escape; it
36
does not concern shooting to wound or the
use of less than le thal force to a p p r e
hend, r e s t r a i n , or s u b d u e a fl e e i n g
37
suspect. Memphis policy and Tennessee law
- 65 -
Captain Coletta testified that recruits were taught
to aim for the torso because it presents a greater
target and thus reduces the chances of missing. R.
357-58. When asked whether he could or would teach
recruits the marksmanship necessary to be able to
shoot and hit a person's extremities. Captain
Coletta said: "Certainly I would." R. 352. He went
on to say, however, that he did not have the time,
budget, or recruit talent to do it successfully. R.
352-53. Some other municipalities provide guide
lines to their officers governing when to shoot to
kill and when to shoot to wound. R. 1303-04. See
also R. 1319.
The alternatives to deadly force in this situation
are numerous. As Chief Bracey testified:
Using a radio to summon assistance is nearly
always correct tactically. With a quick call
armed the officer with a gun, supplied him
with dum-dum b u l l e t s d e s i g n e d to i n f l i c t
m o r e l e t h a l injuries, taught him to shoot
at the torso where viscera are more likely
to be hit, and a u t h o r i z e d him to shoot
from less than 40 feet away w i t h o u t even
- 66 -
for assistance, a fleeing suspect can be even
tually caught even if he does manage to escape
temporarily. Or if the suspect is unarmed,
moving up on him quickly with a drawn night
stick and an air of determination will do
wonders toward halting a suspect thinking about
fleeing. The point is that in most cases there
are alternatives to deadly force if officers
are expected and trained to reach for these
options.
J.A. 89. Accord R. 278-79 (Chief Detective Jones);
R. 376-77 (Inspector Barksdale). Modern technology
also provides options such as rubber bulletsand
tranquilizer guns, for example. Increasingly, police
departments are looking for alternatives.
Local govenments have been turning to the
Justice Department's Community Relations
Service for help.... The sessions stress tech
niques that prevent the use of force by police
in the first place.... Some police departments
are being taught new ways to capture suspects
— the use of a heavy net, for example, rather
than a gun.
"Magnum Force, Massive Lawsuits (More and More
Communities Urge Police to Show Restraint)," The New
York Times, April 8, 1984, p. 2 E, col. 4.
- 67 -
a t t e m p t i n g to give chase. They empowered
him to do so w i t h o u t r e g a r d to the fact
that he had already concluded that Garner
was u n a r m e d , O.A. 41, 56, and w i t h o u t
r e g a r d to the d a n g e r o u s n e s s of the
u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e . This is the " p o l i c e
o r d e r a u t h o r i z i n g 'shoot to kill' with
respect to every f u g i t i v e " i d e n t i f i e d by
the C h i e f Justice in B i v e n s . 403 U.5. at
411. See discussion supra at 16.
In support of this, the state and the
city a d v a n c e an array of i n t e r e s t s that
are on ly c o m p e l l i n g on the s u r f a c e . As
expressed in the briefs, they are " e f f e c
tive law enforcement, the apprehension of
c r i m i n a l s , the p r e v e n t i o n of crime, and
protection of the general public."* State's
Brief at 17, 18; City's Brief at 14. But
t h e s e i n t e r e s t s do not withstand scrutiny
when v i e w e d in light of the act u a l
p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s that they are
a s s e r t e d to j u s t i f y . The use of d e a d l y
- 68 -
f or ce to st op unarmed, nonviolent fleeing
f e l o n y s u s p e c t s is both a r b i t r a r y and
e x c e s s i v e in light of e a c h of these
asserted justifications.
(1 ) A p p r e h e n s i o n of the s u s p e c t :
The f l e e i n g felon d o c t r i n e is inherently
e x c e s s i v e in light of this p u r p o s e . A
M e m p h i s o f f i c e r who uses his gun ” to
apprehend" shoots to kill, c o n t e m p l a t i n g
that either death or serious bodily injury
will r e s u l t . If he is s u c c e s s f u l , no
apprehension will take place.
Analysis of the purposes of a p p r e h e n
si on i l l u s t r a t e s the e x c e s s i v e n e s s of
d e a d l y force e m p l o y e d to " e f f e c t an
arrest." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-808 (1975).
As the c i t y a c k n o w l e d g e s : "The p o l i c e
o f f i c e r s who are in p ursuit of a fleeing
felon h a v e [a] duty to a p p r e h e n d him as
the first step of our c r i m i n a l law
p r o c e s s . " C i t y ' s B r ief at 16. But for
- 69 -
y o un g G a r n e r , it was the first and final
step.
N o r m a l l y , we apprehend a suspect for
the p u r p o s e of t u r n i n g him over to the
j u d i c i a r y . He is put on t r i a l b e f o r e a
jury to determine whether he is g u i l t y or
i n n o c e n t . He is brought before the court
for sentencing — a p r o c e s s that e n t a i l s
c o n s i d e r a t i o n not just of the need for
punishment, but also the need and o p p o r t u
n i t y for r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . S h o o t i n g the
s u s p e c t as a m e a n s of a p p r e h e n s i o n is
e x c e s s i v e in light of these goals and the
v a r i e d and i m p o r t a n t s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s
b e h i n d them. It frustrates the dete r m i n a
tion of g u i l t or i n n o c e n c e that is the
p u r p o s e of a p p r e h e n s i o n . It obliterates
both the substance and a p p e a r a n c e of due
p r o c e s s that is c e n t r a l to the operation
of our c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e s y s t e m . And,
finally, it prevents the judicial determi
nation of punishment that is the u l t i m a t e
- 70 -
goal of the a r r e s t p r o c e s s , f r u s t r a t i n g
the possible r e h a b i l i t a t i v e g o a l s of the
c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e s y s t e m in favor of a
d i s p o s i t i o n that only p r o m o t e s its
p u n i s h m e n t i n t e r e s t s -- retribution and
d e t e r r e n c e .
But t h i s is only if the o f f i c e r is
s u c c e s s f u l . Most of the t i m e he is not.
H a n d g u n s are an u n r e l i a b l e m e a n s of
e f f e c t i n g an a r r e s t . For e x a m p l e , the
r e c o r d s hows that, between 1969 and 1974,
M e m p h i s p o l i c e used t heir r e v o l v e r s to
a t t e m p t to s t o p f l e e i n g p r o p e r t y c r i m e
s u s p e c t s on 114 o c c a s i o n s . But this
r e s u l t e d in o n l y 16 w o u n d i n g s and 17
deaths. , R. 1460-69. Although the data is
i n c o m p l e t e , a l a r g e p e r c e n t a g e of the
s u s p e c t s fired upon eluded capture. I d .;
J.A, 129. In the w o r d s of the M e m p h i s
p o l i c e d i r e c t o r : ” The c h a n c e s are ...
under the circumstances where deadly force
is used,,,, he [the p o l i c e o f f i c e r ] will
not hit [the suspect]." 3. A. 130.
