Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order for Development of Desegregation Plan; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of Ruling on Desegregation Plan

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

V"
)

RONALD BRADLEY, et al., )

Plaintiffs )
v. )

)
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., )

• )
Defendants )

and )
, )

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, )
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION )
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, )

)
Defendant- )
Intervenor )

and )
* )

DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al., )
)

Defendants- ).
Intervenor )

et al. )
______________________ _______________________ )

i -j 
j i

FREDERICK W. JOHNSON, Cierk

___/.<. *
DEPUTY CLERK

CIVIL ACTION NO: 
35257

RULING ON DESEGREGATION AREA 
AND

ORDER FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN OF DESEGREGATION

On September 27, 1971 the court made its Ruling on 

Issue of Segregation, holding that illegal segregation exists 

. in the public schools of the city of Detroit as a result of a 

course of conduct on the part of the State of Michigan and the 

Detroit Board of Education. Having found a constitutional 

violation as established, on October 4, 1971 the court 

directed the school board defendants, City and State, to•• t,
develop and submit plans of desegregation, designed to 

achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, 

taking into account the practicalities of the situation. The 

directive called for the submission of both a "Detroit-only" 

and a "Metropolitan" plan.



♦

pl^ns for the desegregation of the Detroit schools 

were submitted by the Detroit Board of Education and by the 

plaintiffs. Following five days of hearings the court found 

that while plaintiffs' plan would accomplish more desegregation 

than now obtains in the system, or which would be achieved under 

either Plan A or C of the Detroit Board of Education submissions, 

none of' the plans would result in the desegregation of the 

public schools of the Detroit school district. The court, 

in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluded that 

"relief of segregation in the Detroit public schools cannot 

be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of 

the city," and that it had the authority and the duty to 

look beyond such limits for a solution to the illegal segre­

gation in the Detroit public schools. Accordingly, the court 

ruled,it had to consider a metropolitan remedy for segregation.

The parties submitted a number of plans for metropolitan 

desegregation. The State Board of Education submitted six — 

without recommendation, and without indicating any preference.

With the exception of one of these, none could be considered as 

designed to accomplish desegregation. On the other hand 

the proposals of intervening defendant Magdowski, et al., • 

the Detroit Board of Education and the plaintiffs were all 

good faith efforts to accomplish desegregation in the Detroit 

metropolitan area. The three plans submitted by these parties 

have many similarities, and all of them propose to incorporate, 

geographically,,most--and in one instance, all— of the three- 

county area of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb.

The hearing on the proposals have set the framework, 

and have articulated the criteria and considerations, for 

developing and evaluating an effective plan of metropolitan 

desegregation.. None pf the submissions represent a complete

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plan for the effective and equitable desegregation of the 

metropolitan area, capable of implementation in its present 

form. The court will therefore draw upon the resources of 

the parties to devise, pursuant to its direction, a 

constitutional plan of desegregation of the Detroit public 

schools. •
Based on the entire record herein, the previous oral 

and written rulings and orders of this court, and the 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed herewith,

IT IS ORDERED:

I.

A. As a panel charged with the responsibility of 

preparing and submitting an effective desegregation plan in 

accordance with the provisions of this order, the court 

appoints the following:

1. A designee of the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction;

2. Harold Wagner, Supervisor of the Transportation 
Unit in the Safety and Traffic Education 
Program of the State Department of Education;

3. Merle Henrickson, Detroit Board of Education;

4. Aubrey McCutcheon, Detroit Board of Education;

5. Freeman Flynn, Detroit Board of Education;

6. Gordon Foster, expert for plaintiffs;

7. Richard Morshead, representing defendant 
Magdowski, et al.;

... ■ 8. A designee of the newly intervening defendants;

9. Rita Scott, of the Michigan Civil Rights 
Commission. *

*
The designees of the State Superintendent of Public 

Instruction and newly intervening defendants shall be communicated 
to the court within seven days of the entry of this order. In 
the event the newly intervening defendants cannot agree upon a 
designee, they may each submit a nominee within seven days from 
the entry of this order, and the court shall select one of the 
nominees as representative of said defendants.

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Should any designated member of this panel be unable 

to serve, the other members of the panel shall elect any 

necessary replacements, upon notice to the court and the 

parties. In the absence of objections within five days of 

the notice, and pending a final ruling, such designated 

replacement shall act as a member of the panel.

B. As soon as possible, but in no event later than 

45 days after the issuance of this order, the panel is to 

develop a plan for the assignment of pupils as set forth below 

in order to provide the maximum actual desegregation, and 

shall develop as well a plan for the transportation of pupils, 

for Implementation for all grades, schools and clusters in 

the desegregation area. Insofar as required by the 

circumstances, which are to be detailed in particular, the 

panel may recommend immediate implementation of an interim 

desegregation plan for grades K-6, K-8 or K-9 in all or m  

as many clusters as practicable, with complete and final 

desegregation to proceed in no event later than the fall 

1973 term. In its transportation plan the panel shall, 

to meet the needs of the proposed pupil assignment plan, 

make recommendations, including the shortest possible time­

table, for acquiring sufficient additional transportation 

facilities for any interim or final plan of desegregation.

Such recommendations shall be filed forthwith and in no
*

event letter th*m 45 days after the entry of this order.

Should it develop that some additional transportation 

equipment is needed for an interim plan, the panel shall 

make recommendations for such acquisition within 20 days 

of this order.

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C. The parties, their agents, employees, successors.

and all others having actual notice of this order shall 

cooperate fully with the panel in their assigned mission, 

including, but not limited to, the provision of data and 

reasonable full and part-time staff assistance as requested 

by the panel. The State defendants shall provide support, 

accreditation, funds, and otherwise take all actions necessary 

to insure that local officials and employees cooperate fully 

with the panel. All reasonable costs incurred by the'panel 

shall be borne by the State defendants; provided, however, 

that staff assistance or other services provided by any 

school district, its employees or agents, shall be without 

charge, and the cost thereof shall be borne by such school 

district.

of the Detroit public schools is required within the geographical 

area which may be described as encompassing the following 

school districts (see Exhibit P.M. 12), and hereinafter 

referred to as the "desegregation area":

II

A Pupil reassignment to accomplish desegregation

. Fitzgerald 
Van Dyke 
Fraser «.

Lakeshore 
Lakeview 
Roseville 
South Lake 
East Detroit 
Grosse Pointe 
Centerline

Birmingham 
Hazel Park 
Highland Park 
Royal Oak 
Berkley 
Ferndale 
Southfield 
Bloomfield Hills 
Oak ‘Park 
Redford Union 
West Bloomfield 
Clarenceville 
Farmington 
Livonia 
South Redford 
Crestwood 
Dearborn 
Dearborn Heights

Fairlane .
Garden City
North Dearborn Heights
Cherry Hill
Inkster
Wayne
Westwood
Ecorse

Harper Woods 
Warren 
Warren Woods 
Clawson 
Hamtramck 
Lamphere 
Madison Heights 
Troy

• Romulus 
Taylor 
River Rouge 
Riverview 
Wyandotte 
Allen park 
Lincoln Park 
Melvindale 
Southgate 
Detroit

-5-



Provided, however, that if in the actual assignment of 

pupils it appears necessary and feasible to achieve effective 

. and complete racial desegregation to reassign pupils of 

another district or other districts, the desegregation panel 

may, upon notice to the parties, apply to the Court for 

an appropriate modification of this order.

B. Within the limitations of reasonable travel 

time and distance factors, pupil reassignments shall be 

effected within the clusters described in Exhibit P.M. 12 

so as to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation to 

the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or class­

room be substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil 

racial composition. The panel may, upon notice to the 

parties, recommend reorganization of clusters within the 

desegregation area in order to minimize administrative 

inconvenience, or time and/or numbers of pupils requiring 
transportation.

C„ Appropriate and safe transportation arrangements 

shall be made available without cost to all pupils assigned to 

schools deemed by the panel to be other than "walk-in" 
schools.

D. Consistent with the requirements of maximum 

actual desegregation, every effort should be made to minimize 

the numbers of pupils to be reassigned and requiring trans-
• i.

portation, the time pupils spend in transit, and the number 

and cost of new transportation facilities to be acquired by 

utilizing such techniques as clustering, the "skip" technique, 

island zoning, reasonable staggering of school hours, and 

maximization of use of existing transportation facilities,



including buses owned or leased by school districts and 

buses operated by public transit authorities and private 

charter companies. The panel shall develop appropriate 

recommendations for limiting transfers which affect the 

desegregation of particular schools.

E. Transportation and pupil assignment shall, 

to the extent consistent with maximum feasible desegregation, 

be a two-way process with both black and white pupils sharing 

the responsibility for transportation requirements at all 

grade levels, in the determination of the utilization of 

existing, and the construction of new, facilities, care 

shall be taken to randomize the location of particular 
grade levels.

F. Faculty and. staff shall be reassigned, in 

keeping with pupil desegregation, so as to prevent the 

creation or continuation of the identification of schools by 

reference to past racial composition, or the continuation of 

substantially disproportionate racial composition of the 

faculty and staffs, of the schools in the desegregation area. 

The faculty and staffs assigned to the schools within the 

desegregation area shall be substantially desegregated, 

bearing in mind, however, that the desideratum is the balance 

of faculty and staff by qualifications for subject and grade 

level, and then by race, experience and sex. In the context 

of the evidenae in this case, it is appropriate to require 

assignment of no less than 10% black faculty and staff at 

each school, and where there is more than one building 

administrator, every effort should be made to assign a 

bi-racial administrative team.



G. In the hiring, assignment, promotion, demotion, 

and dismissal of faculty and staff, racially non-discriminatory 

criteria must be developed and used? provided, however,

there shall be no reduction in efforts to increase minority 

group representation among faculty and staff in the 

desegregation area. Affirmative action shall be taken to 

increase minority employment in all levels of teaching and 

administration. .

