U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73L Ed 2d (Rogers v. Lodge)
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February 23, 1982 - July 1, 1982

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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Guinier. U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73L Ed 2d (Rogers v. Lodge), 1982. c8ed54af-dc92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/beb37176-6474-4dae-96dd-3beca50f32ab/us-supreme-court-reports-73l-ed-2d-rogers-v-lodge. Accessed April 06, 2025.
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U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d QUENTIN -JAHi Hlal., App"lla,,ts v HERMAN LODGE et al. 458 US 613, 73 L Ed 2d lOL2, L02 S Ct BZ7Z, reh den (US) Z4 L Ed 2d 160, 103 S Ct 198 [No.8G2100] Argued February 23,7982. Decided July 1, 1982. Decision: At-large election system for large rural county with large black population held violative ofequal protection clause. SUMMARY Eight black citizens of Burke county, Georgia, brought a class action in the united states District court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging that the county's system of at-large election of the five county commissioners violated the constitutional and statutory rights of the coun- ty's black citizens by diluting their voting power. The District Court found that the at-large system was being maintained for discriminatory purposes, and it ordered that the county be divided into five districts for the purpose of electing count-v commissioners. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth-Circuit affirmed (639 F2d 1358). _, On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In an opinion by Wun:r, J., joined b-v Buncen, CH. J., and BnBxxaN, MeRSHeu, Br-ecruux, and O'CoxNon, JJ., it was held that the doctrine of unconstitutional dilution of voting rights arising from an atJarge election system applies to counties, that the evidence supported the District Court's finding of intentional discrimination, and that the propriety of the remedy would not be consid- ered because it u'as not questioned in the Court of Appeals. PowelL, J., joined by REnNqursr, J., dissented on the ground that discrim- inatory intent must be proved primarily by objective evidence. SrovrNs, J., dissented on the ground that subjective intent is not a valid criterion for constitutional adjudication. Briefs of Counsel, p 1499, infra. l0l2 73LEd2d L Ed 2d 160. th large black class action in ict of Georgia' .he five count)' rts of the coun- ict Court found rator]- PurPoses' for the PurPose .he Fifth Circutt n an oPinion b1' ret-1. BLecxMt'N' rtutional dilutton olies to countres.' s of intentional i'd not be consto- ,und that discrim- )ce. ent is not a valid ",4 *"i;I*ii:iixl:'!l'ri;;Itr'='-ffi #'"i""i''$ _ itl1 et-larse system of .e1115 I1 A:^i;i.=i1n"ti 'iolot"t tl.," l:'l:- : irll-i{*:fr li',"ffi :#'$fl;l:';.1""****,ri!,t*:*^:*:L---, lf iii'*il":*gry5tT .rii:: h*I#*,*ffi*",'*1.."#"Ti==-^i1i-"i1"1r:" jn"...]i,L'_ * :i ^i*r n:'il. {ikiif; ;l:: ::l i'H1til."il$*l'"''.''"' "'":,"-,. te,t *",jI:*:1)"iAdi1.S1..;.:":,""'"'l,XyJi-:,1-;;:::.',-."'*; RoGEES v "'P,lfJ. cr 32?2 458 us 613' ?3 L Ed 2d rr -ixlli***,"$'","1*t'lt"*t ' "'' I ! t I TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARYn ttDr'Er^!'- -- ,u o* Jur 2d' "'.":::': UJi. orr".I, certiorari' and Revie* f iil;i i'o'"a""' L Ed' APPe.t' "' 1:*tf*xrffiH*illl::::LISCS, Constitutton' r;;'*l;;,. SS i, 4 Ils L Ed Digest' t "iS aaa a. o'o l*-o=, Equai protection of the Laws L Ed lndex to Ann ii* ii"tt* lndex' Discriminatt.n ;:i"; a;ick Index' Elections ANNoTATION REFE*'N"': "-' nominatio ",l1iJ:"ix:i,,ls,':'|-.i;:* * :.:::' "' affec'lins nomina'1ion or , nl I i,f l, llJ ",[['T'JJ' : fi " i *' :' *::"J' ,, :i" :':"T : ;"j'' :i' : Ti' ; s';; 1s3; - -^riries. v.res b) ^aqnliii'J,'ilj:t,i;:J::::"illl', T Diluting, eflect of ill,tt^,1''i'.i.icr a- vit'iarror r013 is required in all types of equal protec- tion cases charging racial discrimination. CivitRightsSl-intent 5a, 5b. Purposeful racial discrimina- tion invokes the strictest scrutiny of ad- verse differential treatment; absent such purpose, differential impact is subject only to the test of rationality. Civil Rights $ 4.5 - racial impact -legislation 6. A law is not invalid under the equal protection clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than another. Civil Righls S 4.5 - intent - legisla- tion 7. Discriminatorf intent need not be proven by direct evidence but may often be inferred from the totality of the rele- vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another, which demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstan- tial and direct evidence of intent as mav be available. Constitutional Lau' $ 316 - discrimi- natory intent 8. Onlf if there is purposeful discrimi- nation can there be a violation of the equal protection clause of the Four- teenth Amendment. Appeal and Error S 1464 - factfind- ings - revien' 9. Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings. Appeal and Error S 1477 - discrimi- natory intent - revierr 10. The clearll' erroneous standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to a trial court's find- ing that a countl' at-large election s.vs- tem is being maintained for discrimina- tor.y purposes, and applies to the court's subsidiary findings of fact. Appeal and Error S 1506 - findings -two-court rule 11. The Supreme Court is reluctant to l0l4 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d disturb findings of fact concurred in br. tu'o lou'er courts. Civil Rights S 4.5 - elections 12. Where blacks have alu'ays made up a substantial majority of a county's population, although they are a distinct minority of the registered voters, the fact that none ha,. ever been elected a count.v commissioner is important evi- dence of purposeful exclusion. Civil Rights S 4.5 - elections 13. That no black has ever been elected a count)' commissioner in a countl' where blacks have alu'ays made up a substantial majority of the popula- tion is insufficient in itself to prove pur- poseful discrimination absent other evi- dence such 6-. proof that blacks have less opportunity to participate in the politi- cal processes and to elect candidates of their choice. Constitutional Lan' $ 3f6 - historical discrimination 14. Evidence of historical discrimina- tion is relevant to drau'ing an inference of purposeful discrimination, particu- larly in cases r+'here the evidence shows that discriminatory practices u'ere com- monl.r' utilized, that the-r, u'ere aban- doned when enjoined b1'courts or made illegal bi civil rights legislation. and that they u'ere replaced by' Iaws and practices u,hich, though neutral on their face, served to maintain the status quo. Constitutional Larl' $ 484.4 - elec- tions 15a. 15b. In determining u'hether a discriminator)' purpose mav be inferred in a case involving a claim of voting dilution under the Fourteenth Amend- ment, proof of unresponsiveness b1, the public bodf in question to the group claiming injurS' is an important element but onll' one of a number of circum- stances a court should consider. Appeal and Error S 1477 - discrimi- nation - revieu' 16 A finding that a cqunti' at-large voting system has been maintained for the purpose of denying blacks equal ac- 73LEd2d :t concurred in b1, Iections rave al*'ays made rrity of a count),'s he1' are a distinct ;tered voters, the 'er been elected a is important evi- :lusion. Iections : has ever been mmissioner in a rave always made :ity of the popula- tself to prove pur- absent other evi- rt blacks have less rate in the politi- lect candidates of 316 - historical ,orical discrimina- wing an inference rination, particu- re evidence shons actices were com- the-r' u'ere aban- ))' courts or made ; legislation, and ced b5' lau's and r neutral on their r the status quo. S 484.4 - elec- rining n'hether a ma'i' be inferred claim o{ voting urteenth Amend- >nsiveness by the on to the group mportant element rmber of circum- )onsider. 1477 - discrimi- r count] at-large n maintained for : blacks equal ac- ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613. ?3 LEd 2d 1012, 102 S Ct 3272 cess to the county political processes is not clearly erroneous where blacks have alr*'a1's made up a substantial majorit.r' of the count)- population, no black has ever been elected a count) commis- sioner, past discrimination adversely af- f'ected black voter registration and par- ticipation in primarl' elections, elected officials have been unresponsive to the needs of the black communitY. and blacks have a depressed socio-economic status. Civil Rights S 12,5 - remedies - scope 17. Where a constitutional violation has been found, the remedl- does not exceed the violation if it is tailored to cure the condition that offends the Con- st it ution. Appeal and Eror S 1339 - scoPe of revieu' 18a. l8b. The Supreme Court v"ill not address a contention not raised in the Court of Appeals and not addressed b1' thai court. Constitutional Lau' S 484.5 - at-large elections - counties 19a. 19b The doctrine of unconstitu- tional dilution of voting rights arising from an at-large election system applies to count], governing bodies. SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS Burke Countl-. Ga., a large. predomi- nantll'rural county. has an at-large sys- tem for electing members of its govern- ing Board of Commissioners. No Negro has ever been elected to the Board. Ap- pellee black citizens of the countl' filed a class action in Federal District Court. alleging that the at-large s)'stem ol elec- tions violated, inter alia. appellees'Four- teenth and Fifteenth Amendment righrs b1, diluting the voting pou'er ol black citizens. Finding that blacks have als'avs made up a substantial majoritl of the count)"s population but that the.r' are a minoritl' of the registered voters. thal there had been bloc voting along racial lines. and that past drscrimination had restricted the preseni opportunitl of blacks to participate effectivell in the political process. the Dtstrict Court held that although the statt'policl'behind the at-large electoral s-\'stenr was "neutral in origin." tht- policv s.as being maintained for invidious purposes in 'r'iolation of appellees' Fourteenth and Fifieenth Amendment rights The court then or- dered the count.\' to be divided intc, dis- tricts for purposes of electing Countl' C<.rmmissioners The Court of Appeals afiirmed. holding that the Disrrict C<.rurt properll'required appellees to prove that the at-large s)'stem vras maintained for a discriminatorl' purpos€. and that the District Court's findings u'ere not onl.r' not clearll erroneous but that its conclu- sion that the atJarge s)'stem \^'as maln- tained for inlidious purposes u'as "virtu- alll- mandated b1' the overwhelming proof." Held: 1. The Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the District Court ap- plied the proper legal standard, rvhere it appears that the District Court demon- strated its understanding of the control- ling standard b.r' observing that a deter- mination of discriminatorf intent u'as "a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution" under the Fourteenth and Filieenth Anrendments 2. \\'here neither the Districl Court's ultinrate lindings of intentional discrimi- nation nor its subsidiarS findings of fact appear to bt' clearll'erroneous and such findings u'ere agreed to bl the Clourt of Apprea)s. this (lourt u'ill not disturb the finciings 3. Nor is there an)' reason to overturn the relief ordered br the Districr Court, u'here neither that courl nor the Court o{ Appeals discerned anl special circum- stances that u'ould militate against uti- Izing sing]e-member districts 639 F2d 1356. affrrmed White. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. in whicb Burger, C.J.. and Bren- nan. Marshal). Biackmun. and O'Connor. JJ.. joined. Pos'ell. J.. filed a dissenting opinion. in r.rhich Rehnquist. J.. joined. Slevens. J., filed a dissentrng opinion t0l5 [458 US 614] Justice \fhite delivered the opin- ion of the Court. tll The issue in this case is whether the at-large system of elec- tions in Burke County, Ga., violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Burke County's black citizens. I Burke County is a large, predomi- nately rural county located in east- ern Georgia. Eight hundred and thirty-one square miles in area,' it is approximately tu'o-thirds the size of the State of Rhode Island. According to the 1980 census, Burke Count-v had a total population of 19.349, of u'hom 10,385, or 53.6Vc, u,ere black.2 The average age of blacks [458 US 615] living there is low'er than the average age of whites and therefore whites con- stitute a slight majority of the vot- ing age population. As of 1978. 6.373 persons were registered to 'r'ote in Burke County, of u'hom 387 were black.3 The Burke Countl' Board of Com- missioners governs the count)'. It was created in 1911, see 1911 Ga Lau's 31G-311. and consists of five members elected at large to concur- 73LEd2d rent 4-year terms by all qualified voters in the county. The county has never been divided into districts, ei- ther for the purpose of imposing a residency requirement on candidates or for the purpose of requiring can- didates to be elected by voters resid- ing in a district. In order to be nomi- nated or elected, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary or general election, and a runoff must be held if no candidate receives a majority in the first primary or general election. Ga Code S 34-1513 (Supp 1980). Each candidate must run for a specific seat on the Board, Ga Code $ 34-1015 (1978), and a voter mal' vote only . once for an5' candidate. No Negro has ever been elected to the Burke County Board of Commissioners. Appellees. eight black citizens of Burke County, filed this suit in 1976 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The suit u,as brought on behalf of all black citizens in Burke County. The class rryas certified in 7977 . The com- plaint alleged that the county's s.ys- tem of at-large elections violates ap- pellees' First, Thirteenth. Four- teenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. 