Under these circumstances, it is hard
to u n d e r s t a n d how the d o c t r i n e can be
v i e w e d as "a s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o d u c t i v e
m e c h a n i s m to j u s t i f y the i n t r u s i o n on
F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t i n t e r e s t s w h i c h su ch
[ s h o o t i n g s ] entail." Delaware v. P r o u s e ,
440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979). The od ds are
that the o f f i c e r will e i t h e r fail to
accomplish his objective or accomplish too
much. That b e i n g so, it c a n n o t be said
that the use of d e a d l y force "to a p p r e
hend" is " c a r e f u l l y t a i l o r e d to its
u n d e r l y i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n , " F l o r i d a v.
R o y e r , 77 L . E d . 2 d at 238 , or that the
T e n n e s s e e s t a t u t e is " n a r r o w l y d rawn to
e x p r e s s o n l y the l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e
interests at stake." Roe v . W a d e , 410 U.S.
- 71 -
38
Director Chapman also testified that part of the
reason for banning warning shots was the fact that
it had the opposite of the desired effect; it
tended to spur the fleeing suspect. He concluded
that shots that miss probably have the same effect.
3.A. 132-33.
at 155.
(2) The c r i m e prevejition i n t e r e s t s ;
The p r e v e n t i o n of c r i m e i n t e r e s t has
several facets. It do es not i n c l u d e the
p r e v e n t i o n of the c r i m e in w h i c h the
suspect is engaged. T e n n e s s e e a u t h o r i z e s
the k i l l i n g of a felony suspect after the
c r i m e has b e e n c o m m i t t e d , as occurred in
this case.
The interest in disabling the suspect
from c o m m i t t i n g a n o t h e r c r i m e in the
i n d e f i n i t e f u t u r e is the e x p l i c i t basis
cited by the mayor and the police director
39
to j u s t i f y the M e m p h i s p o l i c y . But it
- 72 -
The mayor testified that: "[Y]ou let him get away,
tomorrow he's in another place stealing guns and
maybe the next week he's in the 7-11 blowing
somebody's brains out. I'm just a strong man on
feeling that a felon is a felon and if you commit a
burglary you will step up gradually to something
else." R. 1832; accord id. at 1833-34. Similarly,
the police director testified that: "We feel a
dangerous felon is a person who by virtue of his
actions and ... his propensity is an individual
who, if allowed to escape from whatever crime you
encounter him in, is subject to cause danger, is
subject to be in a situation which will be dangerous
in the future." J.A. 122-23.
- I ' b -
s u f f e r s from two d i s t i n c t constitutional
de fec ts: It is both p u n i t i v e in p u r p o s e
and excessive.
Fir st, i n c a p a c i t a t i o n is one of the
p r i m a r y g o a l s of criminal sentencing. See
J.Q. W i l s o n , THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
I n c a r c e r a t i o n s e r v e s this goal in two
ways. It incapacitates the individual from
c o m m i t t i n g f u r t h e r c r i m e s d u r i n g his
sentence and provides specific deterrence,
through punishment, against his committing
f u r t h e r c r i m e s on r e l e a s e . The use of
deadly force to i n c a p a c i t a t e in the way
s u g g e s t e d by M e m p h i s ' s m a y o r and police
director is c learly i n t e n d e d to take the
p l a c e of s p e c i f i c d e t e r r e n c e . Thus, the
incapacitation p u r p o s e c a n n o t n e g a t e the
i n f e r e n c e of p u n i s h m e n t arising from the
a p p l i c a t i o n of the other Mendoza-Martinez
criteria.
Se c o n d , the use of d e a d l y force to
i n c a p a c i t a t e is e x c e s s i v e in its p e r m a -
- 74 -
nency. This is best demonstrated by Coker
y. G e o r g i a , 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Despite
the e x c e p t i o n a l s e v e r i t y of the crime of
rape, ( " S h o r t of h o m i c i d e , it is the
' u l t i m a t e v i o l a t i o n of s e l f . ' " . at
597), "the death penalty, which is unique
in its s e v e r i t y and i r r e v o c a b i l i t y , '
[ G re gg v. G e o r g i a ,] 428 U.S. 187, is an
e x c e s s i v e p e n a l t y for the rapist who, as
su ch d o e s not take h u m a n l i f e . " C o k e r ,
433 U.S. at 598. If the k i l l i n g of a
rapist is e x c e s s i v e to i n c a p a c i t a t e him
and prevent him from repeating that crime,
then shooting an unarmed b u r g l a r y s u s p e c t
who m i g h t , it is s p e c u l a t e d , steal
a n o t h e r $10 in the f u t u r e is s i m i l a r l y
excessive.
The s h o o t i n g of f l e e i n g fel o n y
suspects may prevent crime in another way:
It may s e r v e to deter o t h e r s . As d e v e
loped above, the M e m p h i s p o l i c y has be en
j u s t i f i e d on ju st this b a s i s . But this
j u s t i f i c a t i o n is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d efec
tive for the same two r e a s o n s . G e n e r a l
d e t e r r e n c e is a core p u r p o s e of p u n i s h
m en t, M e n d o z a - M a r t i n e z , 372 U.S. at 168,
and thus u n a v a i l a b l e as an a l t e r n a t i v e
n o n p u n i t i v e r a t i o n a l e for the f l e e i n g
felon doctrine. Moreover, if, despite any
d e t e r r e n t v a l u e , d eath is e x c e s s i v e for
c r i m e s as s e r i o u s as rape or f e l o n y
m u r d e r , C o k e r , s u p r a ; Enmund v, F l o r i d a ,
458 U.S. 782 (1982), then it is s u r e l y
e x c e s s i v e as a d e t e r r e n t to e i t h e r»
burglary or flight.
(3) The s a f e t y i n t e r e s t s ; The state
and the c i t y argue that the protection of
the p u b l i c j u s t i f i e s the f l e e i n g felon
d o c t r i n e . When the s u s p e c t is armed or
has committed a violent crime, this is so
as recognized by the court of appeals. But
young Garner had no weapon, t h r e a t e n e d no
one e i t h e r d u r i n g the c o m m i s s i o n of the
crime or afterward, and was not thought by
- 7 5 -
the p o l i c e officer to be armed. A u t horiz
ing p o l i c e to s h o o t under t h e s e c i r c u m -
~ 76 -
s t a n c e s d o e s not in any way a d v a n c e the
s t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t in p r o t e c t i n g the
40
p h y s i c a l s a f e t y of its c i t i z e n s or ,
41
indeed , jits police of fic er s .