H. The restructuring of school facility utilization 

necessitated by pupil reassignments should produce schools

of substantially like quality, facilities, extra-curricular 

activities and staffs; and the utilization of existing 

school capacity through the desegregation area shall be 

made on the basis of uniform criteria.

I. The State Board of Education and the State 

Superintendent of Education shall with respect to all school 

construction and expansion, "consider the factor of racial 

balance along with other educational considerations in 

making decisions about new school sites, expansion of

present facilities * * *"? and shall, within the desegregation
* ,area disapprove all proposals for new construction or expansion 

of existing facilities when "housing patterns in an area would 

result in a school largely segregated on racial * * * lines,"

all in accordance with the 1966 directive issued by the State 

Board of Education to local school boards and the State 

Board's "School Plant'Planning Handbook" (see Ruling on Issue 

of segregation, p. 13.).

J. Pending further orders of the court, existing 

school district and regional boundaries and school governance

-8-



arrangements will be maintained and continued, except to 

the extent necessary to effect pupil and faculty desegregation 

as set forth herein; provided, however, that existing administra­

tive, financial, contractual, property and governance arrange­

ments shall be examined, and recommendations for their 

temporary and permanent retention or modification shall be 

made, in light of the need to operate an effectively desegregated

system of schools.

. K. At each school within the desegregated area 

provision shall be made to insure that the curriculum, 

activities, and conduct standards respect the diversity of 

students from differing ethnic backgrounds and the dignity and 

safety of «?ach individual, students, faculty, staff and parents.

L. The defendants shall, to insure the effective 

desegregation of the schools in the desegregation area, take 

immediate action including, but not limited to, the 

establishment or expansion of in-service training of faculty 

and staff, create bi-racial committees, employ black counselors, 

and require bi-racial and non-discriminatory extra-curricular 

activities.

III.

The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, with

the assistance of the other state defendants, shall examine,
• •

and make recommendations, consistent with the principles
♦ i. .

established above, for appropriate interim and final arrange­

ments for the (1) financial, (2) administrative and school 

governance, and (3) contractual arrangements for the operation 

of the schools within the desegregation area, including steps 

for unifying, or otherwise making uniform the personnel

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policies, procedures, contracts, and property arrangements
. !

of the various school districts.

Within 15 days of the entry of this order, the 

Superintendent shall advise the court and the parties of his 

progress in preparing such recommendations by filing a 

written report with the court and serving it on the parties.

In not later than 45 days after the entry of this order,

the Superintendent shall file with the court his recommendations

for appropriate interim and final relief in these respects.

In his examination and recommendations, the 

Superintendent, consistent with the rulings and orders of this 

court, may be guided, but not limited, by existing state law; 

where state law provides a convenient and adequate framework 

for interim or ultimate relief, it should be followed, where '

state law either is silent or conflicts with what is necessary 

to achieve the objectives of this order, the Superintendent .

■shall independently recommend what he deems necessary. m  ' ~

particular, the Superintendent shall examine and choose one 

appropriate interim arrangement to oversee the immediate 

implementation of a plan of desegregation.

' IV.

Each party may file appropriate plans or proposals 

for inclusion in any final order which may issue in this 

cause. The intent of this order is to permit all the parties 

to proceed apace with the task before us: fashioning an •

effective plan for the desegregation of the Detroit public 
schools. •

Fifteen days after the filing of the reports 

required herein, hearings will begin on any proposal to modify 

any interim plan prepared by the panel and all other matters

| \
\

I**—*’

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which may be incident to the adoption and implementation of

any interim plan of desegregation submitted. The parties

are placed on notice that they are to be prepared at that

time to present their objections, alternatives and modifications

At such hearing the dourt will not consider objections to

■desegregation or proposals offered "instead" of desegregation.

Hearings on a final plan of desegregation will be 
SGt as circumstances require.

DATE: JUNE 14 , 1972.

United states District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

)
RONALD BRADLEY, et al.( )

)
Plaintiffs )

. )
v. )

)
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.( )

)
Defendants )

and )
)

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, )
LOCAL NO. 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION ) 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, )

)
Defendant- . )
Intervenor )

and )
)

DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al., )
)

Defendants- )
. Intervenor )

et al. . )
• )

_______________________________ )

A T R U E  C O P Y
FREDERICK W. JOHNSON, Clerk

BY / O . / -  A—l( < R < __
DEPUTY, CLERK

CIVIL ACTION NO: 
35257

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF RULING

ON DESEGREGATION AREA AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN

On the basis of the entire record in this action, 

including particularly the evidence heard by the court from 

March 28 through April 14, 1972, the court now makes the follow­

ing Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It 

should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect

to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school
*

districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor 

on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of 

Detroit school district, such school districts have committed 

. Rets of de jure segregation.

INTRODUCTION

Jl. On September 27, 197.1, this court issued its
Ruling on Issue of Segregation. On October 4, 1971, this court



issued from the bench guidelines to bind the parties in the

submission of plans to remedy the constitutional violation

found, _i.e., school segregation; and in particular this court

noted that the primary objective before us was to develop and

implement a plan which attempts to "achieve the greatest
• %

possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account 

the practicalities of the situation." The same day this 

court reiterated these requirements by orders "that the Detroit 

Board of Education submit a plan for the desegregation of its

schools within 60 days" and "that the State defendants submit 

a metropolitan plan of desegregation within 120 days." In 

response to these orders hearings were held, and thereafter 

rulings issued, on Detroit-only plans (see Findings of Fact 

and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation)

and on the propriety of considering remedies which extend beyond 

the corporate geographic limits of the city of Detroxu. v̂ cc=

Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to 

Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City 

of Detroit.) Between March 28, 1972 and April 14, 1972,

hearings were held on metropolitan proposals for desegregation

of the Detroit public schools.

2. From the initial ruling on September 27, 1971, 

to this day, the basis of the proceedings has been and 

remains the violation: de jure school segregation. Since 

Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court has consistently

held that the remedy for such illegal segregation is desegre

gation. The racial history of this country is writ large by 

constitutional adjudication from Dred Scott v. Sanford to 

Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown. The message in Brown was simple: 

the Fourteenth Amendment was to be applied full force in 

public schoolihg. The Court held that "state-imposed" school 

segregation immeasurably taints the education received by all

-2



children in the public schools; p >etuates racial discrimination 

and a history of public action attaching a badge of inferiority 

to the black race in a public forum which importantly shapes 

the minds and hearts of succeeding generations of our young 

people; and amounts to an invidious racial classification.

Since Brown the Supreme Court has consistently, and with 

increasing force, held that the remedy upon finding de jure 

segregation is prompt and maximum actual desegregation of 

the public schools by all reasonable, feasible, and practicable 

means available. This court finds that there is nothing in 

the law, wisdom, or facts, and the particular circumstances 

and arguments, presented in this case which suggest anything 

except the affirmance of these principles in both fact and 

law,

• 3. The task before this court, therefore, is now,

and, since September 27, 1971, has always been, how to 

desegregate the Detroit public schools. The issue, despite 

efforts of the intervenors to suggest a new rationale for
ua return to the discredited "separate but equal" policy,

is not whether to desegregate. That question has been

foreclosed by the prior and settled commands of the Supreme

Court and the Sixth Circuit. Our duty now is to "grapple
2 /with the flinty, intractable realities"—  of implementing the 

constitutional commands.

4. In the most recent set of hearings, several 

issues were addressed generally, including appropriate methods 

of pupil reassignment to desegregate schools; quality and 

capacity of school facilities; transportation needs incident 

to school desegregation; the effects of new ^chool construction, 

and judicially established controls thereon, on any plan of 

desegregation; the reassignment of faculty and restructuring 

of facilities incident to pupil reassignment to accomplish

- 3-



school desegregation; appropriate and necessary interim and 

final administrative and financial arrangements; appropriate 

community, parental, staff, and pupil involvement in the 

desegregation process; and attention to individual, cultural, 

and ethnic values, respect, dignity and identity. But the 

primary question addressed by these hearings, in the absence of 

submission of a complete desegregation plan by the state, 

remains the determination of the area necessary and practicable 

effectively to eliminate "root and branch" the effects of 

state-imposed and supported segregation and to desegregate 

the Detroit public schools.

SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT 

A. The Desegregation Area .

5. The State Board of Education filed six (6)

"plans" without recommendation or preference; intervening defendants 

Magdowski, et al., filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation 

which included most of the tri-county area; the defendant Detroit 

Board of Education filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation
3 /which included the entire tri-county area. At the hearing 

plaintiffs presented a modification of the three proposals which 

actually described areas within which pupil desegregation was to 

be accomplished.

6 . In the consideration of metropolitan plans of

desegregation of the Detroit public schools, the State defendants

stand as the primary defendants.' They bear the initial burden

of coming forward with a proposal that promises to work. In
. . 4 /the context of this case,' they represent the "school authorities"

to whom equity courts traditionally have shown deference in 
’ ' 5 /these matters.— Yet in its submission without recommendation 

of six (6) "plans" the State Board of Education has failed to 

meet, or even attempt to meet, that burden and none of the other 

State defendants has filled the void.

- 4-



7. The State Board refused to make any recommendation 

to the court about the appropriate area for desegregation. In 

State Defendant Porter's words, the State Board "didn't make a 

decision, period." Defendants Milliken and Kelley merely filed

objections to all six (6) plans.

8. Three of the State "plans" merely proposed 

concepts alternative to maximum actual desegregation. The 

Racial Proportion Plan described a statistical method of 

determining the number of transfers involved in achieving a 

particular racial ratio in each school once an area of desegrega­

tion had been chosen. The Equal Educational opportunity and 

Quality Integration Plan was admitted to be a non-plan and 

described criteria for education which, in whole or part, might, 

or might not, be applicable to any school system.

