Correspondence from Winner to Suitts; from Guinier to Williams; from Horton to Hunter from Hunter to Reynolds; Cavanagh v. Brock Motion to Process as Amicus Curiae; Memo in Support of Motion as Amicus Curiae; Correspondence from Reynolds to Brock

    CHAMBERS.

JULIUS LEVONNE CHAMBERS
JAMES E. FERGUSON. II
MELVIN L. WATI'
JONATHAN WALLAS
KARL ADKINS

JAMES C. FULLER. JR.
YVONNE MIMS EVANS
JOHN W GRESHAM
RONALD L. GIBSON
GILDA F. GLAZER
LESLIE J. WINNER
JOHN T. NOCKLEBY‘

‘ 0F D C BAR ONLY

Mr. Steve Suitts

FERGUSON. WATT. WALLAS, ADKINS 8: FULLER, P.A

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SUITE 730 EAST INDEPENDENCE PLAZA

951 SOUTH INDEPENDENCE BOULEVARD

CHARLOTTE. NORTH CAROLINA 28202
TELEPHONE (704) 375-846]

August 12, 1982

Southern Regional Council
75 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Steve:

Re: Gingles v. Edmisten

 

The name of the professor of North Carolina History with whom
I have been communicating is Harry Watson. His office phone
number is 919/962—5436. His home phone number is 919/933-7050.
His address is Department of History, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514.

As I said at our meeting, Harry has indicated that he is

still very interested in the action and he does have some back—
ground knowledge. He is willing to participate but is not
willing to do any original research which he does not have time
for in the next several months. He is willing to meet with
whatever group gets together to decide how to proceed. I am
writing him today to tell him to expect to hear from you.

We did agree on a March 1 discovery deadline with an additional
agreement that we would be ready to go to trial April 1. I am
beginning to go to work on the racial bloc voting analysis, will
start working on written discovery, will amend and supplement
the complaint, and will object to the republicans' class certi—
fication of the class of black voters. If there is anything
else that you think that I have agreed to do right now, please
let me know. That is all that my notes reflect.

Onward and forward -

Sincere y,

   

Leslie J. Winner

LJW:d b . _
cc:' Mr. Napoleon Williams & Ms. Lani Guinier

Memo /rom

LaniGuhfier

July 14, 1982

To: Napoleon Williamsv/
Jim Nabrit

RE: Gingles V. Edmisten

 

We are meeting here in the Large
Conference Room about the North
Carolina voting case, with Leslie,
Julius, Steve Suitts, and Bernie
Grofman (a racial bloc voting and
multi—member district expert) on
August 5 at 9:30 P.M.

Please let me know by July 21 if
you cannot attend.

C“
{4)
\
*3

WHITING, HORTON AND HENDRICK
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
WINSTON—SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA 27IOI

 

PHILIP B.WHITING
HAMILTON C.HORTON,JR. 450 NCNB PLAZA
T. PAUL HENDRICK

TELEPHONE
AREA 9I9-723-I826

 

EDWARD v. onIAN August 13, 1982

Robert N. Hunter, Jr., Esq.

Post Office Box 3245

201 West Market Street
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402

Re: Redistricting Cases

Dear Bob:

At Leslie Winner's request I am enclosing the
original and four copies of a proposed Discovery
Stipulation for your execution. The original and
three of the copies should be returned to Leslie
Winner so that she might file them. The other
copy is for your files.

It was good seeing you Monday.

Sincerely,

WHITING, HORTON AND HENDRICK

I I 6/ .
L 1“ I ,, .l V 2K.

..\

Hamilton C. Horton, Jr?~
HCer:pjk
Enclosures

cc: James Wallace, Jr., Esq.
Jerris Leonard, Esq.
Wayne Elliott, Esq.
Jack Greenberg, Esq.
Leslie Winner, Esq.

