U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 84L Ed 2d (Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, NC)

    U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

PHYLLE A. ANDERSON

v

CITY OF BESSEMER CITY, NORTH CAROLINA

470 us -, 84 L Ed 2d 518, 106 S Ct -
[No. 83-1623]

Argued December 3, 1984. Decided March 19, 1985'

Decision: Court of Appeals held to have misapplied "clearly erroneous"
standard of review in overturning District Court's finding of sex discrimi-
nation.

SU}I}IARY

A 39-yearold female schoolteacher with college degrees in social studies
and education applied and was rejected for a job managing a city's recre-
ational facilities and programs. A 24-year-old male who had recently gradu-
ated from college and had a degree in physical education wa8 chosen for the
position by a selection committee which consisted of four men and one
woman. Only the woman on the committee voted to hire the female
applicant. After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Comruission, the woman brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging sex

discriminarion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS

$S 20OOe et seq.). Following a trial, the District Court deterrnined that the
applicant had been denied the position on account of her sex. The court
issued a preliminary memorandum setting forth its essential findings and
directed the applicant's counsel to submit a more detailed set of findings
consist€nt with them. The District Court's linal decision included findings
that the female applicant was the most qualified candidate, that she alone
had been asked questions about her spouse's reaction to her taking the job'
and that the male committee members were biased against hiring women.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that the District Court's findings were clearly erroneous and that the lower
court had erred in finding that the applicant had been discriminated against
on account of her sex (717 F2d 149).

518

84LEd2d ANDEN.SON v BESSEMER CITY
84 L Ed 2d 5r8

on certiorari, the yrrj"d state^s. supreme court reversed. In an opinionby wunr:, J., joined by Bunc_nn, ch. i; urra go"*n^", rvri*rr,^,r, pow,r.L,
Renxqursr, SrpveNs, and o,coNxo*, j.1., it was h"il'(l)'il;i'tt" Dirt.i.tlcourt's findings were not aubject to more stringent appeilate ,"ui"i" ffi;l;called for by'the appricable rur"r -"i"ry 6.urr"--it"r.ii.ii"a proposedfindings from the prevailing gu"ty arte, the court n"a--"irrou'ced itrdecision; and (2) that the nnai"g- that- ttre r"r".r" 

"orri.r., had beendiscriminated against on the uasis 
"or 

t 
". ."* was not crearry erroneoue andthat the Courr of App:gl: had improperly apptied rh" iti;;rl; erroneous,,rule of Federal Rules of Civil procedure Siat in or"rtuiniil;.'

_ Poweu., J., concurred, expressing the view that, under Rule 52(a) of theFederal Rulee of civil procedure, iiis.appropriate for a courllr Appeals toengage in a comprehensive review of the entire record 
"f 

it 
" 
.r*.

^ Br'^cxuuN, J., concurre.d in the judgment, stating that a District court,gfindings are not necessarily entitled 6 i"fo."rrc" i,rr"r" ,u.h-ti.,ding, 
"r"based wholly on documentary evidence and do ,rot ,".t-on credibilitydeterminations.

5r0



U.S. SUPBEME COUBT REPORTS 84LEd2d

TOTAL CLIENTSERVICE LIBRARY6) REFERENCES

32 Am Jur 2d, Federal Practice and Procedure $ 363; 15 Am
Jur 2d, Civil Rights S$ 154, 161

2 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Appeal, Certiorari, and Review

$ 3:649; 21 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Job Discrimination

$ 50:304

12 Federat Procedural Forms, L Ed, Job Discrimination

$$ 45:11 et seq.

5 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Civil Rights, Forme 61'1 et
seq. (supp)

21 Am Jur Trials 1, Employment Discrimination Action
Under Federal Civil Rights Acts

42 USCS $$ 2000e et seq.; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 52(a)

? RIA Employment Coordinator, Employment Practices

1l1l 11,201 et seq'

US L Ed Digest, Appeal $$ 1464, L4ffi, 1477; Civil Rights

$$ 7.7, ?0; Fideral Rules of Civil Procedure 52

L Ed Index to Annos, Appeal and Error; Civil Rights; Clearly- nrro""o"t Rule; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Labor
and Employment; Sex

ALR Quick Index, Appeal and Error; Discrimination; Rules of
Civil Procedure; Ser Discrimiaation

Federal QuicL lndex, Appeal and Error; "Clearly Erroneous"
n"f"; i^ir Employ-ut t Practices; Federat Rules of Civil
Procedure; Sex Discrimination

Auto-Cites: Any case citation herein can be checked for--iot*, 
putullel-references, later history and annotation ref-

"r"rr."i 
through the Auto-Cite computer research system'

ANNOTATION REFERENCE.S

Supreme C;ourt's views as to what constitutes factual issue under
,,.i;;it erroneous" srandard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),

prlriai'tf that findings of tact shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous. T2LEd 2d 890.

Application of ,lclearly erroneo,ls".test of 
-Rule 

52ta) of Federal Rules of
Ciuii'proceaure to triai court's findings of fact based on documentary
evidence. 1l ALR Fed 212.

Construction and application of provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights

A;;i' i-94 (a2 USC5-$$ 2000e et r.q.t *ating discrimination in employ-

ment unlawful. 12 ALR Fed 15.

520 52t

ANDERSON v BESSEMER CITY
84 L Ed 2d 518

HEADNOTBS

Classitied to U.S. Suprerne Courr Digest, l,awyers' Edition

Appeal g 1477; Civit Rights g ?0 -ser discrimination - 
,,clearly

erroneous" standard of re-
view

la-lc. The Court of Appeals im-
properly applies the "clearly errone-
ous" standard of Rule b2(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
overturning a District Court,s fac-
tual finding that a woman was de-
nied a job on the basis of sex dis-
crimination, where the District
Court's subsidiary findings regarding
the woman's superior qualifications
and the bias of'the selection commit-
tee are not clearly erroneous and
are sufficient to supp<lrt the inl'er-
ence that she was denied the posi-
tion on account of her sex in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Righrs
Act of t964 g2 USCS $$ 2000e er
seq.).