9. Only one State "plan," the Metropolitan District 

Reorganization Plan, attempted to describe an area within 

which desegregation should occur, called the "initial operating 

zone" (sometimes referred to hereafter as the "State Proposal ). 

That "plan," however, was primarily concerned with discussing

a new governance structure for the desegregation area. Pupil

reassignment was mentioned only in passing and no foundation

was laid by State defendants for the particular area of

desegregation described. Further, it suffered from the default

of the State defendants by their stubborn insistence that under

their self-serving, and therefore self-limiting, view of their
0

powers they were free to ignore the clear order of this court 

and abdicate their responsibility vested in them by both the 

Michigan and Federal Constitution for supervision of public 

education and equal protection for all citizens.

10. From the very limited evidence in the record in 

support of the area in that state proposal, the primary 

foundation appears to be the particular racial ratio attained in

-5-



that plan, approximately 65% black, 35% white, with the provision 

that the area could be expanded if "white flight" ensued. In 

the absence of any other persuasive foundation, such area is 

not based on any definable or legally sustainable criteria for 

either inclusion or exclusion of particular areas; and the 

concept of an "initial operating zone" raises serious practical 

questions, which should be avoided if a more permanent solution 

is now possible. In short, the area described by the "initial 

operating zone" does not appear to be based primarily on 

relevant factors, like eliminating racially identifiable schools; 

accomplishing maximum actual desegregation of the Detroit public 

schools; or avoiding, where possible, maintaining a pattern of 

schools substantially disproportionate to the relevant school 

community's racial composition by force of deliberate action 

by public authority. Nor, on the evidence in this record, is 

the "initial operating zone" based on any practical limitation 

of reasonable times and distances for transportation of pupils. 

These factors seem to have played little part in the creation of 

the "initial operating zone" and are reflected less in its

result.
At the hearings, moreover, the State defendants 

did not purport to present evidence in support, or even in 

opposition, to the State Proposal. The State, despite prodding 

by the court, presented only one witness, who merely explained 

what appeared on the face of the various State "Plans" submitted. 

The State's cross examination of witnesses was of no assistance 

to the court in ascertaining any preference, legal or educational. 

Put bluntly, State defendants in this hearing deliberately chose 

not to assist the court in choosing an appropriate area for 

effective desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Their 

resistance and abdication of responsibility throughout has been 

consistent with the other failures to meet their obligations noted

- C -



in the court's earlier rulings. Indeed, some of the submissions 

spoke as clearly in opposition to desegregation as did the 

legislature in Sec. 12 of Act 48 ruled unconstitutional by 

the Sixth Circuit.

12. In such circumstances little weight or deference

can be given to the unsupported submission of the State/ .
Board of Education. In light of the available alternatives 

and the facts produced at the hearing bearing on the' issue, 

the court finds that State defendants offered no basis for 

ruling that the "initial operating zone" is the appropriate 

area within which to effectively desegregate the Detroit public 

schools.

13. Similarly, the newly intervening, defendant 

school districts did not attempt at the hearing to assist the 

court in determining which area was appropriate to accomplish 

effective desegregation. They were given the opportunity, by 

express written order and several admonitions during the course 

of the hearings, to assist the court in the task at hand but 

chose in their best judgment instead, in the main, to suggest 

their view that separate schools were preferable. The failure 

of the group of 40 districts to even comment that the court 

should exclude certain districts under any number of available 

rationales may in part be explained by the awkward position 

chosen by them and their counsel of having single representation 

for districts on different sides of the various suggested 

perimeters.

14. The plans of intervening defendants Magdowski,

et al., and the defendant Detroit Board of Education are similar. 

With slight variations they include the entire tri-county, 

metropolitan Detroit area, with that area divided into several 

regions or clusters to make the planning for accomplishing 

desegregation more manageable. Although both have as their main



objective desegregation, their larger area arises primarily 

from a heavy emphasis on such factors as white flight and an

appropriate socio-economic balance in each cluster and school.

15. The authors of the Detroit Board and Magdowski 

plans readily admit that the regions or clusters for pupil 

reassignment which involve Mt. Clemens and Pontiac are not 

(Jiĵ ectly related to desegregation of the Detroit public 

schools and may be disregarded without any substantial adverse 

effect on accomplishing our objective. No other party has 

expressed any disagreement with that view. And the court finds 

that these two regions or clusters, for purposes of pupil 

reassignment, need not be included at this time in the 

desegregation area.

16. With the elimination of these two clusters there are, 

then, three basic proposals to be considered for the desegregation 

area: the State Proposal; the Detroit Board Proposal, and the 

proposal of defendant-intervenors Magdowski, et al. In addition, 

as noted, plaintiffs filed a modification of these three 

proposals.
17. Each of these proposals starts from the same

7 / .two premises: (1) the tri—county area constitutes the

relevant school community which can serve as an initial 

benchmark in beginning the evaluation of how to effectively 

eliminate the racial segregation of Detroit schools;

(2) but in some instances reasonable time and distance 

limitations for pupil transportation, and in other instances 

the actual area required to eliminate the pattern of racially 

identifiable schools, limit the area within which pupil 

reassignment should occur. In terms of proof, putting aside 

arguments of impotence by the State defendants, there was 

absolutely no contradictory evidence on these two criteria.

The entire tri—county area includes areas, pupils, and

6 /

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schools in 86 school districts; it includes approximately one

million students, of whom approximately 20% are black. Based
8_/

on the evidence concerning school and non-school factors, 

and reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil 

transportation, the court fin that both premises are
2 J  • •accurate. '

18. The State Proposal includes the areas, pupils 

and school in 36 school districts; approximately 550,000 

students are included of whom 36% are black. The Detroit 

Board Proposal (excluding clusters 8 and 12) includes the 

areas, pupils, and schools in 69 school districts; approximately
. . . i ! L /850,000 students are included, of whom 25% are minority.

The CCBE Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in 

some 62 school districts; approximately 777,000 students are 

included of whom 197,000 (25.4%) are black. Plaintiffs'

Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in 54 school 

districts; approximately 780,000 students are included, of 

whom 197,000 (25.3%) are black.

19. The State Proposal approaches what may be 

considered a substantial disproportion in the context of this 

case. It is to be remembered that within any desegregation 

area, the racial composition of desegregated schools will vary 

from the area's racial mix. Given the variations in school 

plant, demographic and geographic factors, limiting the 

desegregation area to the State Proposal would result in some 

schools being substantially disproportionate in their racial 

composition to the tri-county area, and other schools racially 

identifiable, all without any justification in law or fact.

Vhis finding is supported by the lack of any apparent 

justification for the desegregation area described by the 

State proposal except a desire to achieve an arbitrary racial

ratio.
-9-



20. Transportation of children by school bus is a 

common practice throughout the nation, in the state of 

Michigan, and in the tri-county area. Within appropriate 

time limits it is a considerably safer, more reliable, 

healthful and efficient means of getting children to school 

than either car pools or walking, and this is especially true 

for younger children.

21. In Michigan and the tri-county area,' pupils 

often spend upwards of one hour, and up to one and one half 

hours, one-way on the bus ride to school each day. Consistent 

with its interest in the health, welfare and safety of children 

and in avoiding impingement on the educational process, state 

educational authorities routinely fund such transportation

for school children. Such transportation of school children is 

a long-standing, sound practice in elementary and secondary 

education in this state and throughout the country. And the 

court finds such transportation times, used by the state and 

recommended here, are reasonable in the circumstance here 

presented and will not endanger the health or safety of the 

child nor impinge on the educational process. For school 

authorities or private citizens to now object to such 

transportation practices raises the inference not of hostility 

to pupil transportation but rather racially motivated hostility 

to the desegregated school at the end of the ride.

22. The Plaintiffs*. Proposal made reference to 

P.M.8, based on the TALUS regional transportation and travel 

times study. Although there was dispute over the meaning of the 

study, such studies are deemed sufficiently reliable that major 

governmental agencies customarily rely on their projection for

a variety of planning functions. When used by the plaintiffs, 

P.M. 8, in conjunction with the Detroit Board's survey of 

maximum school to school travel times, served as a rough guide-

- 10-



lino within which the plaintiffs' modification of other proposals 

attempted to stay in an effort to provide maximum desegregation 

without any more transportation time than is required to 

desegregate. This court finds that the utilization of these 

two factors, and the lower travel time estimates which should 

result, is a reasonable basis for the modification in the 

circumstances of this case. The court's duty and objective 

is not to maximize transportation but to maximize desegregation 

and within that standard it will always be reasonable to 

minimize transportation. To that end the court has accepted 

the more conservative perimeter for the desegregation area suggested 

as a modification by plaintiffs because it provides no less 

effective desegregation.

23. Based on these criteria, the State Proposal is 

too narrowly drawn.

2*4. Based on these criteria, parts of the Dcl-i oIl

Board Proposal are too sweeping.

25. Based on these criteria, the CCBE proposal

and the Plaintiffs* Proposal, roughly approximate the area so
11/described.

26. There is general agreement among the parties,

and the court so finds, that on the west the areas, schools, and

pupils in the Huron, Van Buren, Northville, Plymouth, and Novi
12/

districts (1) are beyond the rough 40-minute travel time line; 

(2) are not necessary to effectively desegregate schools involved 

in the regions and clusters abutting those schools; and, (3) at 

this writing, are not otherwise necessary, insofar as pupil 

assignment is concerned, to provide an effective remedy now 

and hereafter. (See Findings 63-69 below.)

27. In the southwest the school districts of Woodhaven, 

Gilbralter, Flat Rock, Grosse lie and Trenton are within 

reasonable time and distance criteria set forth above. These

-] 1-



virtually all-white districts are included in the Detroit 

Board Proposal but excluded from the plaintiffs modification. 