1s u'ell as their rights under 42 USC $S 1971, 1973, and 1983 [42 LISCS SS 1971, 1973, and 19831 by diluting the voting po\l'er of black U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL E. Freeman kverett argued the cause for appellants. David F. Walbert argued the cause for appellees. Briefs of Counsel, p 1499, infra. OPINION OF THE COURT ; i ?. .: b t . l E I I t,t f . U. S. Dept. of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Countl and Cit.t Data Book 1977. p 90 { 1978 t. 2. U. S Dept. of Comnrerce. Bureau of the C.ensus, 1.980 Census of Population and Hous- ing. PHC80-V-12, p 5 tl\{ar. 1961r ln 193Ct, Burkr, County had a total populatiorr of t0l6 29.224, of *'hom 22,698 or 78% u'ere black. U S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. II Characterisrics of the Population, pt 2, p 229 (1943,. The percentagt, of blacks in the total population of Burke Countv has steadill' diminished over the last 50 .r'ears. 3. App to Juris Statement 72a. 73LEd2d by all qualified The county has nto districts, ei- e of imposing a nt on candidates rf requiring can- b-v voters resid- rrder to be nomi- candidat.e must rf the votes cast general election, be held if no majority in the eral election. Ga pp 1980r. Each n for a specific ia Code S 34-1015 may vote onlY Ldate. No Negro ed to the Burke nmissioners. black citizens of this suit in 1976 rs District Court strict of Georgia. rt on behalf of all rrke County. The n 1977. The com- the countl"s s)'s- tions violates aP- rirteenth. Four- nth Amendment heir rights under r73, and 1983 [42 3, and 19831 bl' I power of black rr ?8% *'ere black. U lureau of the C.ensus. e Population. Pt 2' P tage of blacks in the e Countv has steadill' 50 -,-eari. rent 72a ROGERS v LODGE 458 US Ors. ?S L Ed 2d 1012' 102 S Ct 3272 citizens. Follou'ing. a bench trial at multinlember districts tend to mini- u'hich both srdes ritroduced exten- ;;; lh" voting slrgncth of minoritl' sive evidence, the to'l'i-i'=""a -ut' ;;;;p:' bv peimitting the political order on september ii,l'rgia. ituti.,g il,";;;tr' '," elect a// representatives rhat appellees werelntitled to pre- "i"i"n"-iri.,tict' A distinct minoritl'' ;;i ;'j ;.dering thai' Burke county 1}jff .;' ffi ,f; J?. fil;fr,,n t ;r"T; rjf,";$t#I,:-$"'#-lrrafji****i{rij.'$ilffi lii inss of fact and to"ii'i"= oi iu" in iv'J 'oting power 'in 'a multimember o't ich it stated tnat while the pres- iit;ti;i f particularll diluted rT'hen :; l''* "; if ;'- "'i [: ;f,i,: "'I ":ffi ; :*: :";l,t ;',::J' # :.'l;'f";'" :ii Ti'"=i"";firt$1' rttt' j='"u"i"g -'- ill"' -wr''"- *"lti'n"mbei districts irir"a iJ. i"riaiori p.rrpo="=" in vio- haue bee' chqliqlg^e! for i;i#; or "pp"rr""s"Fourteenth and [45E us 617l Fifteenth Amenameii;i;h't Id'' at . r - ^,, ^--^^-" "their v''in- 71a,96a' ner-take-all aspects' their tendenc-"" rhe court of Appeals aflirqqd, i:r":*:'n"T'1fi'ff'r:li'i:"f1:i hU ;B;;i";: 63e'F2d 1358 (cAs l,l'*i ''ci,"''i9,a99 u"s tza' 158-15e' ffii;' It stated that u'hile the pro- z6:'i' ea-za 363' 91 S ct 1858 t1971t' ;#ii;*-. i"-ah; District court-took iti.-c""., has repeatedll' held that irr.-"iir"t to the decision in Mobile the' are not unconstitutional per se' I'i"rJ*. +aO US 55' 64 L Ed 2d 4;' ll"trf" t'ilold"n' supra' ut 9.Q: 9a L ioi"5'6i iago (1e80r' the District il;; a;. roo s ci rago: white v a;;.; cor.ectll' anticipated IUobile "il";"";.'lii US ?55' 765' 37 ,l:-.Ed ;;;';"q;i."J appellees to prove t-hat ;;"ii;.^'gi-5 c, 2332 t1e73r: \Yhi!- ;i;;-i.tc" toiit,g s)'stem u'as main- ;;-; il cl,ari.. supra, ar r42' ?9 L irir"a foi a discriminatorl' purpose Lj'ia gffi, gt S Ci 1s58. The Court ho'Fil:-ra1375-13?6 The court.of t.=?"*"ized. hou'e'er' that multi- ;;r;;.'"t-'o t'"ta that the District ,ril-u"r'aistricts violate the Four- Court's findings "\ere not clearll'.er- l"".tf, e-"ndnlent if "concei'ed or ifl I ;:tj j# .l,lj : it. "::l'llii :i.ll{i isi#i f .:i,.l; *;::l*, "xiiii:', iiioi intidious purposes sas "r'irtuallv -i"ir"riti. .r"""fii"g out or dilut- :*:r-ti. J,,,rJl",u::T:til't{ il ,r* 1oti.,g .,,",,*'n of raciar ere. i,ie iurisdiction.454 LjS sl1' 7d.L Ed -!ti-' irr ti'* r'oting population' iJ 60, 102 s c' so ogsi and nor" Hl;m'r; S3:;; .'TJ'itil 'iij affirm.o -"i.o"U'fu," v Regester, supra,-at 765' Iz I ni za 314. 93 s ct 2332 cases II ;;";** ,hat multimember districts [458 US 616] unable to elect an]'- representattves divided into five districts for pur- ;;;- "ii"l* :.Y1"::^,:].*.:LX g schemes ,na it"?oTttTtui'o"utlt aitut" tn" 'oti"g 4. The Districr Court's judgment ua-' staved *Lair- ;;;;i't; 'th" c",u'i of Appeals-. 43it [i;;a','si'i-ea 2d 33e. s!' s (\ 342 rte?8 Tht' Court of Appeal: sraled iu' mandatt on io.rii. 1slir.-pending driposirion of the ca-se hert' tolT strength of racial minorities are thus subject to the standard of proof generally applicable to Equal Protec- tion Clause cases. Washington v Da- vis, 426 US 229,48 L Ed 2d 597,96 S Ct 2040 (1976), and Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. 429 US 252,50 L Ed 2d 450,97 S Ct 555 17977), made it clear that in order for the Equal Protec- tion Clause to be violated, "the invi- dious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ulti- mately be traced to a racially dis- criminatory purpose." Washington v Davis, supra, at 240,48 L Ed 2d 597, 96 S Ct 2040. Neither case involved voting dilution, but in both cases the Court observed that the requirdment that racially discriminatory purpose or intent be proved applies to voting cases b-v relying upon, among others, Wright v Rockefeller, 376 US 52, 11 L Ed 2d 512, 84 S Ct 609 (1964), a districting case, to illustrate that a showing of discriminatory intent has long been required in all types of equal protection cases charging ra- cial discrimination. Arlington Heights, supra. at 265, 50 L Ed 2d 450,97 S Ct 555; Washinglon v Da- vis, supra, at 240,48 L Ed 2d 597, 96 S Ct 2040.5 [458 US 618] [6, 7] Arlinglon Heights and \4:ash- ington v Davis both rejected the no- tion that a lau' is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simpll- be- cause it ma1' affect a greater propor- tion of one race than another. Ar- lington Heights, supra, at 26i, S0 L Ed 2d 450. 97 S Ct 555; Washington v Davis, 426 US, at 242,48 L Ed 2d 597, 96 S Ct 2040. Hou'ever. both cases recoElnized that discriminator-y intent need not be proved by direct U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d evidence. "Necessarill., an invidiousl discriminatory purpose ma-v often be( inferred from the totality of the ."le- \ vant facts. including the fact, if it is / true, that the lavt bears more heav- ily on one race than another." Ibid. Thus determining the existence of a discriminatory purpose "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circum- stantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, b0 L Ed 2d 450,97 S Ct 555. In Mobile v Bolden, supra, the Court rr"as called upon to applv these principles to the at-large election system in Mobile, Ala. Mobile is gov- erned by three commissioners who exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power in the mu- nicipality. 446 US, at 59, 64 L Ed Zd 47, lO0 S Ct 1490. Each candidate for the City Commission runs for one of three numbered posts in an at-large election and can only be elected by a majorit)' vote. Id., at 59- 60, 64 L Ed 2d 47, 100 S Ct 1490. Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile alleging that the at-large scheme diluted their voting strength in vio- lation of several statutorl. and con- stitutional provisions. The District Court concluded that the at-large system "r'iolates the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by improperly restricting their access to the politi- cal process," Bolden v Mobile, 428 F Supp 384, 399 (SD Ala 1976r, and ordered that the commission form of government be replaced by a mayor and a nine-member Cit.r' Council elected from single-memher districts. Id., at 404. The Court of Appeals 5, [5b] Purposeful racial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutinl' of adverse difi'er- ential treatment. Absent such purpose. differ- I0r8 ential impact is subject onl.r' to the test of rationalit-v. Washington v Davis. 426 US, at 24i-248,4E L Ed 2d 597.96 S Ct 2040. 73LEd2d an invidious may often be ty of the rele- re fact, if it is s more heav- nother." Ibid. existence of a l "demands a such circum- ence of intent )." Arlington ,50LEd2d "r, supra, the to apply these .arge election Mobile is gov- issioners who r€, executive, uer in the mu- 19, 64 L Ed 2d ach candidate sion runs for d posts in an can only be ote. Id.. at 59- c0 s ct 1490. lass action on zens of Mobile 'large scheme rength in vio- rtory and con- The District the at-large constitutional by improperly : to the politi- Mobile, 423 F ,la 1976t, and rission form of :d by a ma-vor City Council mher districts. rt of Appeals ll1' to the test of Davis, 426 US, at S Ct 2040. ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613, ?3 L Ed 2d 1012' r02 S Ct 3272 afhrmed. 571 F2d.238 (CA5 1978)' lalitl'' Id'' at 101' 64 L Ed 2d 47' 100 This Court reversect' S Ct-1a90 (White' J" dissentingt' t8l Justice Stewart' writing for The pluralitv w€nt on to conclude himself and tn.""."'oih"''^i"til"*' tf''i'in!-Ditttitt Court had failed to noted that to prevatr i' !ll':'^::::: ;:'tl'i"l*h1his;::i# J|,"'iii' tion that the atJarge votrng sysrem : uiotur", the Equal frotection 9ll:'." i*i\"':Jt*l'LtH tn";t1;4;; oi the Fourteenth ..Amendment' ir4.K;;h;", 485 F2d 1297 (CA5 fiaintitrs n.o,l;J,l3'.",r1n" iA;;i'";tre on .other srounds sub system ;;;'il' -Carroll-Parish School Bd' was "'conce-ived. gr on3r1!ed ;! ,ril jrX"fltSl.'inr|$ t"hel hil;,1 ;;.65:HL? i3 ff't!. l?.}t 7iJ*,1 zi^rner set out a risi or rac- 64 L Ed 2d 47,100 s Lt 'iio' o*l tors' gleaned ffrorTrc u,o, i"n"w't,it.rmb v Chavis, 403 U!'-?l Whitcomb v ifg, Zii i fA Za gG3, 91 S. Ct.1858.6 Chavis, supra, and White v Regester, s;;h-" requirement "is simply one t"o*,'*"i a court should consider ;;;;;a or ine basic principle thar i;:;;";-.*c the constitutionalit5 of ""1"'if iir"r" i. purposefuJ dis.crimi- "i fr.i" ",ia multimember district ;;il"; can there be a violation -ol votinf schemes. Under Zimmer, vot- ;h"^;;;;i protection Clause of_the i,ig'-'tiirti"n is. established "upon ioutt"'"*h Amendment"'446 ust^1t pt-oof of the existence of an aggre- a;, ;;;"^ii-ia u,100 s ct .14e0, ;;;;-"i-these ractors'" 485 F2d' at I"a -Wtti," v Regester is consistent f gOS' ;i; ;h;i PrinciPle' 446 uS' at 6e' 64 L Ed 2d 47, too i-ct-iago. A'.,- The pluralitf in Mobile was of the other Justice agreed u'ith the stan- I'-":'-[;t,"'*T:.1^Jtr- ;;Ti1t11 :t;1:',i"r=:::? iffioJ"l1.ir," pr,r- uion the misunderstanding that it is 6. With resp€ct to the Fifteenth Amend' -"rt.'ti" piu.'"titn held that the Amendment "."nlUi,. onll direct' purposefulll discrimina' i;;i' i;;"J;;,,.. "'i't'' *'' freedom of N egroes i;'''#':ji;;ing io"na .that Negroes in.l\1o' xlt" ;r.ci.re, und tot" r'r'ithout hindrance ' the iji.,ti.ii"r" and Coun of Appeals were'rn ;;;;'j; L"r,".'ing that the appeliants invaded :;-";;,":;;' li tir'" Firtet-ni h I Amendment il'r,f,;;;;;;,-t"" " Mobile v Bolden' 4-46 tis.'"r 'el.-ot L Ed 2d 4? 10(r S ('r l49rt ii.u" .l,.rr,i."s disagreed with the pluralirl's i"t"'r".-o"iiing utid" the Fifie.enth Amend nient 'i;.; italn 3. 6a L Ed 2d 4?' 1oo s ct ia.uii,Sr"."r,r, J.' concurrtng in judgmenlr' id ' "i ioi.'oi'f E d 2d 4i. 100 S cr 14e0 twhite' i. ij.'*il".ild.' at rzs-135' 64 L Ed 2d 41' ;d0 s-Lii'iibb rMarshall. J . dissenting) \r'e ;;;.;.''";'.i"; on the application ol the Fiireenth Amendmenr lo this case'-'ii" of u.ufirl noteC that .plaintiffs-.:t3]: ,l.d", ( 2 of the Voting Rights 'Act' iv- Drai iii.',."il;J; 43 us(' s re.3 l4l^LISCS i rgtii ;;;;J nothing to their Fifieenth Amendment clatm becar.lqr' the "legislative ;j.;; ;i g! make' cle'rr that ir uas tn ili;:i ; i^' 'n eflecr n, different fr.m ;il;'; ii"'Fit,""ntr' Amendmenr ircelf " 446 il'-{.,;'d;i 6J r ea 2d 4? roo S ct 145t(t ? \\t' specifir'.rllr aftrrmed the judgment *i""'; "iit.,ri"upi,ru.'ut of the consiitutional 5J;- ";;;;..;d Li: tr." (\'urr of Appea)s " 424 iis.'r,'o'5i. a; L Ed 2d 2e6' eG s cr I08:t 8. The primar] factor: listed in Zimmer t"liri-', ;;; ;' minoritl access to the candr' dare selecrroti process unresponsiveness of Iil.,"J ufli.i"ls io minoritv interesLs' a tenu- ;ir'. .*t;';i;c* und"'t'i"g the preferenct' for Ir"riit*"ir,.t or at-large 'districting and the ;"il;;';i pasr discri'i"atron *'hich pre- cludes eflective partlclpation in the elector orr."t.'iAi fSd ar tg(li Factors uhrch en- hance tht prool ol soting dilution are the ili.;;";; oi iu'g" drstriCts' anti-single-shot .Liil.c' pt,,. i=ions and rhr' absence of an) "."-:lli.i, Ior ar'lrtrgt candtdates to run from ieograPhic subdistricrs Ibid 1019 not necessary to sho\l a discrimina- tory purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause-that proof of a discrimina- tory effect is sufficient." 446 US, at 71,64 L Ed 2d 47, 100 S Ct 1490. The plurality observed that rn,hile "the presence of the indicia relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminator.v purpose," the mere existence of those criteria is not a substitute for a finding of dis- criminatory purpose. Id., at 73, 64 L Ed 2d 47, 700 S Ct 1490. The District Court's standard in Mobile was like- u'ise flawed. Finalll', the plurality concluded that the evidence upon which the lower courts had relied was "insufficient to prove an uncon- stitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present case." Ibid, Justice Stevens rejected the intentional dis- crimination standard but concluded that the proof failed to satisfy the legal standard that in his vieu' vvas the applicable rule. He therefore concurred in the judgntent of rever- sal. Four other Justices. however, thought the evidence sufficient to satisfl' the purposeful discrimination standard. One of them, Justice Blackmun, nevertheless concurred in the Court's judgment because he be- lieved an erroneous remedy had been imposed. Because the District Court in the present case emplol'ed the eviden- tiarl' factors outlined irr Zimmer, it is urged that [458 US 62r] its judgment is infirm for the same reasons that led to the reversal in Mobile. We do not agree. First, and fundamentalll,, vue are unconvinced that the District Court in this case applied the rvrong legal standard. Not onl-r' u'as the District Court's decision rendered a consider- able time alier \4Tashington v Davis and Arlington Heights, but the trial 1020 U.S. SUPREIUE COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d judge also had the benefit of Nevett v Sides, 577 ?2d 209 (1978), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit assessed the impact of Wash- ington v Davis and Arlington Heights and held that "a shou'ing of racially motivated discrimination is a necessary element in an equal protection voting dilution claim . . . ." 