Appeal g 1464 - findings of fact
- preparation by counsel

2a, 2b. A District Court,s findings
of fact are not subject to more strin-
gent appellate review than is called
for by the applicable rules merely
because the court solicits proposed
findings from the prevailing party
after it has announced its decision,
where the court provides the frame-
work for the lindings in a prelimi-
nary memorandum and directs the
party to submit a more detailed set
of lindings consistent with the
court's, where the opposing party is
ofl'ered and avails itsell'of the oppor-
tunity to respond, and where the
Iinal findings represent the court,s
own considered conclusions; even

when a trial court adopts proposer
findings verbatim, the findings ar,
those of the court and may only br
reversed if clearly erroneoue.

Appeal $ 1464 - findings of fac

- 
t'clearly erronoous,, Etan

dard of review
3a, 3b. Under Rule 52(a) of thr

Federal Rules of Civil procedure, i
finding by a District Court may br
set aside as clearly erroneous when
although there is evidence to sup
port, it, the reviewing court is lefi
with the definite and lirm convictioi
that a mistake has been committed
however, if the District Court's ac
count of the evidence is plausible ir
light of the record viewed in itr
entirety, the reviewing court ma)
not reverse it, even though con,
vinced that had it been sitting as the
trier of fact it would have weighe<i
the evidence differently; this is sc
even when the District Court,s find,
ings do not rest on credibility deter.
minations but are based instead on
physical or documentary evidence or
inferences from other facts.

Appeal $ 1466 - findinge of facl

- credibility of witnesses
4. When a trial judge's finding ol

fact is based on his decision to credit
the testimony ol'one of two or more
witnesses, each of whom has told a
coherent and lacially plausible story
that is not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence, that finding, if not inter-
nally inconsistent, can virtually
never be clear error under Rule
52\d of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.



In 1975, respondent city set about
to hire a new Recreation Director to
manage the city'E recreational facili-
ties and to develop recreational pro
grams. A committee, consisting of
four men and one woman, was re-
slrcnsible for choosing the Director.
Eight persons applied for the posi-
tion, including petitioner, the only
woman applicant. At the time, peti-
tioner waa a 39-year-old school-
teacher with college degrees in social
studies and education. The commit-
tee o{I'ered the position Lo a Z{year-
old male applicant, who had recently
graduaced from college with a de-
gree in physical education. The four
men on the committee voted to offer
the job to him, and only the woman
voted for petitioner. Petitioner then
tiled discrinrination charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Crcmrnission (EEOC), which, upon
finding that there was reasonable
cause to believe that petitioner's
charges were true, invited the par-
ties to engage in conciliation pro-
ceedings. When these eflorts proved
unsuccesaful, the EEOC iseued peti-
tioner a right-to-sue letter, and peti-
tioner filed an action in Federal Dis-
trict Court under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. After a
trial in which testimony from peti-
tioner, the applicant who was hired,
and members of the selection com-
mittee was heard, the court issued a
nremorandum announcing its finding
that petitioner wari entitled to judg-
ment because she had been denied
the position on account of her sex.
The memorandum requested peti-
tioner to submit proposed lindtngs of
Iact and conclusions of law expand-

522

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

SYLI-ABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS

84LEd2d

ing upon those set forth in the mem-
orandum. When petitioner complied
with this request, the court re.
quested and received a response set-
ting forth respondent's objections to
the proposed findings. The court
then issued its own findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court's
finding that petitioner had been de.
nied employment because of her sex
was based on findings of fbct that
petitioner was the most qualilied
candidate, that she had been asked
questions during her interview re-
garding her spouse's feelings about
her application for the position that
other applicants were not asked, and
that the male committee members
were biased against hiring a woman.
The Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that the District Court's findings
were clearly erroneous and that the
court had therefore erred in finding
that petitioner had been discrimi-
nated against on account of sex.

IIeJd: The Court of Appeals misap
prehended and misapplied the
clearly-erroneous standard and ac-
cordingly erred in denying petitioner
relief under Title VII.

(a) Where the District Court did
not simply adopt petitioner's Pro-
posed findings but provided respon-
dent with an opportunity to respond
to those findings and the findings
ultimately issued varied consider-
ably from those proposed by Peti'
tioner, there is no rearion to doubt
that the ultimate findings rePre-
sented the court's own considered
conclusions or to subject those find-
ings to a more stringent aPPellate
review than is called for by the aP
plicable rules.

ANDERSON v BESSEMER CITY
8{ L Ed 2d slE

_ (b) Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure E2(a)-whict p.ouiau.
that "[flindings of fact shail not-be
set a.side unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be-given to tt[
opportunity of the trial court tojudge of the credibility of the wit-
nsss"-"s finding is ,ciearly 

"rro*ous' when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court onthe entire evidence iE lelt with-a
defnite and lirm conviction that amietake has been committed.,,
United Statee v United States Gyp
gurn Co. 333 US 864, 894-995, giL
Ed 746, 68 S Cr S25. If th" Aeiii"r
court's account of the evidence isplausible in light of the ,""oJ
viewed in its entirety, the court oi
a-ppeals may not reverse it even
though convinced that had it been
sitting as the trier ol' Iact, it *orlJ
have weighed the evidence aitrer-
ently. This is so even when the dis-trict court's tindings do not rest oncredibility determinations, but are
baeed on physical o. ao"urn"rrt iy
evidence or inferences from othe'r
facts. When findings are based on
de.terminations regarding the credi_
bulty ol' witnesses, Rule b2tat de-
mands even greaier del'erence to the
trial court's finding.