The areas, schools and pupils in such school districts are 

similarly not necessary to effectively desegregate. (Clusters 

13, 14, and 15 in Plaintiffs' proposal are 20.5%, 24.4% and 

22.7% black respectively.) There is nothing in the record 

which suggests that these districts need be included in the 

desegregation area in order to disestablish the racial 

identifiabil-ity of the Detroit public schools. From the 

evidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board s 

interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not 

racial desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic

balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters.

In terms of what this court views as the primary obligation established 

by the Constitution— racial desegregation— the court deems the 

proper approach is to be more conservative; the court finds it 

appropriate to confine the desegregation area to its smallest 

effective limits. This court weighs more heavily the judicially 

recognized concern for limiting the time and distance of pupil 

transportation as much as possible, consistent with the 

constitutional requirement to eliminate racially identifiable

schools, than a concern for expanding the desegregation area to

raise somewhat the average socio-economic balance of a
13 /

relatively few clusters of schools.

28. To the north and northeast, the only major 

disagreement among the Detroit Board Proposal and plaintiffs 

modification relates to the areas, schools, and pupils in the 

Utica School District. This district is a virtually all-white, 

’ long, relatively narrow area extending several miles in a 

nprth-south direction away from the city of Detroit. Only 

the southern part of the district is within the rough, TALUS 

40-minute travel time line.

- 12-



29. The Detroit Board argues that Utica should 

be included in order to raise the average socio-economic 

balance of the abutting clusters and schools. In this 

instance, however, the overall racial composition of the 

cluster, 27.0% black, may tend toward disproportionate 

black relative to the tri-county starting point.

30. Mr. Henrickson, the planner for the Board, 

also suggested that Cluster 3 of Plaintiffs' Proposal, because 

of its omission of Utica, might present some problems, which 

he admitted could be solved, in designing a plan of pupil 

reassignment for the desegregation of schools. (See 

Findings 34-39 below.).

31. In light of these relevant, and competing, 

considerations the question presented by the Utica situation 

is close; however, at this writing, the court determines

that the areas, schools, and pupils in the Utica School District 

need not be included, and therefore, should not be included in
. I Vthe desegregation area.—

32. The court finds that the appropriate desegre­

gation area is described by plaintiffs' modification of the 

three primary proposals. Within that area the racial 

identifiability of schools may be disestablished by implementa­

tion of an appropriate pupil desegregation plan. The area

as a whole is substantially proportionate to the tri-county 

starting point. Within the area it is practicable, feasible, 

and sound to effectively desegregate all schools without 

imposing any undue transportation burden on the children or 

on the state's system of public schooling. The time or 

distance children need be transported to desegregate schools 

in the area will impose no risk to the children's health and 

will not significantly impinge on the educational process.

-13-



B. Clusters

33. The Detroit Board Proposal makes use of 16 

regions or clusters. These clusters range from 36,000 to

105.000 pupils and from 17.5% to 29.1% "minority." The 

clusters are arranged along major surface arteries and 

utilize the "skip," or noncontiguous zoning, technique to 

minimize the time and distance any child need spend in 

transit. The use of these clusters basically subdivides the 

planning for pupil reassignment within the desegregation area 

into a series of smaller, manageable and basically independent 

plans. Thus, although as the new intervenors suggest devising 

a desegregation plan for a system with some 800,000 pupils 

has never been attempted, the practical and manageable reality 

is that desegregation plans for systems with from 36,000 to

100.000 pupils has been done and such plans have been 

implemented.

34. Plaintiffs' Proposal uses the same cluster 

technique and the same clusters, modified to fit the desegrega­

tion area. The 15 clusters range from 27,000 to 93,000 pupils 

and from 20.5% to 30.8% black. Only three relevant objections 

were raised by Mr. Henrickson, to the clusters as modified.

35. First, Cluster 4 was challenged as "concealing" 

a "problem," namely effective desegregation of other schools 

resulting from the omission of Utica from plaintiffs' modifica­

tion. On cross-examination Mr. Henrickson admitted that the 

"problem" of actual pupil desegregation for these other 

schools could be "solved," that all schools within Cluster 4 

could be effectively desegregated, and that Cluster 4 was 

smaller than the Detroit Board Cluster 6. The objection was 

thus narrowed to the possibility that a suburban high school 

constellation feeder pattern might have to be split between two

-14-



Detroit high school constellation feeder patterns in order to 

desegregate. Several of the Dcrroit Board’s clusters, however, 

also contain two Detroit high school feeder patterns.

36.■ This objection, splitting an existing feeder 

pattern, was raised directly in reference to Cluster 12. In 

neither instance, however, did Mr. Henrickson suggest that the 

time or distance of transportation involved was too long or 

that it would present administrative difficulty in.devising 

a pupil assignment plan for either cluster. The objection 

relates solely to a matter of administrative convenience, 

namely the use of existing feeder patterns in preparing 

pupil assignments.. For example, Mr. Henrickson previously 

admitted that in drawing a pupil assignment plan, an 

alternative to use of existing feeder patterns would be to 

"wipe the slate clean," and disregard existing feeder patterns.

In fact one of the State plans suggested use of census tracts
' 15 / .as an alternative.--- On numerous occasions m  the past

Mr. Henrickson himself has reassigned parts of one feeder

pattern to another school in order to relieve overcrowding and/

or accomplish desegregation. The objection to such practice,

therefore, is admittedly insubstantial.

37. The third objection relates to the exchange 

of Detroit Northern for Detroit Murray in Clusters 6 and 15 

requiring that the students transported, if they proceed on 

their entire journey by way of the expressway, encounter an 

interchange which tends to be rather slow—moving. Such 

transportation time and distance, however, is well within the 

rough criteria for reasonableness and is shorter than or 

comparable to the maximum trips required in the Detroit Board's 

clusters. In other instances, Mr. Henrickson admitted that 

pupils in the Detroit proposal might also have to travel 

through similar interchanges. Moreover, the objection to this



particular increase in travel time must be weighed against the 

apparent general decrease in time which would be required in 

plaintiffs' modified clusters as compared with the Detroit 

Board's clusters. In any event the desegregation panel, 

based on its investigation of all aspects of pupil assignment, 

remains free to suggest a modification of these clusters in 

order to reduce the time and number of children requiring 

transportation.

38. With that caveat, the court finds that 

plaintiffs' modification of the Detroit Board's clusters 

provides a workable, practicable, and sound framework for the 

design of a plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools.

C. Pupil Assignment and Transportation

39. Example of various methods of pupil assignment 

to accomplish desegregation have been brought to the attention 

of the court by the parties: pairing, grouping, and clustering 

of schools; various strip, skip, island, and non-contiguous 

zoning; various lotteries based on combinations of present 

school assignment, geographic location, name, or birthday.

Judicious use of these techniques— coupled with reasonable 

staggering of school hours and maximizing use of existing 

transportation facilities— can lead to maximum actual desegregation 

with a minimum of additional transportation.

40. Quite apart from desegregation, under any •

circumstances, transportation'for secondary pupils living

more than 1 1/2 miles, and elementary pupils living more 

than 1 mile from school, is often demanded by parents and 

i should be provided. Moreoever, it is essential to the

effectiveness of any desegregation plan that transportation 

be provided free to all students requiring it under that 

criteria. (Brewer v. Norfolk Board of Education, ____ F.2d.----_

-16-



(April 197 2) (4th Cir.).)
41. In the recent past more than 300,000 pupils

in the tri-county area regularly rode to school on some type 

of bus; this figure excludes the countless children who 

arrive at school in car pools, which are many, many times 

more dangerous than riding on the school bus.

42. Throughout the state approximately 35-40% of 

all students arrive at school on a bus. In school- districts 

eligible for state reimbursement of transportation costs in 

the three affected counties, the percent of pupils transported

in 1969-70 ranged from 42 to 52%. .

43. in' comparison approximately 40%, or 310,000, 

of the 780,000 children within the desegregation area will 

require transportation in order to accomplish maximum 

actual desegregation.
/\/\ prp>nr'fi fuiv increase in the numbers of pupils 

to be transported upon implementation of a complete desegrega­

tion plan over the number presently transported, relative to 

the state and the tri-county area, should be minimal. Indeed, 

any increase may only reflect the greater numbers of pupils 

who would be transported in any event but for the state 

practice, which affected the segregation found in this 

case, and which denies state reimbrusement to students and 

districts wholly within city limits regardless of the 

distance of the child from the school to which assigned. 

(Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 14.) The greatest change 

is the direction of the buses.

45. There is uncontradicted evidence that the 

' actual _ost of transportation for a two-way plan of

desegregation should be no greater than 50 to 60 dollars per
17 / -pupil transported/ comparable to the present coses per

pupil through the state. Increases in the total costs

-37-



of pupil transportation in the desegregation area, therefore, 

will result primarily from providing all children requiring 

transportation a free ride instead of imposing the costs of 

transportation for many on the families in districts which are 

ineligible for state reimbursement and which fail to provide 

transportation.

46, By multiple use of buses, careful routing, and 

economies of scale resulting from a comprehensive system of 

pupil transportation, it may be possible to achieve savings 

in per pupil costs. For example in 1969—1970 many school 

districts in the tri-county area which used the same bus for 

even two loads per day lowered their per pupil costs to $40 

or less. In a coordinated, urban pupil transportation system 

it may be possible to raise the bus use factor to three or 

more. (See "First Report" State Survey and Evaluation.)

47. In the tri-county area in the recent past there 

were approximately 1,800 buses (and another 100 smaller vans) . 

used for the transportation of pupils. Assuming a rough 

average of 50 pupils per bus carrying three loads of students 

per day, this transportation fleet may prove sufficient to 

carry some 270,000 pupils.

48. Various public transit authorities now transport 

an additional 60,000 pupils on their regular public runs.