The s t a t e and t he c i t y s e e k to end
run the facts by reference to "[t]he need
to r e d Uice v i o l e n c e in our s o cie ty ,"
S t a t e ' s B r i e f at 11, "the ready avail ab i-
1 i t y of h a n d g u n s i.n our s o c i e t y an d
widespread violence," id. at 17, "the long
t r ad i t i 0 n of Violenc e which surrounds the
A m e r l e a n c r i m i n a l ," C i t y ' s B r i e f at 14,
Manifestly, in a case where the safety interests
are properly presented, they would justify resort to
deadly force and its use would be non-punitive in
nature. This belies the state's strawman argument
that "if the killing of a non-violent fleeing felony
suspect deprives the suspect of constitutional
guarantees, it does so no less with the fleeing
violent offender." State's Brief at 18.
The record evidence shows that the limitation of
the use of deadly force to self-defense and defense
of others implemented by the New York City police in
1972 actually increased officer safety, resulting in
fewer officer deaths and fewer assaults on officers.
3.A. 84, 92, 96.
- l i
t h e c o m m o n law c o n c e p t i o n of burglary as
an inherently violent crime, at 23-25,
and the "common experience" that "burglary
f r e q u e n t l y is a s s o c i a t e d with c r i m e s of
v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t the person." at 25.
This rhetoric does not withstand scrutiny.
That h a n d g u n s are a v a i l a b l e to
c r i m i n a l s and that t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l
violence in our s o c i e t y c a n n o t j u s t i f y a
rule that allows a police officer to shoot
a fifteen-year-old when he is " r e a s o n a b l y
sure that the i n d i v i d u a l was not
armed...." 3.A. 41. That some c r i m i n a l s
are v i o l e n t c a n n o t c r e a t e a p r e s u m p t i o n
that all are and, therefore, that all may
be shot. " T h i s a r g u m e n t a l m o s t a l w a y s
p e r m i t s the o f f i c e r to s h o o t to kil l . "
G a r n e r , 710 F.2d at 246 ; A. 52. It would
be hard to i m a g i n e a g r e a t e r i m b a l a n c e
between the asserted justification and the
state's power to kill than a rule premised
on the n o t i o n that, b e c a u s e k i l l i n g is
s o m e t i m e s j u s t i f i e d , it is always j u s t i
fied .
The c i t y ' s argument that burglary is
so frequently a crime of v i o l e n c e that it
j u s t i f i e s use of d e a d l y force to prevent
e s c a p e w o u l d have a p p e a l if it had any
42
basis in fact. But it does not.
- 78 -
At best, the city's argument is that at the time of
the common law and, perhaps, in 1858 when the
current Tennessee statute was enacted, burglary was
often violent and therefore the common law fleeing
felon doctrine is justified as applied to burglars.
But, as with the other common law bases for the
doctrine, see subsection A(1), supra, circumstances
have changed*. Indeed, this is reflected in the Model
Penal Code comment curiously miscited by the city.
While "the offense was originally confined to
violent nighttime assault on a dwelling...," the
fact that the home "is the place of security for his
family, as well as his most cherished possessions"
makes it "understandable that ... public fear of the
burglar has broadened beyond its original objec
tive." ALI, Model Penal Code, Vol. II, Art. 221-1,
Comment at 67. A carefull reading of most of the
authorities cited in the city's brief reveals not
that they consider burglary a violent crime, but
that it is a serious crime because it involves an
invasion of the sanctity of the home. The city's
reliance on the MPC Comment's reference to the
terror instilled by the fear of the burglary is
similarly misplaced. The comment did not conclude
that burglars terrorize their victims, only that the
circumstances of a nighttime burglary do. Id.
The available data refutes the city's
" c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e " a s s e r t i o n that
b u r g l a r y is f r e q u e n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with
v i o l e n c e . See L ewis v. S t a t e , 398 So , 2d
432, 438 (Fla. 1981) (aggravating circ u m
s t a n c e of p r ior c o n v i c t i o n of " f e l o n y
i n v o l v i n g the use or threat of violence"
not s a t i s f i e d by two p r i o r b u r g l a r y
c o n v i c t i o n s ) . The s t u d i e s show that the
singular aspect of b u r g l a r y is that most
b u r g l a r s go to great l e n g t h s to avoid a
confrontation and that the vast m a j o r i t y
43
are not armed. The most extensive study
- 79 -
Two studies reported a consistent desire amongst
burglars to avoid confrontation; Reppetto found that
70% of all burglars reported that they want to
ascertain before entry whether a residence is
occupied. T. Reppetto, RESIDENTIAL CRIME 17,105
(1974); N. Shovell, BURGLARY AS AN OCCUPATION
(1971). Reppetto found that 75% of all burglars
were not armed, 8% were armed with guns, 7% with
knives, and 5% with mace. at 107. Another study
found that the burglar was armed in only 1 2 % of the
few burglaries that resulted in a confrontation with
a resident, I. Waller & N. Okihiro, BURGLARY: THE
VICTIM AND THE PUBLIC 32 (1978). Tennessee law
recognizes this phenomenon, prescribing different
penalties for burglary with or without a gun. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-3-401 (1975).
- 80 -
fo und that 9 2 ?o of all burglaries occurred
in u n o c c u p i e d b u i l d i n g s , that more than
h a l f of the r e m a i n i n g 8 ?o o c c u r r e d while
the residents were asleep, and that ^ of
the r e m a i n d e r o c c u r r e d w i t h o u t the
occupants' awareness of the i n t r u s i o n . T.
R e p p e t t o , R E S I D E N T I A L C R I M E 17 (1974).
Only 2.8?o of the b u r g l a r i e s s t u d i e d
r e s u l t e d in a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . This latter
figure has b e e n c o r r o b o r a t e d in a n o t h e r
c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s s t u d y . C o n k l i n and
Bittner, Burglary in a S u b u r b , 11 C rimino
logy 208, 214 (1973). Even the study that
found a h i g h e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n rate, I.
Waller & N. Okihiro, BURGLARY: THE VICTIM
44
AND THE PUBLIC (1978), reported that only
2 , 6% of all c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d a
p h y s i c a l a s s a u l t or the t h r e a t of one:
most involved only brief verbal exchanges.