. 
(c) Application of the above princi_

ples to the facts ol'this .a"" aiictorus
that the Court of Appeals erred in
tts employment ol' the clearly_errone-
ous etandard. The District Court,s
flnding that petitioner was better

qualified was entitled to del'erence
notwithstanding it was not based oncredibility determinatiorrr, 

"nJ-thurecord contains nothing it ut man_
d.ates. a holding that thJ n"ains-*;
clearly erroneous. As to the Diitrict
Court's. finding that petitiorr", ,n*the only applicant asked questions
regarding he.r spouue,s feelinga abo;i
her application for the positlon, the
Court of Appeals e.rea i"-iuili;s;;give .due regard ro rhe Oiit?i.i
uourt's. ability to interpret and dis-cern rhe credibility oi oral testi-
mony, especially that of the woman
member of the selection committee,
whose testimony the District C;;;telt supported the finding. Giventhat that linding was not clearlv
erroneous, the District Court's find-ing o! bias cannot be termed 

"r.orr"-ous. It is su-pported not only Uy ii 
"treatment of petitioner in hLr inter_

vrew but also by the testirnony ol.
one committee member that he be-lieved it would have been diflicult
lbr a wonran to perlbrm ttr" .ioU-unJby. evidence that another member
solicited applications only f.om men.
lrecause the findings on which theDistrict Court based its finding of
sex discrimination were not cle-arlv
erroneous, its finding of discrimini-
tron was also not clearly erroneous,

7L7 Fzd 149, reversed.
. White, J., delivered the opinion ol'

the. Court, in which Burger, C. J.,
ln{ Brennan, Marshali; powell,

Tehnquist, Stevens, Bnd b'Co;n;;;
.r.r., Jolned. Powell, J., filed a concur_
ring.opinion. Blackmun, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSI]L
Jonathan Wallas argued the cause for petitioner.
carolyn F. corwin argued the cause ior the United states andthe Equal Employment Opportunity-Co*.nirrion as amici curiaesupporting petitioner, by special leave <ll court.Philip lll. Van Hoy argued the cause lbi respondent.

523



U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

OPINION OF THE COURT

84LEd2d

Justice White delivered the oPin-

ion of the Court.

Ilal ln Pullman-standard v Swint'
as'o tis 273,72 L Ed 2d 66, 102 s ct
iier trgazi, we held that a District
Couit;t linding of discriminatory in-
i"nt in ur, .ci=ion brought under Ti-

tle VII of' the Civil Rights Aqt 9l
igoa, zc Stat 253, as amended, 42

iiSc' S ztxloo et Eeq. [42 USCS

SS ZOOCI et seq.l, is a factual finding
ifiul *ov be bverturned on aPqell
;;l; if iiis clearly erroneous' In this
.""", tn" Court of APPeals for- the

i*ttt Circuit concluded that there

*^ at"". error in a District C'ourt's

f."Ji"g of discrimination and re'

,et"ed. Because our reading, of the

,ucota convinces us that the Court of
nor"ut. misaPPrehended and misaP

;lIAih" cleaiiy+rroneous standard'
we reverse.

schoolteacher with college degrees in
.o.i"t .tuai"s and education, was the
only woman among the eight' The

setectlon committee reviewed the re-

r"-ut submitted by the applic-ants

.nJ-Uti"nv interviewed each of the
iobteet ers. Following the interviews'
ihe committee offered the position to

idi.-Oo"afd Kincaid, a 24-year-old

*ho had recentlY graduat'ed from

college with a degree in PhYstcal

educ"ation. AII four men on the com-

;;t"" voted to offer the job to Mr'
Iii"caid; Mrs. Boone voted for peti-

tioner.

Believing that the committee had

";;d ovJr her in favor of a less

qualified candidate solely because

she was a woman' Petitioner tiled

discrimination charges wlth- [ne

Charlotte District Office of the Equat

f*otortn"nt OPPortunitY Commis-

"i"ri t" July 1080 (five Years after

""iitio""t nt"a the charges)' lhu
hCOCa District Director found that
;h"; ** ,u*ottable cause to be-

lieve that petitioner's charges were

lr"" una invited the parties.to at-

temDt a resolution of Pettttoner 6

*i"u""." through conciliation pro-

:ffi;;;. rtte oEoc'" efforts Proved

""*aa'*afrl, 
and in due course, Peti'

;ir;;; received a right-to-sue letter'

Petitioner then filed this Title VU

".iio"-i" 
tfte United States District

Ail i'ot--it" Western District .of
il;;il butoiit u. Al'ter a 2daY trial
ilffi;hi"h the court heard testi-

monv from Peutroner' Mr' Kincaid'
and the five membere of the setec'

ii"i ."*-ittee, the court issued a

iti"f 
--"-orandum of decision set-

ii"o f*tt, its finding that petitioner

uraE entitled to judgment because

she had been denied the Posttton ot

Recreation Direct'or on accounl oI

I

Early in 1975, officiale of resPon-

au"i-ditv of Bessemer CitY, North
Carolina, set about to hire a new

R";;;;ti;. Director for the citY' Al'
;ffi6 ih" duties that wenl with
iiie-frsition were not precisely. delin-

""t"a, 
the new Recreation Director

wa6 to be resPonsible for managlng

uff uf tft" city'i recreational facilities
u"O fo, developing recreational pro-

uramE--athletic and otherwise-to
;;;;;- the needs of the citY's resi-

dent". e live'member committee ee'

iltlJ uv *," MaYor was reaPonsible

io. ct oo"it g the Recreation Director'
Of the five members, four were men;

the one woman on the committee'
ivil.- euaaie Boone, served as the

chairperson.

Eight Persons aPPlied tbr the Posi
ti;;";l'Recreation Director' Peti'
;i;;"r,- oi tiu time a 39-Year-old

524

ANDERSON v BESSEMER CITY
84 L &t 2d 518

her sex. In addition to laying out the
rationale for this finding, thi memo-
randum requested thaf petitioner,s
counsel .submit proposed findings of
tact and conclusions of law expand-
ing upon those set forth in the mem-
orandum. Pet,itioner's counsel com-
plied with this request by submitring
a. lengthy set of proposed findingl(App 1la-34a); the court then rL
quested and received a response set-
ting forth in detail responient,s ob-
jections to the proposed lindings tid.,
at 36a-47a1-objections that were, in
turn, answered by pet,itioner,s coun_
sel in a somewhat less lengthy reply(id., at 48a-54d. AIIer reieiving
these subrnissions, the court issuel
its <.rwn findings ol' fact and conclu-
sions of law. 557 F Supp 412, 4tJ-
419 (1983).