49. The degree to which these plausible bus-use

factors can be realized to their maximum, and whether these
*

public transit facilities may be fully utilized in a plan of 

desegregation, must be answered upon careful investigation by 

a panel of experts.

i . so. There is no disagreement among the parties, and

the court so finds, that additional transportation facilities, 

at least to the number of 350 buses, will have to~ be purchased 

to meet the increase in the number of students who should be

-1 8



provided transportation for either an interim or final plan of 

desegregation.

51. For all the reasons stated heretofore— including 

time, distance, and transportation factors— desegregation within 

the area described is physically easier and more practicable

and feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate 

geographic limits of the city of Detroit.

52. The issue of transportation of kindergarten 

children, and their inclusion in part or in full in the 

desegregation plan, may require further study. There was 

general agreement among the experts who testified that kinder­

garten, but for "political" considerations, should be included, 

if practicable, in the desegregation plan. Kindergarten, 

however, is generally a half-day program. Transportation of 

kindergarten children for upwards of 45 minutes, one-way, does 

not appear unreasonable, harmful, or unsafe in any way. In 

the absence of some compelling justification, which does not 

yet appear, kindergarten children should be included in the

final plan of desegregation.

53. Every effort should be made to insure that 

transportation and reassignment of students to accomplish 

desegregation is "two-way" and falls as fairly as possible

on both races. Although the number of black and white children 

transported and reassigned at the outset will be roughly equal, 

it is inevitable that a larger__proportion of black children will 

be transported for a greater proportion of their school years 

than white children, if transportation overall is to be 

minimized. To mitigate this disproportion, every effort should 

be made at the outset to randomize the location of particular 

gj-ade centers. In the short term, full utilization of vastly 

under-capacity -inner-city schools may also help to mitigate the 

disproportion for sonic black children; and in the long term,

-19



new school capacity, consistent with other constitutional 

commands and the overall needs of the desegregation area and 

the surrounding area, should be added in Detroit, in relative 

proximity to concentrations of black student residence.

D. Restructuring of Facilities and Reassignment of Teachers

54. In the reassignment of pupils to accomplish 

desegregation the court finds that facilities must be substantially 

reallocated and faculty substantially reassigned by reason of

the clustering, pairing and grouping of schools.

55. In order to make the pupil desegregation process 

fully effective the court finds that it is essential to integrate 

faculty and staff and to insure that black faculty and staff 

representation at every school is more than token. The court 

has previously found and reaffirms that "a quota or racial 

balance in each school which is equivalent to the system-wide 

ratio and without more" is educationally unsound, and that

the desideratum is the balance of staff by qualifications for 

subject and grade level, and then by race, experience and 

sex. It is obvious, given the racial composition of the 

faculty and staff in the schools in the metropolitan plan 

area, and the adjusted racial composition of the students, 

that vacancies and increases and reductions in faculty and 

staff cannot effectively achieve the needed racial balance 

in this area of the school operation. Active steps must be 

taken to even out the distribution of black teachers and staff 

throughout the system.

56. In the desegregation area approximately 16% of 

the faculty and 12% of the principals and assistant principals 

are black. In this context "token" means roughly less than 

10% black. Moreover, where there is more than one building 

administrator in any school, a bi-racial administrative team

- 20-



is required wherever possible.

57. Every effort should be made to hire and promote, 

and to increase such on-going efforts as there may be to hire 

and promote, additional black faculty and staff. Because of 

the systematic and substantial under-employment of black 

administrators and teachers in the tri-county area, an 

affirmative program for black employment should be developed

and implemented. •

58. The rated capacity of classrooms in the Detroit 

public schools is 32; in some of the suburban districts the 

average rated capacity is as low as 24 or 25. Utilization 

should be redetermined on a uniform basis.

59. In respect to faculty and staff, school 

facilities, and the utilization of existing school capacity, 

normal administrative practice in handling the substantial 

reallocation and reassignment incident to pupil desegregation 

should produce schools substantially alike.

60. la the circumstances of this case, the pairing, 

grouping and clustering of schools to accomplish desegregation 

with minimum transportation often requires use of grade 

arrangements such as K-4, K-5, or even K-6. In so planning 

pupil reassignments, it is sometimes necessary, and often 

administratively practicable, to include grades K-8 or even 

K-9 to achieve the maximum actual desegregation with the 

minimum transportation. Grade structures in most elementary 

schools in the desegregation area is a basic K-6; however, 

almost all other combinations are found. They differ within 

and among various districts.

• 61. In the reassignments of pupils and teachers

and the reallocation of equipment and facilities required to 

accomplish desegregation, the elementary grades and schools
I

present relatively few administrative difficulties, vdiilc the

- 21-



high school grades and facilities present the greater 

difficulties, particularly with respect to scheduling and 

curriculum.
62. For these reasons, if it develops that 

interim choices must be made because of the impossibility of 

immediate desegregation of all grades, schools, and clusters 

in the desegregation area, the weight of the evidence is, and 

the court so finds, that desegregation should begin first 

at the earliest grades for entire elementary school groupings 

throughout as many clusters as possible.

E. School Construction

63. Relative to suburban districts the Detroit 

public schools, as a whole, are considerably over-capacity.

(See also Finding 58, supra.) To alleviate this overcrowding, 

equalize rated capacity and minimize and equalize transportation 

burdens borne by black pupils in the city, needed new school
I •

capacity, consistent with other requirements of a desegregation 

plan, should be added on a priority basis in the city of 

Detroit.
64. Relevant to the court's choice of a desegregation 

area more limited than the Detroit Board Proposal is the 

testimony, elicited on cross-examination from two of the 

primary authors of that proposal, related to the effects of 

controlling new school construction. The broader area in the 

Detroit proposal was chosen without any real consideration

of the impact of controlling school construction in an area 

larger than the desegregation area. Upon reflection, both 

'Dr. Flynn and Mr. Henrickson admitted that closely 

scrutinizing and limiting the addition of capacity to areas 

outside the desegregation area might lead them to re-evaluate 

the need,- in the context of maintaining now and hereafter a 

unitary system, to include an area as swooping as recommended



by the Detroit Board proposal.

65. In our Ruling on Issue of Segregation, pp. 8-10, 

this court found that the "residential segregation throughout 

the larger Metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of 

long standing" and that "governmental actions and inaction at 

all levels, Federal, State and local, have combined with 

those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions 

and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish 

and to maintain the pattern of associations and brokerage 

firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential 

segregation through the Detroit metropolitan area." We also 

noted that this deliberate setting of residential patterns had 

an important effect not only on the racial composition oi 

inner-city schools but the entire School District of the City 

of Detroit. (Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 3-10.) Just 

as evident is the'fact that suburban school districts in the 

main contain virtually all-white schools. The white population 

of the city declined and in the suburbs grew; the black 

population in the city grew, and largely, was contained therein 

by force of public and private racial discrimination at all

levels.
66. We also noted the important interaction of 

school and residential segregation: "Just as there is an inter

action between residential patterns and the racial composition 

of the schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the 

residential pattern by the racial composition of schools.

Ruling on Issue of Segregregation at 10. Cf. Swann_v.

Charlottc-Mccklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971); "People
gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located 
in response to the needs of people. The location of schools 
may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a 
metropolitan area and have important impact on composition



of inner city neighborhoods."

67. Within the context of the segregatory housing

market, it is obvious that the white families who left the

city schools would not be as likely to leave in the absence of

schools, not to mention white schools, to attract, or at least 
‘ 18/serve, their children. Immigrating families were affected

in their school and housing choices in a similar manner. Between

1950 and 1969 in the tri-county area, approximately 13,900

"regular classrooms," capable of serving and attracting over
3-V .400,000 pupils, were added xn school districts which were less 

than 2% black in their pupil racial composition in the 1970-71 
school year. (P.M. 14; P.M. 15).

68. The precise effect of this massive school

construction on the racial composition of Detroit area public

schools cannot be measured. It is clear, however, that the
20 /

effect has been substantial. Unfortunately, the State,

despite its awareness of the important impact of school 

construction and announced policy to control it, acted "in 

keeping generally, with the discriminatory practices which 

advanced or perpetuated racial segregation in these schools." 

Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 15; see also id., at 13.

69. In addition to the interim re-evaluation of new 

school construction required in the order, pursuant to the 

State Board's own requirements, the final plan will consider 

other appropriate provisions for future construction throughout 

the metropolitan area.

F. Governance, Finance and Administrative Arrangements

70. The plans submitted by the State Board, the 

atroit B^ard, and the intervening defendants Magdowski, et al.,

discuss generally possible governance, finance, and administrative 
arrangements which may bo appropriate for operation of an

interim or final plan of desegregation. Without parsing in detail

-24



the interesting, and sometimes sensible, concepts introduced 

by each plan, it is sufficient to note that each contemplates 

overlaying some broad educational authority over the area, 

creating or using some regional, arrangement (with continued 

use or eventual redrawing of existing districts), and 

considerable input at the individual school level. The court 

has made no decision in this regard and will consider the 

matter at a subsequent hearing. .

71. Each concept needs to be "fleshed-out" in the 

hard prospect of implementation of a final plan of 

desegregation and what is necessary and essential, and only 

that, for the successful operation of that plan of school 

desegregation now on an interim basis and hereafter on a 

permanent footing.

72. There are now some 86 school districts in the 

tri-county area of varying size, numbers of pupils, shapes, 

and wealth.

73. In another context, the State Board of Education 

found each related to a "metropolitan core city" (Detroit) as 

"city," "town," or "urban fringe" districts.

74. The boundaries of these school districts in

general bear no relationship to other municipal, county,
22 /

or special district governments, needs or services":

75. Some educational services are already 

provided to students on an .interdistrict, county,, inter­

county, or metropolitan basis; and many support services 

are provided by the intermediate school districts and the 

State Department of Education. For various reasons many 

pupils ailready cross school district lines to cittend school
• , • — /or receive educational services.