Although Waller and Okihiro found a confrontation
rate of 2 1 ?o, their sample was extremely small,
consisting of only 116 residential crimes. In
contrast, Reppetto's sample was 1910.
I d . at 31-32. Only of all burglaries
b e c a m e r o b b e r i e s , only ,6% of all murders
occurred during burglaries, and only 6 ,5%
of all r e p o r t e d r a p e s o c c u r r e d in a
r e s i d e n c e b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . R e p p e t t o ,
s u p r a , at 5, 93.
Thus, the a s s e r t e d s a f e t y j u s t i f i
cations for the fleeing felon doctrine are
45
but a chimera of the common law age. They
c a n n o t j u s t i f y a m o d e r n p r a c t i c e that
a l l o w s p o l i c e to shoot and kill unarmed,
nonviolent, p r o p e r t y c r i m e s u s p e c t s like
Edward Eugene Garner.
(4) E f f e c t i v e law e n f o r c e m e n t :
■I ■ ■ ■ » ' ■ ! ■ ■ II ■ ' »■" — ■— 1 ^ ' 1 ■ ■ I I
F i n a l l y , the state and city urge that the
- 81 -
The Court has not hesitated to question common law
premises when they are no longer supported by the
modern experience with crime. In Enmund v. Florida,
the Court rejected the application of the felony
murder doctrine as a basis for the imposition of the
death penalty. In doing so, it rejected the common
sense notion that robbery is so frequently asso
ciated with murder that a state legislature could
rationally make robbery/felony-murder a capital
offense. It looked instead to recent crime statis
tics that refuted this anecdotal sense of criminal
behavior. 458 U.S. at 799-800 & nn. 23-24.
- 82 -
d o c t r i n e be m a i n t a i n e d b e c a u s e it is
n e c e s s a r y to e f f e c t i v e l a w e n f o r c e m e n t .
" O n l y t h r o u g h the p r i v i l e g e to use d e a d l y
force as a last re sort ... is the power to
a r r e s t truly e f f e c t i v e . " S t a t e ' s B r i e f at
19; s e e a l s o C i t y ' s B r i e f at 15. T h i s
a r g u m e n t fails for two r e a s o n s .
F i r s t , it a s s u m e s t h a t a l l o w i n g
e s c a p e and i m p o s i n g d eath are the only two
o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e . But if the c i t y
c o m p l a i n s a b o u t ''[n]ot g i v i n g p o l i c e
o f f i c e r s the n e c e s s a r y power to e f f e c t u a t e
th e a r r e s t . . . , " C i t y ' s B r i e f at 15, it is
b e c a u s e t h e c i t y h a s f a i l e d to d e v e l o p
o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e s . W h i l e it m a y h a v e
be en t r u e at the t i m e of t h e c o m m o n l a w
t h a t o n l y l e t h a l w e a p o n s were a v a i l a b l e ,
it is not so in 1 9 8 4 . O t h e r t a c t i c a l an d
t e c h n o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s n o w e x i s t to
effect c a p t u r e that do not c a r r y tfcie s a m e
r i s k of f a t a l c o n s e q u e n c e s . See d i s c u s
sion, supra, s u b s e c t i o n D ( 1 ),
S e c o n d , and m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , the
a r g u m e n t o n l y s e r v e s to i l l u m i n a t e the
a r b i t r a r y n a t u r e of the doctrine. If it
is the effective power of a r r e s t and the
a u t h o r i t y of law that we are vindicating,
then why c a n n o t d e a d l y force be used to
st op the f l e e i n g m i s d e m e a n a n t ? M emphis
p r o h i b i t s the s h o o t i n g of e m b e z z l e r s no
m a t t e r how m u c h they have t a k e n or how
many p e o p l e t h e y have v i c t i m i z e d , 3 . A.
142, 190. Yet Garner, who stole $10, was
shot. But, as a f i f t e e n - y e a r - o 1 d , the
most serious crime tha‘t he could have been
convicted of under T e n n e s s e e law in 1974
was d e l i n q u e n c y . Tenn. Code Ann. §37-102
(1977). These r e s u l t s c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y
be j u s t i f i e d in the name of v i n d i c a t i n g
lawful authority. That r a t i o n a l e e i t h e r
fails to p r o v i d e a s e n s i b l e b a s i s for
drawing a line in this area or exposes the
fact that the l i nes d r a w n by both the
- 83 -
- 84 -
T e n n e s s e e s t a t u t e and the Memphis policy
are wholly arbitrary.
The li ne d r a w n by the c o u r t of
appeals, on the other hand, t r u l y r e l a t e s
"the police reponse ... to the gravity and
n e e d . " B i v e n s , 403 U.S. at 419 (Burger,
C.O., d i s s e n t i n g ) . If the o f f i c e r has
cause to believe that a f l e e i n g felon is
d a n g e r o u s , he ma y be a u t h o r i z e d to use
deadly force to prevent escape and thus to
protect the public.
The state and the city argue that the
o f f i c e r will be u n a b l e to make the
o n - t h e - s p o t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s called for by
this rule. S t a t e ' s B r i e f at 11, C i t y ' s
B r i e f at 21 ( q u o t i n g W i l e y , 548 F .2d at
12 53 ). But the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e s of most
law enforcement a g e n c i e s d e m o n s t r a t e its
p r a c t i c a b i l i t y . F o u r t e e n s t a t e s have
a d o p t e d the sa me rule. C i t y ' s B r i e f at
30-31, and most police departments already
restrain the use of deadly force by police
o f f i c e r s in a m a n n e r that is e q u a l l y or
m o r e r e s t r i c t i v e . See Matulia, A Balance
of Fo r c e s ; A Re port ,of the International
A s s o c i a t i o n of C h i e f s of P o l i c e 17
(National Institute of Justice 1982). The
common s e n s e of law e n f o r c e m e n t p r o f e s
s i o n a l s a c r o s s the n a t i o n is that these
restrictive standards are w o r k a b l e and do
not hamper effective law enforcement.
The judgments and actual practices of
the v a r i o u s states are surely relevant to
the constitutional "reasonableness" of the
fleeing felon doctrine. The city concedes
that " [ t j h e r e c e r t a i n l y is no c o n s e n s u s
a m on g the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . . . . " I d . at
19. This is m u c h like the s i t u a t i o n in
- 85 -
Moreover, prior fourth amendment cases require
similar Judgments by police under no less difficult
circumstances. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20,27;
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). And, we
expect the criminal justice system, including its
lay jurors, to make similar judgments regarding
future dangerousness all the time. See Schall v.