HUNTER. HODGMAN. GREENE 8c GOODMAN REGE—EyE—Dj

ATTORNEYS AT LAM' JUN - 9
SUITE 410 m

GATE CITY SAVINGS 6: LOAN BUILDING

201 WEST MARKET STREET Wfi
GREENSBORO. NORTH CAROLINA 27402-3245
ROBERT N. HUNTER. .JR. P. O. Box 3245
ROBERT SA\\'YER HODOMAx (919) 373—0934
RICHARD M. GREENE (919) 275-1341

GARY B. GOODMAN

June 8, 1982

J. Bradford Reynolds

Assistant Attorney General _.
Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division

Washington, D.C.

RE: Pugh vs. Hunt, No. 81 E. 1066 Civ. 5
Eastern District, N.C.

Dear Mr. Reynolds:

I represent the plaintiffs in a Voting Rights Act suit which
has been brought against the State of North Carolina for intentional
racial discrimination in apportioning certain multimember districts
in the State of North Carolina. The Department of Justice earlier
this year interposed objections to reapportionment plans in the
State of North Carolina in 40 "Section 5" counties where concentration
of minority members have been submerged into larger multimember
districts. However, in the remaining sixty counties of North Carolina
not covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the North Carolina
legislature redistricted the state in such a way that concentration
of minority voters in four areas have been submerged into large
multimember districts. These areas are Forsyth, Wake, Mecklenburg
and Durham counties.

Our suit has been brought by four Republican plaintiffs who are
very concerned about the adverse effects of this redistricting on both
political and racial minorities. We have previously provided a lot of
information and data regarding this matter to the staff of the Voting
Rights Section in preparing responses to the State of North Carolina's
plans.

I am requesting that the Department of Justice intervene in the
suit as an amicus curia to be of assistance in proving our case of
intentional voter discrimination. I fear without such assistance and
material help in terms Of legal time, expert witnesses and financial
ability to conduct depositions that we will be unable to fully and
adequately litigate this matter. Our request is of an urgent nature.
The voting rights of many minority racial and political elements of
North Carolina will be adversely effected should our cause not be
sustained in the court. For the next ten (10) years large segments
of North Carolina's voting population will be effectively unable to
exercise their franchise. Although I have not asked them to write

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH DIVISION '

JOHN J. CAVANAGH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
MOTION TO PROCEED AS

V. AMICUS CURIAE

 

ALEX K. BROCK, et al.,

Defendants.

Ralph Gingles, Sippio Burton, Fred Belfield and
Joseph Moody, on behalf of themselves and all other black
citizens of North Carolina who are registered to vote move
for leave to proceed as amicus curiae in filing a memorandum
in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to remand this action to
the Superior Court of Wake County.

The movants are the certified class of plaintiffs in

the action of Gingles v. Edmisten, 81-803—Civ-5, currently

 

pending in this Court.
In support of this motion, movants submit the Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Proceed as Amicus Curiae and in
Opposition to Motion to Remand filed concurrently herewith.
Attorney for the movants has discussed this motion
with counsel for the plaintiffs and with counsel to the
defendants and has been informed that neither objects to
the participation of the Gingles plaintiffs in the consideration
of plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand.

this 28th day of June, 1982.

m Mm

J.LEEVONNE CHAMBERS

LESLIE J. WINNER

Chambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas,
Adkins & Fuller, P.A.

Suite 730 East Independence Plaza

951 South Independence Boulevard

Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

704/375-8461

 

 

JACK GREENBERG 'MV

NAPOLEON WILLIAMS

LANI GUINIER

NAACP Legal Defense Fund

Suite 2030, 10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Plaintiffs in
Gingles v. Edmisten

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH DIVISION

JOHN J. CAVANAGH, et al.,
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO PROCEED AS AMICUS
CURIAE AND IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TOREMAND

V.

 

ALEX K. BROCK, et al.,

Defendants.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

 

This action challenges the apportionment of the North
Carolina General Assembly on the ground that the apportionment
fails to comply with Article II §3(3) and §5(3) of the North
Carolina Constitution. These provisions prohibit the division
of any county in creating representative districts for the
North Carolina House ofRepresentativesand the North Carolina
Senate. The action was filed in the Superior Court of Wake
County seeking to prohibit defendants, various state officials,
from conducting an election pursuant to the challenged appor—
tionment. Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §1443(2), and plaintiffs have moved to remand
the action to State Court.

