Memorandum in Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari RE Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist. v. Hon. J. Roth
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1973
10 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, Milliken Working Files. Memorandum in Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari RE Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist. v. Hon. J. Roth, 1973. fdd9e087-54e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/dc8df1d8-1a27-4aa0-8ee7-a92a5ac086eb/memorandum-in-opposition-to-petitions-for-writs-of-certiorari-re-bloomfield-hills-sch-dist-v-hon-j-roth. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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October Term, 1972
In the
No. 72-747
B loomfield H ills School D istrict,
Petitioners,
vs.
T he H onorable Stephen J. B o th .
No. 72-748
W est B loomfield School D istrict of
Oakland Co u n ty , M ichigan , et al.,
Petitioners,
T he H onorable Stephen J. B o th .
No. 72-817
School D istrict of T he City of B irm in gh am ,
Oakland County , M ichigan ,
Petitioner,
vs.
T he H onorable Stephen J. B o th .
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI
J ack Greenberg
N orman J. Ch ach k in
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
P aul B. D imond
906 Bose Avenue
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
E. W lN TH ER McCROOM
3245 Woodburn Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio 45207
L ouis B. L ucas
W illiam E. Caldwell
525 Commerce Title Bldg.
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
N athaniel B . J ones
1790 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
L ucille W atts
3246 Cadillac Towers
Detroit, Michigan
M arian W right E delman
J. H arold F lannery
B obert P ressman
61 Kirkland Street
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Attorneys for Respondents
Ronald Bradley, et al.,
Plaintiffs Below
1st the
(Erwrt nf % lutfrin States
October T erm, 1972
No. 72-747
Bloomfield H ills S chool District,
Petitioners,
vs.
T he H onorable Stephen J. R oth.
No. 72-748
W est Bloomfield S chool District of
Oakland County, M ichigan, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
T he H onorable Stephen J. R oth.
No. 72-817
School District of T he City of B irmingham,
Oakland County, Michigan,
Petitioner,
vs.
T he H onorable Stephen J. R oth.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI
These Petitions for Writs of Certiorari are collateral to
the lawsuit commenced in 1970 to desegregate the public
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schools of the Detroit, Michigan area, Bradley v. Milliken.
That matter was last before this Court this past Term on
the Petition of the State officials who are defendants in the
case seeking review (which was denied) of the dismissal
of an interlocutory appeal by the Sixth Circuit. 468 F.2d
902, cert, denied, 93 S.Ct. 45 (1972).
Petitioners are all corporate entities, school districts
which were created by and function pursuant to the au
thority of the State of Michigan, and each of which is
located within Oakland County, Michigan—the county which
abuts the City of Detroit to its northwest. Each of the
Petitioners elected in early 1972 not to intervene before
the District Court, at the time when some 40 similarly
situated school districts sought and were granted the right
to intervene in the Bradley v. Milliken proceedings since
the District Court was considering possible forms of relief
which might affect them as agents of the State of Michigan
for educational purposes. Each of the Petitioners instead
waited until after the District Court issued an order,
defining the area surrounding and including the City of
Detroit within which a desegregation plan was to be de
veloped, and then Petitioners sought Writs of Prohibition
or Mandamus from the Court of Appeals to halt proceed
ings in the District Court. In each instance, the Petitions
for Mandamus or Prohibition were denied without prej
udice to their right to seek intervention in the District
Court.
Even then Petitioners did not avail themselves of the
opportunity either to enter the case at the District Court
level or to intervene in the Court of Appeals, which con
sidered the merits of the District Court’s order defining
a “desegregation area” in an appeal argued August 24,
1972 pursuant to an Order expediting proceedings. Instead,
each of the Petitioners sought rehearing or rehearing
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en banc of the orders denying the extraordinary writs, and
then filed with this Court the Petitions for review which
are presently under consideration.