Martin, U.S. ____ , 81 L. Ed.2d 201,207,226
(1 984); Barefoot v. Estelle, ____ U.S. > 77
L.Ed.2d 1090, l10(̂ (1^6371
P a y t o n v. New Y o r k , 445 (J.S. 573 ( 1 980),
w h e r e the C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d and r e j e c t e d
another ancient c o m m o n law p r a c t i c e . In
P a y t o n , the c o u r t l o o k e d at " c u s t o m and
c o n t e m p o r a r y n o r m s " as part of "the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n a l y s i s " of what is
" r e a s o n a b l e . " I d , at 600 ( " O n l y 24 of
the 50 s t a t e s sanction [the practice] and
t h e r e is an o b v i o u s d e c l i n i n g t r e n d . " )
47
Here only 23 states retain the outdated
f l e e i n g felon rule; 26 h a v e e x p r e s s l y
limited it. As in P a y t o n , "the strength of
the t r end is g r e a t e r than the n u m b e r s
alone indicate." The actual practices
of most p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t s are g o v e r n e d
not by state law but by m o r e r e s t r i c t i v e
m u n i c i p a l or d e p a r t m e n t a l p o l i c i e s . See
M a t u l i a , s u p r a , at 153-54. N i n e t y - t h r e e
- 86 -
The city lists Maryland as a common law state.
City's Brief at 27, but a reading of Giant Food,
Inc. V. Scherry, 51 Md. App. 586, 444 A.2d 483
(198^), shows that the courts of that state are
limiting the doctrine to forcible felonies where
there is imminent danger.
p e r c e n t of t h e s e p o l i c i e s r e j e c t the
c o m m o n law rule, id. at 161; about 75% of
them w o u l d bar the shooting in this case.
B r i e f in O p p o s i t i o n for R e s p o n d e n t -
48
Appellee at 18.
The o u t m o d e d c o m m o n law rule no
longer commands the support of e x p e r i e n c e
or r e a s o n in light of modern developments
It c a n n o t w i t h s t a n d
s c r u t i n y u n d e r the fo urth or f o u r t e e n t h
a m e n d m e n t s . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d
for the use of deadly force adopted by the
c o ur t of a p p e a l s s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d
- 87 -
and pract ices .
This trend holds true even in common law states. For
example, Michigan is a common law jurisdiction. See
Werner v. Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N.W.2d
82^ C l ̂ ^2). But more than half of the local law
enforcement agencies have deadly force policies that
are more restrictive than the common law and about
7 5% of those are consonant with the standard adopted
by the court of appeals. Staff Report to the
Michigan Civil Rights Commssion at 54 et seq. (May
18, 1981). This trend is particularly true of major
metropolitan areas. Although Arizona, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Ohio are common law
states, Phoenix, New Haven, Boston, Alburquerque,
Santa Fe, Cincinnatti, and Dayton all have deadly
force policies that would bar the shooting in this
case. R. 1318, 1291, 1130-1131, 1110, 1330, 1209, &
1218.
- 88 -
b e c a u s e it c o r r e c t l y b a l a n c e s the
interests at stake.
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l line drawn by the
court of a p p e a l s s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d for
one f u r t h e r r e a s o n . It is a commonplace
of constitutional law, not just an a s p e c t
of the Terry balance, that the greater the
governmental intrusion on life or liberty,
the h i g h e r the n e c e s s a r y j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
S e e , e , g , , A d d i n g t o n v , T e x a s , 441
U . S . 4 1 8 , 4 2 3 (1979); In re W i n s h i p , 397
U.S. 3 5 8 , 3 6 2 (1970). In a u t h o r i z i n g the
use of deadly force upon probable cause to
m a k e a f e l o n y a r r e s t , the f l e e i n g felon
d o c t r i n e e q u a t e s the level of c e r t a i n t y
r e q u i r e d for the p ower to kill with that
n e c e s s a r y for the a u t h o r i t y to a r r e s t .
P r o b a b l e c a u s e l e a v e s a large margin for
error; it is not proof beyond a reasonable
d o u b t or, even, a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of the
e v i d e n c e . S e e , e . g . , B r i n e g a r v. United
S t a t e s , 338 U.S. 1 60 , 1 75-76 ( 1 949). It
- 89 -
s u f f i c e s for an arrest because the nature
of the i n t r u s i o n is l i m i t e d ; it o n l y
a u t h o r i z e s the police to hold the suspect
for a limited time and then put him before
a m a g i s t r a t e . G e r s t e i n v. P u g h , 420 U.S.
103, 113-14 (1975); Baker v. M c C o l l a n , 443
U.S. 137, 142-43 (1979).
The fleeing felon doctrine allows the
k i l l i n g of the s u s p e c t upon the same
probable cause required, and with the same
r i s k of e r r o r t o l e r a b l e , for an arrest.
But s u r e l y the p e r m a n e n t d e p r i v a t i o n of
life at the hands of a lone police officer
r e q u i r e s a level of c e r t a i n t y s l i g h t l y
more rigorous than that which suffices for
a trip to the s t a t i o n house. O t h e r w i s e ,
fatal e r r o r s are sure to occur. Garner,
after all, was shot on probable c a use to
b e l i e v e he was a felon when, under
T e n n e s s e e law, his g r e a t e s t c r i m e was
delinquency. Similarly, in Pruitt v. City
of M o n t g o m e r y , Civ. Act. No. 8 3 - T - 9 0 3 - N
(M.D. Ala. June 12, 1984), a burglary in
progress call ended with the shooting of a
t e e n a g e r who had be en n e c k i n g with his
girlfriend. No crime had occurred at all.
A s y s t e m of law " m i n d f u l that the
function of legal p r o c e s s is to m i n i m i z e
the r i s k of e r r o n e o u s d e c i s i o n s , "
A d d i n g t o n , 441 U.S. at 425, can a c c e p t
t h i s l e vel of e r r o r when the only c o n s e
q u e n c e is a s h o r t term d e p r i v a t i o n of
liberty. The rule adopted by the court of
a p p e a l s o n l y c a l l s for a l i t t l e m o r e
c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d i n g the n e c e s s i t y of
p o l i c e a c t i o n that may well ha ve fatal
consequences. It should be affirmed.