571 F2d. at 219. The court stated that "[t]he ultimate issue in a case alleging unconstitutional dilu- tion of the votes of a racial group is whether the districting plan under attack exists because it was intended to diminish or dilute the political efficacy of that group." ld., at 226. The Court of Appeals also explained that although the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer were important considerations in arriving at the ul- timate conclusion of discriminator)' intent, the plaintiff is not limited to those factors. "The task before the fact finder is to determine. under all the relevant facts, in u'hose favor the 'aggregate' of the evidence pre- ponderates. This determination is peculiarl.v dependent upon the facts of each case." Id., at 224 (footnote omitted ). The District Court referred to Nevett v Sides and demonstrated its understanding of the controlling standard b1' obsen'ing that a deter- mination of discriminatorf intent is "a requisite to a finding of unconsti- tutional vote dilution" under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend- ments. App to Juris Statement 68a. Furthermore. u'hile recognizing that the evidentiary factors identified in Zimmer were to be considered, the District Court was aware that it u'as "not limited in its determination onl-r' to the Zimmer factors" but could consider other relevant factors as vi'ell. Id.. at 7Oa. The District Court then proceeded to deal with 73LEd2d re benefit of Nevett 209 (1978), where peals for the Pifth he impact of Wash- s and Arlington that "a shou'ing of i discrimination is nent in an equal g dilution claim at 219. The court ultimate issue in a :onstitutional dilu- rf a racial group is ricting plan under use it was intended ilute the political roup." ld., at 226. eals also explained evidentiary factors er were important arriving at the ul- of discriminatorv ff is not limited ; re task before the termine. under all ;, in u.hose favor the evidence pre- determination is )nt upon the facts , at 224 (fbotnote lourt referred to I demonstrated its the controlling ring that a deter- ninator-r' intent is nding of unconsti- ttion" under the rifteenth Amend- is Statemenr 68a. : recognizing that Itors identified in ,e considered. the ar^'are that it was ts determination ner factors" but r relevant factors '0a. The District ded to deal r*'ith ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613, ?3 L H 2d 1012. 102 S Ct 3272 what it considered to [458 us utl ,n" relevant oroof and concluded that the at- iarse scheme of electing commission- ersl "although racially neutral-when adopted, is being maintained for in- vidi,ous purposes." Id., at Tla That svstem 'iwhile neutral in origin has been subverted to invidious pur- Doses." Id., at 90a. For the most iart, the District Court dealt u'ith ihe evidence in terms of the factors set out in Zimmer and its Progeny' but as the Court of APPeals stated: "Judge Alaimo emPloYed the con- stitutionallY required standard . . . [and] did not treat the Zim- mer - criteria as absolute. but rather considered them onlY to the extent theY were relevant to the question of discriminatory intent'" 639 F2d, at 1376. Although a tenable argurrient can be made to the contrar), we are not inclined to disagree u'ith the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Dis- trict Court applied the proper legal standard. III A tF11l We are also unconvinced that we should disturb the District Court's finding that the at-large sys- tem in Burke CountY was being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strenglh of the black population. In White v Reges- ter, 4i2 us, at 769-770' 37 L Ed 2d 314, 93 S Ct 2332, u'e stated that we were not inclined to overturn the District Court's factual findings' "representing as thel' do a blend of hisiorl' and an intensell' local ap- praisai of the design and impact.of th" B"*". Count-v multimember dis- trict in the light of past and present \realitl, politiial and otheru'ise'" See also Columbus Board of Education v Penick, 443 US 449,468,61 L Ed 2d 666, 99 s ct 2941 (1979) (Burger, c. J., concurring in judgment). Our re- cent decision in Pullman-Standard v Su'int, 456 US 273, 72 L Ed 2d 66' 102 S Ct 1781 (1982), emphasizes the deference Federal Rule of Civil Pro- cedure 52 requires reviewing courts to give a trial court's findings of fact' "Rule 52(d broadlY requires that findings of fact not be set aside un- less t458 us 6231 clearly erroneous. It does not make excep- tions or purport to exclude certain categoriei of factual findings : 456 us, at 28i, 72 L Ed 2d 66, 102 s Ct 1781. The Court held that the issue of whether the differential im- \ pact of a seniority system resulted/ i.o* an intent to discriminate onf racial grounds "is a pure question of) fact, subject to Rule 52(a)'s clearl.v-l "rro.r"o.,--. standard." Id., at 287-288'\ 72 L Ed 2d 66, r02 S Ct 1781. The \ Su'int Court also noted that issues of I intent are commonly treated as fac- f tual matters. Id., at 288, 72 L Ed 2d 66, 102 S Ct 1781. We are of the. vieu' that the same clearly-erroneous/ standard applies to the trial court's\ finding in this case that the at-largeJ svstem in Burke CountY is being maintained for discriminatory pur- poses, as u'ell as to the court's sub- iidlurl'' findings of fact. The Court of Appeits did not hold an)' of the Disirict Court's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous. and this Court has frequentll' noted its reluctance to disturb findings of fact concurred in by tr*'o lower courts. See, e'g" Berenyi v Information Director, 385 us 630, 635. 17 L Ed 2d 656,87 S Ct 666 t196?r; BIau v Lehman. 368 US 403. 408-40s.7 L Ed 2d 403, 82 S Ct 451 (1962r; Graver Tank & Mfg Co' v Linde Co. 336 US 271, 275,93 L Ed 672, 69 S Ct 535 (1949). We agree l02l with the Court of APPeals that on the record before us, none of the factual findings are clearly errone- ous. B t12l The District Court found that blacks have alu'ays made uP a sub- stantial majority of the population in Burke County, ApP to Juris State- ment 66a, n 3, but that theY are a distinct minority of the registered voters. Id., at 71a-72a. There u'as also overwhelming evidence of bloc voting along racial lines. ld., at 72a- ?3a. Hence, although there had been black candidates, no black had ever been elected to the Burke Countl' Commission. These facts bear heav- ily on the issue of purPoseful dis- crimination. Voting along racial lines allows those eiected to ignore black interests without fear of politi- cal consequences. and u'ithout bloc voting the minoritl' candidates would not lose elections solell' be- cause of their race. Because it is sensible to expect that at least some [458 US 624] blacks would have been elected in Burke Countl', the fact that none have ever been elected is important evidence of purposeful exclusion. See White v Regester. supra, at 766, 37 L Ed 2d 314,93 S Ct 2332. t13l Under our cases, hou'ever, such facts are insufficient in them- selves to prove purposeful discrimi- nation absent other evidence such as proof that blacks have less opportu- nity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice. United Jewish Organi- zations v Care-v, 430 US 144, 167, 51 L Ed 2d 229, 97 S Ct 996 tr9i?l. White v Regester, supra. at 765-766. 37 L Ed 2d 3t4.93 S Ct 2332: Whit- comb v Chavis, 403 US, at 149-150. 29 L Ed 2d 363, 91 S Ct 1858. See also Mobile v Bolden, 446 US. at 66. L022 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d 64 L Ed 2d 47, 100 S Ct 1490 (plural- ity opinion). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals thought the supporting proof in this case tvvas sufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination. The sup- porting evidence vvas organized pri- marily around the factors which Nevett v Sides, 57i F2d 209 (CAs 1978), had deemed relevant to the issue of intentional discrimination. These factors were primariiv those suggested in Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (CA5 1973). The District Court began b1'deter- mining the impact of past discrimi- nation on the ability of blacks to participate eflectively in the political process. Past discriminatiqn !\'/as found to contribute to lou' black vot.er registration because prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks had been denied access to the political process by means such as literacy tests. poll taxes, and u'hite primaries. The result was that "Black suffrage in Burke CountY u'as virtually non-existent." App to Juris Statement 71a. Black t'oter registration in Burke CountY has increased following the Voting Rights Act to the point that some 38% of blacks eligible to vote are registered to do so. Id., at 72a. On that basis the District Court inferred that "past discrimination has had an adverse effect on black voter regis- tration which lingers to this date." Ibid. Past discrimination against blacks in education also had the same effect. Not onll' did Burke County schools discriminate against blacks as recentll' as 1969, but also some schools [458 us 625] still remain essentially segregated and blacks a-s a group have completed less formal educa- tion than u'hites. Id.. at 74a. [1a] The District Clourt found fur- 73LEd2d 1490 (plural- )istrict Court rcals thought this case was , inference of ion. The sup- rrganized pri- rctors which 2d 209 (CAs evant to the iscrimination. Lmarily those ,' McKeithen, l). gan by deter- cast discrimi- of blacks to r the political rination $'as o lou' black ruse prior to ict of 1965, access to the eans such as rs, and u'hite t u'as that urke County ent." App to Black voter Countl' has the Voting rt that some to vote are .. at 72a. On )ourt inferred rn has had an i voter regis- ;o this date." tion against rlso had the ; did Burke inate against 969. but also n essentially as a group ormal educa- 74a. Lrt found fur- 458 us 613, ?3 L Ed 2d 1012, 102 s cr 3272 therevidenceofexclusionfromtheevidencerangedfromthe.eflectsof oolitical process. puri air".i-ination past discrimination which still #;"';;;;.-t"J ur'.r'"-i;;; effec- t458 us 6261 tively participating--in Democratic ,he eountv courthour haunt Partv affairs tto ""'i'ii'uil:i;i the countv courthouse to the infre- tioni. Until this r"*'Iii--*"t nr"a' quent appointment of blacks to there had never u""""I^Lutt -"-- "ou"ty boards and committees; the ber of the County -^e."*ti"" C"-- ';;ttly discriminatory pattern of mittee of the D";;;-;i; Party' paving countv roads; the reluctance There were also property o\{'lglship of thJ county to remedy black com- requirements that ;;; it aimtt.rtl piui"tt' which forced blacks to take for blacks to serve *i;"'i;;il;; i"gti t"tion 'to obtain school and in the county. Tne[ -r'uJ u"Jn ai=- g-t"'a jury' -desegregation; and the crimination in the ,"1";;, J grand roi" prrv"i by the county commis- iurors, the hiring ;i;;;;i)' e#plov- 'iot'"i= in the incorporation of an L"r, and in the appointments to ali-rx'hite private- -school to u'hich boards and commiti6Js whict' ote'- li'"y ao"'igd' public funds for the see the county government' Id''- at f"it'*u of band uniforms' Id'' at 74a-76a. The Oi.iiict-- Coutt thus 77a-82a' conct"aea that historical discrimina- The District Court also considered tion had restricted lh",.pt.":".1-"^f tn"-a"p."rsed socioeconomic status portunity of blacks. effectively ' B?.1- oi- g"iX" County blacks. It found li"iput" in the political process' Lv)- tf,rr proportionately more . blacks ;;;'.; of historical discrimination is ;i;;; ;hii"s have intomes below the ;;i;-;;a to drawing an inference of no*ertv level. ta., ai- ggu. Nearlv purposeful discrimination' partrcu- ESS, of all black families living in [.li * cases such as this one where L".X" Cr""ly had incomes equal to lhe'"o'ide.,ce shou's that discrimina- ;r-l;;.-ti,u.,-"tf,r""-fourths of I pov- itil' ptu.tices were commonll' uti- ertv-level l.r"o-". ILid' Not only i#a,'tr,ut the.v were abandoned i'r';]"'ir".x-.' *-pr","a less formal x,E:, ilj :iffl.':i, F" "#iil, iiiii i i[: ::*:,lx *i.'""';"::1" :]' 1,.:,i; that thel' rrere replaced b1' lav's-and .""iirr,*"fy inferio, to a marked practicei q'hich. though neutral on ;;;;;i'l.i:, "i ga, Btacks rend ro if,"l. face. serve to maintain the ;;:;t-- fi..' prf than *'hites. even status quo. ioi .i*if"r *o.[. and thel' tend to be [15a] Extensive evidence was cited "rnpfov"a in menial jobs more often bv the District d;i ; support its tt,an trr,ites. Id.'. at 85a' seventy- nnaing that elected-;ffi;;^it oi Burke ;i;;;; p"' 9"11 o.{ houses occupied b1' Countl' have been '"'"'po"'i* '"a Uiutftt'Iacked all or some plumbing insensirive to the ,*"ar-6i it e black facilities: onl) 16% of $'hiteoccu' communitl'.' *'tti"ii- ittt"*"= the pi"a f'o"t"s iuffered the same defi- Iikelihood that the political pro:g:s Ii""11, 1u:t^-1[ ,?:'.ti:::, *Ir* ROGERS v LODGE hkellhooo fnal LIIe PurrLreqr l.lvvvvv -r"atira"a that the depressed socio *.. ""t equally open to blacks This c( 9. [15b] The Court of Appeals he.ld .that "oroof ol unrespons)\'eness b1 the public bod-r in ouestion to the group claiming lnJur) . ls ".'"rt""i;rl elemenl of a claim of *oting Iiiril"t una"r the Fourteenth Amendment 639 F2d, at 1375 Under our cases' however' i"n.".*n.lt"ness is an important element but o"i,: Jn" of a number of circumstances a court ;;;-rki ;;.;d"r in derermining *'hether dis' criminatorl purpose ma1 be inferred' r023 economic status of blacks results part from "the lingering effects past discrimination." Ibid. Although finding that the state policy behind the at-large electoral system in Burke County was "neu- tral in origin," the District Court concluded that the policy "has been subverted to invidious purposes." Id., at 90a. As a practical matter, main- tenance of the state statute provid- ing for at-large elections in Burke County is determined by Burke County's state representatives, for the legislature defers to their wishes on matters of purely local applica- tion. The court found that Burke County's state representatives "have retained a system u'hich has mini- mized the ability of Burke C,ountl' Blacks to participate in the political system." Ibid. [458 us 627] The trial court considered, in addi- tion, several factors u'hich this Court has indicated enhance the tendenc.r' of multimember districts to mini- mize the voting strength of' racial minorities. See Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US, at 143-744.2Sr L Ed 2d 363. 