76, ' In many respects— patterns of economic life, work, 

play, population, planning, transportation, health services— the

-25-



tri-county area constitute:-, a rough series of interrelated 

communities constituting, in the view of the-United States 

Census Bureau, a single standard metropolitan statistical area.

77. Local units of government in the metropolitan 

area have in many instances joined together for the purpose 

of providing better solutions to problems confronting them.

In such instances various units of government have either 

disregarded local boundaries or have concluded that the 

problems were such as to call for a metropolitan solution.

In some cases they have created overlay organizations.

SEMCOG, recreational authorities, a metropolitan sewage system, 

SEMTA, and the Detroit Water System are examples of these 

metropolitan approaches.

78. Indeed, the State defendants at this very 

moment are attempting in state court to strike down one 

irrationality, and the discriminatory effect, of the existing 

school district arrangement, i_.e_. , finance, apparently in the ' 

hope of moving to a virtual state-wide assumption of costs.

. 79# In such circumstances there has been no showing

that the existing school district boundaries are rationally 

related to any legitimate purpose; and the court finds that the 

particular welter of existing boundaries for 86 school districts 

is not necessary to the promotion of any compelling state 

interest.

80. On the basis of the present record,_ the court 

is of the view that the shifts in faculty, staff, resources 

and equipment and the exchanges of pupils necessary to 

accomplish maximum actual desegregation may be made, at least 

on an interim basis, by contractual agreements or otherwise 

among and between the existing school districts. The court 

has serious reservations, however, whether such procedures 

will inevitably threaten the continuing effectiveness of a



plan of desegregation over the long-term. On these issues 

more evidence and further hearings will be necessary before 

reaching a final decision.

81, The State defendants, and in particular the 

State Board of Education which is charged with the primary 

responsibility for public education in Michigan, are the 

primary parties to be charged with responsibility to undertake 

that vital inquiry and return with recommendations about those 

governance, financial, and administrative arrangements which 

are necessary and essential to the successful implementation 

of a plan of desegregation on an interim and continuing basis.

G. Involvement of Affected Persons and Communities and 
Protection Against Racial Discrimination in the 
Desegregation Process

82. The court has received uncontroverted evidence 

in the plans filed by every party and in testimony, and 

advice in several briefs amicus curiae, and the court finds, 

that the following additional factors are essential to 

implementation and operation of an effective plan of 

desegregation in the circumstances of this case:

(a) Bi-racial councils made up of the parents and 
staff, and, where appropriate, pupils, should 
be set up at each school? the persons most 
affected must be encouraged and given every 
opportunity to participate in the implementation 
of desegregation.

(b) Curriculum content, and all curriculum materials 
and student codes, must be re-evaluated and 
reflect the diversity of ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds of the children now in.the schools.
As far as possible, those immediately affected 
by these decisions at the individual school 
level should participate in that process.

(c) In-service training for faculty and staff for 
multi-ethnic studies and human relations should 
be required; we must, after all, rely primarily

• on our teachers and children to respect, nurture,
and deal with the diversity of students present 
in the desegregated school.

(d) The entire grading, reporting, counselling, and 
testing program should bo reviewed in light of:

-2 7-



desegregated schools compared to traditional 
schools and to avoid imposing the effects of 
past discrimination on the children. Tracking, 
whether so labeled or by any test, which has 
racial effects should not be utilised; within 
schools a pattern of classes which are 
substantially disproportionate in their racial 
composition from the relevant school or grade 
mix should be closely scrutinized and maintained 
only if necessary to promote a compelling 
educational objective.

83. In making the finding above, we remind the 

parties that this court's task is to enforce constitutional 

rights not to act as a schoolmaster; the court's task is to 

protect the constitutional rights here found violated with as 

little intrusion into the education process as possible. The 

court's objective is to establish the minimum constitutional 

framework within which the system of public schools may operate 

now and hereafter in a racially unified, non-discriminatory 

fashion. Within that framework the body politic, educators, 

parents, and most particularly the children must be given the 

maximum opportunity to experiment and secure a high quality, • 

and equal, educational opportunity. However, experience has 

proven that specific goals, deadlines and methods of 

reporting and review must be required in all desegregation 

cases to insure compliance. >

H. Timing

84. The burden remains with State defendants to 

show why desegregation for all schools, grades, classrooms, 

and pupils in the desegregation area should not proceed now,

_i .<2. , in the context of this litigation, for the 1972 fall 

term. The design and implementation of desegregation plans 

for all grades in 15 clusters— including pupil assignments, 

necessary reassignment of faculty and restructuring of 

facilities, planning and acquiring the needed transportation 

facilities— is conceded by all parties to be a major undertaking 

Yet next fall will already be a full year, not just four or six



or even eight weeks, Cf. Carter v. West Feliciano Parish

School Pd,, 396 U„S. 290 (1970), after the initial ruling 

by this court of the need for maximum feasible desegregation 

’’now." In such circumstances the burden to prove the 

infeasibility of implementation of complete relief is high.

85. The desegregation panel, therefore, must make 

every effort to plan to implement as much actual desegregation, 

for as many clusters, schools, grades, classrooms, and students 

as possible.

86. At a minimum, there is agreement among, and 

evidence from, the experts that desegregating several grades, 

and more particularly entire elementary schools, within many, 

if not all, clusters may be accomplished in the fall.

87. In view of Findings 60 to 62, supra, if 
hard choices must be made for the fall, any interim plan 
should attempt to desegregate grades K-6, K-8, or K-9
in as many entire clusters as possible; and, in the absence

of some other showing, there appears no reason why a complete
24 /

plan may not be implemented by fall 1973.

88. A heavy burden rests with those who seek delay 

in any way, shape, kind, degree or extent to convince the 

court that maximum actual desegregation cannot proceed 

effectively forthwith.

89. In view of the time constraints, the need 

to discharge this burden forthwith, the State defendants' 

default in assisting this court to determine the appropriate 

desegregation area, and the State defendants' asserted and 

evident lack of available planning capacity suit ed to the 

task, the court finds that some additional entity must be 

charged with the task of preparing a pupil assignment plan to 

accomplish maximum actual desegregation and a transportation 

plan within the framework this day established. To that end

29-



a panel of skilled experts, broadly representative of the 

parties and their interests, appointed by the court and 

assigned that task, is required to discharge effectively 

and promptly these two tasks.

90. State defendants remain charged with the duty, 

however, of coming forward with other necessary reports and 

plans concerning those governance, administrative, and 

financial arrangements necessary and essential to the 

implementation of an effective plan of desegregation on an 

interim and on-going basis.

I. The Plan

91. Based on the entire evidence amassed in this 

case, the court finds that an educationally sound, 

administratively feasible, constitutionally adequate, 

practicable and effective plan of desegregation may be developed, 

implemented and operated hereafter for the desegregation area

as set forth in findings 1-90 above.

30-



CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The court has continuing jurisdiction of this 

action for all purposes, including the granting of effective 

relief. Bradley v. Milliken, Ruling on Issue of Segregation, 

September 27, 1971; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 

on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 28, 1972.

2. A de jure segregation violation having been found,

the minimum remedy is maximum actual desegregation, taking
25 y

into account the practicalities of the situation. Bradley v

Milliken, Oral Order, October 4, 1971; Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation,

March 28, 1972; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U 0S. 383 (1954) 

349 UoSo 294 (1954); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S0 430

(1968) ; Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Ed., 396 U.S. 19

(1969) ; Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U 0S0 290 (1970) 

Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenberq Bd. of Ed., 402 U„S. 1 (1971); 

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile, 402 U.S. 33 

(1971); Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 

573, cert, denied, 925 UnS. 233 (1971).

3. The remedial obligation rests with school 

authorities; but where in any way they fail, or are unable 

because of the circumstances of the case, to fulfill any part 

of the obligation promptly and fully, the court has broad 

equity power, and the duty, to insure that demonstrable progress 

be made now; that a schedule for planning be adopted forthwith; 

and that necessary planning be specifically ordered and 

immediately undertaken in order that a constitutionally adequate 

plan may be fashioned and finally ordered implemented as soon

as possible. Swann v. Charlotlc-Mocklenberg Board of Education, 

311 F. Supp. 265 (W„D»N,.C„ 1970), aff *d f 402 U.S. 1 (1971); 

Carter v. West Feliciano School P.d., 396 U.S. 226, 227-228



(1969), 396 U.S„ 290 (1970); Arrce v. County Board of 

Educatjon, No. 72-1211 (5th Cir. March 31, 1972); Rule 53,

Fed. R. Civ. P.; P„A„Rr.C. v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1247,
'

1266-7 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Only then will the court in this 

case be apprised fully of the practicalities of the situation,

and what is reasonable and feasible, in order that a final
. i

order may issue. School authorities, of course, will be given 

an opportunity to (1) raise relevant objections, (2) make
j

suggestions for modifications, (3) or present an alternative
..

plan of desegregation; and their judgment and expertise will 

be considered and given appropriate weight by the court.

4. Funds must either be raised or reallocated, where

necessary, to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional

rights and to insure that no such unconstitutional neglect J

recurs again. Shapiro v. Thompson, 397 U„S. 254, 265-266 (1970);
. 1 
Boddle v, Connecticut, 91 S.Ct. 780, 788 (1971); Griffin v.

Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U 0S 0 j

365, 374-375 (1971); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971); _

Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hoosier v.

Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 320-321 (DcSt. Croix, 1970); United

States v. School District 151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 232 (N.D»

111. 1969), aff'd as modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970),

cert, denied, 402 U QS. 943 (1971); Plaquemines Parish School

Board v. U 0S ., 415 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970); Bradley v.

Richmond, _____F. Supp.______ (April 1971) ; Brewer v. Norfolk,

No. 71-1900 (4th Cir., March 7, 1972)(Slip op. at pp. 7-8). •

It would be a cruel mockery of constitutional law if a

different rule were to be applied to school desegregation cases.

