Memorandum from Williams to Chambers
Correspondence
February 2, 1982
Cite this item
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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Memorandum from Williams to Chambers, 1982. 2ab736d9-d792-ee11-be37-6045bddb811f. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1daca25c-113c-45d1-adda-0c0ea4752024/memorandum-from-williams-to-chambers. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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MEMORANDUM
February 2, L982
To : Julius Levonne Chambers
From : Napoleon B. Wi11iams, Jr.
Re : Gingles v. Edmisten (f.O. N.C.)
North Carolina Reapportionment
I
The Nature of the Claims for Relief
Our overall goals in the North Carolina reapportion-
ment lawsuit are twofold: (1) to maximize the number of
districts in which minority voters in North Carolina can
elect candidates of their choice to the General Assembly
and to the House of Representatives; and (2) to insurer ES
near as possible, that the Staters districting plans are in
compliance with the constitutional mandate of one person,
one vote.
Our complaint in Gingles v. Ed.misten reflects the twin
goals. One claim for relief in the complaint is based upon
dilution of minority voting strength and the other claim
for relief is based upon the constitutional standard of one
person, one vote.
There are two components to the claim based upon vote
dilution with respect to districting for the General Assembly.
One part arises from the adoption and application in 1967
of amendments to the Constitution of North Carolina which
prohibit the division of county lines in drawing up
electoral districts for the two houses of the General
Assembly. The second component results from gerrymander-
ing in 1981 and L982 in the placement of district lines.
The vote dilution claims are based upon both the equal
protection cl-ause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. The former requires proof that
the discrimination is purposeful and caused by giovernmental
officials. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, all
new changes in voting laws, practices, and rules must be
approved by the Attorney General of the United States or by
the United States District Court in the District of Columbia.
The changes can be d.isallowed if their purpose or effect is
discriminatory.
By contrast, government officials of the State are assumed
to have intentionally violated the 14th Amendmentrs equal
protection claim of one person, one vote if the arithmetical
total of the percentage deviations of any two districts in the
State from the median exceeds 16.58. If, however, the total
never exceeds this amount but is greater than 9.92, then an
intentional violation of the one person, one vote standard will
not be presumed. Rather, it must be established.
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It can be established only by showing that smaller
deviations could have been achieved which did not sacrifiee
the compelling and legitimate governmental interests which
the State was trying to achieve when it adopted the district-
ing plan with higher deviations. When this occurs, this
State is put into the position of having to justify the large
deviations. Where the combined percentage deviations for any
two districts does not exceed 9.9t, it wiII, in most cases,
not be necessary for the State to justify the deviation from
population equality.
II
The Re1ief Required and Requested
Assuming that our claims are good and that they can be
established, then we move to the next stage of our lawsuit,
namelym the question of relief or remedy. Here, the basic
problem is that the relief which we are entitled to receive
as a matter of law if our claims are proved, is not necessarily
the same as the relief which we desire. The relief we desire
for the General Assembly is the creation of single member dis-
tricts, appropriately drawn as to maximize the potential for
electing the largest, number of minority members. In practical
terms, this means that we want single member districting and
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we want the districting plan to contain the largest number
possible of districts in which either the majority of the
registered voters or the majority of the population is com-
posed of minority citizens. This is our first prJ-ority.
A second priority, if the first is not achieved, is to harre
the maximum number of districts, however constructed, in which
minorities can be constructed.
There is no law which gives us a right to have any of
the two priorities realized, that is, we will not be entitled
automatically, even if we prove all of our claims, to have a
districting scheme maximizing the number of minorities who
can get elected to the General Assembly. What our claims
entitle us to get unconditionally is (1) a reapportion which
satisfies the one person, one vote standard, and (2) a dis-
tricting scheme whose purpose or effect is not to minimize or
cancel out minority voting strength.
There are four possible ways in which this lawsuit might
result in the creation of single member district for the
General Assembly. First, the State l,egislature might volun-
tarily create them for one or both houses. Second, the Justice
Department might continue to invalidate proposed apportionment
schemes until single member districts are finally proposed and
adopted. Third, single member districts may prove to be the
only districting scheme which will have the requisite
variances. Fourth, the district court might impose single
member districts. The second and t.hird are possibilities which
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are either remote or non-existent. The first possibility
is not one whose likelihood I can determine.
Our hopes for single member districts are based on
the fourth possibility. Here, however, we have obstacles
arising out of well established legal principles promulgated
by the Supreme Court of the United States. First, the Court
has instructed district courts, following invalidation of a
reapportionment plan (irrespective of whether the claim is
based on the one person, one vote standard or on the dilution
of minority voting strength), to give the affected Legislature
the first opportunities to come up with a remedial respportion-
ment plan. Second, the Supreme Court has held that district
courts are to give deference to any choice by the Legislature
of multimember district p1ans. See, for example, Wise v.
Lipscomb,437 U.S. 535 (1978).
It is only when the Legislature defaults and is not able,
during the remedy stage, to come up with a districting plan
that works, i.e., which satisfies the applicable federal legal
standards, that the district court should step in and devise
its own remedy. In trying to determj-ne whether the Legislature
is likely to to able to develop a satisfactory plan, the
federal district court can take into account, I assume, the
previous failures by the Legislature to devise an acceptable
plan. Once, however, it is clear that the Legislature cannot
district court
be relied upon to draw up a valid plan and that the federal /
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must intervene, then the district court, according to
existing Supreme Court 1aw, must ordinarily impose only a
single member district pIan.
This analysis reveals, dt least in part, the extent to
which this lawsuit relies upon a belief that the State
Legislature willr ds a practical matter, continue to be
unable to draft a satisfactory reapportionment p1an. If
the district court is forced to draw up a plan, then, I
believer w€ will have won.
SomethJ-ng less than tot.al victory can be achieved if each
successive plan developed by the Legislature is progressively
more favorable for the ability of minorities to get elected
to the General Assembly. This Rdy, j-n fact, be the pattern
which the Legislature is now pursuing.
In addition to the concerns articulated above, there are
other important j-ssues which are surfacing in the lawsuit.
One is the manner in which we prove our claims. This concerns
the methods which we use to prove intentional racial discrim-
ination and violation of the one person, one vot,e standard as
weII as the means employed to get evidence of this nature.
Evidence of discrimination must be obtained both for the Fourth
Congressional District and for the reapportionment of the
General Assembly.
Another matter which must be determined is the significance
of the Justice Department's invalidation of the L967 consti-
tutiqlalamendments. More precisely, we must ascertain how
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it will be possible, with respect to each apportionment
scheme, to establish that the apportionment plan was not
constructed to conform with the requirements of the L967
amendments. This issue will become extremely important when-
ever it is necessary to show that the reason why a particular
district is a multimember district is because of the
necessity for complying with the disallowed L967 amendments
(this is another manner in which single member districts might
be created).
A third issue of concern is our ability to identify each
district which we believe can be made into a minority district
and each district which we can show, by credible evidence,
to be entitledr ds a matter of 1aw, to be made into a minority
district, I will present this and other issues j-nvolved in
the analysis at another tj-me.
III
Prognosis
Our chances of winnj-ng on the one person, one vote issue
are good. Whether they are good enough to get us ultimately
to single member districts is a different question altogether.
Our cnances on the vote dilution issue are, until we have
examined the evidence more thoroughly, up for grabs. Even
if we are not able to wein the vote dilution issue directly,
we might still be able to prevail as a result of whatever
advantages might flow from a victory on the one person, one
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vote issue without stint or limit.
I will prove later a more detailed, thoughtful,
comprehensive, and practical analysis of all of the
issues raised in Gingles.
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