91 S Ct 1858. It found that the sheer geographic size of the countl', u hich is nearll' trvo-thirds the size ol Rhode Island, "has made it more difficult for Blacks to get to polling places or to campaign for ofIice." App to Juris Statement 91a. The court concluded. as a matter of lau'. that the size of the countl' tends tcr impair the access of' blacks to the political process. Id.. at 92a. The majoritl' vote requirement, Ga Code $ 34-1513 tSupp 1980t. was found "to submerge the u'ill of' the minoritl"' and thus "den-"- the minority's access to the s-vstem." App to Juris St.ate- ment 92a. The court also found the requirement that candidates run for specific seats, Ga Code S 34-1015 toz4 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d (1978), enhances appellees' lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political group from concentrating on a single candidate. Because Burke Countl' has no residency re- quirement, "[a]ll candidates could reside in Waynesboro, or in 'lilly- white' neighborhoods. To that ex- tent, the denial of access becomes enhanced." App to Juris Statement 93a. [16] None of the District Court's findings underlying its ultimate find- ing of intentional discrimination ap pears to us to be clearly erroneous; and as we have said, lve decline to overturn the essential finding of the District Court, agreed to by the Court of Appeals, that the at-large system in Burke CountS' has been maintained for the purpose of denl'- ing blacks equal access to the politi- cal processes in the county. As in White v Regester, 412 US, at 767, 37 L Ed 2d 314, 93 S Ct 2332, the District Court's findings u'ere "suffi- cient to sustain Iits] judgment and. on this record. rt'e have no rea- son to disturb them." IV [17, 18a, 19a] We also find no rea- son to overturn the relief ordered b1' the District Court. Neither the Dis- trict Court nor the Court of Appeals discerned an1' special circumstances that vi'ould militate [458 US 628] against utilizing single-member districts. Where constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not 'exceed' the violation if the remedy is tai- lored to cure the 'condition that ofl'ends the Constitution."' Milliken v Bradlel', 433 US 267, 282, 53 L Ed 2d 745, 97 S Ct 2749 r1977r (emphasis deleted t, quoting Mil- liken v Bradlel', 418 US 717, 738, in of 73LEd2d )es' lack of s a cohesive rncentrating e. Because esidency re- dates could or in 'lillY- fo that ex- ess becomes s Statement trict Court's ,ltimate find- mination aP )' erroneous; re decline to inding of the to by the the atJarge ty has been pose of denY- to the politi- runtl . As in lS, at 76?,37 It 2332, the s \r'ere "suffi- udgment have no rea' o find no rea- ief ordered bY ither the Dis- rrt of APPeals circumstances rl lainst utilizing Ls. Where 't a )n has been )s not 'exceed' 'emedf is t.ai- :ondition that on."' hlilliken 26i, 282, 53 )r 2i49 ,1977t quoting Mil- us 717, 73E, ROGERS v LODGE 458 us ois'"zlL Ea 2d ror2' 102 S Ct 3272 411 Ed 2d 106e' ;; ;- ", ,rr, ,jr'::tHli of the court of Ap' (1974).'0 SEPARATE OPINIONS Jus- case, the decision' Court todaY affirms their Justice Porvell' t'ith whom ti"""-n"fr*"quist joi n s' d isse n ti n g' I Whatever the wisdom of Mobile' tf,"'ii"rt'. opinion cannot be recon- "ii"J p"t=uasivel-v- u'ith that case There are some variances in the irr*"ft sociological evidence Pre- sented in the two cases But lMobile i"ia iir", this kind of evidence u'as ;;i"";;;h suct' et'idence' u;9 fgund t;'M;;tl;. did not merell fall short' il'i':i"ii'ai short['l of shou'ins that i; ;ii;;e electoral scheme was1 i;;;;;;'or operated [as a] - Pur- i;::''i,i Frl.l:t i:,T "Iii;";il,odiscriminatton -rro-r ^1 t oo S Ct 1490 (emPhasis '"lui,. **'* !\'hitcomb *: glStltr ioi'us iia. rag' 2e L Ed 2d 363' el 3"4,"1d8-(1971r' Because I believe that \{obile controls this case' I dis- sent. Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55' 91: ni""zf,"ai, -1-oq ?-t:, Lt;'rt ffi:L establishes that an :H;;';;st be.uPheld asainst c-on- iir*ii"trr attack unless maintatneo for a discriminatorl' purpose ln ir{o- fji"'*;";;;;rsed -a. finding of u"":l. ili;Ji;J vote dilution because the i#";;;;tts had relied on factors insufficient as. a. matter of law to #ryi{ ;;:,r'lu";t'; ;i rye 1]i: if,bd-,prut"litv opinion of Stewart' ;l; Ti;-Di=ttitt court and court or i;;;1. i,'1r'i' case based '1h"i,t'::- i"'gi "r unconstitut::::] fiil"'#'#- :Hil'l-itri:: i:,''n" court nou i"J= ir,"it conclusion unexceptiona- ilii"- iir-' rtlobile pluralitv also al- firmed [45t L's G2s] that the concePt'of "ilt:Il' II ,,\'as no m"i" nction' 3nd h:t9- tl3l Xi"=;1:.,;* c'"'i i'.'a ::1**":\:ili#=:;'id";ii ir'"'tut-",on"'1r; fiH' iil"* ii'';n!idil*,':1"t,^*' :wnose IIrLErrr " '""=- id 2d 4?. 100 s Id.. at 74, n 20' 64 L. --r^ l-,.rnrr 3t' ft'nbl' oi tr.,""gi' 1''" "-:Yl:', :"lll :i"iill,1ffi,il"" tl"ti"g strensth or the ;h ,j;i' ;.J-l"'-it'" question in this The Court's decision todar relie's h";;ir)-;; .h" '?11:il1"',T f:3; eral districl courts- ;ffi ";;i standards ProPounded^' b]' i'r,"t=' c"tt,-tc, determine u'hether ;'i:i;';;-r'"tins s'stems are "being ir.i.[ir"a foi the invidious P']ff;: S Ct 159h 19?0.' ^r^.) conrend thal the [19b] Appelir':: .:,':':.r";iiur,nn ur,u,,ne do-ctrine of unconst ltullor iieit'r."i'g fronr an at larse;lffti1,:t.."il does no1 applr t('flulli,:';;;";: f"r'ng previ' find no merit l" thl:::.1';i"rirt ,i.r^'i. "r"i'ouslr aft,rnred a .ludfmerr' #Jrl -of a parish tioni for the go'erntnl '-':':,;;- ryid :#1 ill t+;* ['i-*' i Cl 1063 {19;6' f02b 10. t18b] Appellant^' contend that tht Dis ,.i'.1 i"il'ii"'ra, l:l ^f T,d':il',Tr';:l: counr r int o ..fr '" 1'-"Ilil...' u''piln- io, .ui,a' allou'ed appellants t",::H;;iliheir ptan for vidrng the count\ and l""iiir"'r:"iini niq1,. nreclearance under 5c t ';;';; ;i;i 111: ": l1Lld"""1,l;,1;it #' ;'"1 I42 USCS $ 1e?3cr "':#i';i";ppeal- a,,c ixll,:?;':"."T r,iLr ;; ; r'\''- t hereror"t ;;;;;,il;;;. i' .Y 1';:!:'J Brlo*CS, Cc..39E US 144 14'' n U.S. SUPREME black population." Ante, at 622,75 L Ed 2d. at 1027. pederal courts thui are.invited to engage in deeply sub_jective inquiries into the motlvations of local offcials in structuring local governments. Inquiries of this kindnot onl-v can be ',unseemlv." .see Karst, The Costs of l\{otive-Clntered llguiry, 15 San Diego L Rev 1163, 1164 (1978); they intrude the federai cou.rts-q'ith onl.y the vaguest consti- tutional direction-into an area of intensely local and political "o.r"".r,. - Emphasizing these considerations, {qfti.S Stevens, post. at 642_6b0,7B L Ed 2d. at 1094-l03g, argues force_full.t that the Court's foirs of i.,_quiry is seriously mistaken. I agree u'jth much of u,hat he says. as I donot share his vierrr.s entirely, how- ever, I write separately. [458 US 630] A As I understand it, Justice Ste- vens' _ critique of the Court.s ap- proach rests on three principles u,ith u'hich I am in fundamental ug."u- ment. COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d Second, I agree with Justice Ste- vens that vote dilution cases of this kind are difficult if not impossible to distinguish-+speciall-r. in' their rL- medial aspect-from other actions to I9q.gl1gerumanders. See po.t. ai65M53, 73 L Ed 2d. at 1089_1041. Finall;, Justice Stevens clearlv is correct in arguing that the standard used to identilr- unlav,,ful racial Jis_ crimination in this area should be defined in terms thar are iudiciai.l manageable and rer.ieu,atle. Sel post, at 633, 642-650, 78 L Ed 2d, at 1028, 1034-1038. In the absence oi compelling reasons of' both laru anJ fact, the federal judiciarl. i. un*ur_ ranted in undertaking to restructure state political s1'srems. This is inher_ently a political area, r+.here the identification of a seeming violation does not necessarill- suggest an en_ forceable judicial ' .emed1,-o, at least none short of a sJ.stem of quo- tas, or group representation. Anf. such s],stem, of course. would b; antithetical to the principles of our democracr'. First, it is appropriate to distin_ guish betu'een "state action that in-hibjts an indir.idual's right ; ";i"and state action that aflLcts the po_ liji:gl strengrh of various g.nrp!: Mobile v Bolden. supra. at gg. Oa L Ed 2d 47, 100 S Ct tagCr rsreveni. .ll :glcuIinq in judgnrent): see posr. ar 632. 637-636. n 16. 78 L Ed 2d. ar 1027. 1031. Under this distinciio;, this case is fundamentallr. difl-;e;; from cases inr.olving direct tr*i".ito voting. There is no clainr herethat blacks ma\. not register freelr. and 'ote {br u'hom tn"-r:?f,ulr*. i;;: case also differs fronr one_man, one_ vote cases. in u'hich districting prac_ tices- nrake a person's vote ^ les-. 'r'eightf in some districts than i; others. 1026 B Justice Stevens vi.ould accontmo_ date these _principles br. holding thar suDJecttve rntent is irrelevant lo the establishment of a case of' racial votedilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. See post. at 68?. ?3 L Ed 2d. at 1031. Desprte sharing the concerns [458 US e3r] from u'hich his position is de- veloped. I u,ould nor accept this vieu,. "The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating onthe basis of race." \4,ashlngon -v Davis. 426 US 229. 2Sg. aS l"fi Za 597. 96 S Ct 2040 r19T6r. B""uu-..* iam unu'illing to abandon this cen_ 73LEd2d :h Justice Ste- n cases of this t impossible to' in their re- ther actions to See post, at r 1039-1041. ,ens clearlf is I the standard 'ful racial dis- "ea should be are judicialll- 'ie*'able. See '3 L Ed 2d, at re absence of both la'*' and rrf is unrvar- [o restructure This is inher- ., u'here the ring violation lggest an en- nedr,-or at ;stem of quo- :tation. An.r' e. r.r'ould be ciples ol' our d accommo, holding that evant to the lf racial vote Fou rteent h rt 63?. 73 L sharing the rsition is de- accept this pose of the of the Four- : prevention ninating on rshington \r 48LEd2d ,. Because I n this cen- ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613. 73 L H 2d 1012. I02 -s Cr 3272 tral principle in cases of this kind, I cannot join Justice Stevens' opinion. Nonetheless, I do agree with him that u'hat he calls "objective" factors should be the focus of inquiry in vote-dilution cases. Unlike the con- siderations on u'hich the ]o'*'er courts relied in this case and in Mobile, the factors identified b1' Jus- tice Stevens as "objective" in fact are direct, reliable, and unambigu- ous indices of discriminatory intent. If we held, as I think we should, that the district courts must place pri- ,mary reliance on these factors to establish discriminat.ory intent, w'e u'ould prevent federal-court inquir- ies into the subT'ective thought pro- cesses of local officials-at least until enough objective evidence had been presented to u'arrant discovery into subjective motivations in this com- plex, politicall-v- charged area. By prescribing such a rule '*'e u'ould hold federai courts t.o a standard that u'as judiciallv manageable. And vge would remain faithful to the cen- tral prot.ective purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. In the absence of proof of discrimi- nation by reliance on the kind of' objective factors identified b1' Justice Stevens. I u'ould hold that the fac- tors cited b1' the Court of Appeals are too attenuated as a matter of' lavu to support an inference of dis- criminaiorf intent. I vuould reverse its judgment on that basis. Justice Stevens, dissenting. Our Iegacy of racial discrimination has left its scars on Burke County, [458 US er2] Georgia.r The record in this case ampl-v supports the conclusion that the governing officials of Burke County have repeatedly denied black citizens rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend- ments to the Federal Constitution. No one could legitimately quesrion the validitl of remedial measures, u'hether legislative or judicial, de- signed to prohibit discriminatory conduct by public officials and to guarantee that black citizens are effectivel.v- afforded the rights to reg- ister and to vote. Public roads may not be paved only in areas in u'hich white citizens live;2 black citizens may not be denied employment op- portunities in county government:3 segregated schools may not be main- tained.n Nor, in m5'opinion, could there be any doubt about the constitutional- it1' of an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that u'ould require Burke Countv and other covered jurisdic- tions to abandon specific kinds of at- large voting schemes that perpetu- ate the efiects of past discrimination. "As against the reserved powers of the States. Congress may-. use an)' rational means to effectuate the con- stitutional prohibition of racial dis- criniination in voting." South Caro- lina v Katzenbach. 383 US 301. 321. 15 L Ed 2d 769, 86 S Ct 803. It l. Certain vestigr: ol discrimination-al. though ciearl.\'not the m(,st pressing prob. lems facing black cirizens todar'-are a haunt. ing remincier ol an all too recent perio<i of our Nalion's histor,r The Disr rict Clouri Ioutrd thal a segregated laundromal is operared u'ithin a feu blocks of the count.r' courthouse. at the courthoust,itselJ. faded paint over rest- room doors does not entirelv conceal the q'ord: "colored" and "uhite.'' 2. See Doudell v Cirl of Apopka. 511 F Sup1, 1375 tIllJ PIa 1961 r 3. 13 USC S 20me-2 i42 LISCS S 20ocre-21 4. Broun r Board of Education. 347 US 463. 98 L Ed t173, 74 S Cr 666. 