Since the filing* of the Petitions, the Court of Appeals
issued a ruling on December 8, 1972 in which it vacated the
District Court’s order defining a desegregation area and
remanded for additional remedy hearings, holding that
school districts (such as Petitioners), who would be af
fected by such a desegregation order, are necessary par
ties to proceedings in the District Court prior to the entry
of such an order.* On January 16, 1973, however, the
Court of Appeals issued an Order setting the matter down
for rehearing en banc on February 8, 1973, with the effect
of vacating the opinion of the panel.**
The Petitioners raise three basic issues, each of which
is intimately bound up with the proceedings in the main
appeals now pending before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upon rehearing en banc, and
each of which ought not be considered by this Court prior
to disposition by the full Court of Appeals.
Petitioners claim, first, that the District Court should
not have proceeded to enter a decree which affects the
operation of their schools if they were not parties to the
proceedings before the Court. Putting to one side the
facts that Petitioners chose not to avail themselves of the
opportunity for intervention which was seized by many
of their sister districts and that Petitioners are each sub
sidiary agents of the State of Michigan (which was rep
resented before the District Court), the claim is an in
* The December 8, 1972 opinion of the panel was reprinted as an
appendix to the “ Supplemental Brief in Support of Petitions for
Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit” in Nos. 72-549, 72-550.
** Rule 3(b), United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
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appropriate one for review at this juncture. The panel
of the Court of Appeals ruled on December 8, 1972—even
though Petitioners disdained to participate in the appeals
before the Court—that Petitioners were indeed necessary
parties before the District Court. It is entirely possible
that the full Court upon rehearing will reaffirm this ele
ment of the decision since, so far as these Respondents
are presently aware, none of the parties opposes the
participation of Petitioners in the remand hearings before
the District Court which had been ordered by the panel.
Thus, should that ruling the upheld en banc, the question
whether the Petitions for Mandamus or Prohibition were
properly denied will be rendered moot.*
Petitioners also complain that the District Court acted
improperly when it determined to include their school
districts in the “desegregation area” without specific find
ings that Petitioners had engaged in “ de jure” segregation
practices. This matter is one which perhaps might be
viewed as lending support to Petitioners’ claims that
mandamus or prohibition should have issued, but it is
intimately concerned in the present proceedings before the
Court of Appeals and ought not to be reviewed at this
stage. The panel’s opinion at page 68 held:
In fashioning an equitable remedy in this case, it will
not be necessary for the District Court to find dis
criminatory conduct on the part of each school district,
either de jure or de facto, as a prerequisite to including
such district in a desegregation area to be defined by
the Court’s decree.
We are, of course, unable to predict whether this language
will be adopted, modified, or rejected by the full Court,
but certainly this Court’s consideration of so important
* Of course, should the panel’s opinion be reversed by the full
Court on the question of metropolitan desegregation relief, these
Petitions will also thereby be mooted.
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an issue will be materially aided by its intervening litiga
tion before the Court of Appeals. Cf. Brown Shoe Com
pany v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (Clark J., con
curring).
Finally, two of Petitioners argue that the order of the
District Court defining a desegregation area was one which
could have been issued only by a statutory three judge
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281. This issue is likewise
before the Court of Appeals in its consideration of the
main case, and this Court would be better served by deny
ing review of these Petitions and postponing its considera
tion for a later stage following the ruling of the entire
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
For these reasons, Respondents Bradley, et al., respect
fully submit that the Petitions are premature, constitute
attempts to secure piecemeal review, and should be denied
so as to afford the Court of Appeals an opportunity to
rule upon the substantive questions common both to these
Petitions and to the matters now pending before it upon
rehearing en banc.
Respectfully submitted,
J ack Greenberg
N orman J . Ch ac h k in
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
P aul R. D imond
906 Rose Avenue
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
E . W lN TH E R McCROOM
3245 Woodburn Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio 45207
Louis R. L ucas
W illiam E. Caldw ell
525 Commerce Title Bldg.
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
N athaniel R. J ones
1790 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
L ucille W atts
3246 Cadillac Towers
Detroit, Michigan
M arian W right E delman
J. H arold F lannery
R obert P ressman
61 Kirkland Street
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Attorneys for Respondents
Ronald Bradley, et al.,
Plaintiffs Below