Ralph Gingles, Sippio Burton, Joseph Moody and Fred
Belfield, on behalf of themselves and all other black citizens
of North Carolina who are registered to vote, move for leave
to proceed as amicus curiae and to file a Memorandum in Opposi—

tion to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

II. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO PROCEED AS AMICUS CURIAE

 

The movants have been certified as the class of plaintiffs

in Gingles, et al. v. Edmisten, et al., Civil Action Number

 

81—803-Civ—5, currently pending in the Eastern District of

North Carolina. That action, in part, challenges Article II,

§3(3) and §5(3) of the North Carolina Constitution as
violating §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
51973, 42 U.S.C. §l981 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Complaint
alleges that the challenged portions of the North Carolina
Constitution have the purpose and effect of denying black
citizens the right to use their vote effectively because

of their race.

In addition, gigglgg challenges the specific apportion—
ments enacted because of their result of dilution of minority
voting strength. The Gigglgg plaintiffs request that the
Court require North Carolina to apportion the legislature
in a manner which fairly reflects minority voting strength,
and plaintiffs contend that the State's refusal to divide
counties necessarily prevents them from having an apportion-
ment without a discriminatory result.

The determination of the question raised in Cavanagh v.
REESE, that is, the enforcability of Articles II §3(3) and
§5(3), of the North Carolina Constitution, will inevitably
have an impact on the determination of the claims raised

in Gingles v. Edmisten. The Gingles plaintiffs, therefore,

 

have an interest in litigation at hand. They request to
file this memorandum in order to urge the Court to allow
the important civil rights question raised in Cavanagh to
be considered in by federal court and to allow these inter—

twiningquestionsin the Cavanagh, Gingles, and Pugh cases

 

to be determined by a single court, the federal court in

which they are already pending.

III. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO REMAND

 

Defendants in Cavanagh base their motion to remand on
28 U.S.C. §l443(2) which provides:

Any of the following civil actions or crimi-
nal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may
be removed by the defendant to the district court
of the United States for the district anddivision
embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(2) For any act under color of authority
derived from any law providing for equal rights,
or for refusing to do any act on the ground thgg
it would be inconsistent with such law.(Emphasis addedJ

-2-

Under this section removal is proper when a state court
action challenges the refusal of state officials to comply
with a state law or requirement and the refusal is on the
grounds that compliance would violate federal law which
protects equal rights.

This action is exactly such an action. Whatever its
form, the heart of the complaint in Cavanagh is a challenge
to the refusal of the State of North Carolina and its officials
to comply with Article II §3(3) and §5(3) of the North Carolina
Constitution in enacting the 1981 apportionment of the North
Carolina General Assembly. There is no dispute that the
State did, indeed, refuse or fail to comply with these provi—
sions in dividing Forsyth and several other counties. Thus,
the only real question presented by the litigation is whether
that failure was justified in order to comply with federal
statutes and constitutional provisions and, therefore, was
required by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti—
tution, Article VI, §2.

This is the very kind of situation for which §l443(2)
refusal removal was intended. As explained in Bridgeport

Education Association v. Zinner, 415 F.Supp. 715, 718 (D. Conn.

 

1978), when the predecessor of §l443 was enacted, Representa—
tive Wilson proposed an amendment to cover refusals to act in
addition to actions under Federal authority. He explained

his amendment by saying, "[TJhis amendment is intended to
enable State officers, who shall refuse to enforce State laws
discriminating... on account of race or color, to remove

their cases to the United States courts when prosecuted for
refusing to enforce those laws.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst

Sess. at 1367, as quoted in Bridgeport Ed. Ass'n v. Zinner,

 

supra .