After all schooling is this nation's biggest industry and the

most important task of government left to the states by the

Constitution. in this case, were a different rule to be

applied, it would constitute a gigantic hypocrisy: After all

-32-



the money which has been spent over the years creating and 

maintaining the segregated condition, the relatively small 

amounts of money required to undo that segregation can be 

found. The law, surely, requires at least that. And the 

application of the commands of Swann does require that in almost 

every school desegregation case which has been brought to this 
court's attention.

5. In the substantial reassignment of faculty and 

restructuring of facilities required by the clustering, pairing, 

and grouping of schools to accomplish pupil desegregation, 

normal administrative practice should lead to schools with 

substantially like facilities, faculty and staff, and equipment.

Swann, supra_, 402 U.S„ at 18-20. Moreover, special care should 

be taken in the necessary reassignment of faculty to avoid 

creating or maintaining the racial identification of schools i
"simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and 

staff." Swann, supra, 402 U.S0 at 18. in any event, the 

equitable discretion of the court is broad enough to insure 

that those aspects of faculty desegregation and equalization 

of facilities which are essential to the effective operation of 

a desegregation plan are included in the planning and final 

order, Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 15; U.S. v. Montgomery Countv 

Bgard_p,f, Ed. , 395 U.S. 225 (1969); Hecht v. Bowles. 321 U.S.

329-330 (1944); and no contract, union agreement or otherwise,

or Board policy or practice may impede these Fourteenth ■
!

Amendment obligations. U.S. v. Greenwood Municipal Separate 

SchopOiOtrict, 406 F.2d 1086, 1094 (5th Cir.), cert, denied.

‘ 395 U.S. 907 (1969); Berry v. Benton Harbor, _____f . Supp. _____

(W„D„ Mich. 1971).
• " |

' |j
6. rhe Federal courts have repeatedly rejected Plans 

exempting the lower grades from integration, relying less on j

-33 i



educational data than upon the hard legal fact that segregation

at any age is a denial of the equal protection of the law. See, 

e_. ci_. , United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Bduc. , 372 

F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'd on rehearing on banc, 380 

F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967). To leave grades K through 3 exempt 

from a desegregation plan is not to eliminate segregation 

"root and branch." Green v. County School Board of New Kent 

County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). .

7. The consistent application of settled consti- 

tuional law invests this court with the equitable power, and 

the duty, to order preparation, and thereafter implementation, 

of a practicable and sound plan which embodies the principles 

set forth in these findings and conclusions and the attached 

memorandum and order. See, generally, Ruling on Propriety of 

Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation 

of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit, March 24, 1972; 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only

Plans, March 24, 1972; oral ruling on offers of proof, April 13, 

1972; and the cases cited therein.

8. School construction practices throughout the 

metropolitan area have added to and reinforced the pattern of 

segregation referred to. Although there were vacant seats 

throughout the city to which students could have been assigned 

at lesser cost and with the achievement of integration,
4

continued sums were expended for construction of new schools 

designed to service particular areas of racial concentration, and 

such schools opened as and have continued to be racially 

identifiable in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann v. 

Charlotto-Mocklonborg P.d. of Fduc. , 402 U.S „ 1, 18-20 (1971) ; 

United States v.. School nisi. 151, 404 F.2d 13 25, 1132-33 

(7th Cir. 1968); ]>..vi ?; v. School Pi St. of Pont iac, 309 F. Supp.



443 F .2d 573 (6th Cir.734, 741-42 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff *d .

1971) ; Spangler v. Pasadena City Bel, of Ecluc. , 311 F. Supp.

501, 517-18 (C.D. Calif. 1970); Johnson v. San Francisco 

Unified School Dist., Civ. No. C-70-1331 (N.DC Calif.

April 28, 1971); Brewer v. School Board of the City of 

Norfolk, 397 F..2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1968); Cf_. Sloan v. Tenth

School Dist. of Wilson County, _____F.2d_____ (6th Cir. 1970);

United States v. Board of Educ. of Polk County, _____F.2d_____

(4th Cir. 1968) ; Kelley v. Altheimer, _____F.2d_____(8th Cir.

1967); Bradley v. School Bd. , _____F. Supp._____ (E0D 0 Va.

1971); Clark v. Board of Educv of Little Rock, 401 UCS. 971 

(1971) . .

9. The legal effects of racially discriminatory 

confinement to a school district are not different from the 

effects of such containment within a district. E_.cj_., Lee v.

Macon county Board of Education, 558 r.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971); 

Haney v. County Board Sevier, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), 429 

F .2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).

10. Where the actions of state defendants and local 

school authorities throughout the metropolitan area have had 

the natural, foreseeable, and actual effect of building upon, 

taking advantage of, and encouraging racially segregated 

demographic patterns deliberately fixed by governmental action 

at all levels with the effect of creating and maintaining racial 

segregation in the public schools, there is a present obligation 

to eliminate the continuing effects of such violation; and 

the District Court has the duty, upon default by school 

authorities, to intervene to secure compliance with the 

Constitution pursuant to the sound exercise of traditional equity 

powers consistent with the practicalities of the local situation.

' Swann v. Char1 o' tc-Meck1enborg, 402 U„S. 1, 15-16, 20-21, 31-32

35-



(1971) . Cf. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; on 

Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, p. 5, Conclusion 4. In 

devising remedies where state-imposed segregation has been 

established, it is the responsibility of school authorities and 

district courts to see to it that future school construction and 

abandonment is not used and does not serve to perpetuate or 

re-establish the violation. Swann, supra, 402 U„S0 at 21.

11. Moreover, where the State, and named defendants, 

are substantially implicated in the segregation violation found 

and are ultimately responsible for pub]ic schooling throughout 

the state, the consistent application of constitutional 

principles requires that this court take all steps necessary 

and essential to require them to desegregate the Detroit public 

schools effectively and maintain, now and hereafter, a racially 

unified, non-discriminatory system in the absence of a showing 

that the judicial intervention here contemplated will Frustrate 

the promotion of a legitimate and compelling state policy or 

interest. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U„S„ 533, 575 (1964); Hunter v . 

City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 178-179 (1907) ; Phoenix v. 

Kolodziejski, 399 U 0S. 204, 212-213 (1970); Kramer v. Union 

Free School District, 395 U 0S. 621, 633 (1969); Williams v. 

Illinois, 399 U 0S0 235, 244-45 (1970) ; Shelton v. Tucker,

364 UoS. 479, 488 (1966); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U 0S0 

430, 439, 442; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U 0S. 1 (1971); 

Davis v. Bd. of School Commissioners, 402 U 0S0 33 (1971);

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U 0S 0 483 (1954); Brown v. Board 

of Education, 349 U GS. 292, 300 (1955); Monroe v. Board of 

' Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).

36



FOOTNOTES

1. In the main such proof entirely misses the point: 
the violation here found has to do with school segregation 
caused in substantial part by force of public authority and 
action; yet the intervening defendants' questions and offer of 
proof speak mainly to educational theory and recent and some­
times contradictory research about narrowly measured educational 
effects, mostly on achievement test scores, of quite limited 
beginnings of racial, or socio-economic integration of various 
types and as compared with the effects of dollar or other 
resource inputs and continued segregation. This court does 
not understand, however, that such research, from the Coleman 
report to its many reanalyses, formed the primary bases for 
the Brown decision or any of its progeny. See, e.g.', Brunson v. 
Bd. of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (J. Sobeloff,
concurring). In a context similar to newly intervening 
defendants' objections to desegregation, the Supreme Court in 
Swann specifically held that such factors constitute an 
impermissible limit upon the duty to desegregate. 402 UCS . 
at 24, Fn. 8. Citation to such research, either in support 
or rejection of school desegregation, misses the primary point: 
insofar as pupil assignments are concerned, the system of 
public schooling in every state must be operated in a racially 
non-discriminatory, unified fashion; until that objective is 
met, the very system of public schooling constitutes an invidious 
racial classification. The adoption of an education theory 
having the effect of maintaining a pattern of de jure segre­
gation is therefore clearly impermissible. (Whether such 
theories, research, or evidence on educational quality or

lITCm  dC* X 0 -« p i  1 4- Q>*\7pnf- -J

and relief in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation 
is a question this court need not face.)

In any event, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held, on June 19, 1970, that greater, not less, 
desegregation is the proper manner to alleviate the problem of 
disparity in achievement. Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 
Jackson, Tenn., 427 F.2d 1005, 1008 (C0A 0 6, 1970).

2. Chief Justice Burger in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U0S. 1, 6.

3. Defendants Magdowski, et al., originally opposed to 
desegregation, during the course of the taking of proofs on 
the issue of segregation, conceded that the public schools of 
the city of Detroit were in fact segregated, and took the 
early lead in suggesting that the only effective avenue for 
desegregation was a metropolitan plan. The Detroit Board of 
Education, while continuing to deny that it has been guilty of 
any act of segregation, took the position that if desegregation 
were to be undertaken it could be done only on a metropolitan 
basis. So that now the white parents of the city of Detroit and 
its Board of Education— the parties most directly involved with 
the lot of the students in the Detroit school system— see no 
alternative to, and, for all practical purposes seek a 
metropolitan solution to the basic Detroit school problem.

4. In the context of this hearing, the defendant; Detroit 
Board of Education is not in a position to act as the usual

l



"school authority" primarily responsible for suggesting an 
appropriate desegregation area simply because its authority 
does not extend beyond the geographic limits of the city of 
Detroit. The competence, knowledge of local conditions, and 
expertise of those schoolmen who helped prepare the Detroit  ̂
Board's proposal, however, may be utilized and given appropriate
weight.