As set lbrth in rhe fbrmal findings
of fact and conclusions of law, tf,e
court's finding that petitioner had
been denied employment by respon-
dent because ol'her sex rested on a
number ot' subsidiary lindings. I'irst,
the court lbund that at the tinte the
selection committee made its choice,
petitioner had been better qualiliej
than Mr. Kincaid to perfbim the
range of duties demanded by the
position. The courr based this finding
on petitioner's experience as a clasi_
room teacher responsible lbr super-
vising schoolchildren in recreational
and athletic activities, her ernploy-
ment ai; a hospital recreation direi-
tor in the late l9b0's, her extensive
involvement in a variety ol' civic
organizations, her knowledge of
sports acquired both as a high school
athlete and as a mother of' children
involved in organized athletics, her
skills iu a public speaker, her expe-
rience in handling nroney rgained in
the course ol' her conrn,u,lity activi-
ties and in her w<.rrk as a borlikeeper

for a group of physiciane), and her
knowledge of music, dance, and
craf'ts. The court found that Mr.Kincaid's principal qualitications
were his experience as a student
teacher and as a coach in a local
youth basketball league, his exter)-
sive knowledge of team and individ-
ual sports, acquired as a result of his
lifelong involvement in aihletics,
and his formal training as a physicai
education major in college.' Noting
that the position o(' Recieation Dil
rector involved rn<lre than the man-
agement of athletrc programs, thec0urt concluded that petitioner,s
greater breadth ol' experience made
her better qualitied lbr the position.

Second, the court lbund that the
male committee members had in
Iact been biased against petitioner
because she was a woman. the court
based this finding in parr on the
testim<lny of one of the committee
menrbers that he believed it would
have been "real hard,' for a wontan
to handle the job and that he would
not wat)t his wif'e to have to pertbrm
the duties of the Recreation Direc-
tor. The finding of bias lbund addi-
tional support in evidence that an-
other male committee member had
told Mr. Kincaid, the successful ap-
plicant, ol'the vacancy and had alio
s<.rlicited applications f rom three
other men, but had not attempted to
recruit atry worrlen Ibr the job-

Also critical to the court,s inl'er-
ence ol' bias wae its finding that
petitioner, alone anrong the appli-
cants fbr the job, had been asked
whether she realized the job would
involve night work and travel and
whether her husband approved of
her applying for the job. the court,s
linding that the conrmittee had pur-
sued this line ol' inquiry only with
petitioner was based on the testi-

626



U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 84LEd2d

monv of petitioner that these ques-

tions had-been asked of her and the
tetstimony ol'Mre' Boone that similar
questioni had not been asked of the
other aPPlicants. Although l41s'

Boone alio testified that during Mr'
Kincaid's interview, she had made a
"comment" to him regarding the
reaction of his new bride to his tak-
ins the position of Recreation Direc-
toi, the'court concluded that this
comment was not a serious inquirY,
but merelY a "facetious" remark
oromuted bY Mrs. Boone's annoy-
ance'that only petitioner had been

ouestioned about her spouse'e reac-

iion. The court also declined to

credit the testimonY of one of the
male committee members that Mr'
kincaid had been asked about his

wife's feelings "in a way" and the
testimony of another committeeman
that all aPPlicants had been ques'

tioned regarding their willingness. to
work at 

-night- and their families'
reaction to night work' The court
concluded that the linding that only
petitioner had been seriously ques-

iioned about her family's reaction
suggested that the male committee
r.,Jilb".t believed women had sPe-

cial family responsibilities that
made certain forms of emPloYment
inappropriate.

mittee valued exPerience more
t infrt, than formal training in phys'

icil education.t The court also re'
iected the claim of one of the com'
"*itto"*"n that Mr. Kincaid had

been hired because of the superiority
of the recreational Programs he

planned to implement if selected for
tt u joU. The court credited the t€sti-
monv of one of the other committee'
men-who had voted for Mr' Kincaid
that the Programs outlined bY P"!L
tioner and Mr. Kincaid were sub-

stantially identical.

On the basis of its findings that
oetitioner was the most qualified
tandidate, that the comrnittee had

been biased against hiring a woman'
and that the committee's exPlana-

iio"" fo. its choice of Mr' Kincaid
*"to ptete*tual, the court concluded
that petitioner had met her burden
of esiablishing that she had been

denied the Position of Recreation
Director because of her sex' Peti-

iiorr"t having conceded that ordering
the citY to hire her would be an

inappropriate remedy under.the cir-
cumstances, the court awarded petl-

ti"n"t backPaY in the amount of
Sg0,i-92.00 i"-.t attorney's fees of

$16,971.59.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the
Oistrict Cnurt's finding of discrimi
;i;;. 7r7 Fzd 14e (1e83). In the
view of the Court of APPeals, three
of the District Court's crucial tind-
i"n" *"." clearly erroneous: the find-

ini that Petitioner was the most

qu-alified candidate, the finding that

ietitionot had been asked questions

lrroi-Ltrr". applicants were spared'
and the finding that the male com'

Finally, the court found that the
reaaona bffered by the male commit-
&re members for their choice of Mr'
Kincaid were prelextual. The court
rejected the proposition that Mr'
Kincaid's degrLe in physical educa-

tion jusrified his choice, as the ev-i-

denci suggested that where male
candidates were concerned, the com-

l. The evidence establio'hed lhat thc com-

.iio-..i"trt had initially favr'rred a third
candidutc, Bert Broudway, and had. declded

.rii. f,ltl, him only because he ctat€d that he

**-rn*iff ing to rnor" to Begs€mer City' Mr'

626

Broadway had two years of experience as a

;;;;;;iry recreation director; but like peti-

ii"."i, r,""r""led a college degree in phyeical

education.

ANDERSON v BESSEMER CTTY
84 L Ed 2d 5r8

mittee members were biased against
hiring a woman. Having rejected
these findings, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Dictrict Court
had erred in finding that petitioner
had been discriminat€d against on
accounL ot'her sex.