- 90 -
II. THE JUDGMENT BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE THE MEMPHIS POLICY AND CUSTOM
IS ONE OF LIBERAL USE OF DEADLY FORCE
THAT RESULTS IN THE EXCESSIVE AND
UNNECESSARY USE OF SUCH FORCE TO STOP
NONDANGEROUS, FLEEING FELONY SUS-
PECTS____________________________________
Although the court of appeals did not
reach the question of the c o n s t i t u t i o n s -
l i t y of M e m p h i s ' s p o l i c i e s and c u s t o m s
regarding the use of deadly force, it was
familiar with Memphis's exceptional record
of shooting fleeing suspects, particularly
blacks. See Hayes v. Memphis Police D e p t . ,
571 F.2d 357 (6 th Cir. 1978); W i l e y v.
M e m p h i s P o l i c e D e p t . , 548 F.2d 1247 (6 th
Cir. 1977); Qualls v. P a r i s h , 534 F.2d 690
(6 th Cir. 1 976); B e e c h y . Mel a n c o n , 465
F.2d 425 (6 th Cir. 1972); see also
Cunningham v. E l l i n g t o n , 323 F. Supp. 1072
(W.D. Tenn. 1971) (three j u d g e c o u r t ) ;
M c K e n n a v. City of M e m p h i s , 544 F. Supp.
415 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (shooting of brother
o f f i c e r in a t t e m p t to st op f l e e i n g
49
m i s d e m e a n a n t ) . The excessiveness of the
- 91 -
It is noteworthy that Memphis accounts for about
30?o of all the reported federal cases on this issue
in the last 10 years. This is not suprising. The
percentage of firearm discharges against non-
dangerous, fleeing suspects as compared to all
firearm discharges by Memphis police is 50.7?o, J.A.
100; R. 1469, one of the highest in the country. See
J.A. 100 (11 .35o in New York between 1971-1975); W.A.
Geller & K.3. Karales, Split Second Decisions:
Shootings of and by Chicago Police 6 (Chicago Law
tnForcement Study Croup 19^1) ̂l7So between 1974-
- 92 -
M e m p h i s p o l i c i e s and customs in violation
of the f o u r t h a m e n d m e n t and the due
p r o c e s s c l a u s e , w h i c h a c c o u n t s for this
r e c o r d , also p r o v i d e s an a l t e r n a t i v e
g r o u n d for a f f i r m i n g the judgment below.
S mi th V . P h i l l i p s , 455 U.S. 209, 215 n . 6
(1 98 2); U n i t e d S t a t e s v. New York T e l e
phone C o . , 434 U.S. 159, 166 n . 8 (1977).
Ev en a s s u m i n g the appropriateness of
using one's revolver to arrest a s u s p e c t ,
Memphis's policies, practices, and customs
are excessive. Memphis arms its o f f i c e r s
with " d u m - d u m " bullets and trains them to
shoot at the t a r g e t ' s torso. The i n d e
l i b l e i m p r e s s i o n upon the Memphis police
1978); M. Myer, Police Shootings at Minorities; The
Case of Los Angeles, 52 Annals of Amer. Acad, of
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 98, 104 (1980) (between 1974-1978,
15?o of all shootings at blacks, 9% of all shootings
at Hispanics, and 9% of all shootings at whites); M.
Blumberg, The Use of Deadly Firearms by Police
Officers; The Impact of Individuals, Communities,
and Race 26l (Ph.D.T)issertation, 5.U.N.Y., Albany,
Sch. of Crim. Justice Dec. 14, 1982) (7.8% in
Atlanta between 1975-1978; between 1973-1974, 4.6%
in the District of Columbia, 10% in Portland, Ore.,
but 58.1% in Indianapolis).
- 93 -
o f f i c e r is that the policy of the d e p a r t
ment is to s h o o t to kill. M o r e o v e r ,
d e p a r t m e n t a l p o l i c i e s and c u s t o m s —
including inadequate training in a l t e r n a
t i v e s to d e a d l y force and i n a d e q u a t e
s t r e s s on the n e c e s s i t y of e x h a u s t i n g
o t h e r r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s — also
encourage the quick r e s o r t to the use of
d e a d l y f orce w i t h o u t a p r o p e r e f f o r t to
exhaust alternatives.
Most i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , are the
d e p a r t m e n t a l p o l i c i e s that i n s u l a t e
o f f i c e r s from any d i s c i p l i n e for use of
e x c e s s i v e force. In a d d i t i o n to the
e v i d e n c e in this record, the Court should
c o n s i d e r that b e f o r e it in B r a n d o n v.
Holt, No. 83-1 622 . There the e v i d e n c e
established, and the district court found:
that departmental p o l i c i e s i n s u l a t e d the
p o l i c e d i r e c t o r from any k n o w l e d g e of
misconduct by his subordinates 5 that there
was a t a c i t l y s a n c t i o n e d code of silence
- 94 -
th at p r o h i b i t e d o f f i c e r s and supervisors
alike from r e l a t i n g i n c i d e n t s of m i s c o n
du ct; that t h e r e was a p r o v i s i o n in the
c o n t r a c t with the union that p r o h i b i t e d
r e a s s i g n m e n t to a d e s k job for d i s c i p l i
nary reasons; and that the Civil S e r v i c e
C o m m i s s i o n ' s consistent failure to uphold
dismissals for police m i s c o n d u c t r e s u l t e d
in a d e p a r t m e n t a l decision not to attempt
any d i s c i p l i n a r y a ction. In sh ort, the
d i s c i p l i n a r y s i t u a t i o n was characterized
by Director Chapman as " h o p e l e s s . " B r i e f
for Petitioners in No. 83-1622 at 12-17.
The p r o x i m a t e r e s u l t of these
p o l i c i e s is use of d e a d l y force in
s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e it is u n n e c e s s a r y and
e x c e s s i v e as a m e a n s of a p p r e h e n s i o n .
This case provides an a d e q u a t e i l l u s t r a
tion: The p o l i c e e x p e r t s t e s t i f i e d that
Hymon should have a t t e m p t e d to a p p r e h e n d
y ou ng G a r n e r , who was only 30 to 40 feet
away, r a t h e r than r e l y i n g s o l e l y on his
- 95 -
gun. A. 8 . Other i l l u s t r a t i o n s abound.
In M c K e n n a , the o f f i c e r who shot his
f e l l o w o f f i c e r was fir i n g at a fl e e i n g
misdemeanant; he was a k nown s h o o t e r but
had n ever b e e n d i s c i p l i n e d or retrained.
544 F. Supp. at 417. In another i n s t a n c e ,
Memphis officers shot and killed a fleeing
black teenager who had stolen a car, even
t h o u g h his a c c o m p l i c e was a l r e a d y in
c u s t o d y and c o u l d have p r o v i d e d i d e n t i
f i c a t i o n . The o f f i c e r who shot n e ver
c o n s i d e r e d any a l t e r n a t i v e s , not even
g i v i n g c h a s e down an e m p t y d o w n t o w n
street. R. 844-45.