53 Ohio Ops 326, 36 ALR2d I rU() t027 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d might indeed be wise policy to accel- erate the transition of minority g"oups to a position of political power commensurate with their vot- ing strength by amending the Act to prohibit the use of multimember dis- tricts in all covered jurisdictions. The Court's decision today, how- ever, is not based on either its own conception of sound policy or any statutory command. The decision rests entirely on the Court,s inter- pretation of the requirements of the Federal Constitution. Despite my sympathetic appraisal of the Court's laudable goals, I am unable to agree with ifs approach to the constitu- tional issue that [458 US 63it] is presented. In my opinion, this case raises questions that encompass more than the im- mediate plight of disadvantaged black citizens. I believe the Court errs by holding the structure of the local governmental unit unconstitu- tional without identifying an accept- able, judicialll, manageable standard for adjudicating cases of this kind. I The Court's entry into the busi- ness of electoral reapportionment in 1962 was preceded by a lengthy and scholarl-v debate over the ro16 the judiciary legitimately could pla1. in what Justice Frankfurter deicribed in Colegrove v Green, g2g US S4g, 90 L Ed t492, 66 S Ct 119g. as a "political thicket."5 In that case, de- cided in 1946, the Court declined to entertain a challenge to single-mem- ber congressional districts in Illinois that had been created [458 US 634] in 1901 and had become grossl-_v unequal b1. rea- son of the great grot'th in urban population.6 In dissent, Justice Black advocated the use of a statewide, at- large election of representatives; he argued that an at-large election ..has an element of virtue that the more convenient method does not have_ namely. it does not discriminate against some groups to favor others, it_ gives all the people an equally effective voice in electing theii rep- resentatives as is essential under a free government, and it is constitu- 5. In his much criticized opinion announc. ing the judggnent of the C,ourr, Justice Frank- furter r{rote: "Nothing is clearer than that this controversr. concerns matters that bring courl. inro imme- diate and active relations with part-v contest.s. From the determination of suth issues this Court has traditionall.v held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic sl,stem to involve tf," luai-ciar-t in the politics of the people And lt is not less pernicious if such judicial intenen- tion in an essentiall.v potiticat contest be dressed up in the abstract-phrases of the la,rr LOy* _oughr not to enter thi. poiiticat thicket. The remedl. for unfairnes_s in distrrct- ing is to secure State legislatures thar *.il) apportron-properl.r. or to invoke the ample powers of C,ongress The Constitution has man.\' commands that are not enforceable bv courts because the.r. clearl.r fall ourside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe ju- dicial action Thus. 'on Demand of the exeiu- 1028 trve Authoritv,' Arr I\', $ 2. of a Srat€ it is the duty of a sister State to delrver up a fugitive from justice. But the fulfilment of thi.--d,rt., cannol be judiciall.r.enf<rrced Kentuckv i, Dennison, 24 Hou 66. 16 L Ed 717. The durr. to see to .it that the lau.s are faithfullr exe. cuted-cannot be broughr under legal compul. sion. Mississippi v Johnson. 4 Wall 475, l-g L Ed 437. Violation of the great guarant-v of a republican form of government in States can- not be challenged in the courls. pacific Tele- phone Co. v Oregon, 228 US 116. 56 L Fn Bi7. 32 S Ct 224. The Constitution has left the performance of manr. duties in our govern. mental scheme to depend on the fidelitv of the executive and legislative action and. ulti. matell. on the vigilance of the people in exercising their politicai rights." 32S US. at 55L554,556.90 L Ed 14J2.66 S Ct 1198. 6. The districls ranged in population from 112,000 to 914,000 persons Id.. ar bS?. 90 L Ed 1432.66 S Ct 1198. 73LEd2d r into the busi- pportionment in ry a lengthy and er the role the y could plaf in furter described rn, 328 US 549, i Ct 1198, as a ln that case, de- lourt declined to e to single-mem- ;tricts in Illinois d i34l in 1901 and unequal b1'rea- rowth in urban rt, Justice Black a stateu'ide, at- ,resentatives: he 'ge election "has r that the more loes not have- ot discriminate to favor others, rple an equally rcting their rep- sential under a d it is constitu- l. of a State it is the leliver up a fugrtive ilment oI this dutr <lrced. Kenruckl r' L Ed 717 The dutl' , are faithfulll' exe- .rnder legal compul- n. 4 Wall 475. 18 L 4reat guarant.r' ol a ment in States can- courts Pacific Tele- is 118. 56 L Fi 377. tution has left the ties in our govern- I on the fidelitl' of ive action and. ulti- of the people in rights " 326 US, at l. 66 S Ct 1198. in population from s. Id., at 557, 90 L ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613. 73 L Ed 2d 1012. 102 S Ct 3272 tional." Id., at 574,90 L Ed 1432' 66 s ct 1198. In 1962, the Court changed course' In another challenge to the constitu- tionality of a 1901 districting stat- ute, it held that the political ques- tion doctrine did not foreclose judi- cial review. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 7 L Ed 2d 663, 82 S Ct 691. That decision represents one of the great landmarks in the historY of this Court's jurisPrudence. Two aspects of the Court's oPinion in Baker v Carr are of sPecial rele- vance to the case the Court decides today. First, the Court's scholarll' revieu- of the political question doc- trine focused on the dominant im- portance of satisfactory standards ior judicial determination.T Second' the Court's articulation [458 us 635] of the rele- vant constitutional standard made no reference to subjective intent.s The host of cases that have arisen in the u'ake of Baker v Carr have shared these tu'o characteristics. They have formulated, refined. and applied a judiciallv manageable standard that has become knou'n as the one-person, one-\'ote rule: thel' have attached no significance to the subjective intent of the decisionnlak- ers u'ho adopted or maintained the official rule under attack. In revievring the constitutionalitl' of the structure of a local go\-ern- ment. two quite different methods of analysis could be emPlol'ed. The Court might identify the specific fea- tures of the government that raise constitutional concerns and decide u'hether, singll or in combination, they are valid. This is the approach the Court has used in testing the constitutionalitl' of rules condition- ing the right to vote on PaYment of a poll tax,' imposing burdens on inde- ?. The Court staled that the "nonjusticiabil- itl of a political question is primarill' 1 lunc tion of the separation of pou'ers " 36ll US' at 2tO. i L Ed 2d 663. 82 S Ct 691. It empha' siz.ed. houeler. that ''the lack of satisfactorl crrteria for a judicral determination" \ as a don.rinant c<.rnsideration in Coleman l Miller' 30; us 433. 454-455. tt3 L Ed 1365. 59 S Ct 972. 122 ALR 695: that s'hether a lbreign relations question is justiciable turns. in part' on "rts susceptihilrn t<, judicial handlinc"; that in the presenct' of clear).r' definable crite- ria for decision "the political quesr.lon barrier falls ar,r'ar"': and that "even in private litigrr' tion uhich directlf implicates no feature of separation o{ pout'rs. lack of judicialll discor- erable standards and the drive Ior elel)' handed application nrar impe) relerence t<r the political dep3rtmenls' determrnation of darei of hostilities begrnning and ending " 369 US. at 210.211.211.7 L Ed 2d 663.82 S Cr 691. Luther v Bc,rden. ? Hos 1' 12 L Ed 531, u'as distinguished in part. because that case involved "the lack ol criteria b-v q'hich a court could derernrine nhich form of govern- ment sas republrcan": tht' Court stated that "the onll signifrcance that Luther could havt for our inrmedrate purposes is tn its holdrng that lhe (luarantr ('lrust' is nol a repositor] of judiciallr- manageable standards u'hich a court could utilize rndependentl-r in order to identifi a Stale's Iau'ful governme-nt- " 3-6!t US. at 222. 223.; L Ed 2d 663. 82 S C't 691 In concluding that tlrt' reapl'orlioltmenl ques' tion before il u'as justiciable. the Court em' phasized thai it u'oulci no1 be necessar) "to entel upon policl delernrinations lor shich judicial)1 manageable standards are Iacking'" ld.. al 22i;. ; L Ed 2d 663. El S C\ 6!rl 8. The Couri simPl1 stateg. "Judicial standarci. under the Equal Protec tion Claust are uell developed and lanriliar' and it has beer, opetr l() cou!'1s sinc'" tht' enactment oI tht- Fourreenlh Anlendnlent to derermine. if on the part tcular factt the.r' musl. that a dlscrtnltnation reflects n() pc)llc)' but simpil arbitrarr and caprtctous action'" Ibid 9. Harper r' \'irginra Board of Elecilon'. 36ll US 663. 16 L Ed 2ci 169.8(i S Cr l0?!r The Court con: lucied that ' a Statt' r'ioirites the Equa) Prolecrron ('laust' ol the Fourreenth Amendment uhener-er it makes the aflluence of the voter or paYmenl of anl fet' arl elec- loral standard Yott'r qurlification: havt no relsttart, tc, uealth nor to pul ing o: nt't plling this or anl o'.her tax " Id.. at 666. 16 L Ed 2d 169. il6 ,s Cr l0;9. "To introduct' ',r'ealth or 1029 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d pendent candidates,to denyins [458 US 636] - residents or members of the A.Xr"": Forces the right to vote,r prohibitinj crossovers in party primaries,!2 re_quiring political candidates to pav filing fees,'3 and disadvantaging ;i_ nority parties in presidentlal -elec- tions.r. In none of these cases did thevalidity of the electoral procedure turn on whether the legislators who enacted the rule subJectively in- tended to discriminate againsi mi_ nority voters. Under the approach employed by the Court in' those cases, the objective circumstances that led to a declaration that an election procedure was unconstitu- tional would invalidate a similar law wherever it might be found. . Alternatively, the Court could em_ pi-of' a subjective approach under u,hich the constitutionality of a chal- leng-ed procedure depenjs entireiy on federal judges' appraisals of thl reasons why particular Iocalities have chosen to govern themselves ina particular \r'ai'. The Constitution would simplS' protect a right to t ar"an electoral machinerl. lstablished and maintained without the influ_ ence of impermissible factors. Consti_ tutional .challenges to identical p.o- cedures in neighboring communities could produce totally different re- sults, for the subjective moth,ations ot the Iegislators vvho enacted the procedures---or at least the admissi_ ble evidence that might Ue aiscou_ ered concerning such- motivation_ could be quite different. . In. deciding the question presented rn thls case, the Court abruptly re_jects the former approach and'con_ siders only the latter. It starts from the premise that Burke Cor"tvi ,i- large [458 US 637] method of electing its five county commissioners is, on lts face, unobjectionable. The otheru,ise vaiij system is unconstitutional. however, because it makes it more aifficuti for the minority to elect commissioners and becau.se the majority that is norl rn power has maintained the system for that very reason. T*,o facto;;;; a.pparently of critical importance: (1) the intent of the majority to main- tain control; and (2) the racial char- acter of the minority.rs pa.vment of a fee a-( a measure of a voter.s qualifications is to introduc" " ."p.,.ioui- o. ir-relevanr faoor." Id.. a1 666. fO f- ea ZJiO.q. 86 S Ct 1079. In dissenr. Justice gl;"h-"oi"d: It should be pointed out al once thar theLourl s declslon is to no extent based on a findrng, rhat the Virginie, lro u. o.ritt"n o. u.applred ls belng used as a device or mecha- nlsm to den.r' Negro citizens of Virginia therlFhl to vore on account of their color.'. ]d.. ar 672, 16 L Ed 2d 169.86 S Cr rOzs.---' _ 10. Storer r.Brol,n. 4lS US 724,5g LA 2d 7.14. 9t S Ct 1274. The Court ,t"t"a if,ri l"determining the constit ut ional it-r. of "rieilli ii ; requiremenlc for independenr cunaiartlr, it"' rnevrra.ble question for judgmenr'. is .'could a reasonablv diligent independent candidare beexpected t<, satisf.r.the signature requiremeils. or u.ill it be onl.r rarely tnri -if," unaftiliared candidate u.ili'succeeJ i"- g"r,ir^ on^the batlor?" Id. at ?42. Bg L Ed iJ ti;.'i;i S_Ct 1274 See Mandet - b.uaf"t,-tS-tL;Sj?i 177: id., at tiit. ES L Ed 2d 19,:'9? S Cizc'3s r030 (Steven.. J.. dissentingr See alsc, American Iq.lt. 9f Texa-. v Whrte-. 4li US T6;. ZgS,'ig i_Ed 2d 744,94 S Cr 1296. ll. Dunn y Blumstein, 40i US 330. gt L Ed ?4^274.92 S Cr g9S; Carrington r. no.f.,. aAft US 89, l3 L Ed 2d 625. 85 S ar 7?5 _.12. Kusper v Pontikes,4f4 US 51.88 L Ed 2d 26().94 S Cr 803. 13. Lubin v Panish, 4f5 US 709, 39 L Ed 2d 702. 94 S Cr l3lb: Bullock r. Carrer, 405 USlII. 3l L H 2d 92.92 S Cr 849 14. \4'illiams v Rhodes, B9S US 25. 2t L H 2d 24. 89 S O 5, 45 Ohio Ops 2d 236 15. The Caurt's articulation of the applica- ble standard in this case is,o-""i,ui'fu, zling lt states that this ca-se is subjecr to ;,n" 1and.a! of proof generall.r. applicaUie io Egual Protection Clau-se ca"e.. " Ante, at ef i, 73 L Ed 2d, at l0l8 Bur tater in the same 73LEd2d 'ithout the influ- rle factors. Consti- to identical pro ring communities rlly different re- ctive motivations who enacted the east the admissi- might be discov- rch motivation- ent. restion presented rurt abruptly re- rproach and con- rr. It starts from rrke County's at- 6.371 rf electing its five rs is, on its face, r otherwise valid rtional, however, more difficult for :t commissioners ority that is now rined the system . T\r,o factors are .l importance: (1) rajority to main- . the racial char- See also American 15 US 767. 795. 39 L r05 us 330. 31 L Ed rington v Rash. 38(t S Cr 775. 4r4 us 51. 38 L Ed us 709. 3-e L Ed 2d 'k l Carter. 405 tl-s t &r9 393 US 23. 