II

[2a] We must deal at the outset
with the l'ourth Circuit's suggestion
that "close scrutiny of the record in
this case [was] justilied by the man-
ner in which the opinion was pre-
pared," id., at 156-that is, by the
District Court's adoption of petition-
er's proposed findings of fact and
conclusi<lns ol' law. 'l'he court re-
called that the Fourth Circuit had
on many occasions condemned the
practice ol' announcing a decieion
and leaving it to the prevailing
party to write the lindings of l'act
and conclusions of law. See, e.g.,
Cuthbertson v Biggers Bros., Inc. 702
F2d 454 t1983); EEOC v Federal Re-
serve Bank o1' Richrn<lnd, 698 lr2d
633 (1983t; Chicopee Mlg. Corp. v
Kendall Co. 288 F2d 719 (1961). The
court rejected petitioner's contention
that the procedure followed by the
trial judge in this case was proper
because the judge had given respon-
dent an opportunity to object to the
proposed findings and had not
adopted petitioner's findings verba-
tim. According to the court, the vice
of the procedure lay in the trial
court's solicitation of Iindings after it
had already announced its decision
and in the court's adopticln of' the
"substance" ol' petitioner's proposed
findings.

We, [oo, have criticized courts lbr
their verbatim adoption of findings
of fact prepared by prevailing par-
ties, parLicularly when th<lse tind-
ings have taken the Ibrm of conclu-

6ory Etatements unsupported by cita
tion to the record. See, e.9., Unite,
States v El Paso Natural Gas Cr
376 US 65r,65Hi57, t2L Ed 2d 12

84 S Ct 1044 t1964); Unired Srates
Marine Bancorporation, 418 US 60,
615, n 13, 41 L Ed 2d 978, 94 S C

2856 (1974). We are also aware c

the potential fur overreaching an
exaggeration on the part ol' attol
neys preparing findings ot'l'act whet
they have already been inlbrme
that the judge has decided in thei
favor. See J. Wright, The Nonjur
Trial-Preparing Findings of Fac]
Conclusions <lf Law, and Opini<lnt
Seminars lbr Newly Appointe
United Suates District Judges l5{
166 ( t9tj2). Nonetheless, our previou
discussions of the subject tsuggci
that even when the trial judg
adopts proposed lindings verbatirr
the lindings are those ol' the cour
and may be reversed only if clearl
erroneoug. United States v Marin
Bancorporation, supra, at 615, n ll
4r L Ed 2d 978, 94 S Cr 285ti; Unire
Stares v El Parso Natural Gas Co
supra, ar 65Hi57, 12 L Ed 2d 12,8
s cr 1044.

[2b] In any event, the Distrir
Court in lhis case does not appear I

have uncritically accepted findinl
prepared without judicial guidan<
by the prevailing party. The cout
i[self provided the framework lt
the proposed findings when it issue
its preliminary memorandum, whic
set forth its essential findings an
directed petitioner'E counsel !o sul
mit a more detailed set o1' findinl
corrsistent with them. [.'urther, r
spondent was provided and availt
itself of the opportunity to respon
at length to the proposed finding
Nor did the District Court simpl
adopt petitioner's proposed finding
the lindings it ultimately issued-

62



U.S. SUPREME COURT REPOBTS

and particularly the crucial findings
regarding petitioner's qualifications,
the questioning to which petitioner
was subjected, and bias on the part
of the committeemen-vary consid-
erably in organization and content
lrom those submitted by petitioner's
counsel. Under these circumstances,
we see no reason to doubt that the
tindings istiued by the District Court
represent the judge's own considered
conclusions. There is no reason to
subject those lindings to a more
stringent appellate review than is
called for by the applicable rules.

III
Because a linding of intentional

discrimination is a finding of fact,
the standard governing appellate re-
view of a district court's finding of
discrimination is that set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a): "Findings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the wit-
nes6es." The question betbre us,
then, is whether the Court of Ap
peals erred in holding the District
Court's finding of discrimination to
be clearly erroneous.

[3a] Although the meaning of the
phrase "clearly erroneous" is not
immediately apparent, certain gen-
eral principles governing the exer-
cis€ of the appellate court's power to
overturn findings of a district court
may be derived from our cases. The
foremost of these principles, as the
Fourth Circuit itself recognized, is
that "a finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although [here is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a
mistake hae been committed."
528

United States v United States GyP
sum Co. 333 US 364, 395, 92 L lld
746, 68 S Ct 525 (1948). This stan-
dard plainly does not entitle a re-
viewing court to reverse the finding
ofthe trier of fact simply because it
is convinced that it would have de-
cided the case differently. The re-
viewing court oversteps the bounds
ol'its duty under Rule 52 if it under-
takes to duplicate the role of the
Iower court. "In applying the clearly
erroneous standard to the findings <ll'

a district court sitting without a
jury, appellate courts must cou-
stantly have in ntind that their l'unc-
tion is not to decide l'actual issues de
novo." ZeniLh Rardio Corp. v llazel-
tine Research, Inc. 395 US 100, 123,
23 L Ed 2d t29,89 S Cr 1562 (1969).

If the district court's account of the
evidence is plausible in light ol' the
record viewed in its entirety, the
court of appeals may not reverse it
even though convinced that had it
been sitting as the trier of I'act, it
would have weighed the evidence
diflbrently. Where there are two per-
missible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between then.r
cannot be clearly erroneous. United
States v Yellow Cab Co. 338 US 338,
342,94 L Ed 150, 70 S Cr 177 (L949);

see also Inwo<ld Laboratories, Inc. v
Ives Laboratories, lnc. 456 US 844,
72LEd,2d 606, 102 S Ct 2182 (1982).

[3b] This is so even when the dis-
trict court's tindings do not rest on
credibility determinations, but are
based instead on physical or docu'
mentary evidence or inl'erences from
other fhcts. To be sure, various
Courts of Appeals have on occasion
asserted the theory that an aPPel'
late court may exercise de novo re-
view over findings not based on cred-
ibility determinations. See, e.g., Or-
vis v Higgins, 180 F2d 537 (CA2

84LEd2d ANDERSON v BESSEMER CITY
84 L Ed 2d 618

1950); Lydle v United Statee, 635
Fzd 763, 765, n I (CA6 1981); Swan-
son v Baker Industries, Inc. 615 F2d
479, 483 (CA8 1980). This theory has
an impressive genealogy, having first
been articulated in an opinion writ-
ten by Judge Frank and subscribed
to by Judge Augustus Hand, see Or-
vis v Higgins, supra, but it is impos-
eible to trace the theory's lineage
back to the text of Rule 52, which
states straightforwardly that "lind-
ings ol' lact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous." That the
Rule goes on to emphasize the spe-
cial deference to be paid credibility
deternrinations does not alter its
clear cornmand: Rule 52 "does not
make exceptions or purport to ex-
clude certain categories of lactual
findings from the obligatir.rn r-rf a
court of appeals to uccept a district
court's lindingti unless clearly erro
neous." Pullnran-Standard v Swirrt,
456 US, at 287, 72 L Ed 2d 66, f02 S
ct 1781.