"In this case. City officials did set
the p o l i c i e s i n v o l v e d ... t r a i n i n g and
s u p e r v i s i n g the p o l i c e force...," Le it̂ e
V . City of P r o v i d e n c e , 463 F. Supp. 585,
589 (D. R.I. 1978), e x p osing the city to
l i a b i l i t y under M o n e l l . Young Garner was
shot pursuant to a policy "which allows an
o f f i c e r to kill a f leeing felon r a t h e r
- 96 -
t h a n run the ri sk of a l l o w i n g him to
escape a p p r e h e n s i o n . ” G a r n e r , 600 F. 2d at
54; A. 16, Hymon did no more than follow
th at p o l i c y , as he "was t a u g h t . " Id, at
53; A. 16. The j u d g m e n t below should be
affirmed on this basis.
III. M E M P H I S ' S POLICY AUTHORIZING THE
D I S C R E T I O N A R Y S H O O T I N G OF
N O N D A N G E R O U S , F L E E I N G P R O P E R T Y
C R I M E S U S P E C T S V I O L A T E S THE
F O U R T H A M E N D M E N T A N D THE E Q U A L
P R O T E C T I O N C L A U S E B E C A U S E IT
I N V I T E S A N D R E S U L T S IN R A C I A L
DISCRI^iINATION_____________________
The M e m p h i s policy runs afoul of the
C o n s t i t u t i o n in a n o t h e r f u n d a m e n t a l way
not d i s c u s s e d by the c o u r t of a p p e a l s :
The b r e a d t h of the d i s c r e t i o n that it
c o n f e r s upon i n d i v i d u a l o f f i c e r s is
susceptible to r a c i a l l y m o t i v a t e d abuse;
the materials in the offer of proof depict
the policy "in a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n , and the
facts s h own e s t a b l i s h an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
... with an evil eye and an u n e q u a l h and"
a g a i n s t bl a c k s . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
- 97 -
U . S. 356 , 3 7 3 - 7 4 ( 1 8 8 6 ); see also Furman
V . G e o r g i a , 408 U.S. 238, 389 n.12 (1972)
(Burger, C. 3., dissenting).
In A r l i n g t o n Heights v. Metropolitan
H o u s i n g C o r p . , 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the
Court discussed what is necessary to prove
that a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y or law is
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y .
[ W a s h i n g t o n v.] D a v i s does not
require a plaintiff to prove that the
c h a l l e n g e d acti o n r e s t e d s o l e l y on
r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p u r p o s e s .
Rarely can it be said that a legisla
ture or administrative body operating
under a broad mandate made a decision
motivated solely by a single concern,
or even that a particular purpose was
the "dominant" or "primary" one....
D e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r i n v i d i o u s
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p u r p o s e was a m o t i
v a t i n g factor d e m a n d s a s e n s i t i v e
inquiry into such c i r c u m s t a n t i a l and
d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t as may be
available. The impact of the official
a c t i o n -- w h e t h e r it " b e a r s mo re
h e a v i l y on one race than a n o t h e r , "
W a s h i n g t o n v. Davis, supra, at 242,
48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 96 S.Ct. 2040 -- may
p r o v i d e an important starting point.
Sometimes a clear pattern u n e x p l a i n
able on g r o u n d s o ther than race,
emerges from the effect of the s tate
a c t i o n ev en when the g o v e r n i n g
l e g i s l a t i o n a p p e a r s n e u t r a l on its
face. Yick Wo v. H o p k i n s , 118 U.S.
- 98 -
356 , 30 L.Ed.
(1 88 6 )____
220, 6 S.Ct. 1064
The h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d of the
decision is one e v i d e n t i a r y s o u r c e ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y if it r e v e a l s a series
of o f f i c i a l a c t i o n s t a k e n for
invidious purpose,,,.
at 265-67.
Here, the Memphis policy authorizing
use of deadly force against no n - d a n g e r o u s
f l e e i n g p r o p e r t y c r i m e s u s p e c t s c l e a r l y
" b e a r s m o r e h e a v i l y on one race than
a n o t h e r " and is "unexplainable on grounds
o t h e r than r a c e . " Id. Blacks accounted
for 8 4 . 2 1 % of the property crime suspects
shot by M e m p h i s p o l i c e b e t w e e n 1969 and
1974, a l t h o u g h blacks comprise only 70.5%
of those arrested for property crimes. In
c o n t r a s t , the n u m b e r of b l a c k v i o l e n t
c r i m e s u s p e c t s who were shot at was
p r o p o r t i o n a l to the r a c i a l b r e a k d o w n of
v i o l e n t c r i m e a r r e s t s . R. 1 5 8 9 - 9 2 ,
1 5 5 9 - 6 2 , 1 7 6 9 - 7 7 . C o n t r o l l i n g for d i f
ferential involvement in p r o p e r t y c r i m e s .
b l a c k s were m o r e than twice as likely to
be shot at, four t imes more l i k e l y to be
wounded, and 40% more likely to be killed.
50
J.A. 101-02. The g reat d i s p a r i t y in
blacks shot by Memphis police o f f i c e r s is
l a r g e l y a c c o u n t e d for by the p o l i c y
a l l o w i n g the s h o o t i n g of n o n - d a n g e r o u s
f l e e i n g f elons. B e t w e e n 1969 and 1976,
M e m p h i s p o l i c e kill e d 2.6 u n a r m e d ,
n o n - a s s a u 1 1 iVe b l a c k s for ea ch armed,
assaultive white. J.A. 103-04.
The racially discriminatory nature of
this pattern is confirmed by its r o o t s in
a p o l i c y g i v i n g o f f i c e r s u n l i m i t e d
d i s c r e t i o n to use their own j u d g m e n t in
d e t e r m i n i n g when to shoot n o n - d a n g e r o u s
f l e e i n g p r o p e r t y c r i m e s u s p e c t s . See ,
- 99 -
Evidence produced at the Wiley trial confirms this
data. Although the Wiley statistical data covered a
shorter period, 1969-1971, it indicated that blacks
were shot at disproportionately in relation to the
racial breakdown of property crime arrests, and that
this disproportion was significant at the . 0 2 level
(less than two chances in 100 that the difference
was due to chance). R. 1559-62, 1769-77.
e ,g , , R. 195-96. This consignment to the
officer's discretion is "a ready mechanism
for d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , " Rowe v . Gener al
Motors Corp. , 457 F. 2d 348, 359 (5th Cir.