2t L U )ps 2d 236. rtion of the applica- r is somex'hat puz- ,se is subject to "the 'alll applicable to ases '' Ante. at 617. : later in the same ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613, 73 LA 2d fi12, 102 S Cr 32i2 I am troubled by each aspect of the Court's analysis. In my opinion, the question rvhether Burke Coun- ty's at-large system maY survive scrutiny under a purely objective analysis is not nearl-"- as easY to answer as the Court implies. Assum- ing, however, that the system is oth- er*'ise valid, I do not believe that the subjective intent of the persons vvho adopted the system in 1911, or the intent of those who have since declined to change it, can determine its constitutionality. Even if the in- tent of the political majority u'ere the controlling constitutional consid- eration, I could not agree that the onl.v* political groups that are enti- tled to protection under the Court's rule are those defined by racial char- acteristics. II At-large voting systems generally tend to maximize the political power of the majority. See ante, at 616, 73 L Ed 2d. at 1017.'6 There are, [458 L]S 6381 however, man]' types of at-large electoral schemes. Three features of Burke Countl's electoral s-vstem are note- worthy, not in m1' opinion because they shed special light on the subjec- tive intent of certain unidentified people, but rather because they make it especially difficult for a mi- nority candidate to win an election. paragraph, the Court indicates that its special requirement of a shou'ing of discriminator5' intent merel.v applies to equal protection cases "charging racial discrimination." Ibid The Court seems to impll that plaintiffs in equal protection cases charging racial discrim- ination must surmounl a special hurdle in order to prevail. \'et the Court has unequivo- calll stated that a ''racial classification. re' gardiess of purported motivation. is presump' tivelv invalid and can be upheld onll upon ar: extraordinarl justification.'' Personnel Ad- mirristrato:' of N1ass r Feene.t'. 44! US 256. 272 60 L Ed 2d 67tr. 99 S Cr 2282 16. In the vvords of Chancellor Kent. the requiremeni of districting "u'a-. recommended bl the u'isdom anC justice ol giving. as Iar a-' possible. to the local subdivisions of rhe pec" ple o{ each stale. a due influence in the chotce of representatives. s<i as nol to leave the aggregate minoritl of the people in a state. though approaching perhaps to a major)l\. to k sholl.r overpou'ered b.r the combrned ac- tion o1 the numerical majoritr', r*'ithout an.r' \'oice uhatever in the national counciis." I J. hent. C<.rmmentaries on American Lau '23(l- 231. n rc, rl2th ed 1873r See also Mobile v Bolden. 416 US 55, 105. n 3. 64 L Ed 2d 4i. 10(r S Ct 1490 tlUarshall. J.. dissentingt; Whit- comb r Chavis. 403 US 121, 156-160. 29 L Ed 2d 363. 91 s C\ 1858 The challenge to multimember or at-large districts is, of course, quite diflerent from the challenge to the value of individual votes considered in Re1'nolds v Sims. 377 US 533, 12 L Ed 2d 506. 84 S Ct 1362. An at-large s]'stem is entirel)'consistenl n'ith the one person. one-vote rule deve)oped in that case. As Justice Stes'art noted in l\lobile, in consid- ering the applicability of Re1'nolds and the ca-ses that folloqed it: "Those cases established that the Equal Pro- tection Clause Efuarantees the right of each voter [o'have his vote u'eighted equalll'*'ith those of all other citizens' 377 US, at 576 [12 L Ed 2d 506. 8i -s Cr 1362j The Court recog- nized that a voter's right to'have an equalll efrectise voice' in the election of representa- tives is impaired u'here representation is not apportioned substantialll' on a population ba- sis ln such ca-ces. the votes of persons in more populous districts carrl less weight than do those of p€rsons in smaller districts There can be. of course, no claim that the 'one person. one lote' principle ha-. been violated in this case. because the city of l\lobile is a unitarl- electoral district and the Commissibn elections are conducted at large. It is there' fore obvious that nobody's vote has been 'di- luted' in the sense in u'hich that u'ord s'as used in the Revnolds case " 446 US. at 7?-78, 64 L Ed 2d 4?. ltxr S Ct 149() tp)uralitl opinion t. See also rd.. ar 83. 64 L Ed 2d 47, 100 S Ct 1490 (Stevens. J.. concurring in judgment t. 1031 U.S SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d First, although the qualifications and the duties of the office are lden_ tical for all five commission".., "u.hr31s for a separately designated po- sition.tT [458 US 63e] Second, in order to be elected, each commissioner must ,e- ceive a majority of all votes cast in the primary and in the general elec-tion; if the leading cindidate re- ceives only a plurality, a runoff elec_tion must be held. Third, there arl no residency requirements; thus, all candidates could reside in a single, all-white neighborhoefl . rr Even if one assumes that a system of local government in which powerrs concentrated in the hands of asmall group of persons elected from the communit.v at Iarge is an accept_ able--o_r perhaps even a preferred'_ lorm of municipal government,rp it isnot rmmediately apparent that these additional [458 US 640] features that help to per- petuate the por+'er of an enirenched majority are either desirable ;; i"-gitimate.m If the only purpo"" it "r"features se.ue-pu.ilcutaitr. ;ir"; vlewed rn combination_is to assist adominant party to mainrain itrp"ilt- rcal power. thel' are no more llgiti- mate than the Tennessee distrlcts t t I I : I I7, This feature distinguishes Burke Coun_ty's atJarge electoral system from th" .;;i;;-pal commission form of g"""r";";i-;;;;;;_ ized by reformers shonl.r.'after th" ;r;;f i;"c-entur.v and knorx.n as the Galveston plan oithe Des Moines plan. See n 19. ini;;.- l8-. Other features of certain atJarge elec-toral schemes that malie ir more almcrii f".,minorit_v group to elect a l.avored ""na,arJuhen.bloc voting occurs_p.ofriUltio* .suii.icumulatjve and incompleie voting_6[-'noi invoh,ed in rhis case ' prohibiil,i. lgri".icumulative or partial r.oting are "*.1."if,rnapptlcable in electoral schemes inr.olving numbered posts I9, During it^c evolurron as a progressir.e solution to municipal prob.lems. ti" -!"_rnr.- ston ,ormat wzr-. r.ari<rusl.r knou.n as the Gal.veston plan. the Texas idea, and ti," O".Moines plan. Since Galr.eston i;.,""1;; ;;;basic organization and O". Uoin"i'p"irll.- ized the additron of relared ."f"; ;;.t;'i;;.. 1!" ,.:" ,t.rp* 9f go\.ernmenr is probabl.: -be-sr qescrloed a.s the Galveston-Des Moines planSo popular did the neu idea b".;;;';h;touns could reap adr.t,rtrsing benetirs f<rr-'be.lnt rn the l<.rrefront of municrpal tnnor.ation il.the.r used the commissrun ptan Conse;;i;. some cities boasted thar the-v had the ;_";i;;,knou'ing full r*'ell that their "h;.i;- ;;;Iittle resemblance ro Galveston's. B;i-,h;;;were certain essentials necessar.y before a citt:could claim commissjon status. nen;aminDeU'itt, an ear.l.r. histor.ian .f tf,u p-S;:,".i* molement. explained: " 'In ever.v case. hos,ever, no matter hou.much charters ma.r. difler as to minor detalls,the.r'hat'e certair: fundamental features in 1032 common. These fundamental features of com-mission charters are four: . "1. Authority and responsibjlit-r. are central- ized. "2. The number of men in whom this au-thorjt.v and this responsib;lit.r' ,."' ,"riua"i. small. "3. These fen men are elected from the citr.at large and not b_r. wards or districts. - "4. Each man is at the head of a singledepartment.' "The most radical departure the nerscheme made u.as the comtinatron of i"oi.l,ti'e and executi\.e funcrions ln on" uJrl'ii,lplan d.isregarded the federal -ra"f oi."pr.r-tion of po\ .ers. Sitting togeth".. tt " "o.rirnil-sron \^'as a..t.r'pical polic-r.. and ordinance-mak-rng council: but. separarel.r.. each.orn_ii sloner aclmrnlstered a specific department ona. da1'-toda1. basis. The original Crli=ito" charter pror.ided for a ma.r.or-prestdent plus commissioners of finance ,nd ."""nuo. *,"'t"1, u'ork*. and ser.erage. streels and public oroaerr.v. gn! fire and police Later 'co^rni!ii-o'n cities follo*eC a similar drvision "f ;;;;;;;;:bilitv " B Rice. progressir.e Ciries Th;-C"; mrsslon Uovernment Movemenl in America, 1901-1920. pp xiir_xir. rtg77r rfootno;;;i;l ted r. 20. Ir is noteu,orthl. thar these features apparentl.r' characterize man.r, governmental units in jurisdrctions that har.e bL,, ;;;;;";to the srrictures of rhe Voti"s nig|t i.illthe ,resulr of prior practices tf,ji "r.lraJjblack cltizens from the electoral p.oc.s.. S*ogeneraljr_The \joting Righrs e.r: t,nirlfif f "juoals. A Heport of the [.]nited States Commis- sion on Civil Rights SS_b0 (1981). 73LEd2d in which power ,he hands of a ns elected from 'ge is an accept- n a preferred- vernment,re it is rrent that these {01 hat help to per-'an entrenched desirable or le- I purpose these :icularly u'hen n-is to assist a rintain its polit- no more legiti- nessee districts al features of com. .sibilitl are central- in r*'hom this au- riiit.'- are vested is ected from the citl' rr districts. r head of a single ,parture the nes bination of legrsla- rs in one bod.r The al model of separa' ether. the commis- rnd ordinance-mak- e).v. each commis' rific department on original Galleston r1'or-president plus nd revenue. g'ater- L-. and public prop Later commission ivisron of responsi- e Cities: The Clom- :ment in America. i?t (footnote omit" tat these features anl governmenta) rave been sub.)ected ting RighLs Acl as ces that exc)uded clorat process See t-. Act Llnfulfilled ted Srates Commis- l98l r. ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613. ?3 L Ed 2d 1012. 102 S Ct 3272 described in Baker v Carr as "no Dolicy, but simply arbitrary and ca- tricious action." 369 tIS, at 226, i L ba za 663, 82 S Ct 691 (emPhasis in original). Unless these features are ind-ependentll' justified, they may be invaiid simply because there is no legitimate justification for their im- pa;t on minoritl'' ParticiPation in elections.2l In this case, aPPellees have not argued-PresumablY because theY asJumed that this Court's many ref- erences to the requirement of prov- ing an imProPer motive in equal protection cases are controlling in ihi. .,e* cont,ext-that the special features of Burke County's at-large sYstem have such an' t456 us *ilr"."" impact on the minority's opportunitl' to par- ticipate in the political process th.at this type of Elovernment deprives the minoritl' of equal protection of the Iau'. Nor have the appellants sou€iht to identifS' legitimate )ocal policies that might justifY the use of such rules. As a result, this record does not provide an adequate basis for determining the validit.r' of Burke County's governnlentai structure on the basis of traditional objective standards.2: If the governmental structure were itself found to lack a legitimate justification, inquiry into subjective intent r"'ould clearll' be unnecessar-v As Justice 1\Iarshall stated in his dissent in Mobile: "Whatever mal'be the merits of applving motivational anall'sis to the allocation of constitu- tionalll' gratuitous benefits. that ap- proach is completell' misplaced '*'here. as here. it is applied to the distribution of a constitutionalll pro- tected interest '' 446 US, at 121' 64L Ed 2d 4?. i00 S Ct 1490.'z" Under the 21. t'No group has a right to proporrional representaiion See I\lobile v Bolden. 446 LIS' ar 75-76. 64 L Ed 2d 4?. 1O0 S Cl 149() tp)uralitl opinionr: id ' at 122' 64 L Ed 2o 4?' foo S Ct 1490 t\larshall. J., dissenting' But in a represenlative democracl. meantngfui particrpatron bl minoritl' groups in the elec- iora) proces: is essential to ensure that repre- seniatlve bodies are responsive to the entire electorste. For this reason. a challenged elec- toral procedure ma] no1 be jusrified solell' on the giound thal it serves to reduce the abilitl of a minoritl group to participate eflectrvell' in the electoral Process 22. The record nevertheless dtrs indicate that the validit.v of the at-large s.r'stem it.sell need not be decided in this ca-se For it is apparent that elimination of the majoritr runofl requirentent and the numbered post-s u'ould enabie a wellorganized minorin to elecl ont'or tu'o candidates to the Countr' Board That consequence could be achieved u'ithout replacing the at'large s'r's!en: itself u'ith five single-member disrricts. ln otht'r u'ords. minorill access to the polltical prtress could be eflected b-r' invalidaling specific' rult'' that impede thal access and without changing the basrc struclure ol the local golernmental unit. See l\lobile v Bolden. supra. a! ttO. 64 L Ed 2d 4?. lo(i S Cl l49t) (Blackmun. J.' con- curring in result; 23. Ir is uorth repearing tht' slatemenl of Prolessor Ei1' nored bl Justice l\Iarshal): "'l'hr' danset" I see ts the someuhat diflerent one thar rhe (lourt. in its neu.-found enthusi- asm for motilatiot: anail'sts. u'ill seek to ex' oort it to fields u he:. it has no busrnes' It ihe:'ei'ore cirnnoi l,t enrphasized too strongl.r that analr'-sis of morivatron is appropriate onlv t<, claims of improper discrimination in thedistribution o{ good. that are constitution- alll graruitous rlhlr: is. benefit: to rrhich peo- ol" oi,' nor entitleo as 3 nratler of substantive constrtuti,,nai righr' ln such case' Ihe covert emplovnrent oi a principle of selecrion thal could not constitu'.lotralll bt' emplol'eci overtll is equall.r' unconstitutional Hc'uever' uhere t hai is cienieci .l.' -sonl('t.hln! to shii']; the complainani lra.' a -substan t ive' cc'nstitutional rlghi--either bec:use it is granted b-r - the terms of tht-Clonstitution, or because it is esst,ntial 1() the eflectrve functi<-rning ol a dem- (rcratlc goverltn)enl-lhe rer.sons 11 g'3's de- nied are' irrelevant It ma.r' become important in courl what justllications c<-runsel f<ir the state can articulatt in support ol it: denial or n()r'-Dr()\'isi()n. bu: th*' reasons that acrualll ,nspi.ed rhe dental n('\er can T<, ha'e a right to iomelhrng is t<, have a clainl on it irrespec- rive of uhl it is denieci lt uould bt'a traged.r' 1033 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d [458 US 642] Court's analysis, however, the char_ acteristics of the particular form ofgovernment under attack are virtu_ ally irrelevant. Not only would the Court's approach uphoid an ".Ui-trary-but not invidious_system that lacked independent jusiinca- tion, it would invalidate_if a dis_ criminatory intent were proved_a local rule that would be' pe.iecttu acceptable absent a showing of invi- dious intent. The Court's "rt."a"ri applies not only to Burke Countv and to multimember districts. but tL an-l' other form of government as well. III . Ever- since I joined the Court, Ihave been concerned about the Court's emphasis on subjecti"" ln- tent as a criterion for conltitutional adjudication.u Although ttat crite- rion is often [458 LrS 643] - regarded as a restraint on the exercise of judicial power, it ma.r' in fact provide judgei rx,ith a tool for exercising power that other_ u'rse u'ould be confined to the legis)a_ ture.25 M1 principal concern witir the suoJectlve-lntent standard. hou.ever. is unrelated to the quantum of power it confers upon the judiciary. It is based on the qualit): of tfrii power. For in the long run constitu- tional adjudication that is p.emisld on- a case-by-case appraisal of the subjective intent of- iocal decision- makers cannot possibly satisly the requirement of impartiil administra- tion of the law that is embodied in the Equal protection Clause "i1h;Fourteenth Amendment. The facts of this case illustrate the ephemeral character of a constifu_ tional standard that focuse. or, ,ub-jective intent. When the sult rnlas filed in 1926, approximatelv 5g nei lent of the population of gu.ke Uounty was black and approximatelv 42 percent u'as white. tieiause Ulacii citizens had been denied ,.."r. io the political process-through -"..rithat have since been outlawed bv the Voting Right-s Act of f 965_and because there had been insufficieni time to enable the registration oi black voters to overcome the history. 