The rationale lbr del'erence to thc
original linder o1' Iact is not lirnited
to the superiority of the trial judge's
position to nrake determinations of
credibility. The trial judge's major
role is the deternrination of I'act, and
with experience in tulfilling that
role comes expertise. Duplication of
the trial judge's eflbrts in the court
of appeals would very likely contrib-
ute only negtigibly to the accuracy
of'fact deternrination at a huge cost
in diversion of judicial resources. In
addition, the parties to a case on
appeal have already been lbrced to
concentrate their energies and re-
sources on persuading the trial judge
that their account of the facts is the
correct one; requiring them to per-
suade three more judges at the ap
pellate level is requiring too much.
As the Court has stated in a difl'er-

ent context, the trial <ln the merits
should be "the 'main event'
rather than a 'tryout on the road."'
Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72, 90,
53 L Ed 2d 594,97 S Ct 2497 i97?),
For these reasons, review ol'lactual
findings under the clearly-erroneous
standard-with its del'erence to the
trier of fact-is the rule, not t.he
exception.

[a] When lindings are based on
deierminations regarding the credi-
bility of witnesses, Rule 52 demands
even greater deference to the trial
court's frndings; lbr only the trial
judge can be aware ol'the variations
in denreanor and tone of voice that
bear s<.r he.rvily on the listencr's urr-
derstanding of and beliel' in what is
said. See Wtrinwright v Witt, 469 US

-_, 
83 L Ed 2d 84I, 105 S Ct U,t.l

(1985). This is not to suggesr rhat the
trial judge nray insulate his lindings
lrom review by denominating them
credibility determinations, Ibr lac-
tors ot,her than demeanor and intlec-
tion go into the decision whether or
not to believe a witness. Documents
or objective evidence may cr.lntradict
the witness' story; or the story itsell'
nray be so internally inconsistent clr
inrplausible r.rn its lace that a reason-
able factfinder would not credit it.
Where such lactors are present, the
court of appeals may well Iind clear
error even in a linding purportedly
based on a credibility determination.
See, e.g., United States v United
States Gypsum Co., supra, at 396, 92
L Ed 746, 68 S Ct 525. But when a
trial judge's linding is based on his
decisi<ln to credit the testim<lny ol'
one of two or more witnesses, each
of wh<lm has t<lld a coherent and
facially plausible story that is not
contradicted by extrinsic evidence,
that finding, if not internally incon-
sistent, can virtually never be clear

52C



error. Cf. United States v Aluminum
Co. of America, f48 F2d 416, 433
(CA2 1946); Orvic v Higgine, 8upra,
at 539-540.

IV

[1b] Application of the foregoing
principles to the facts of the case
lays bare the errorc committed by
the l'ourth Circuit in its employ-
ment of the clearly-erroneous stan-
dard. In detecting clear error in the
District Court's finding that peti-
tioner wae better qualilied than Mr.
Kincaid, the Fourth Circuit improp
erly conducted what amounted to a
de novo weighing of the evidence in
the record. The District Court's
Iinding was based on essentially un-
disputed evidence regarding the re-
apective backgrounds of petitioner
and Mr. Kincaid and the duties that
went with the position of Recreation
Director. The District Court, after
considering the evidence, concluded
that the position of Recreation Di-
rector in Bessemer City carried with
it broad responsibilities for creating
and managing a recreation program
involving not only athletics, but also
other activities for citizens of alt
ages and interests. The court deter-
mined that petitioner's more varied
educational and employment back-
ground and her extensive involve-
ment in a variety of civic activities
left her better qualilied to imple,
ment euch a rounded program than
Mr. Kincaid, whoee bacfuround was
more narrowly focused on athletics.

The Fourth Circuit, reading the

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 84LEd2d

same record, concluded that the ba-
sic duty of the Recreation Director
was to implement an athletic pro-
gram, and that the essential qualifi-
cation for a successftl applicant
would be either education or experi-
ence specifically related to athletics.r
Accordingly, it seemed evident to
the Court of Appeals that Mr. Kin-
caid was in fact better qualified than
petitioner.

Based on our own reading ol' the
record, we cannot say that either
interpretation ol'the facts is illogical
or implausible. Each has support in
inferences that may be drawn frorn
the facts in the record; and il'either
interpretation had been drawn by a
district court on the record before
us, we would not be inclined to find
it clearly erroneous. The question we
must an6wer, however, is not
whether the Fourth Circuit's inter-
pretation of the I'acts was clearly
erroneous, but whether the District
Court's finding was clearly errone-
oue. See McAllister v United States,
348 US 19, 20-2t,99 L Ed 20, ?5 S
ct 6 (1954). The Districr Court derer-
mined that petitioner was better
qualified, and, as we have stated
above, such a finding is entitled to
deference notwithstanding that it is
not based on credibility determina-
tions. When the record is examined
in light of the appropriately def'eren-
tial standard, it is apparent that it
contains nothing that mandates a
finding that the District Court's con-
clusion was clearly erroneous.

Somewhat different concerns are
raised by the Fourth Circuit's treat-

2. The l'ourth Circuit thus cnw no inconsia-
tency between the ct{rlement of the male
conrnritt-ec memtrru that they preferred Bert
Broodway becau& ol'hic cxperience and their
claim that they had s€lect€d Mr. Kincaid over
petitioner bocause of his lbrmal training. See

630

n l, eupra. In the view of the Court of Ap
pealt, this demonetrat€d only that Mr. Broad-
way had relevant experiencr-. and Mr. Kincaid
had relevant education, while petitioner had
neither.