5. In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, #K88-71, 
Judge Fox pointed out the primary responsibility_of the state 
"The State of Michigan is represented by two entities, but 
the entity is an agent of the State . . . [T]he Constitution
says something about your [the State's] responsibility.
The court went on to order the State to take an active role. 
Pre-trial order and transcript, May 1, 1972.

6. The Detroit Board plan places heavier reliance on 
white flight and socio-economic factors, while the Magdowski^ 
proposal in addition places an emphasis on maintaining a minimum 
percentage black in each school. These considerations in 
no way determine the court's choice of a desegregation area 
necessary to meet constitutional requirements. In fairness, 
however, it also should be noted that the desegregation area, 
which the court deems to best meet constitutional requirements, 
also happens in the main, to meet the other concerns expressed 
in these two proposals. That the Board's interest in socio­
economic integration is largely met by racial desegregation 
is not surprising. • There is uncontroverted evidence m  the _ 
record, and the court so finds, that there is a high correlation 
between blacks and persons of a low socio-economic status, the 
result, in the main, of the cumulative effects of past and 
present racial discrimination including discrimination in 
education. At some point hereafter, of course, school _
authorities with responsibility for implementation and operation 
of the racially-unified non-discriminatory school system  ̂
contemplated, or parts thereof, may and should include in its 
plan other educational goals and needs whether or not they are 
required by the law or any court. Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. at 16.

7. If a state is constitutionally forbidden to institute 
a system of racial segregation by the use of artifical 
boundary lines, it is likewise forbidden to perpetuate a system 
whose effect is to maintain segregation. "There is no legally 
protected vested interest in segregation. If there were, then 
Brown v. Board of Education and the numerous decisions based 
on that case would be pointless. Courts will not say in one 
breath that public school systems may not practice segregation, 
and in the next that they may do nothing to eliminate it.' 
Wanner v. School Bd. of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452, _
(Soboloff, Cir. J.), PP. 454 and 455. The historic fact is 
that existing conditions are based on a design to segregate 

• the races. To hold that segregation, once accomplished, is 
sacrosanct and beyond constitutional reach, is.to say that the 
United States Constitution and its Amendments, and their 
provisions for equality, are mere- rhetoric.

8 . See Findings 70-78, infra.



9. The interplay of these two factors summarizes two 
other guidcposts or starting points: maximum feasible desegregation 
and eliminating racially identifiable schools. Factors such as 
time and distance limitations, together with the rough definitions 
of substantial disproportion with the relevant school community’s 
pupil racial composition, in turn largely determine the meaning 
of "eliminating racially identifiable schools" and what con­
stitutes "maximum feasible desegregation," in the particular 
circumstances here present and in the-context of a prior finding 
of segregation.

10, The Detroit Board Proposal contemplates desegregation 
on a "minority"-white basis. The proof in this cause, however, 
has been aimed at the segregation of black children and white 
children; similarly the remedy has been so defined, -argued, 
and in the main presented by parties. The court finds, 
therefore, that the area, and further planning, should, in the 
main, be confined to a black-white breakdown.

11. To the Southwest, Plaintiffs' Proposal falls on the 
side of less time in transit than the 40-minute guideline 
because inclusion of more area is not required to desegregate. 
(See Finding 27, infra.)

12. Moreover, in the main, the areas, schools, and pupils 
in these districts are not as fully members of the greater 
Detroit school community: many are less urban; they are the 
furthest in terms of time, distance, and contact from the 
Detroit area's economic and social acitivities; and manv are 
more oriented, if anything, to urban areas other than Detroit, 
for example, the Ann Arbor - Ypsilanti area.

13. The court notes, however, that the range of average 
socio-economic status for the various regions or clusters 
in Plaintiffs' Proposal is similar to that in the Detroit Board 
Proposal: based on the Michigan Assessment the range in 
Plaintiffs' Proposal happens to be 44.7 to 53.7, while in the 
Detroit Board Proposal the range is 46.3 to 53; and only three 
of the 15 clusters of schools in Plaintiffs' Proposal fall 
below 46.3.

14. Because of the closeness of the question, particularly 
as it relates to any problems which may arise hereafter in 
establishing a pupil desegregation plan, the court feels that 
some opportunity should be given to the expert panel to suggest
a modification of this tentative resolution. See also Findings 34­
38 below.

15. A common practice in other cases is the use of "pupil
locator" maps. See Northcross v. School Board of City of 
Memphis, ____F.2d____(6th Cir. 1971) .

16. For years these city-contained school districts, 
which include some suburban districts in the desegregation area, 
as well as the Detro.it Public Schools, have demanded without 
success that, this inequitable slate practice be changed so that 
all districts could be reimbursed on the same basis for pupil 
transport.' t i on.



V%
*

17. The figure almost twice that which appears in 
several of the State "plans" was based on the assumption that 
busing would be "one-way" with black children being assigned to 
suburban schools. Mr. Wagner, the state official in charge of 
pupil transportation, provided the information on which that 
estimate was based and also informed his superiors that a two­
way plan of desegregation and transportation would cost much 
less per pupil. The State defendants did not bring this 
important fact to the court's attention in any of their 
submissions; it was uncovered and fully explored in the 
deposition of Mr. Wagner taken by plaintiffs. .

18. This phenomenon was noted in Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21. 
The principle was long known, and actively, supported by the 
F.H.A. For example, consider that public agency's early 
understanding in its 1936 manual that white subdivision 
developments require white schools: "if the children of 
people living in such area are compelled to attend school 
where the majority or a good number of the pupils represent 
a far lower level of society or an incompatible racial element, 
the neighborhood under consideration will prove far less stable 
and desirable than if the condition did not exist."

19. This figure assumes 30 children/regular classroom. 
Although rated capacities may be lower, the figure for 
regular classrooms does not include several types of 
instructional, recreational, laboratory, and other rooms which 
add overall pupil capacity to schools.

20. The resulting pattern is unmistakable: "Residential 
segregation within the city and throughout the larger 
metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long standing. 
Black citizens are located in separate and distinct areas within 
the city and are not generally found in the suburbs. While the 
racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic 
factors may have played some part in the development of this 
pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the 
result of past and present practices and customs or racial 
discrimination, both public and private, which have and do 
restrict the housing opportunities of black people. Perhaps 
the most that can be said is that all of them [various 
governmental units], including school authorities, are, in 
part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists." 
Ruling on Issue of Segregation, 8 and 10. Moreover, an 
examineition of PX 181, 192 and 185 shows that black children often 
remain isolated in predominately black schools in the few 
suburban school districts with any numbers of black pupils.
In the last several weeks the local press has reported that 
the United States Office of Education cut off funds for one 
such district.

21. Included in this set of arrangements are contract 
relationships of various types concerning personnel, property 
and debts. ■

22. The defendant, William G. Millikan, Governor of the 
State of Michigan, in h.is amicus brief filed in the: Supreme 
Court of flu: United States, Ho. 71-1332, San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Demetrio P. Rodriguez, says, page II:

iv



"1. Amici, whose individual and particular .interests 
are set forth in more detail below, are the Governors of the 
above-listed States. As Governors and chief executive 
officers of their respective States, Amici are responsible 
for upholding and carrying out the commands of the 
Constitutions and laws of their various States, including 
the provisions thereof requiring the establishment of 
public schools and school districts and commanding the 
children of their States to attend school. Ainici are 
responsible for financial decisions affecting all State 
operations, including those pertaining to support and 
financing of the public schools.

"Amici are deeply concerned about the ongoing and 
continuing crisis in public education and the difficulties 
facing public educational systems in their States and around 
the nation. Amici recognize that grave inequities exist 
because of variation in local property tax bases upon which 
local school districts must rely in order to support their 
school systems. Amici believe that these inequalities in 
educational resources violate the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and that these inequalities 
must be eliminated* * * *"

The Governors' amicus brief, speaking of the 
State of Texas, could as well be said of the State of Michigan, when 
it used these words:

"It is also undisputed that the local school districts and 
their boundaries, and hence the aggregate value of the property 
they contain, are entirely the creation of and their main­
tenance is the responsibility of the State of Texas. Further­
more, the detailed regulation of public education financing . 
in Texas * * * is a state not a local responsibility.
Indeed, the school districts have the power to raise funds 
for education only as a result of delegation by the State of 
its own power to tax for the general welfare." (Page 8 of 
brief.)

"Since the State could not discriminate directly against 
students residing in.poorer localities, it should not be 
permitted to accomplish the same result by dividing its 
responsibility for equal education with local school districts 
and failing to supplement the funds raised by the school 
districts sufficiently to eliminate discrimination."* (Page 11 
of brief.)

* Compare Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
While a State may delegate certain of its functions to smaller 
subdivisions such as cities or counties, it cannot escape 
accountability for their actions. Such subdivisions are "created 
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental 
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them* * * * The 
number, nature, and duration of [their] powers * * * and 
the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the 

.absolute discretion of the State." Hunter v. City of Pittsburg,
‘ 207 UcS0 161, 178 (1907) .

23. For years black children .in the Carver School District 
were assigned to black schools in the inner city because no white 
suburban district, (or white school in the city) would take the 
children.

v



r Ak
♦

24. These findings are made on the basis of thc present 
record and are subject to modification based on evidence which 
may be developed once the specific problems of actual desegrega­
tion are faced in the planning process.

25. See, Kelley, et al. v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ.,
CCA 6, Nos. 71-1778-79, page 22, slip opinion, May 30, 1972:

"Perhaps the primary thing that the Swann case 
decided was that in devising plans to terminate such 
residual effects, it is appropriate for the school system 
and the District Judge to take note of the proportion of 
white and black students within the area* and seek as 
practical a plan as may be for ending white schools and 
black schools and substituting therefor schools which 
are representative of the area in which the students live."

*The area referred to in this case is all of Davidson 
County, including the City of Nashville, which is 
included in the jurisdiction of defendant 
Metropolitan Board of Education.

I

!

vx