9f pasl injustice. the majoritl, of reg- istered voters in the iorniy *"-r1 u'hite. The at-large electoral 'system therefore sened, as a result of tl" presence of bloc voting. to maintain of the firsr order u'ere the Court to expand itsburgeoning a\{.areness of tf,e .ete*an;i;i;;; tivation int<, the thoroughl,r. -i.t"t "n "oiionthat a denial of a constirirtiinul .igf,r ao". noi count a-q such unless ir was inteniional.,, EI.r.,The. Centralit-r. and Limits of ltoti"at,un Analvsis. 1i San Diego L Rev il55. n6Gll;;tty,6r remphasrs in originalr (footnotes omir- ted r. - !a. ln \l'ashingron r. Davis, 426 US Z2g, 4gL Ed 2d 59i,96 S Cr zono, I wrote: . "Freque-ntl1' the most probative evidence ofrnten.t u'ill be objectir.e er.idence of what actu.ail\. happened rather than evidence describ-ing the subjective stale of mind of th;;;;;;For normalll. the actor is presumed to haveintended the natural consequences of his 1034 deeds. This is particularl_v true in the ca-se ofgovernmental action n.hich is frequentlr. theproduct of compromise. of collectirlu a".l.io"_ making. and of mixed motivation tt i. uni"ui- istic. on the one hand. to require the r.ictim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intenr of the decisionm.k;. o;-;;;- versel;,, to invalidate othern.ise legitimaiea;- tion simpl.v because an impropei-;;i;; ;i-fected the deliberation of u parircipr"i-'i" ti"dncisional process. A larr. conscripiing clericsshould nor be invalidated U".uu.! ,ri ";;;i;;1ot$ {or it." Id., at 2S8,48 L Ed 2d sgt,96-S Ct 2040 {concurring opinionr. -.25. See Miller, If ',The Der.il Himself Knou,sNot the Mind of luan." Hou. p""iiUfi.-C"" Judges Knou the Motir.atio. ,f-f.sl.i;,;;i, 15 San Diego L Rer.lt6i. ft70 (1978r 73LEd2d Le quantum of 'n the judiciary. qualitl' of that 1g run constitu- hat is premised ppraisal of the local decision- bly satisfy the tial administra- is embodied in Clause of the rnt. ;e illustrate the of a constitu- locuses on sub- the suit u-as matelv 58 per- .ion of Burke approximately Because black nied access to through means r outlawed b1' I of 196$-and en insuficient registration of me the historl' :ajorit-1' of reg- COuntl' P'gpu 3ctoral s)'stem result of the 1. to maintain 'ue in the case of is frequentl.r. the ollective decision- rtion. It is unreal. uire the victim oi rcover the actual ionmaker or. con- ise legitimate ac. troper motive af- ranicipant in the nscripting clerics cause an atheist ,il2d597,96S I Himself Knor,r's ru Possibl_r' Can of l,egislators?, 0 (1978) ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613.73 L Ed 2d 1012. 102 S Cr 32?2 white control of the local govern- ment. Whether it would have contin- ued to do so would have depended on a mix of at least three different factors-the continuing increase in voter registration among blacks, the continuing exodus of black residents from the county, and the extent to u'hich racial bloc voting continued to dominate local politics. If those elected officials in control of the political machiner.y had formed the judgment that these fac- tors created a likelihood that a bloc of black voters u'as about to achieve sufficient strength to elect an en- tirell ne'6' administration, thel' [458 US 644] might have decided to abandon the at-large system and substitute five single-member districts with the boundary lines drau'n to provide a vvhite majority in three districts and a black majority in onl-v* two. Llnder the Court's intent standard, such a change presumably would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It is ironic that the remedy ordered b1' the District Court fits that pattern precisell'.5 If votes continue to be cast on a racial basis. the judicial remed.r' vir- tualll' guarantees that u'hites u'ill continue to control a majoritl- of seats on the Countl' Board. It is at least possible that u'hite control of the political machinery has been fro zen b-v judicial decree at a time when increased black voter registra- tion might have led to a complete change of administration. Since the federal judge's intent \^,as unques- tionably benign rather than invidi- ous-and, unlike that of state offi- cials, is presumablv not subject in any event to the Court's standard- that result has been accomplished without violating the Federal Consti- tution. In the future. it is not inconceiva- ble that the u'hite officials u'ho are Iikely to remain in pou'er under the District Court's plan u'ill desire to perpetuate that system and to con- tinue to control a majority of seats on the County Board. Under this Court's standard, if some of those officials harbor such an intent for an "invidious" reason. the District Court's plan u'ill itself become un- constitutional. It is not clear whether the invidious intent u'ould have to be shared by all three u'hite [458 US 645] commissioners, b5' merell' a majorit-"- of tvyo, or b1' simpll' one if he u'ere influential. It is not clear u'hether the issue would be affected b1' the intent of the tu'o black commission- ers, r*'ho might fear that a return to an at-large system u'ould undermine the certaintl of t\4.o black seats.2r Of 26. The follou'ing table shou's a breakdou'n of the population oi rhe disrricts in the plan selected bl the Districr Court as to race and voting age: Blacl \{ hrrr votrng Agr \:otrng Agr lorrng As, Drstrrct Popuialru, Populatror, r.l ,l,opulalroi i I 2.(ur 1.48: r?l 4, 55{. 1:: 6 2 !.0:|i, 1.40r t6ir.3 6?: i3{,;, 3 2.1 15 9;f 146.:.1 1.13: isiJ r. 4 2.112 911 t446' l.l?5 (55{ 5 2.ll; t():i (:16.? 1.41.1 ,tiit F See todge v Buxton, 639 F2d 1356. 1361. n 4 (CAs 19811 27. In Wright v Rockefeller. 376 US 52, I I L Ed 2d 512. 84 S Ct 603, a group of minorit-r voters in Neu York Citl challenged a district, ing scheme that placed most minorit.r' \'oters in one of four districts Thel soughr "a more even distribution of minorirl groups amon6 the four congressional districts." Id,, ar 56. l1 L Ed 2d 512. 84 S Ct 603 Congressman Adam Clar-ton Poq'ell intervened in the la*'suit and argued strenuousl.r' "that the kind of drstricts for lvhich appellants contended would be un. desirable and, because based on race or place of origin, rx'ould themselves be unconstitu- tronal." Ibid. 1035 U.S. SLIPREME course, if the subjective intent ol these officials were such as to man- date a change to a governmental structure that would permit black voters to elect an all-black commis- sion-and if black voters did so- those black officials could not harbor an intent to maintain the system to keep u'hites from returning to power. In sum. as long as racial consciousness exists in Burke Count.y, its governmental structure is subject to attack. Perhaps those more familiar than I u'ith political maneuvering u'ill be able to identifl' u'ith greater accuracy and reliabilitl' those subjective intentions that are legitimate and those that are not. Because judges ma1' not possess such expertise, however. I am afraid the COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d Court is planting seeds that ma]' produce an unexpected harvest. The costs and the doubts associ- ated u'ith litigating questions of mo- tive, u,hich are often significant in routine trials. u'ill be especialll'so in cases involving the "motives" of leg- islative bodies.2. Often there will be no evidence that the governmental [458 US 646] system w,as adopted for a discrimina- tory reason.n The reform movement in municipal government, see n 19, supra, or an attempt to comply with the strictures of Re-ynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 12 L Ed 2d 506. 84 S Ct 1362, ma)' account for the enact- ment of [458 US 647] countless at-large systems. 28. Professor Karst has strongll criticized motivational anal-vsis on the ground that it is inadequate to protect black citizens from un- constitutional conduct: "[E]ven though the proof u.ill center on the effects of u'hat oftcials have done. the ulti- mate issue u'ill be posed in terms of the goodness or the evil of the officials' hearts. Clourts have long regarded such inquiries as unseeml.r'. a-s the legislative investigation cases of the 1950's attest. The princrpal con, cern here is noi that tender judicial sensrtrr.i. ties ma.r be bruised. bur thar a judge's reluc. tance to challenge the purjr.r' oi orher oflicrals' motives mal cause her to fail to re(.ognizr, valid claims of raciai discrimination er.en s'hen the motives for gor.ernmenta) action are highll suspect. Because an individual's behar.- ior results from the interaction of a mulritude of motives, and because racial attitudes often operate at the margin ol consciousness. in anr given ca-se there almost certainll rrill bt, an opportunit.\' for a governmenlal official to ar- gue that his actior'; uas prompred b.r. raciall.r neutral considerations When that argumeni is made. should r,r'e not expecl the judgc r<r give the oflicial the benefir of the moral doubr? l{'hen the governmental action is the product of a grurup decision. u'ill not thar tendenc-v tousrj g.r..osit.\' be heiAhtenedr" Karst. The Costs of Motive{,entered Inquir.t. 15 San Diego L Rev 1163. 1164-1165 (1976) (footnote omitted r. To re.ject an examinatior, into subjectivr, in. tent is not lo rule that the reasons for legisla- 1036 tive action are irreler.ant. "In m.v opinion, customar,\' indicia of legislative int.ent provide an adequate basis for ascertaining the pur- pose that a lau' is intended to achieve. The formal proceedings of the legislature and its committees. the eflect of the mea-sure as evi- denced b; its text, the historical setting in which it u'as enacted. and the public acts and deeds of its sponsors and opponents. provide appropriate evidence of legislative purpose.'' Cou-.ins l Crtl- Councii of Chicag<-:. 466 F2d 83(i.656 rCAT 1972' (Srevens. J.. dissenting,. If a challenged lau drsadlantages minoritr. citi- zens and i1s justifications-as er.idenced bv cust()marI indrcia 0f legrslatrve inlenl-are insuftcient to persuade a neutral observer that the lau ua-s enacted lbr legitimate. non- discriminatorl' reasons. it is, in mr. opinion. invalid. 29. As the Court of Appeals noted: "The general elecrion lau's in man.r' jurisdictions u ere originalll adopted ar a time \,\'hen Blacks had not receiveld.l their franchise No one disputes that such lans u'ere not adopted to achieve an end, the exclusion of Black voting. that $'as the status quo C)ther states' election iar.r's. though adopted shortl,v after the enactment of the Fifreenth Amendment. are so old that q'hatever evidence of discrimi- natorv inrent ma1' have existed. has long since disappeared. This case falls u'ithin thal categor\. The focus then becomes the exis- tence of a discriminatort purpose for the maintenance of such a s.vsten) " 639 F2d. at 1363. n 7 73LEd2d eeds that ma]' ,d harvest. doubts associ- luestions of mo- r significant in especially so in motives" of leg- n there r,r'ill be r governmental r6l cr a discrimina- brm movement nent, see n 19. to compll' u'ith vnolds v Sims. 2d 506, 84 S Ct for the enact- t7) t-large systems. . "In m.r' opinion. rtive intent provide 'ertaining the pur' e<i to achieve. The legislature and its he measure as evi' islorical settinS in the public acts and opponents. providr- :gislative purlrcse " Chicago. 466 F2d rs. J.. drssenting, Ii tages minorrt.r' citi- -a-. evidenced br slatise intent-are r neutral observer ibr legitimate. non- is. in ml opinior',. >peals noted: "The man.r jurisdrctions al a time when their franchist' Ncr s were nol adopled rxclusion of Black quo. Other states' ,pted shortl.v after ienth .Amendment. ''idence of discrimi- existed. has long ;e falls *'ithin that becomes the exis- ' purpose for the ;tenr." 639 F2d. at ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613, 73 L Ed 2d 1012, 102 S Ct 3272 In such a case the question becomes whether the sYstem \\'as maintained for a discriminatory purpose. Whose intentions control? Obviously not the voters, although theY maY be most responsible for the attitudes and ac- tions of local government.so Assum- ing that it is the intentions of the "sfate actors" that is critical, hou' u'ill their mental processes be dis- covered? Must a specific proposal for change be defeated? What if differ- ent motives are held b-v different legislators or, indeed, bY a single official? Is a selfish desire to sta-v- in office sufficient to justifl' a failure to change a governmental sYstem? The Court avoids these Problems by failing to answer the very ques- ti,on that its standard asks. Presum- ably, according to the Court's analy- sis, the Burke Countl' governmental structure is utrconstitutional because it u'as maintained at some point for an invidious purpose. Yet the Court scarcell' identifies the manner in u'hich changes to a county govern- mental structure are made. There is no reference to any unsuccessful at- tempt to replace the at-large s)'stem r+'ith single-member districts. It is incongruous that subjective intent is identified as the constitutional stan- dard and yet the Persons who alleg- edll' harbored an improper inten-t ..e ne.'et identified or mentioned' Undoubtedlv, the evidence relied on b;- the Court proves that racial prej- uiice has played an imPortant role in the history of Burke Countl' and has motivated manl' u'rongful acts by various communit.t' leaders. But unless that evidence is suficient to prove that er?r:r' governmental ac- iion was motivated by a racial ani- mus-and may be remedied b-"- a federal court-the Court has failed under its ovvn test to demonstrate that the governmental structure of Burke Countl'' '*'as maintained for a discriminator)' purPose. Certainly governmental action should not be influenced b-v irrele- vant considerations. I am not con- vinced, hou'ever. [458 us 648] that the Constitu- tion aflords a right-and this is the onlr' right the Court finds applicable in ttrii case-to have every official decision made without the influence of considerations that are in some u,ay "discriminatory." Is the failure of a state legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment invalid if a federal judge concludes that a ma- joritl' of the legislators harbored stereotypical vieu's of the proper role of u'omen in societY? Is the estab- Iishment of a memorial for Jews slaughtered in World War Il uncon- stitutional if civic leaders believe that their cause is more meritorious than that of victimized Palestinian refugees? Is the failure to adoPt a state holidal for Martin Luther King. Jr.. invalid if it is proved that state legislators beUeved that he does not deserve to be commemcF rated? Is the refusal to provide Med- icaid funding for abortions unconsti- tutional if offrcials intend to discrim- inate against \r'omen u'ho would abort a fetus?3' 30. Apart from the lach of "state action"' the ver! purpose of the secret ballot is to protecl the individual's right- to cast a vote r,r'ithout explaining to an-vone for u'hom. or for what reason. the vote is cast. 31. A stereot-vpical reaction to particular characteristics of a disfavored group cannot justifl' discriminator.