The statute has been applied to allow removal of cases

in e.g., White v. Wellington, 627 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1980);

 

Bridgeport Ed. Ass'n v. Zinner, supra; and O'Keefe v. New York

 

 

City Bd.of Elections, 246 F.Supp. 978 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).

 

In White v. Wellington, supra officials of the City

 

of New Haven refused to comply with various provisions of
the state civil service laws becausetheyalleged that to
do so would be in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, prohibiting racial discrimination in employment.
This action to enforce the state civil service laws was held
to be properly removed under the refusal clause 28 U.S.C.

§l443(2). Bridgeport Ed. Ass'n V. Zinner, supra, had essentially

 

similar facts.

In O'Keefe v. New York City Bd. of Elections, supra, City
elections officials requed to enforce the New York State
literacy test because they alleged that it violated the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. The Court held that the citizens' action
to require enforcement of the literacy test was properly removed
under the refusal clause of 28 U.S.C. §l443(2).

Each of these cases is parallel in all important aspects
to the case at hand in which state officials have refused
to comply with provisions of the North Carolina Constitution
which violate the Voting Rights Act and other federalrequirements.

There is no dispute that defendants in Cavanagh v. Brock

 

are state officials. They are designated as such in the
Complaint, Part II. As state officials they are entitled
to invoke the refusal to act portion of §l443(2). See, in

addition to White, supra, Zinner, supra, and O'Keefe, supra,

 

West Virginia Bar v. Bostic, 351 F.Supp. 1118 (S.D. W.Va.l972);

 

Burns v. Board of School Commissioners, 302 F.Supp. 309 (S.D.
Ind. 1969), aff'd 437 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1971).
In this respect, Massachusetts Council of Construction

Employees v. White, 495 F.Supp. 220 (D.Mass. 1980), is not

 

to the contrary. The Court ordered a remand under §l443(2)
of an action against State officials who were held not to
be acting under federal authority under the “[F]or any act
under color of authority" clause of §l443(2). There was

no discussion of their right as State officials to invoke the

"for refusing to do any act" clause of §l443(2). Rather the
Court held that it was an action and not a refusal to act
which was challenged and that use of the latter clause was
not appropriate. lS- at 222.

Similarly, Folts v. City of Richmond, 480 F.Supp. 621

 

(E.D. Va. 1979) is not contrary on this point. The defen—
dant officials of the City of Richmond were held not to be
acting under Federal authority under the "for any act" clause.
The "refusal to act” removal was rejected, not because defen-
dants were not the proper persons to invoke it, but because
defendants did not predicate the removal on a federal law
providing for equal rights. Id; at 626.

Since defendants are state officials, and since the
complaint challenges the refusal or failure to comply with
the State Constitution, the only question is whether that
refusal is arguably justifiable by the inconsistence of the
state law with a federal law providing for equal rights.

At this stage the defendants only have to show a colorable
conflict between the state and federal laws and do not have
to establish that they are likely to prevail on the merits.

See White v. Wellington, 627 F.2d at 586—587; Bridgeport Ed.

 

Ass'n v. Zinner, 415 F.Supp. at 722—723. This is logical since
the only inquiry now is which court should ultimately determine
the merits, and requiring a showing of likelihood of prevailing
would require the federal court to predetermine the merits
of the equal rights defense.

In this case, defendants say that their failure to comply
with the North Carolina Consititution was necessary in order
to comply with §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and, in
particular, the requirement of the Attorney General of the
United States that Guilford County be apportioned in a way
that fairly reflects the voting strength of the black citizens
of that county. The affidavits oflbssrs.Ha1e and Long tend

to establish that it was necessary to divideadjacent

Forsyth County, a county not covered by §5, in order to
apportion Guilford County, in a manner that does comply
with 55.

At this point defendants do not have to show that
they will prevail on their defense of the necessary conflict
between the North Carolina Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act. They merely have to raise a colorable conflict between
state and federal law. This they have done.