1972) ( T i t l e VII), " s u p p o r t [ i n g ] the
p r e s u m p t i o n of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r a i s e d by
the s t a t i s t i c a l s h o w i n g . " C a s t a n e d a v.
P a r t i d a , 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (citing
W a s h i n g t o n v. D a v i s , 426 U.S. at 241).
This c o n c l u s i o n is p a r t i c u l a r l y
strong in this case. As d e t a i l e d above,
the M e m p h i s P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t has a
h i s t o r y of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n that was
- 100 -
51
The mayor testified: "I'm not sure that every
officer would react, for example, to a fleeing
burglar ... the same as another.... That doesn't
mean, in my opinion, that every policeman will shoot
an escaping person, felon, if they can't apprehend
him. There may be some people over there, I don't
know who they are or anything else, but I believe
some would say 'I'm just not going to shoot that
fellow. I believe we can catch him. I believe he
is catchable.'" J.A. 115.
Similarly, Director Chapman testified that: "We
rest our case in the Judgment of [the] police
officer.... I think that you would find more cases
of escaping burglars who in effect successfully
escaped and who did not have deadly force used
against them." J.A. 128-29.
- 101 -
u n a b a t e d at the time of the G a r n e r
shooting. Thus, the c o n s e q u e n c e s of the
unlimited discretion to shoot are predict
able: When shootings by Memphis o f f i c e r s
are most likely to be in response to bona
fide s a f e t y c o n c e r n s , i.e., a g a i n s t
v i o l e n t c r i m e s u s p e c t s , t h e r e is no
d i s p a r a t e r a c i a l r esult. But when
s h o o t i n g s are not m o t i v a t e d by need and
are o p t i o n a l , see n.51, s u p r a , b l a c k s
52
are shot at disproportionately.
The four t h a m e n d m e n t ' s and e q ual
p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e ' s c o n cerns coincide in
this case. The fo urth a m e n d m e n t was
a d o p t e d to c o n t r o l the d a n g e r of abuse
52 At minimum, the proffer establishes a prima facie
case, shifting the burden to the city to rebut.
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493-96. The district court's
distortions, suppositions, and attack on the "bias"
of respondent's expert cannot suffice to fill this
"evidentiary gap." J[d. at 499. Nor does the fact
that Hymon was black "dispel the presumption of
purposeful discrimination." I d , In 1974, Hymon was
only one of a small minority of black officers in a
department where racism was well entrenched; in the
police director's words, "the black officers tried
to out red-neck the white officers...." B.A. 137.
See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 499.
- 102 -
i n h e r e n t in b r o a d , d i s c r e t i o n a r y po lice
p o w e r s .
A c e n t r a l c o n c e r n ... has be en to
assure that an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a s o n
a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n of p r i v a c y is not
subject to arbitrary i n v a s i o n s o l e l y
at the u n f e t t e r e d d i s c r e t i o n of
officers in the field.
Br own v . T e x a s , 443 U.S. 47 , 51 ( 1 979).
The a m e n d m e n t was a r e a c t i o n to the
E n g l i s h and c o l o n i a l e x p e r i e n c e with
g e n e r a l w a r r a n t s and writs of assistance,
which conferred too much discretion on the
e x e c u t i n g officer: "a discretionary power
... to s e a r c h w h e r e v e r t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s
ma y c h a n c e to fall," W i l k e s v . W o o d , 10
Howell St. Tr. 1153, 1167 (1973); "a power
that p l a c e s the l i b e r t y of e v e r y man in
the h a n d s of e v e r y p e t t y o f f i c e r . " 2 L .
Wroth & H. Zobel (eds.), L EGAL P A P E R S OF
JOHN ADAMS 141-42 (1965) (reporting Otis's
argument against the writs of assistance) .
A l t h o u g h the w a r r a n t requir e m e nt is
the fourth amendment's primary d e v i c e for
- 103 -
l i m i t i n g pol i c e discretion, the Court has
recognized and implemented this p r i n c i p l e
in a variety of other contexts. S e e , e .g , ,
D o n o v a n v , D e w e y , 452 U.S. 594, 599, 601 ,
605 (1981); D e l a w a r e v. P r o u s e , 440 U.S.
at 6 5 4 - 5 5 , 661, 662; Brown v. T e x a s , 443
U.S. at 51; Beck v . O h i o , 379 U.S. 89, 97
( 1 964). Yet, bo th the Memphis policy and
the T e n n e s s e e c o m m o n law f l e e i n g felon
rule place life itself within the unguided
d i s c r e t i o n of each and e v e r y p o l i c e
o f f i c e r .
[T]'o i n s i s t upon n e i t h e r an a p p r o
p r i a t e fa c t u a l b a sis ... nor upon
some o t h e r substantial and objective
s t a n d a r d or rule to g o v e r n the
e x e r c i s e of discretion "would invite
i n t r u s i o n s upon c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
guaranteed rights...."
D e l a w a r e v. P r o u s e , 440 U.S. at 661
( q u o t i n g T e r r y v. O h i o , 392 U.S. at 22).
This has s u r e l y been the e x p e r i e n c e in
M e m p h i s , w h e r e p o l i c e e x e r c i s e their
d i s c r e t i o n d i f f e r e n t i a l l y b a s e d on the
race of the suspect.
Thus, the c o u r t of a p p e a l s was
correct in imposing an o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d
b a s e d on d a n g e r and need to limit police
discretion to shoot fleeing suspects. The
t o t a l l y d i s c r e t i o n a r y n a t u r e of the
a u t h o r i t y to s h o o t g i v e n M e m p h i s p o l i c e
o f f i c e r s , r e s u l t i n g in d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e
n u m b e r s of n o n t h r e a t e n i n g b l a c k s b e i n g
shot, is at war with the basic notion of
our constitutional system. "For, the very
idea that one man may be compelled to hold
his life ... at the mere will of a n o t h e r ,
s e e m s to be i n t o l e r a b l e in any c o u n t r y
w h e r e f r e e d o m p r e v a i l s . . . . " Yick W o , 118
U.S. at 370.
- 104 -
CONCLUSION
For the f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , the
judgment of the court of appeals should be
a f f i r m e d .
- 105 -
Respectfully submitted,
3, LeVONNE CHAMBERS
STEVEN L. WINTER *
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
WALTER L. BAILEY, JR.
Suite 901, Tenoke Building
161 Jefferson Avenue
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
(901) 521-1560
Attorney for Appel!ee-Respondent
♦ Counsel of Record
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