\' legislation. ft1: ":-B-.-Matheu's v Lucas, 427 US 495. 520-521. 49 L Ed 2d 65f. 96 S Cr 2?55 tStevens. J.. dissent- ingr lt is nevertheless important to remember that the Frrst Amendment protects an indi- vidual's right to entertain unsound and unpo- pular beliefs-including stereotl'pical beliefs about classe. of persons-and to expound those beliefs publicll. There ts a vast differ' ence betu'et'n rejecting an irrational belief a-" a justification for discriminatorl legislation rm7 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73LEd2d A rule that would invalidate all governmental action motivated by racial, ethnic, or political considera- tions is too broad. Moreover, in m1, opinion the Court is incorrect in assuming that the intent of elected officials is invidious when they are motivated by a desire to retain con- trol of the local political machinery. For such an intent is surely charac- teristic [458 US 649] of politicians throughout the country. In implementing that sort of purpose, dominant majorities have used a r,r'ide variety of tech- niques to limit the political strength of aggressive minorities. In this case the minority is defined by racial characteristics, but minority groups seeking an effective political voice can, of course, be identified in manv other ways. The Hasidic Jeu's in Kings County, N. Y.,t, the Puerto Ricans in Chicago,s the Spanish- speaking citizens in Dallas.s the Bo- hemians in Cedar Rapids,s the Fed- eralists in Massachusetts,s the Dem- ocrats in Indiana,r and the Republi- cans in California$ have all been disadvantaged bv deliberate political maneuvers by the dominant major_ ity. As I have stated. a device that serves no purpose other than to ex- clude minoritl' groups from effective political participation is unlau,ful under objective standards. But if a political majorit_r.'s intent to main- tain control of a legitimate local government is sufficient to invali- date any electoral device that makes it more difficult for a minority group to elect candidates-regardless of the nature of the interest that gives the minoritl' group cohesion-the Court is not just entering a "political thicket"; it is entering a vast u'on- derland of judicial revie'x' of potitical activity. The obvious response to this sug- gestion is that this case involves a racial group and that governmental decisions that disadvantage such a group must be subject to special scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore must [458 US 650] sider whether the Court's fr"fjlJ, can legitimatel.y be confined to polit- ical groups that are identified by racial characteristics. and concluding thal neutral legislation is in- valid because it u.as motivaled b1. an irra- tional belief. Fresh air and open discussion are better cures for r.icious prejudice than are secrec.v and dissembling. No matter how firm11' I might disagree with a legislator's motivation in casting a biased vote. I not onll' must respecr his right to form his ou.n opin- ions. cf. }'oung r. American Mini Theatres. Inc . 42? US 5(). 63. 49 L A 2d 310. 96 S Ct 244C) {opinion ol Srevens. J.r, but also *.ould prefer a candid explanation of those opinions to a litigation-oriented silence. 32. Se€ United Je\r'ish Organization v Carel', 430 US 144, 5l L Ed ?.d 229.97 S Cr 996 33. See Cousins r Citv C,ouncil of Chicago. 466 F2d 83(l rCAT 1972r. cer.t denied. 409 L)S 893. 34 LEA 2d 151, 93 S Ct 65 34. See White v Regester. 4f2 US 7SS. g7 L Ed 2d 314. 93 S Ct 2332. 35. Se€ Rice. supra. n 19, at 78. 36. The term "gerrJ-mander" arose from an election district-that took the shape of a salamander-formed in Massachusetts br. Governor Elbridge Gerr.r.'s Jeffersonian or Democratic-Republican Partr.. The phrase *'as coined b1' Gerr-v's opponents. the FederalisLs 37. See 39 Congressional Quarterlr' ?56 (1981 t 38. See id.. at 941. I038 ,RTS 73LEd2d l9-7-2r. cen denred. 409 US .93 S Cr 85 :egester. 412 US 7Si. 3; L33: r. n 19. ar 78. r-vmander" arose from anar took the shape of ain Massachuserts bv Gerr.r"s Jeffersorrian oi ln Part.r-. The phra-se n.a: )onents. the Federalists 'essional euarterl.r. ?56 ROGERS v LODGE 458 US 613, 73 L Ed 2d 1012. 102 S Ct 3272b.v the dominant major. ve stated, a device tirat lrpose other than to ex- t-\' groups from eflective'trcipation is unlar+,ful lve standards. But if aorit.\''s intent to main_ - of' a legitimate IocaIrs suffcient to invali_ toral device that makes ,r,r. lol a minorit.\.group r€lrdates-regardless of. the interest that gives group cohesion_the rst entering a ..political . entering a vast !\,on- lclal revie\4. of political . response to this sug_t this case involves a nd. that governmental drsadvantage such a)e subject to special e_r the Fourteenth therefore must r8 us 650l con_the Court's holding i' be confined to polit_at are identified br.'istics. IV Governmental action that discrim- inates between individuals on the basis of their race is, at the ver.1, least, presumptively irrational.3e For an individual's race is virtualll, al- u'ays irrelevant to his right to enjoy the benefits and to share the respon- sibilities of citizenship in a demo- cratic society'. Persons of different races, like persons of different reli- gious faiths and different political beliefs, are equal in the eyes of the Iau'. Groups of ever1, character ma]. associate together to achieve legiti- mate common goals. If thel' r,olunta- rily identify' themselves by a com- mon interest in a specific issue, by a common ethnic heritage, by a com- mon religious beliel or b;' their race, that characteristic assumes sig- nificance as the bond that gives the group cohesion and political strenglh. When referring to different kinds of political groups, this Court has consistentlf indicated that, to borrolt Justice Brennan's phrasing. the Equal Protection Clause does not make some groups of citizens more equal than others. See Zobel v Wil- liams. 457 US 55. 71. 72 L Ed 2d 672. 102 S Ct 2309 tBrennan. J., concurring). Thus. the Court has considered challenges to discrimina- tion based on "differences of color, race, nativitl', religious opinions [or]political affiliations," American Sugar Refining Co. v Louisiana, 129 us 89, 92, 45 L Ed 102, 21 S Ct 43: to redistricting plans that serve "to further racial or economic discrimi- nation," \4/hitcomb v Chavis, 403 US L24. 149,29 L Ed 2d 363, 91 S Ct 1858; to biases "tending to favor particular political interests or geo- graphic areas." Abate v Mundt, 408 us 182. 187, 29 L Ed 2d 399, 91 S Ct 1904. Indeed, in its [458 US 65r] opinion today the Court recognizes that the practical impact of the electoral system at issue applies equally to any "distinct minority, n'hether it be a racial. ethnic, economic, or political group." Ante, at 616, 73 L Ed 2d , at 1012. A constitutional standard that gave special protection to political group-c identified b1' racial character- istics would be inconsistent u'ith the basic tenet of the Equal Protection Clause. Those groups are no more or less able to pursue their interests in the political arena than are groups defined by other characteristics. Nor can it be said that racial alliances are so unrelated to political action that any electoral decision that is influenced by racial consciousness- as opposed to other forms of political consciousness-is inherentll. irra- tional. For it is the verl' political power of a racial or ethnic group that creates a danger that an en- trenched majority u'ill take action contrar-r' to the group's political in- terests. "The mere fact that a num- ber of citizens share a common eth- nic, racial. or religious background does not create the need for protec- tion against gerrymandering. It is onlv u,hen their common interests are strong enough to be manifest.ed in political action that the need arises. Thus the characteristic of the group which creates the need for protection is its political character." Cousins v Cit-v Council of Chicago. 39. Since I do not understand the Court's opinion to rel.r' on an affirmative.action ratio. nale, I put that entire subjecr to one side If that u'ere the rationale for the Court's hold- ing. hou'ever. there r,r.ould be no need to in- quire into subjective int€nt. 1039 U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73 LEd 2d 466 F2d 830, 852 ICAT 1972r lste_ vens, J., dissenting). It w,ould be un- realistic to distinguish racial groups from other political groups on the ground that race is an irrelevant factor in the political process. Racial consciousness and racial as- sociation are not desirable features of our political system. We all look forward to the da1, when race is an irrelevant factor in the political pro- cess. In my opinion, however, that goal will best be achieved by elimi- nating the vestiges of discrimination that motivate disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups to vote as identifi- able units. Whenever identifiable groups irj our societl. are disadvan- taged, they u,ill share common polit- ical interests and tend to vote as a "bloc." In this respect, racial groups are [458 LlS 652] like other political groups. A permanent constitutional rule that treated them differently. would. in m-y opinion, itself tend to perpetuate race as a feature distinct from all others; a trait that makes persons different in the e1'es of the law. Such a rule ir',ould dela1,-rather than ad- vance-the goai advocated bv Justice Douglas: "When racial or religious lines are drau'n b1' the State. the mul- tiracial, multireligious communi- ties that our Consritution seeks to u,eld together as one become sepa- ratist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issue-" are generated; com- munities seek not the best repre- sentative but the best racial or religious partisan. Since that sys- tem i-c at vi'ar q'ith the democratic ideal. it should find no footing here." Wright v Rockefeller. 876 r040 us 52, 67, l1 L Ed 2d 512, 84 S Cr 603 (dissenting opinion ). My conviction that all minoritv groups are equally entitled to consti- tutional protection against the mis- use of the majority's political pox,er does not mean that I would abandon judicial revieu' of such action. As I have u'ritten before, a gerrymander as grotesque as the boundaries con- demned in Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 5 L Ed 2d 110, 81 S Ct 125, is intolerable whether it fences out black voters, Republican voters, or Irish-Catholic voters. Mobile v Bolden, 446 US, ar 86, 64 L Ed 2d 47. 100 S Ct 1490 topinion concur- ring in judgment). But if the stan- dard the Court applies today extends to all types of minoritl, groups, it is either so broad that virtually every political device is vulnerable or it is so undefined that federal judges can pick and choose almost at u'ill among those that u,ill be upheld and those that u'ill be condemned. There are valid reasons for con- cluding that certain minority groups -such as the black voters in Burke Countl', Georgia-should be given special protection from political op- pression b-r' the dominant majoritl,. But those are reasons that justifl' the application of a legislative policl' choice rather than a constitutional principle that cannot be confined to special [458 US 653] circumstances or to a t.empo- rarl' period in our histor.v. An1. sug- gestion that political groups in u'hich black leadership predominates are in need of a permanent constitu- tional shield against the tactics of their political opponents underesti- mat.es the resourcefulness. the wis- dom, and the demonstrated capacit-v tI I .t J,! { t l ,, 1 : t II I t D D 73LEd2d I 2d 512,84 S Ct nion ). at all minority ntitled to consti- rgainst the mis- ; political power i would abandon rch action. As I a gerrymander boundaries con- )n v Lightfoot, 2d 110, 81 S Ct hether it fences publican voters, rters. Mobile v 86, 64 L Ed 2d opinion concur- ]ut if the stan- rs today extends 'ity groups, it is virtualll everl' lnerable or it is leral judges can rlmost at u'ill I be upheld and rdemned. easons for con- minoritv groups voters in Burke rould be given rm political op- ,inant majority. rns that justif.r, egislative policl' r constitutional be confined to r3l s or to a t,empo- stor.'*. An1' sug- :al groups in p predominates ranent constitu- the tactics of ents underesti- rlness, the u'is- ;trated capacit-y ROGERS v 458 us 613, 73 L Ed 2d LODGE 1012, 102 S Ct 3272 I respectfulll' dissent.of such Court's leaders. I cannot accePt the constitutional holding.ao 40. The Court does not address the statu- t^ru ouestion r,r'hether the at'large system "i.iut"1 $ 2 of the \/oting Rights Act of 1965 Neither ih" Di.t.ict Court nor the Courl ol Appeals considered this issue Since appellees ha"" been granted full relief by the Court' I express no opinion on their statutory claims' D o l04l