Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene

    O 
[ -* 
u

tup Ur. •i"* n  U  r r ^  r* - ^ r r i n r s T A n  %r '  T*
ilD SaAaES nibiiVlOA LUUAi i'UA A

r? a o r;'1 v? * * *\T T ' T C r CF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

■p A 7  n  TP 73* A r - 7  W  <- 1iD iN x* —i i i  1  ^ C -c -  • j )
*>
)

Plaintiffs, )
\

v .

WILLIAM G .  MILLIREN ,  et ai . ,

)

)
\
;

)

MEMORANDUM IN 
SLT̂ ?CilT 0?  

MOTION TO
Defendants

)
)
N

INTERVENE

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

)
\
J

)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION 
NO .  O52o7

Defendant-  

Intervenor
/

)
)
)
)

*\/•A , o t *-•-"vr ,7O ^ r T  /a.-!- o l  
i-»-> ll* u> i\ .L . j  C  <a- -*- • >

J

)
\

Defendants-  

Intervener.

/

)
)
)

Section 902 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.3.C. 2000h-2) and Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure authorize the Attorney General to inter­
vene in this action as of right. H.R. Rep. No. 9i45 88tn 
Cong.3 1st Sess. 22 (1963); 110 Cong. Rec. 2256-61, 
2278-69 (1964); (House Debate) 110 Cong. Rec. 13464-67, 
13905-6, 13901-2 (1964); (Senate Debate); Slnvleton v.

>n Municipal Separate School Piis trie it al. , 348

F .2d 729 (5th Cir., 1965), Lexer v. Dossier Parish School, 
Heard, 240 ?. Su?p. 709, 715 (W.D. La. 1965).



Although an application to intervene must be 
timely, that determination is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Diaz v. Southern 
brillir.g Coro., 427 F .2d 1118 (5th Cir., 1970); Moore
v. -Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 298 F. Supp. 288 
(E.D„ La., 1969); McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 
1065 (5th Cir., 1970); Smith Petroleum Service. Inc, v. 
Monsanto Chemical Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir., 1970); 
3B J. Moore, Federal Practice, Sec. 24.13[1j (1969). 
Here the Attorney General's application was filed six 
cays after the President's message to Congress in which 
he proposed significant legislation relevant to the 
relief in this case and directed the Justice Department

seek intervention in selected cases.
But minus the argument of timely application pur-

nt to Congress ional interest, "timeliness is not
olute and should be evaluated in the light of all
'cians tances." Atkins v. State Board of Education of

North Carolina, 418 F.2d 874 (4th Cir., 1969). Indeed, 
it has been held that timeliness in the case of inter­
vention of right is limited to the question of prejudice.
McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., supra. And where an 
applicant may intervene as of right, the court will 
exercise its discretion in denying with greater reluctance, 
Diaz, sunra, at 1126; J. Moore, supra, at 24.13[1].

2



Conclusion
For the above reasons, it is requested that 

the Attorney General*s motion to intervene be 
granted.

Respectfully submitted,

j>& a P
DAVID L. NORMAN 
Assistant Attorney General