In addition to §5 of the Voting Rights Act there are,
however, several other federal equal rights statutes and
constitutional provisions which are necessarily in conflict
with Article II §3(3) and §5(3) of the North Carolina Consti~
tution: §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,

42 U.S.C. §1973, 42 U.S.C. §l981 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Whether the
division of non—§5 covered counties in the apportionment

of the North Carolina General Assembly is required by these
provisions is the essential question raised in Gingles v.
Edmisten; it is a question appropriately raised in a federal
court and already pending in this court. The question is not
frivolous. As the United States Department of Justice found

in its objection to these provisions under §5, "[T]he use

of such multi—member districts necessarily submerges cognizable
minority population concentrations into larger white electorates.
In the context of the racial bloc voting that seems to exists,
such a phenomena operates and would continue to operate 'to

minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial...elements

I

FOrtson\L Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439 (1965)." See letter of William Bradford Reynolds dated

of the voting population.

30 November 1981, attached.

This reasoning applies as well to the 60 counties not
covered by §5 as it does to the 40 counties which are covered.
There is clearly a colorable claim that compliance with these

North Carolina Constitutional provisions outside the §5 covered

counties is in conflict with federal statutes and constitutional
provisions which prohibit racial discrimination and apportionment
of representative districts.

The federal court has jurisdiction to answer this question,
and a state's refusal to comply with a state law contrary
to these federal equal rights provisions justifies removal
under 28 U.S.C. §l443(2).

In addition, 28 U.S.C. §l443(2) refers to federal laws
"providing for equal rights.” This contrasts to 28 U.S.C.
§l443(l) which speaks of laws providing for "equal civil

rights.‘ Assuming that this difference is for a purpose,

then §l443(2) should not be limited to federal laws prohibiting
1/
racial discrimination as is §l443(1). — But cf. Appalachian

Volunteers v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying

 

the Supreme Court interpretation of §l443(1) to §l443(2)
but only with regard to the "act under color of authority”
phrase.)

If conflicts with other federal equal rights provisions
justify removal under §l443(2), then there is further reason
to deny the motion to remand. There is ample evidence in
the transcripts of the North Carolina House and Senate Redis—
tricting Committees to support the conclusion that the state
refused to follow the North Carolina Constitution prohibition
against dividing counties in areas not covered by §5 in part
because of the one person-one vote requirement of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and in part because to apply that State
Constitutional provision to some parts of the state and not
to others was itself perceived to be a violation of the equal
protection clause. See, e.g. Dunston v. Scott, 336 F.Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972).

Since the equal protection clause is obviously a ”law

I!

providing for equal rights, the state's refusal to follow

the state constitutional provisions in order to avoid a conflict
with the equal protection clause also justifies removal under

28 U.S.C. §l443(2).

_1/ Note that each citation that addresses this question
on p. 4 of defendants' Brief in Opposition to Remand considers
the question only for 28 U.S.C. §l443(1).

 

-7-

' CONCLUSION

At the heart of Cavanagh v. Brock is a series of federal

 

statutory and constitutional questions. Because of the pendency

of Gingles v. Edmisten and Pugh v. Hunt, this court already

 

has before it the question of whether the division of counties
in apportioning the General Assembly is permissible or required
under the Voting Rights Act and the United States Constitution.
If the judgment of this Court were inconsistnet with the
judgment of the state court in Cavanagh v. Brock, the defendant
state officials would be subjected to mutually exclusive
mandates. There can be only one apportionment of the North
Carolina General Assembly. Whether the one enacted is legal
and enforceable is, at this time, essentially a series of
questions of federal law. These questions should be answered
by a single federal court. The motion to remand should be
denied.

This .;Z§:_ day of June, 1982.

fluid cum
. eVONNEfigHAMBERS
I

LESLIE J. NNER

Chambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas,
Adkins & Fuller, P.A.