ANDEIISON V BESSEMER CITY
84 L Ed 2d 516

ment of the District Court's finding
that petitioner, alone among the ap
plicants for the position of Recre-
ation Director, was asked questions
regarding her spouse's feelings about
her application lbr the position.
Here the error of the Court of Ap-
peals was its failure to give due
regard to the ability ol' the District
Court to interpret and discern the
credibility of oral testirnony. The
Court ol' Appeals rested its rejection
r.rl' the District Court's finding of
difl'erential trea[nrent on its own in-
terpreLation of testinrony by Mrs.
Bor-rne--the very witness wh<lse testi-
nrony, in the view of the District
Court, supporte'd the finding. ln the
eyes of' the F r.rurth Circuit, Mrs.
Boone's testimony that she had
nrade a "cornrrlent" [o Mr. Kincaid
about the leelings ol'his wile (a cont-
nrent judged "l'acetious" by the Dis-
trict C<lurt) conclusively established
that Mr. Kincaid, and perhaps other
male applicants as well, had beert
questioned about the leelings of his
sPouse.

Mrs. Boone's testimony on this
p<lint, which is set fbrth in the utar-
gin,3 is certainly not I'ree from ambi-

guity. But Mrs. Boone several times
stated that other candidates had not
been questioned about the reaction
of their wives-at least, "not in the
same context" as had Petitioner.
And even al'ter recalling and calling
to the attention o('the court that she
had made a conrnlent on the subject
to Mr. Kincaid, Mrs. B<.rone denied
that she had "asked" Mr. Kincaid
about his wil'e's reaction. Mrs.
Boone's testitnony on these nlatters
is not inconsistent with the thetlry
tltat her remark was llot a serious
inquiry into whether Mr. Kincaid's
wife approved of his applying tbr the
position. Whether the judge's inter-
pretation is actually correct is irn-
possible t<l tell li'orn the paper rec-
ord, but it is easy to imagine that
ttre tone ol' voice in which the wit-
ness relatcd her comtDent, coupled
with her imrnediate denial that she
had questi<-rrred Mr. Kincaid on the
subject, nright have conclusively es-

tablished that the remark was a
Itrceti<.rus one. We therelbre cannot
agree that the judge's conclusion
that the remark was I'acetious was
clearly erroueous.

Once the trial court's characteriza-

3. "Q: Did the conrlnittee rnenrbers ask that
same kind ol question of the other applicants?

"A: Not that I recall."

"Q: Do you deny that the other applicanrs,
aside lrt-rm the plaintill', were asked about the
procpcct ol'working at night in that grsition'l

"A: Not to nry knowledge.
"Q: Are you s:rying they were not asked

that?
"A: They were not asked, not in the context

that they were asked of Phyllie. I don't know
whether they were worried because Jinr
wasn't going tt-r get his Euppcr or what. You
know, that goes both ways.

"Q: Did you tell Phyllis Arrderson that Don'
nie Kincuid waa nut uked about niglrt work?

"A: He wugn't usked about nighr worlt.

"Q: That answcrs otte question. Now, let's
arrswer the other one. Did you tell Phyllis
Anderron that, thut Donnie Kincaid was tlot
asked about rright work?

"A: Yes, uller the interviews-l think the
next duy or rornctitne, arrd I know-may I
unswer somethittg?

"Q: ll il's u question tha! has been asked;
otherwise, no. l!'s up to the Judge to 68y.

"A: You asked if tltere was any question
asked about-l think Donnie wus just mar-
ried, and I think I made the conrrnent to hinr
personully-and your new bride won't mind.

"Q, S,r, you asked hinr yourself about his
own wile'c reaction?

"A: No, no.
"Q: 'l'hat i6 wh$i you just said.
"Mr. (iibcon: Objcction, Your Honor.
"lThel (hurt: Susrained. You don't have to

rephrare the ancwer." App 108a, l20a-I2la.

531



U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

tion of Mrs. Boone's remark is ac'
cepted, it is aPparent that the
tlnding that the male candidates
were not seriously questioned about
the feelings ol'their wives cannot be

deemed clearly erroneous. The trial
judge was faced with the testimonY
tf lnree witnesses, one of whom
(Mni. Boone) stated that none ol'the
other candidates had been so ques-

tioned, one of whom (a male commit-
tee member) testilied that Mr. Kin-
caid had been asked such a question
"in a way," and one of whom (an-

other committeeman) teetified that
all the candidates had been sub'
jected to similar questioning. None
bf these accounts is implarlsible on

its face, and none is contradicted by
any reliable extrinsic evidence. Un-
dei these circumstances, the trial
court's decieion to credit Mrs. Boone
was not clearlY erroneous.

The Fourth Circuit's refusal to
accept the District Court's linding
that the committee members were
.biarsed against hiring a woman was
based to a large extent on its rejec-
tion of the linding that petitioner
had been subjected to questioning
that the other aPPlicants were
apared. Given that that tinding was
not, clearly erroneous' the finding of
bias cannot be termed erroneous: it
finds support not onlY in the treat-
ment ofi petitioner in her interview,
but aleo in the testimonY of one
committee member that he believed
it would have been difficult for a
woman to perform the job and in the
evidence that another member solic'

ited applications
only from men.'

84LEd2d

Ibr the position

[1c] Our determination that the
nnaings of the District Court regard-
ing petitioner's qualifications, the
conduct of her interview, and the
bias of the male committee members
were not clearly erroneous leads us

to conclude that the court's linding
that petitioner was discriminated
against on account of her sex was
also not clearly erroneous. The Dis-
trict Court's findings regarding peti-
tioner's superior qualitications and
the bias of the selection committee
are sufficient to support the inl'er-
ence that petitioner was denied the
position of Recreation Director on
iccount of her sex. AccordinglY, we
hold that the Fourth Circuit erred in
denying petitioner relief under Title
VII.