Suite 730 East Independence Plaza
951 South Independence Boulevard
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202
704-375-8461

r46£iv Haa
J C GREENBERG I
NA LEON WILLIAMS
LANI GUINIER
NAACP Legal Defense Fund
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

 

(JVJ

Attorneys for Plaintiffs in
Gingles v. Edmisten

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing

Motion to Proceed as Amicus Curiae and Memorandum in Support

of Motion to Proceed as Amicus Curiae and in Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand upon all other counsel by placing

a copy of the same in the United

prepaid, addressed to:

Mr. Robert N. Hunter, Jr.
Attorney at Law

Post Office Box 3245

201 West Market Street
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402

Mr. James Wallas, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General for
Legal Affairs

N.C. Department of Justice

Post Office Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Mr. Jerris Leonard

Jerris Leonard & Assoc, PC
900 17th Street, NW

Suite 1020

,Washington, DC 20006

This 31? day of June, 1982.

States Post Office, postage

Mr. Arthur J. Donaldson
Burke, Donaldson, Holshouser
& Kenerly
309 North Main Street
Salisbury, North Carolina 28144

Mr. Wayne T. Elliot

Southeastern Legal Foundation
1800 Century Boulevard, Suite 950
Atlanta, Georgia 30345

Mr. Hamilton C. Horton, Jr.
Whiting, Horton & Hendrick

450 NCNB Plaza

Winston—Salem, North Carolina 27101

LeElie J. Winner

U.S. Department of Justice

 

 

(_ Civil Rights DiviC I
Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530
3 0 NOV 1981

Mr. Alex Brock

Executive Secretary - Director
State Board of Elections

Suite 801, Raleigh Building

5 West Hargett Street

Raleigh, North Carolina 27601

Dear Mr. Brock:

This is in reference to the 1968 amendment (H.B. No. 471
(1967)), which provides that no county shall be divided in the
formation of a Senate or Representative district and which was
recently submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973c.
Your submission was completed on October 1, 1981.

We have made a careful review of the information that you
have provided, the events surrounding the enactment of the change,
the application of the amendment in past legislative reapportion—
ments, and comments and information provided by other interested
parties. On the basis of that analysis, we are unable to conclude
that this amendment, prohibiting the division of counties in
reapportionments, does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect.

Our analysis shows that the prohibition against dividing
the 40 covered counties in the formation of Senate and House
districts predictably requires, and has led to the use of, large
multi-member districts. Our analysis shows further that the use
of such multi-member districts necessarily submerges cognizable
minority population concentrations into larger white electorates.
In the context of the racial bloc voting that seems to exist, such
a phenomenon operates and would continue to operate "to minimize
or cancel out that voting strength of racial . . . elements of the
voting population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).

.9, C _2_ (.

This determination with respect to the jurisdictions
cOvered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act should in no
way be regarded as precluding the State from following a
policy of preserving county lines whenever feasible in
formulating its new districts. Indeed, this is the policy in

.many states, subject only to the preclearance requirements of
Section 5, where applicable. In the present submission,
however, we are evaluating a legal requirement that every
county must be included in the plan as an undivided whole.

As noted above, the inescapable effect of such a requirement
is to submerge sizeable black communities in large multi—
member districts.

Under these circumstances, and guided by the standards
established in cases such as Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130 (1976), we are unable to conclude that the 1968 amendment
requiring nondivision of counties in legislative redistricting
does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect.
Accordingly, on behalf of the Attorney General, I must
interpose an Objection to that amendment insofar as it affects
the covered counties.

Of course, as provided by Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, you have the right to seek a declaratory judgment
from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia that this Change has neither the purpose nor will
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race, color or membership in a language minority
group. In addition, the Procedures for the Administration of
Section 5 (Section 51.44, 46 Fed. Reg. 878) permit you to
request the Attorney General to reconsider the Objection.
However, until the objection is withdrawn or the judgment
from the District of Columbia is obtained, the effect of the
objection by the Attorney General is to make the 1968 amendment
legally unenforceable.

If you have any questions concerning this matter,
please feel free to call Carl W. Gable (202-724—7439), Director
of the Section 5 Unit of the Voting Section.

Sincerely,

    

Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division