In so holding, we do not assert
that our knowledge of what haP-
pened 10 years ago in Bessemer CitY
is superior to that of the Court of
Appeils; nor do we claim to have
g*atet insight than the Court of
l,ppeals into the state of mind of the
..rln on the selection committee who
rejected petitioner Ibr the position.of
Ricreation Director' Even the trial
judge, who has heard the witnesses
iirictty and who is more closelY in
touch ihan the aPPeals court with
the milieu out of which the contro-
versy before him arises, cannot al-
*u"i b" confident that he "knows"
whit happened. Often, he can-onlY
determine whether the plaintiff has

succeeded in presenting an account
of the facts that is more likely to be

{. The Fourth Circuit's uuggestion that any
inference of bias was dispelled by the fact
that each of the male committ€e nembers
war married to a woman who had worked at
some point in the marriage ie ineufticient to
ectrrblish thst the finding of bias was clearly
erroneoua. Although we decline to hold that a

532

man's attitude toward his wife's employment
is irrelevant to the question whether he may

be found to have a bias against working
*on,"n, any relevance the factor may have.in
a particulai case is a matter for the district

"outt 
to weigh in its consideration of bias' not

the court of aPPeals.

ANDERSON V BESSEMER CITY
84 L Dd 2d 618

true than not. Our task-and the
task of appellate tribunals generally

-is mori-Iimited still: we must de-

termine whether the trial judge's

conclusionB are clearly erroneous'
On the record belbre us, we cannot
sav Lhat. theY are. AccordinglY, the
juigment of the Court of APPeals is
reversed.

J ustice Powell, cr.rncurring'

I do not dissent I'rom the judgment
that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Rule 52(a) in this case. I write sepa-

rately, however, because I am con-

.".nud that one may read the
Court's opinion as irnplying criticism
of the Court ol' Appeals tbr the very
lact that it engaged in a comprehen-
sive review of the entire record of
this case. Such a reading may en-

courage overburdened Courts of Ap-
peals simply to apply Rule 52(at in a
conclusory t'ashion, rather than t<l

undertake the tYPe of burdensome
review that maY be aPProPriate in
s0me cases.

decided tbr either party. Therelbre'
as the Court holdu, the District'
Court's decision was not clearly erro-
neous within the meaning of Rule
52(a).

Justice Blackmun, concurring in
the judgment.

In this case, the Court of APPeals

made no arbitrarY judgment that
the action of the District Court was

clearly erroneous. On the cont'rary,
the court meticulously reviewed the
entire record and reached the con-

clusion that the District Court was

in error. One easily could agree with
the Court of APPeals that the Dis-

trict Court committed a mistake in
its Iinding of sex discrimination,
based, as it was, on fragmentarY
statements made Years belbre' in
informal exchanges between mem-

bers of the selection con'rmittee and

the applicants for the position to be

filled.- On the record belbre us, how'
ever, the factual issue fairly could be gued by the Parties, rather tlra" t"

I would like to join the Court's
opinion, Ibr I think its judgment is.

correct, and I agree with most t-rl'

what. the Court saYs. l, however, d<r

not ioin the broad dictum, ante, at

-- --, 84 L Ed 2d 528-529,
to the e(fect that the same result is

to be reached when the District
Court's lindings are based wholly on

documentarY eviderrce and do trot

resL at all on credibility determirla-
tions. In the past, I have joined at
least one opinion that, generally, is
to the opposite ell'ect' See United
States v 

- 
Mississippi Valley Barge

Line Co. 285 F 2d 381, 388 (CAU

1960). See also Rulston Purina Co' v
General Foods CorP. 442 F 2d 389,

391 ICAS 19?1); Frito-LaY, Inc' v So

Gr.rod Potato ChiP Co' 540 F 2d 927,
930 (CA8 1976); Swanson v Baker
lndustries, lnc. 615 F 2d 479, 483
(cA8 1980).

While the Court maY be correct itr

its dictum today, certainly this case

does not require us to decide the
question. ThL record contains far
more than documentary evidence, as

the Court's oPinion so adequatelY
discloses. In a case that requires
resolution o1' the question, I might
eventuallY be Persuaded that the
Court's approach is wise' I pref'er'

however, 
-tb 

wait lbr a case where

the issue must be resolved and

where it has been briel'ed and ar-

'The Charlotte branch ol' the EEOC, with
whom p€titioner tiled a corrtpluint, [ook tr<r

action lbr live years. Thc testirnony at trial'
therelbre, was based on stale recollections'

533



7
U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 84LEd2d

"OOr"r, 
the issue by edict without I therefore join the Court only in

these customary safeguards. its judgment and not in its opinion.

634

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ATLANTA, etc., Appellant

v

BARTOW COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS et al.

470 US -, U L Ed 2d 535, 106 S Cr -
lNo. 83-r6201

Argued October 30, 1984. Decided March 19, 1985.

Decision: State'e exclusion lrom net worth, in computation o[' property
on bank shares, only that portion o1' f'ederal obligations attributabl
assets rather than to liabilities, held valid.

SUII{MARY

This case presented the question whether under Rev Stat |i 3701

anrended, 3f USCS Ii ?42 (f 976 ed), exempting obligations of the Ur
States from taxation by state or nrunicipal authority and extending I

exemption to every fbrm ot taxation which would require that the ob

tions be considered in the computaticln of the tax, a state, fbr property
purposes, must allow the deduction lrom net worth of the full value of
ixempt United States obligations or whether S 3701 is satisfied by a lin
deduction that excludes fiom net worth only that portion of the fec

obligations properly attributable to assets rather than to liabilities.
Supieme Court of Georgia construed a state statute which impost
property tax on the t'air market value ol' bank shares and which prol
[tul r.,ctr fair market value was io be determined by dividing the bank'r
worth by the number of outstanding shares, as allowing a bank to de

from its net worth Dot the full value ot' the United States obligatior
holds but only the percentage o1' assets attributable to l'ederal obliga,
(251 Ga 831, 312 Strl2d 102),

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court aflirmed' In an opinio
Br-ecrrrruN, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court, it was held

$ 3?01, as amended, is satisfied by the limited pro rata deduction appr
by the Georgia Supreme Court. The court pointed out that federal ot
tions may be acquired, in part, by liabilities, and, when they are, a pro
method of atlocating a l'air share ol' those obligations to liabilities doet